ANKUR ARORA vs PUNJAB AND SIND BANK on 14 October 2026

ORDER

I.A. No.1235/2026 (application for condonation of delay)

1. 1. The instant application is filed for seeking condonation of delay in filing the present Misc. Appeal bearing no.281/2026 as per the Section 20(3) of the RDB Act, 1993 read with Section 18(2) of the SARFAESI Act. It is contended that the appellant has preferred the present appeal to impugn the order dated 17.12.2025 (hereinafter referred to as '**the impugned order**') passed by DRT-I, Delhi (hereinafter referred to as '**DRT**').

2. 2. The appellant preferred a review application bearing T.S.A No.997/2022 by filing the I.A. No.2958/2025 titled as **Ankur Arora V Punjab & Sind Bank and others** before DRT seeking review of the impugned order. DRT issued notice of the application bearing I.A. No.2958/2025 to the respondents vide order dated 07.01.2026 and the said application is still pending for adjudication and was listed for 04.08.2026. The appellants were *bona fide* awaiting the adjudication of the review application but to safeguard the rights by way of abundant caution has preferred the present appeal. There was delay in filing the present appeal which was neither deliberate nor intentional but was occurred due to the filing of review application bearing I.A. No.2958/2025. The appellants are having good case on merit. Accordingly, it is prayed that the delay in filing the appeal to impugn the order dated 17.12.2025 passed by DRT in T.S.A bearing no.997/2022 be condoned.

3. 3. The respondent no.1 contested the said application by filing reply. The respondent no.1 in the preliminary objections/preliminary submissions stated that the sufficient cause for condonation of delay has not been established and that the facts and circumstances of the present case which is condition precedent to establish the plea of condonation of delay. The appellants have failed to show and establish sufficient cause for condonation of delay of over seven months and the secured asset has already been sold on 17.12.2025 and the sale certificated dated 05.01.2026 has already been issued to the *bona fide* third-party purchaser who is respondent no.4. The appellants were not stopped for immediately approaching this Tribunal after passing of the impugned order. The appellants have also filed

--- civil proceedings before the High Court of Delhi bearing Ex.Appl. (OS) No.73/2026. The appellants have also filed another application under Section 151 CPC in Ex. Appl. (OS) No.252/2026 for seeking vacation of the *status quo* order dated 27.01.2026 on several grounds. The respondent no.1 also disputed the claim of the *bona fide* awaiting adjudication of the review application which as per the respondent no.1 was incomplete and not available to the appellant. The respondent no.1 in the reply have given the detailed facts and ultimately stated that the application did not disclose the sufficient cause. It was prayed that the application be dismissed.

4. The respective Senior Counsels for the contesting parties advanced oral arguments. The contesting parties were directed to file written statement within a week from the last order passed on 21.09.2026 but none of the contesting parties has preferred to file written synopsis.

5. The Supreme Court of India in **Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) by L.Rs. & others V The Special Deputy Collector (LA)**, Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.31248/2018 decided on 08.04.2024 after referring **Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag & others V Katiji & others**, (1987) 2 SCC 107 observed that some time refusal to condone delay may result in dismissing a matter which might have merit. The issue of substantial justice must prevail on the technical consideration and the delay can be condoned if it is found not to be deliberate. Simultaneously it was also observed that the liberal approach should not be adopted in condoning the delay if the sufficient cost which is a condition precedent does not exist for not filing the appeal in time. It was also observed that the existing of sufficient cause is the first ingredient for the purpose of condonation of delay which depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The Supreme Court in case of **Shiv Amma (dead) by LRs. V. Karnataka Housing Board & others**, Civil Appeal No.11794/2025 defined the phrase 'sufficient cause' under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and observed that there should be a liberal, pragmatic and justice approach to be adopted by the courts while dealing with an application for condonation of delay as the courts are obliged to remove injustice. It was also observed that the substantial justice should not undermine by the technical consideration in condonation of delay. However, the liberal approach in condonation of delay in case of gross negligence on the part of the litigation or counsel should not be adopted. It was further observed that in construing "sufficient cause" it must be borne in mind that rules of procedure are handmaids of justice.

Procedural rigidity should not become an instrument of injustice. In the context of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, this balance assumes special significance. Courts have repeatedly underscored that while limitation provisions are founded on sound principles of finality and certainty, their application cannot be divorced from the overarching objective of ensuring that litigants are not shut out from the doors of justice merely on account of technicalities. It was also observed that the Court is duty-bound to apply a liberal interpretation of "sufficient cause" so as to balance technical requirements with the demands of justice. A litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late, and therefore, a pragmatic and justice-oriented approach must inform the judicial discretion under Section 5. Therefore, when courts interpret "sufficient cause," they are expected to exercise discretion in a manner that fosters justice, fairness, and equity, keeping in mind the realities of litigation. The idea behind vesting the courts with such discretion is to ensure that the power to condone any delay in the filing of an appeal or application, as the case may be, is exercised only to advance substantial justice, where no prejudice or injustice would be meted from such delay being condoned. Condonation of delay is not a matter of right but discretion of the court.

6. It is reflecting that the present appeal is filed to impugn the order dated 17.12.2025 whereby the application bearing I.A. No.2767/2025 filed by the S.A. applicant was dismissed. It is also reflecting that the appellants have filed review application bearing I.A. No.2958/2025 titled as **Ankur Arora V Punjab & Sind Bank & others** for seeking the review of the impugned order and the said application stated to have been withdrawn by the appellants. The appellants have also filed civil proceedings before the High Court of Delhi as detailed herein above. The appellants have stated that they were awaiting the adjudication of the review application bearing I.A. No.2958/2025 but which was remained pending for adjudication before DRT. It is appearing that the delay in filing the present appeal was caused due to this reason which appears to be neither deliberate nor intentional.

7. After considering all facts, the application is allowed and the delay of over seven months in filing the present appeal stands condoned.

8. List on 29.01.2027 for argument. Interim order to continue.

SA ----- **(Dr. Justice Sudhir Kumar Jain)** **Chairperson**

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