ICICI BANK LIMITED vs MAHESH ARYA ADN ANR on 9 October 2026

**ORDER**

**I.A. No.838/2023 (Application for condonation of delay)**

1. The appellant filed O.A bearing no. 700/2016 titled as **ICICI Bank V Mr. Mahesh Arya and others** before DRT-I, Delhi (hereinafter referred to as '**DRT**'). Which was allowed vide final order dated 08.02.2019 (hereinafter referred to as '**impugned order**'). The relevant portion of the impugned order dated 08.02.2019 is reproduced as under:-

i) I allow this OA and direct the defendant No.1 to 3 to pay the applicant bank, a sum of Rs.39,82,430/- (Rupees Thirty Nine Lakhs Eighty Two Thousand Four Hundred Thirty only) together with pendent lite and future interest @ 10.00% from the date of the present OA with monthly rests, till its realization. The recovery shall first be made from defendant No.3.

ii) Defendant No.3 is directed to pay the aforesaid amount within 30 days, failing which the aforesaid amount shall berecovered from the sale of mortgage property i.e. Flat No. 1602, 16th Floor, Tower-E, AVJ Heights, Plot No. GH- 12/2, Sector ZETA-I, Greater Noida, Uttar Pradesh- 201307. Short fall if any recovered from the borrower and co-borrower i.e. defendant No.1 & as per the provision of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993. The cost of litigation be also borne by the defendants. The applicant bank is also directed to file the revised statement of account before the Ld. Recovery Officer of this Tribunal.

ii) The recovery certificate be issued forthwith and be sent to the Recovery Officer, DRT-I Delhi.

2. The appellant being aggrieved filed the present appeal on 18.09.2023 after delay of 1662 days i.e. 4 years, 7 months and 9 days as per the calculation made by the Registry. The appellant has filed an application bearing I.A no. 838/2023 for condonation of delay wherein stated that the previous counsel of the appellant had never informed about the correct status of the Original Application and never communicated to the appellant that the respondent no. 1 and 2 have been absolved of their liability and the recovery certificate has been issued only against respondent no. 3. There was no occasion for the appellant that to know that the OA was not allowed against all the respondents who were impleaded as defendants in the original application.

3. Section 20 of the Act deals with appeal to the Appellate Tribunal. It provides that any person aggrieved by an order made by a Tribunal may prefer an appeal before the Appellate Tribunal and that appeal has to be filed within a period of 30 days from the date of the order. However, the Appellate Tribunal may entertain the appeal after the expiry of 30days if there is sufficient cause to the satisfaction of the Appellate Tribunal for not filing the appeal within the period of limitation.

4. The Supreme Court of India in **Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) by L.Rs. & others V The Special Deputy Collector (LA)**, Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.31248/2018 decided on 08.04.2024 after referring **Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag & others V Katiji & others**, (1987) 2 SCC 107 observed that some time refusal to condone delay may result in dismissing a matter which might have merit. The issue of substantial justice must prevail on the technical consideration and the delay can be condoned if it is found not to be deliberate. Simultaneously it was also observed that the liberal approach should not be adopted in condoning the delay if the sufficient cost which is a condition precedent does not exist for not filing the appeal in time. It was also observed that the existing of sufficient cause is the first ingredient for the purpose of condonation of delay which depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The Supreme Court in case of **Shiv Amma (dead) by LR.s. V. Karnataka Housing Board & others**, Civil Appeal No.11794/2025 defined the phrase 'sufficient cause' under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and observed that there should be a liberal, pragmatic and justice approach to be adopted by the courts while dealing with an application for condonation of delay as the courts are obliged to remove injustice.

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It was also observed that the substantial justice should not undermine by the technical consideration in condonation of delay. However, the liberal approach in condonation of delay in case of gross negligence on the part of the litigation or counsel should not be adopted. It was further observed that in construing "sufficient cause" it must be borne in mind that rules of procedure are handmaids of justice. Procedural rigidity should not become an instrument of injustice. In the context of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, this balance assumes special significance. Courts have repeatedly underscored that while limitation provisions are founded on sound principles of finality and certainty, their application cannot be divorced from the overarching objective of ensuring that litigants are not shut out from the doors of justice merely on account of technicalities. It was also observed that the Court is duty-bound to apply a liberal interpretation of "sufficient cause" so as to balance technical requirements with the demands of justice. A litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late, and therefore, a pragmatic and justice-oriented approach must inform the judicial discretion under Section 5. Therefore, when courts interpret "sufficient cause," they are expected to exercise discretion in a manner that fosters justice, fairness, and equity, keeping in mind the realities of litigation. The idea behind vesting the courts with such discretion is to ensure that the power to condone any delay in the filing of an appeal or application, as the case may be, is exercised only to advance substantial justice, where no prejudice or injustice would be meted from such delay being condoned. Condonation of delay is not a matter of right but discretion of the court.

5. It is reflecting that the appellant filed O.A. bearing no.700/2016 titled as **ICICI Bank V Mr. Mahesh Arya and others** which was allowed vide impugned final order dated 08.02.2019 by DRT-I, Delhi. DRT-I, Delhi in the impugned final order directed the respondents no. 1 to 3/defendant 1 to 3 to pay Rs. 39,82,430/- along with interest and the recovery shall first be made from defendant no. 3. The appellant being aggrieved filed the present appeal on 18.09.2023 but after the delay of 1662 days. The appellant primarily claimed the condonation of delay on the ground that the previous counsel has never informed the appellant about the disposal of the OA and that the respondent no. 1 and 2 have been absolved from liability and further the appellanthas gained knowledge about the impugned final order in the month of July 2023. The appellant also claimed that the delay in filing the present appeal was neither deliberate nor intentional.

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6. However, in the present appeal there was inordinate delay of more than four years which has not been properly explained by the appellant. The plea of the appellant that the appellant came to know about the passing of the impugned final order in the month of July 2023 does not appeal to reasons and cannot be accepted. The appellant has failed to disclose sufficient cause for condonation of delay. Hence, the application is dismissed being devoid of any merit.

**Appeal No.341/2023**

7. The present appeal is dismissed being time-barred.

----- **(Dr. Justice Sudhir Kumar Jain)** **Chairperson**

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