CWJC/12532/2026 of Shionath Ram Vs The State of Bihar on 18 August 2026

ORAL ORDER

18-08-2026 Heard Mr. Suresh Mukhiya, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, and Ms. Mita Kumari, learned counsel appearing for the State.

2. The petitioner, who was working as a Health and Nutrition Supervisor under Sundaram CLF, BPIU, Kotwa, has approached this Court seeking a direction upon the respondents to open ID No. 01068339 in his favour and to release his current salary as well as the due salary for the two months which, according to the petitioner, has been arbitrarily withheld.

3. Having considered the nature of the relief sought and the materials available on record, this Court is of the prima facie view that the services of the petitioner are not governed by any statutory rules or regulations. It further appears that the petitioner was working under Sundaram Jivika Mahila Sankul Astariya Sangh, which does not fall within the ambit of the expression “State” as defined under Article 12 of the Constitution of India.

4. Furthermore, the dispute in question arises out of the service relationship between the petitioner and a non-aided, non-statutory body and does not involve any public law element. As such, the dispute is not amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

5. It would be apposite to refer to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in St. Mary's Education Society & Anr. v. Rajendra Prasad Bhargava & Ors., [(2023) 4 SCC 498], wherein the Apex Court, after painstakingly considering the catena of decisions on the subject, finally summarised the legal position in paragraph 75 of the judgment, which reads as under: “75. We may sum up our final conclusions as under:

75.1. An application under Article 226 of the Constitution is maintainable against a person or a body discharging public duties or public functions. The public duty cast may be either statutory or otherwise and where it is otherwise, the body or the person must be shown to owe that duty or obligation to the public involving the public law element. Similarly, for ascertaining the discharge of public function, it must be established that the body or the person was seeking to achieve the same for the collective benefit of the public or a section of it and the authority to do so must be accepted by the public.

75.2. Even if it be assumed that an educational institution is imparting public duty, the act complained of must have a direct nexus with the discharge of public duty. It is indisputably a public law action which confers a right upon the aggrieved to invoke the extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 for a prerogative writ. Individual wrongs or breach of mutual contracts without having any public element as its integral part cannot be rectified through a writ petition under Article 226. Wherever Courts have intervened in their exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, either the service conditions were regulated by the statutory provisions or the employer had the status of “State” within the expansive definition under Article 12 or it was found that the action complained of has public law element.

75.3. It must be consequently held that while a body may be discharging a public function or performing a public duty and thus its actions becoming amenable to judicial review by a constitutional court, its employees would not have the right to invoke the powers of the High Court conferred by Article 226 in respect of matter relating to service where they are not governed or controlled by the statutory provisions. An educational institution may perform myriad functions touching various facets of public life and in the societal sphere. While such of those functions as would fall within the domain of a “public function” or “public duty” be undisputedly open to challenge and scrutiny under Article 226 of the Constitution, the actions or decisions taken solely within the confines of an ordinary contract of service, having no statutory force or backing, cannot be recognised as being amenable to challenge under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the absence of the service conditions being controlled or governed by statutory provisions, the matter would remain in the realm of an ordinary contract of service.

75.4. Even if it be perceived that imparting education by private unaided school is a public duty within the expanded expression of the term, an employee of a non-teaching staff engaged by the school for the purpose of its administration or internal management is only an agency created by it. It is immaterial whether “A” or “B” is employed by school to discharge that duty. In any case, the terms of employment of contract between a school and non-teaching staff cannot and should not be construed to be an inseparable part of the obligation to impart education. This is particularly in respect to the disciplinary proceedings that may be initiated against a particular employee. It is only where the removal of an employee of non-teaching staff is regulated by some statutory provisions, its violation by the employer in contravention of law may be interfered with by the Court. But such interference will be on the ground of breach of law and not on the basis of interference in discharge of public duty.

75.5. From the pleadings in the original writ petition, it is apparent that no element of any public law is agitated or otherwise made out. In other words, the action challenged has no public element and writ of mandamus cannot be issued as the action was essentially of a private character.”

6. In view of the aforesaid legal position and having regard to the nature of the relief sought in the present writ petition, this Court is of the considered view that the writ petition is not maintainable.

7. Accordingly, the present writ petition stands dismissed as not maintainable.

8. However, dismissal of the present writ petition shall not preclude the petitioner from availing any other remedy available to him in accordance with law.

rohit/- (Harish Kumar, J) U