Punjab and Haryana High Court

CRM-M/38260/2026 of JITENDER KUMAR @ MANGRU Vs STATE OF HARYANA on 3 September 2026

Cites 2, Cited by 0

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH 234 CRM-M-38260-2026 JITENDER KUMAR ALIAS MANGRU ….Petitioner Versus STATE OF HARYANA …Respondent Date of Decision: 03.09.2026 Date of Uploading: 05.09.2026 CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUMEET GOEL Present:- Mr.

Citations and Judicial Treatment

No citing decisions in the index yet

Cited by

0

Decisions in the index citing it

Cites

2

Decisions referred to

In this index

2

Of the decisions it cites

Overruled / Questioned

0

No negative treatment found

Loading the citing and cited decisions…

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH

JITENDER KUMAR ALIAS MANGRU ….Petitioner Versus STATE OF HARYANA …Respondent Date of Decision: 03.09.2026 Date of Uploading: 05.09.2026

CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUMEET GOEL

Present:- Mr. Chander Pal Tiwana, Advocate for the petitioner.

Ms. Priyanka Sadar, Senior DAG, Haryana.

Mr. Jaynish Saini, Advocate for the complainant. ***** SUMEET GOEL, J. (ORAL)

Present 3rd petition has been filed under Section 483 of the BNSS, 2023 seeking grant of regular bail to the petitioner, in case FIR No. 71 dated 30.01.2025, registered under Section 316(4), 3(5) of BNS (Section 318(2), 338, 336(3), 340 (2) and 61(2) of BNS was added later on) at Police Station Kundli, District Sonipat.

2. The FIR in question pertains to defalcation of Rs.1,41,50,234/-.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that the petitioner is in custody since 13.08.2025. Learned counsel has iterated that the petitioner has been falsely implicated into the FIR in question. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further urged that the petitioner was working in the HR Section of the complainant-company and was not directly responsible for maintaining/upkeeping the accounts of the company. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further urged that the PW-1 Ankush Jain has already stands examined. It has been further contended that the petitioner has already suffered incarceration of more than 01 year and is a man with clean antecedents. On the strength of these submissions, the grant of regular bail is entreated for.

4. Learned State counsel has opposed that the allegations raised against the petitioner are serious in nature and, hence, he ought not to be extended the concession of regular bail. Learned State counsel seeks to place on record the custody certificate dated 01.09.2026, in Court today, which is taken on record.

5. Per contra learned counsel for the complainant has vehemently opposed the grant of regular bail to the petitioner by iterating that the petitioner(herein), is the prime conspirator and active participant in the crime in question. Learned counsel for the complainant has further urged that the complainant-company has been duped for a huge amount of Rs. 1,41,50,234/- and this amount is yet to be recovered. Learned counsel for the complainant has further urged that petitioner is likely to abscond from the proceedings, if the petitioner is released on regular bail. Learned counsel for the complainant has further urged that the prosecution case clearly shows that the embezzled amount has been usurped by the petitioner and therefore, the petitioner ought not to be granted the concession of regular bail.

6. I have heard counsel for the parties and have gone through the available records of the case.

Before delving into the matter further, it would be germane to refer herein the case law governing the issue in hand: 6.1

Gudikanti Narasimhulu and others vs. Public Prosecutor, High Court of Andhra Pradesh AIR 1978 SUPREME COURT 429, relevant whereof reads as under: “10. The significance and sweep of Article 21 make the deprivation of liberty a matter of grave concern and permissible only when the law authorising it is reasonable, even-handed and geared to the goals of community good and State necessity spelt out in Article 19. Indeed, the considerations I have set out as criteria are germane to the constitutional proposition I have deduced. Reasonableness postulates intelligent care and predicates that deprivation of freedom- by refusal of bail is not for punitive purpose but for the bi-focal interests of justice-to the individual involved and society affected.

11. We must weigh the contrary factors to answer the test of reasonableness, subject to the need for securing the presence, of the bail applicant. It makes sense to assume that a man on bail has a better chance to prepare or present his case than one remanded in custody. And if public justice is to be promoted, mechanical detention should be close to ours, the function of bail is limited, 'community roots' of the, applicant are stressed and, after the Vera Foundation's Manhattan Bail Project, monetary suretyship is losing ground. The considerable public expense in keeping in custody where no danger of disappearance or disturbance can arise, is not a negligible consideration. Equally important is the deplorable condition, verging on. the inhuman, of our sub-jails, that the unrewarding cruelty and expensive custody of avoidable incarceration makes refusal of bail unreasonable and a Policy favouring release justly sensible.

12. A few other weighty factors deserve reference. All deprivation of liberty is validated by social defence and individual correction along an anti-criminal direction. Public justice is central to the whole scheme of bail law. Fleeing justice must be forbidden but punitive harshness should be minimised. Restorative devices to redeem the man, even, through community service, meditative drill, study classes or other resources should be innovated, and playing foul with public peace by tampering with evidence, intimidating witnesses or committing offence while on judicially sanctioned 'free enterprise,' should be provided against. No seeker of justice shall play confidence tricks on the court or community. Thus, conditions may be hung around bail orders, not to cripple but to protect. Such is the holistic jurisdiction and humanistic orientation invoked by the judicial discretion correlated to the values of our constitution.”

6.2

Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a judgment titled as Gurcharan Singh vs. State (UT of Delhi) 1978 (1) SCC 118, has held as under: “Where the granting of bail lies within the discretion of the court, the granting or denial is regulated, to a large extent, by the facts and circumstances of each particular case. Since the object of the detention or imprisonment of the accused is to secure his appearance and submission to the jurisdiction and the judgment of the court, the primary inquiry is whether a recognizance or bond would effect that end.”

6.3

Furthermore, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a judgment tiled as Sanjay Chandra vs. CBI (2012) 1 SCC 40, has held as under: “21. In bail applications, generally, it has been laid down from the earliest times that the object of bail is to secure the appearance of the accused person at his trial by reasonable amount of bail. The object of bail is neither punitive nor preventative. Deprivation of liberty must be considered a punishment, unless it can be required to ensure that an accused person will stand his trial when called upon. The courts owe more than verbal respect to the principle that punishment begins after conviction, and that every man is deemed to be innocent until duly tried and duly found guilty.

22. From the earliest times, it was appreciated that detention in custody pending completion of trial could be a cause of great hardship. From time to time, necessity demands that some un- convicted persons should be held in custody pending trial to secure their attendance at the trial but in such cases, “necessity” is the operative test. In this country, it would be quite contrary to the concept of personal liberty enshrined in the Constitution that any person should be punished in respect of any matter, upon which, he has not been convicted or that in any circumstances, he should be deprived of his liberty upon only the belief that he will tamper with the witnesses if left at liberty, save in the most extraordinary circumstances.”

7. The petitioner is in custody since 13.08.2025, whereinafter, the investigation was carried out and the challan qua the petitioner stands presented on 04.10.2025 and total 20 prosecution witnesses have been cited, but only 04 witnesses have been examined till date. Keeping in view factual milieu of the case in hand; especially the factum of the challan (upon culmination of investigation) have already been filed, the prime prosecution witness PW-1 Ankush Jain, already having been examined, the petitioner already suffered incarceration for one year and 19 days and the petitioner being a man with clean antecedents; this Court is inclined to afford regular bail.

The rival contention raised at Bar give rise to debatable issues, which shall essentially be ratiocinated upon during the course of trial. This Court does not deem it appropriate to delve deep into these rival contentions, at this stage, lest it may prejudice the trial. Nothing tangible has been brought forward to indicate the likelihood of the petitioner absconding from the process of justice or interfering with the prosecution evidence. As per custody certificate dated 01.09.2026 filed by learned State counsel, the petitioner has already suffered incarceration for a period of 01 year & 19 days.

Suffice to say, further detention of the petitioner as an undertrial is not warranted in the facts and circumstances of the case.

8. In view of above, the present petition is allowed. Petitioner is ordered to be released on regular bail, if not required in any other case, on his furnishing bail/surety bonds to the satisfaction of the Ld. concerned CJM/Duty Magistrate. However, in addition to conditions that may be imposed by the concerned CJM/Duty Magistrate, the petitioner shall remain bound by the following conditions:

(i) The petitioner shall not mis-use the liberty granted.

(ii) The petitioner shall not tamper with any evidence, oral or documentary, during the trial.

(iii) The petitioner shall not absent himself on any date before the trial.

(iv) The petitioner shall not commit any offence while on bail.

(v) The petitioner shall deposit his passport, if any, with the trial Court.

(vi) The petitioner shall give his cellphone number to the Investigating Officer/SHO of concerned Police Station and shall not change his cell-phone number without prior permission of the trial Court/Illaqa Magistrate.

(vii) The petitioner shall not in any manner try to delay the trial.

9. In case of breach of any of the aforesaid conditions and those which may be imposed by concerned CJM/Duty Magistrate as directed hereinabove or upon showing any other sufficient cause, the State/complainant shall be at liberty to move for cancellation of bail of the petitioner.

10. Ordered accordingly.

11. Nothing said hereinabove shall be construed as an expression of opinion on the merits of the case.

12. Since the main case has been decided, pending miscellaneous application, if any, shall also stand disposed off.

(SUMEET GOEL)

JUDGE 03.09.2026 Kamal Gandhi

Whether speaking/reasoned: Yes/No Whether reportable:

Yes/No

You have used today's free searches. Sign in, for free, to keep searching without a limit.

Compass reads the judgments for you and finds the paragraphs for and against your question. Sign in to use it.

My Vault follows judgments for you and records every later decision that cites them. Sign in to keep one.

Sign in to download the court's PDF. The full text stays free to read here.

Sign in, for free, to download the court copy. Reading the full text here stays open to everyone.

Search and read Indian judgments without limits, save them to My Vault and find the relevant paragraphs with Compass.

Open the sign-in page instead