WA/67/2026 of STATE OF ODISHA Vs ASHISH KUMAR PANIGRAHI on 20 July 2026

1. Having heard learned counsel for the parties.

2. By means of the present writ appeal, the appellants call in question the judgment dated 20.06.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C) No.37257 of 2023, whereby the appellants were directed to appoint the respondent as Constable under the Home Guard quota with consequential notional benefits.

3. The factual matrix is largely undisputed. The recruitment process in question commenced pursuant to the advertisement dated 23.10.2006. The physical test and written examination were conducted on 01.12.2006 and 13.12.2006 respectively. The respondent participated in the selection process and was fully aware of the outcome thereof. Aggrieved by his non-selection, the respondent approached the Odisha Administrative Tribunal by filing O.A. No.3219(C) of 2008. The said proceeding was disposed of on 20.01.2009. Pursuant thereto, the D.G. & I.G. of Police considered the claim of the respondent and rejected the same by order dated 12.10.2009. Thus, the respondent’s claim stood examined and rejected by the competent authority as early as in the year 2009. What assumes significance is that after the rejection dated 12.10.2009, the respondent remained dormant for almost fourteen years. No challenge was laid to the said order before any competent forum. It was only in the year 2023 that the respondent again approached this Court in W.P.(C) No.15253 of 2023 seeking a direction for consideration of his representation. Pursuant to the said order, the D.G. of Police reconsidered the matter and once again rejected the claim by order dated 30.09.2023. Thereafter, W.P.(C) No.37257 of 2023 came to be instituted questioning the order dated 30.09.2023.

4. In our considered opinion, the order dated 30.09.2023 did not furnish a fresh cause of action. The said order merely reiterated the earlier decision taken by the competent authority in the year 2009. It is trite that stale claims cannot be revived by repeatedly submitting representations and obtaining orders thereon. Were such a course to be permitted, the law of delay and laches would be rendered otiose.

5. The respondent, in essence, sought to reopen a recruitment process of the year 2006 and a claim which had already been rejected in the year 2009. The challenge was thus sought to be raised after an unexplained lapse of nearly seventeen years from the recruitment process and about fourteen years from the first rejection of his claim. No satisfactory explanation has been forthcoming for such prolonged inaction.

6. The writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is discretionary and equitable. The well-established maxim vigilantibus non dormientibus jura subveniunt aptly applies here; translating to: the law assists those who are vigilant and not those who sleep over their rights; continues to guide the exercise of such jurisdiction. A person who remains indolent for years together cannot, as a matter of course, seek relief under the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court. In Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board & Ors. vs. T.T. Murali Babu, reported in (2014) 4 SCC 108, the Hon’ble Apex Court reiterated that delay and laches cannot be lightly brushed aside and that a constitutional court, while exercising its equitable jurisdiction, is duty- bound to scrutinise whether a stale claim deserves to be entertained at a belated stage. The relevant paragraph is reproduced as below: “16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the court would be under legal obligation to scrutinize whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in must circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of the litigant-a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, “procrastination is the greatest thief of time “and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis”.

7. Further, equally instructive is the decision in Rabindranath Bose & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., reported in (1970) 1 SCC 84, wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court held that stale service claims ought not to be entertained after an inordinate lapse of time, particularly where such interference would unsettle appointments and promotions which have attained finality and thereby prejudice rights that have accrued to others. The relevant paragraphs are as follows: “31. But insofar as the attack is based on the 1952 Seniority Rules, it must fail on another ground. The ground being that this petition under Article 32 of the Constitution has been brought about fifteen years after the 1952 Rules were promulgated and effect given to them in the Seniority List prepared on August 1, 1953. Learned counsel for the petitioners says that this Court has no discretion and cannot dismiss the petition under Article 32 on the ground that it has been brought after inordinate delay. We are unable to accept this contention. This Court by majority in Tilokchand Moti Chand v. H.B. Munshi held that delay can be fatal in certain circumstances...

32. The learned counsel for the petitioners strongly urges that the decision of this Court in Tilokchand Motichand case needs review. But after carefully considering the matter, we are of the view that no relief should be given to petitioners who, without any reasonable explanation, approach this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution after inordinate delay. The highest Court in this land has been given original jurisdiction to entertain petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution. It could not have been the intention that this Court would go into stale demands after a lapse of years. It is said that Article 32 is itself a guaranteed right. So it is, but it does not follow from this that it was the intention of the Constitution-makers that this Court should discard all principles and grant relief in petitions filed after inordinate delay.

33. We are not anxious to throw out petitions on this ground, but we must administer justice in accordance with law and principles of equity, justice and good conscience. It would be unjust to deprive the respondents of the rights which have accrued to them. Each person ought to be entitled to sit back and consider that his appointment and promotion effected a long time ago would not be set aside after the lapse of a number of years. It was on this ground that this Court in Jaisinghani case observed that the order in that case would not affect Class II officers who have been appointed permanently as Assistant Commissioners. In that case, the Court was only considering the challenge to appointments and promotions made after 1950. In this case, we are asked to consider the validity of appointments and promotions made during the periods of 1945 to 1950. If there was adequate reason in that case to leave out Class II officers, who had been appointed permanently Assistant Commissioners, there is much more reason in this case that the officers who are now permanent Assistant Commissioners of Income Tax and who were appointed and promoted to their original posts during 1945 to 1950, should be left alone.”

8. The aforesaid principles have been consistently reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, inter alia, in P.S. Sadasivaswamy vs. State of Tamil Nadu, reported in AIR 1974 SC 2271, and most recently in Mizo Chief Council, Mizoram, through its President Shri L. Chinzah vs. Union of India & Ors., reported in MANU/SC/0229/2026. The jurisprudence is thus unequivocal that a litigant who allows his claim to remain dormant for years without any plausible explanation cannot invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of a constitutional court as a matter of right. More so in matters of public recruitment, where the rights of selected candidates, appointments made pursuant thereto, and the attendant administrative arrangements have long since crystallised. Entertaining such stale claims at a distant point of time would not only defeat the doctrine of delay and laches but would also seriously impair the principles of finality, certainty and stability which are indispensable to public administration.

9. It also deserves to be noticed that the materials on record disclose that O.A. No.3109(C) of 2009 stood disposed of on 23.02.2017 as withdrawn. The respondent seeks to contend that he had been diligently pursuing his claim. However, the respondent has neither questioned the correctness of the said order before the forum which recorded it nor produced any material to indicate that the proceeding continued to remain pending thereafter. The principle enunciated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in State of Maharashtra vs. Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak, reported in AIR 1982 SC 1249, that the correctness of a judicial record must be assailed before the very forum which recorded it, squarely applies to the present case. It is well settled that a judicial record carries a presumption of correctness and cannot be casually impeached in collateral proceedings. Unless corrected by the forum which recorded it, the Court is bound to proceed on the basis of such record. Proceeding, therefore, on the basis of the order dated 23.02.2017, it is manifest that after withdrawing the aforesaid Original Application, the respondent did not pursue any substantive remedy against the rejection of his claim and remained inactive until the year 2022, when W.P.(C) No.7725 of 2022 came to be instituted. Significantly, the said writ petition was also withdrawn with liberty to file a better application and was thereafter followed by the filing of W.P.(C) No.33235 of 2022. These successive proceedings, however, do not efface the prolonged periods of inaction preceding them nor do they furnish a satisfactory explanation for the delay occasioned in assailing the rejection of the respondent’s claim. Such conduct constitutes yet another circumstance reinforcing the conclusion that the claim sought to be agitated is vitiated by gross delay and laches. The plea that the respondent had been continuously prosecuting his remedies is, therefore, unsustainable.

10. In that view of the matter, we are unable to sustain the judgment of the learned Single Judge. The Writ Petition ought to have been dismissed on the ground of gross delay and laches alone. Accordingly, the present Writ Appeal is allowed. The judgment dated 20.06.2025 passed in W.P.(C) No.37257 of 2023 is set aside. I agree. (Harish Tandon)

(Chittaranjan Dash) Chief Justice

Judge

AK Pradhan/Bijay/Sarbani/Priyanka Digitally Signed Signed by: SARBANI DASH Designation: Junior Stenographer Reason: Authentication Location: HIGH COURT OF ORISSA, CUTTACK Date: 24-Jul-2026 15:27:58 Signature Not Verified