RP/415/2025 of M/S. ASHOK RUBBER FACTORY Vs RESERVE BANK OF INDIA on 3 April 2025

ORDER

This review petition has been filed seeking a review of the judgment of this Court in W.P(C) No.39257 of 2024. The primary contention raised is that the review petitioners/writ petitioners were not a party to the judgment of the Division Bench in P.K Krishnakumar v. IndusInd Bank; 2024 SCC OnLine Ker 6888 and are therefore not bound by the findings rendered therein. It is also contended that the fact that the review petitioners/writ petitioners had conducted previous litigations before this Court without raising the plea that it was entitled to the benefit of the notification issued under the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 is no ground to deny the benefit of the notification. It is also contended that since the review petitioners/writ petitioners had sought various declaratory reliefs this Court ought not to have dismissed the Writ Petition without issuing notice to all the parties.

2. A reading of the judgment of this Court in W.P(C) No.39257 of 2024 will indicate that this Court had taken the view that all points raised were covered against the petitioners by the Division Bench judgment in P.K Krishnakumar (supra). As already noticed, the review petitioners/writ petitioners proceed on the basis that since they were not a party to the judgment in P.K Krishnakumar (supra), they are not bound by the declaration of law in that judgment. This contention cannot be accepted. Where the question of law raised or the issues raised are identical and the Court sees no fact or point of law requiring the Court to take a view that the earlier decision was rendered per incuriam, the Court is bound by precedent. This principle is too well settled in our jurisprudence. In Mamleshwar Prasad v. Kanhaiya Lal; (1975) 2 SCC 232 it was held:- “7. Certainty of the law, consistency of rulings and comity of courts — all flowering from the same principle — converge to the conclusion that a decision once rendered must later bind like cases. We do not intend to detract from the rule that, in exceptional instances, where by obvious inadvertence or oversight a judgment fails to notice a plain statutory provision or obligatory authority running counter to the reasoning and result reached, it may not have the sway of binding precedents. It should be a glaring case, an obtrusive omission. No such situation presents itself here and we do not embark on the principle of judgment per incuriam.

8. Finally it remains to be noticed that a prior decision of this Court on identical facts and law binds the Court on the same points in a later case. Here we have a decision admittedly rendered on facts and law, indistinguishably identical, and that ruling must bind.”

3. A review does not authorise the re-hearing of a case. In Northern India Caterers (India) Ltd. v. Lt. Governor of Delhi; (1980) 2 SCC 167 it was held:- “8. It is well-settled that a party is not entitled to seek a review of a judgment delivered by this Court merely for the purpose of a rehearing and a fresh decision of the case. The normal principle is that a judgment pronounced by the Court is final, and departure from that principle is justified only when circumstances of a substantial and compelling character make it necessary to do so [Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan; AIR 1965 SC 845]. For instance, if the attention of the Court is not drawn to a material statutory provision during the original hearing, the Court will review its judgment [G.L. Gupta v. D.N. Mehta; (1971) 3 SCC 189]. The Court may also reopen its judgment if a manifest wrong has been done and it is necessary to pass an order to do full and effective justice [O.N. Mohindroo v. Distt. Judge, Delhi, (1971) 3 SCC 5]. ………….” Considering the aforesaid principles, the review petitioners have clearly not demonstrated any ground for exercising review jurisdiction. The Review Petition will stand dismissed. Sd/- GOPINATH P. JUDGE acd