WA/632/2026 of SATYA NARAYAN SAHOO Vs STATE OF ODISHA on 18 May 2026

JUDGMENT

This intra-Court appeal preferred under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent constituting the High Court of Judicature at Patna read with Article 4 of the Orissa High Court Order, 1948 read with and Rule 6 of Chapter-III and Rule 2 of Chapter-VIII of the Rules of the High Court of Orissa, 1948 is directed against the judgment dated 19.03.2026 passed in W.P.(C) No.16836 of 2024 by the learned Single Judge.

2. The petitioner, while working as Junior Clerk in the Office of the Sub-Collector, Keonjhar, came to learn that a Departmental Promotion Committee recommended his name for promotion to the post of Senior Clerk. Due to his personal difficulties, he requested the Sub-Collector to adjust him against any of the vacant posts at Headquarters. The Sub-Collector, Keonjhar recommended his case to the Collector, Keonjhar for consideration on 23.11.2009.

2.1. The authority promoted him to the post of Senior Clerk on 05.01.2010 and transferred to work in the Integrated Child Development Scheme Project, Joda (U). Again a request was made to the authority for his adjustment at Headquarter on 16.01.2010 and his superior authority recommended the same to the Collector.

2.2. Since there was non-consideration of the grievance, the petitioner approached the Odisha Administrative Tribunal in O.A No.169(C) of 2010, which came to be disposed of on dated 25.01.2010 with a direction to consider his case, but protected him to the extent that till the same is considered he was not to be relieved, if not relieved already. On an application in this regard being made to the Collector and the Sub-Collector, Keonjhar with an affidavit, without paying any heed to such direction, the petitioner was relieved on 04.02.2010.

2.3. On the ground of ill-health while the petitioner was on medical leave, he was suspended by order dated 17.05.2010 of the Collector and on the ground of unauthorized absence, disobedience of the order of higher authority and gross misconduct departmental proceeding was sought to be initiated. Against the allegations the petitioner submitted his reply denying charges levelled against him. The enquiry being completed, the Enquiry Officer submitted report on 31.01.2011. The Enquiry Officer in his report proposed before the authority to consider the case of the petitioner.

2.4. After completion of enquiry the show cause reply was filed on 18.05.2011 in pursuance of the notice dated 23.04.2011, whereby it was specifically stated that while the petitioner was availing medical leave, the provisions of the Odisha Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1962 would not postulate initiation of proceeding. Since he was not paid subsistence allowance nor was he reinstated in service, he moved before the Odisha Administrative Tribunal in O.A No.3877(C) of 2012 and, thereafter this Court. On 09.04.2013 it was directed that the Collector would finalize the departmental proceeding within 15 days and to release the petitioner from suspension. Though the Collector reinstated the petitioner on 30.04.2013, did not finalize the departmental proceeding.

2.5. The petitioner had approached the Odisha Administrative Tribunal, Cuttack Bench, Cuttack in OA No.892(C) of 2014 wherein a prayer was made to quash the order of suspension dated 17.05.2010 and the departmental proceeding No.7 of 2010. The Tribunal in its order dated 09.04.2013 had directed to finalise the departmental proceeding within a period of 15 days from the date of receipt of the copy of the order and to release the petitioner from suspension failing which the petitioner shall be reinstated in service automatically. Pursuant to the direction of the learned Tribunal, the petitioner was reinstated on 30.04.2013, but the departmental proceeding was not concluded as per the order of the learned Tribunal. Therefore, the Odisha

Administrative Tribunal passed the following order dated 29.03.2017 in O.A. No.892(C) of 2014: “6. Only thing to be seen is that the Odisha Administrative Tribunal in O.A. No.3877(C) of 2012 vide order dated 09.04.2013 has directed to finalise the departmental proceeding within 15 days from the date of receipt of a copy of the order and to release the applicant from suspension failing which, the applicant shall be reinstated in service automatically. Pursuant to this, the applicant has been reinstated in service vide office order dated 30.04.2013 as at Annexure-9. But Respondent No. 2 is highly negligent in not carrying out the direction of the Tribunal by not disposing of the departmental proceeding within 15 days from the date of receipt of the order 09.04.2013. So, the stand taken in counter that the disciplinary proceeding has not been finalized since the representation of the applicant against the inquiry report is under consideration cannot be accepted and I am of the firm opinion that the Disciplinary Authority, i.e., Respondent No. 2 is highly negligent in not carrying out the order of the Tribunal. The Disciplinary authority was at liberty after the order dated 09.04.2013 in O.A No. 3877(C) of 2012 to finalized the departmental proceeding but it was not finalized at least till 06.03.2014 which is almost around one year.

7. Hence, in this back ground, I direct Respndent No. 2 to dispose of the departmental proceeding against the applicant within a period of one month from the date of receipt of a copy of this order failing which it will be deemed that the disciplinary proceeding, is dropped. With this observation the O.A. is disposed of.”

2.6. The petitioner having challenged the order dated 05.06.2017 passed by the Collector, approached this Court in WPC (OAC) No.1715 of 2017, which came to be disposed of with liberty to approach the appellate authority. Accordingly the petitioner preferred an appeal before the Revenue Divisional Commissioner, Northern Division, Sambalpur wherein the said authority vide order dated 28.05.2024 modified the punishment inflicted in the departmental proceeding.

2.7. Questioning the propriety and legality of such punishment being modified by the appellate authority and competence of the disciplinary authority in passing the order in departmental proceeding after the period stipulated by the Odisha Administrative Tribunal lapsed, the petitioner filed a writ petition, registered as W.P.(C) No.16836 of 2024, before this Court.

2.8. Instead of directing for adhering to order dated 29.03.2017 of the Odisha Administrative Tribunal in O.A. No.892(C) of 2014 and issue writ of mandamus to drop the departmental proceeding, the learned Single Judge while disposing of the said writ petition, being W.P.(C) No.16836 of 2024, passed the following order on 19.03.2026:

“7. Having heard learned counsel appearing for the parties and considering the submissions made, this Court finds that the Tribunal while disposing O.A. No.892(C) of 2014 vide order dated 29.03.2017 under Annexure-11, directed the disciplinary authority–opposite party No.2 to dispose of the proceeding within a period of one (1) month from the date of receipt of this order. But after receipt of the said order on 17.04.2017 and prior to completion of the one (1) month period, an application was filed in the said Original Application by opposite party No.2 on 04.05.2017, with the prayer to allow two(2) months further time to complete the proceeding.

7.1. As found from the record of O.A. No.892(C) of 2024 so tagged to the case record, the said application was registered as M.P. No.508(C) of 2017. On the face of such application being filed seeking extension of time, the matter was disposed of vide order dated 05.06.2017 under Annexure-14.

7.2. Taking into account the prayer made in M.P. No.508(C) of 2017, this Court is of the view that the disciplinary authority has not violated the order passed by the Tribunal under Annexure-11.

7.3. However, considering the materials available on record and the nature of order passed by the Tribunal under Annexure-11, this Court is of the view that the proceeding is to be disposed of afresh and petitioner be permitted to file a fresh reply to the 2nd show cause by taking all the grounds available to him under law.

7.4. This Court accordingly while disposing the proceeding with quashing of the orders under Annexure-14 and 15 permits the Petitioner to file a

fresh reply to the 2nd show cause notice on or before 10.04.2026. On such filing of the reply, Opposite Party No.2 shall pass a fresh order in accordance with law, without being influenced by the earlier order so passed by him on 05.06.2017, by end of May, 2026. Learned Addl. Standing Counsel for the State is directed to communicate this order before Opposite Party No.2 for compliance.

8. Accordingly, the writ petition stands disposed of.”

2.9. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner has preferred this writ appeal.

3. It is submitted by Sri Jagdish Biswal, learned Advocate assisting Sri Budhadev Routray, learned Senior Advocate that mere filing of extension of period to conclude the disciplinary proceeding would not clothe the authority to proceed further in the matter once the period stipulated in the order of the Odisha Administrative Tribunal expired. Unless and until the extension is granted by the competent authority/Court, the learned Single Judge could not assume or usurp jurisdiction to extend the period. On the date of lapse of one month period as specified by the Odisha Administrative Tribunal in its order dated 29.03.2017 in O.A. No.892(C) of 2014, the disciplinary authority would cease to have jurisdiction to proceed further.

4. Sri Saswat Das, learned Additional Government Advocate referring to the counter affidavit filed before the learned Single Judge, indicated that the second show cause notice with proposed punishment was issued to the appellant-petitioner vide District Office order No.1266/BBE dated 04.05.2017 as per Rule 15(10)(i)(b) of the Odisha Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1962, which was acknowledged by him on 10.05.2017. However, considering the time taken for concluding the disciplinary proceeding beyond the period specified by the Odisha Administrative Tribunal and the nature of charges framed against the delinquent, the Revenue Divisional Commissioner- appellate authority felt that the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority is not strictly in proportion to the charges and therefore, the said authority was inclined to modify the penalties imposed by the disciplinary authority as follows: i. One increment is withheld with cumulative effect. ii. The delinquent is censured. iii. The suspension period is to be treated as leave due and admissible. As per Rule 12(6) of the Odisha Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1962 the disciplinary authority, while passing the final order in the disciplinary proceedings against the Government servant, shall issue directions about the treatment of the period of suspension, which is passed not as a measure of substantive punishment but as suspension pending inquiry, and indicate whether the suspension would be a punishment or not. In terms of said Rule the disciplinary authority, viz., Collector, Keonjhar as well as the appellate authority, viz., Revenue Divisional Commissioner, Northern Division, Sambalpur had passed orders to regularize the suspension period as leave as due and admissible in the order of regularization of suspension period for the charges framed against the appellant were established.

4.1. It is arduously submitted that the petitioner consequent upon being relieved with effect from 04.02.2010, which was passed in obedience to the order passed in O.A. No.l69(C) of 2010 (claimed to have been received by the respondents on 16.02.2010) the petitioner was required to join in his new place of posting after availing minimum transit period. As he did not join, such misconduct or insubordination attracted consequences.

5. Sole question for adjudication in this writ appeal has been raised as to whether the disciplinary authority could proceed further in the matter as directed by order dated 29.03.2017 in O.A. No.892(C) of 2014 by the Odisha Administrative Tribunal inasmuch as consequences for non-adherence to timeline stipulated in the said order to conclude the disciplinary proceeding.

6. Sri Jagdish Biswal, learned Advocate asserting that answer to such question is no more res integra and laid emphasis by drawing attention of this Court that the Odisha Administrative Tribunal has categorically directed to dispose of the departmental proceeding against the appellant within a period of one month from the date of receipt of copy of order dated 29.03.2017 in O.A. No.892(C) of 2014. Nevertheless, the said Tribunal proceeded to pass further direction that in the event of failure to conclude the departmental proceeding within such period as stipulated, the proceeding would “be deemed that the departmental proceeding is dropped”. To buttress his argument that the disciplinary authority ceases to have power to proceed further unless and until such period is extended by the competent authority on appraisal of reason for such non-adherence to the time- line, the imposition of punishment by invoking jurisdiction under Rule 12 read with Rule 15 of the Odisha Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1962, is without authority, bad in law and perverse, Sri Jagdish Biswal, learned Advocate placed heavy reliance on the ratio laid down in the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India rendered in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh Vrs. Ram Prakash Singh, (2025) 5 SCR 275.

7. Having the occasion to peruse the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in State of Uttar Pradesh

Vrs. Ram Prakash Singh, (2025) 5 SCR 275, this Court does not find any difficulty in adjudicating the issue raised by the appellant as the ratio of said reported judgment would apply in all fours to the context of the instant appeal.

7.1. The following observations in State of Uttar Pradesh Vrs. Ram Prakash Singh, (2025) 5 SCR 275 are pertinent: “61. The fourth issue requires us to consider Abhishek Prabhakar Awasthy Vrs. New India Assurance Co. Ltd., 2013 SCC OnLine All 14267, a decision of the Full Bench of the High Court. Being a Full Bench decision, obviously the Tribunal as well as the Division Bench of the High Court was bound thereby. The Full Bench rendered such decision upon considering, inter alia, the decision of this Court in Union of India and Others Vrs. Satyendra Kumar Sahai and Another, (2005) 12 SCC 355 We may only notice the answers to the questions referred to the Full Bench, reading as follows:

‘(A) Question No. (a):

We hold that if an enquiry is not concluded within the time which has been fixed by the Court, it is open to the employer to seek an extension of time by making an appropriate application to the Court setting out the reasons for the delay in the conclusion of the enquiry. In such an event, it is for the Court to consider whether time should be extended, based on the facts and circumstances of the case. However, where there is a stipulation of time by the Court, it will not be open to the employer to disregard that stipulation and an extension of time must be sought; (B) Question No. (b):

The judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Suresh Chandra (supra) as well as the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Satyendra Kumar Sahai (supra) clearly indicate that a mere delay on the part of the employer in concluding a disciplinary enquiry will not ipso facto nullify the entire proceedings in every case. The Court which has fixed a stipulation of time has jurisdiction to extend the time and it is open to the Court, while exercising that jurisdiction, to consider whether the delay has been satisfactorily explained. The Court can suitably extend time for conclusion of the enquiry either in a proceeding instituted by the employee challenging the enquiry on the ground that it was not completed within the stipulated period or even upon an independent application moved by the employer. The Court has the inherent jurisdiction to grant an extension of time, the original stipulation of time having been fixed by the Court itself. Such an extension of time has to be considered in the interests of justice balancing both the need for expeditious conclusion of the enquiry in the interests of fairness and an honest administration. In an appropriate case, it would be open to the Court to extend time suo motu in order to ensure that a serious charge of misconduct does not go unpunished leading to a serious detriment to the public interest. The

Court has sufficient powers to grant an extension of time both before and after the period stipulated by the Court has come to an end.’

62. While affirming the aforesaid view of the Full Bench, we would like to provide clarification on certain points not touched by such State of Uttar Pradesh through Principal Secretary, Department of Panchayati Raj, Lucknow Vrs. Ram Prakash Singh bench. First, in view of unseen institutional hurdles that can slow down swift action, it may not always be possible for the disciplinary authority in each such case where a fixed time has been stipulated by a tribunal/court to conclude the proceedings to apply and seek extension of time before expiry of such time although there can be no gainsaying that applying and obtaining an extension before expiry is eminently desirable. In exceptional cases, even after expiry of the stipulated time, such an application can be moved; and, depending on the cause shown for inability or failure to conclude the proceedings within the time stipulated and also for not applying for extension before expiry, the tribunal/court may, in its discretion, allow or reject the prayer for extension. If the application is rejected, the proceedings cannot be carried forward unless a superior court, reversing the order of rejection, permits the disciplinary authority to so proceed. Secondly, if the delinquent employee objects to continuation of proceedings beyond the time stipulated, the disciplinary authority without proceeding further ought to apply for extension of time and may not go ahead till such time its prayer for extension is granted on such application. Proceeding despite objection and

without there being an extension could give rise to apprehensions of bias. Therefore, applying for extension upon halting the proceedings awaiting order on the application would be an advisable course of action to balance the interests of both the employer and the employee. Thirdly, even if the delinquent employee has not objected to continuation of proceedings beyond the time stipulated by the tribunal/court but before the final order is passed in the proceedings, the disciplinary authority would be bound to seek and obtain extension of time. This is for the simple reason that the sanctity of the orders of tribunals/courts cannot be disrespected by errant parties. The dignity of the judicial process would be seriously eroded and there would be nothing left of the rule of law if orders of tribunals/courts, validly made, are disobeyed and the disobedience is encouraged by being indulgent. Finally, we hasten to add that if a tribunal/court stipulates a fixed time by which an enquiry or proceedings for disciplinary action ought to be concluded coupled with a rider that, in default, the enquiry/proceedings will stand lapsed, the disciplinary authority in such a case would cease to have the jurisdiction to proceed further unless, of course, citing genuine grounds, a recall of such default clause is sought and obtained to proceed further in accordance with law.

63. We also hold that continuation of disciplinary proceedings beyond the time stipulated by a tribunal/court could invite interdiction if no bona fide attempt is shown to have been made to seek an extension of time. However, much would depend on the facts of each case and it may not be possible to lay down a common formula applicable to each case. In an exceptional case, the tribunal/court would have the discretion to overlook the laxity and make such direction as it deems fit in the circumstances.”

7.2. Meticulous reading of the order dated 19.03.2026 passed in W.P.(C) No.16836 of 2024 by the learned Single Bench would manifest that the respondent- disciplinary authority had approached the Odisha Administrative Tribunal for extension of period stipulated in order dated 29.03.2017 passed in O.A. No.892(C) of 2014 by way of miscellaneous petition bearing M.P. No.508(C) of on 04.05.2017. Nonetheless, no material is placed by the respondents that such petition was ever moved before the said Tribunal and the same was allowed by extending the period to conclude departmental proceeding. The learned Single Judge candidly stated that said petition was “tagged to the case record”. This would clearly indicate that the Odisha Administrative Tribunal has not taken up such petition for consideration at any point of time. Therefore, this Court has no two opinion but to follow the ruling of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in State of Uttar Pradesh Vrs. Ram Prakash Singh, (2025) 5 SCR

275.

7.3. Having found force in the submission of the learned Advocate for the petitioner that whereas the Odisha

Administrative Tribunal stipulated in the order dated 29.03.2017 passed in O.A. No.892(C) of 2014 that failing to “dispose of the departmental proceeding within a period of one month from the date of receipt of a copy of this order”, “it will be deemed that the departmental proceeding is dropped”. In view of enunciation of law in this regard in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh Vrs. Ram Prakash Singh, (2025) 5 SCR 275, this Court, thus, holds that in absence of any order extending the period to conclude the departmental proceeding bearing D.P. No.7 of 2010, the disciplinary authority could not assume jurisdiction to proceeded after lapse of one month from 16.02.2010, i.e., date on which the order of the Tribunal is claimed to have been received by the respondents. The order of learned Single Judge reveals that “an application was filed in the said original application by the opposite party No.2 on 04.05.2017, with a prayer to allow two (2) months further time to complete the proceeding”. The order of the disciplinary authority could not be shown to have been passed within the period stipulated by the Odisha Administrative Tribunal. Hence this Court hastens to hold that the disciplinary proceeding as stated to have been concluded on 05.06.2017 cannot be countenanced in law.

8. In the wake of above, having found the decision of the learned Single Judge as not in consonance with the legal perspective delineated in State of Uttar Pradesh Vrs. Ram

Prakash Singh, (2025) 5 SCR 275, this Court feels it apposite to show indulgence in the matter by setting aside the order dated 19.03.2026 passed in W.P.(C) No.16836 of 2024. As a consequence thereto, this Court sets aside the order dated 28.05.2024 passed by the Revenue Divisional Commissioner, Northern Division, Sambalpur (appellate authority) and quash the order dated 05.06.2017 passed by the Collector, Keonjhar (disciplinary authority).

8.1. Having thus quashed the departmental proceeding initiated against the petitioner, he is entitled to all the consequential service benefits as admissible in law and the authorities are directed to extend the benefit to him within a period of eight weeks from date.

9. Given the legal position and with the discussions made, the writ appeal, is allowed as indicated above and Interlocutory Application(s), pending if any, shall also stand dismissed. However, in the circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs.

(HARISH TANDON)

CHIEF JUSTICE

(MURAHARI SRI RAMAN)

JUDGE High Court of Orissa, Cuttack The 18th May, 2026//MRS/Laxmikant Digitally Signed Signed by: LAXMIKANT MOHAPATRA Designation: SENIOR STENOGRAPHER Reason: Authentication Location: High Court of Orissa, Cuttack Date: 20-May-2026 19:18:09 Signature Not Verified