CRM-M/20920/2026 of JATAN Vs STATE OF HARYANA on 27 July 2026

1. The present petition has been instituted under Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (corresponding to Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973) seeking the concession of regular bail in FIR No. 266 dated 08.04.2023, registered under Section 20(ii) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, at Police Station Camp Palwal, District Palwal, Haryana (Annexure P-1).

2. Briefly stated, the prosecution case is that on 07.04.2023, SI Hazar Khan, along with other police officials, was present at Chhajjunagar, Palwal in connection with crime checking when a secret informer disclosed that the petitioner, Kamla, and co-accused Mohit were engaged in the illicit trade of ganja and would be transporting the contraband in car bearing registration No. HR-30J-7081. Treating the information to be reliable, the Investigating Officer reduced the same into writing and forwarded it in compliance with Section 42 of the NDPS Act, thereafter laying a naka near Aswata Nala Bridge, Palwal. After some time, the said vehicle was intercepted. On noticing the police, the driver allegedly abandoned the vehicle and fled from the spot, whereas the petitioner, who was travelling in the vehicle, was apprehended. Thereafter, the prescribed statutory formalities, including service of notice under Section 50 of the NDPS Act, were allegedly complied with, and 26 kilograms and 100 grams of ganja were recovered from the vehicle. Consequently, the present FIR came to be registered and investigation commenced.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner is innocent and has been falsely implicated in the present case. It is contended that the delay in conclusion of the trial is wholly attributable to the prosecution and not to the petitioner. Learned counsel further submits that the principal accused has already been enlarged on regular bail, while co-accused Manoj Kumar has been granted the concession of anticipatory bail by this Court, thereby entitling the petitioner to claim the benefit of parity. It is further argued that the petitioner's continued incarceration for an indefinite period would amount to an infringement of her fundamental right to a speedy trial guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Accordingly, it is prayed that the present petition be allowed.

4. The custody certificate produced by the learned State counsel is taken on record, subject to all just exceptions.

5. Learned State counsel has vehemently opposed the prayer for grant of regular bail, contending that, having regard to the nature, gravity and seriousness of the allegations, the commercial quantity of the contraband allegedly recovered, and the manner in which the offence is stated to have been committed, the petitioner does not deserve the concession of regular bail at this stage. It is, therefore, prayed that the present petition, being devoid of merit, be dismissed.

6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the paper book minutely with their able assistance.

7. The right to a speedy trial is an integral facet of the fundamental right to life and personal liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The constitutional mandate is not confined merely to ensuring a fair trial but also obligates the State to conclude criminal proceedings within a reasonable time so that the process itself does not become punitive.

8. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Hussainara Khatoon v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, 1980 (1) SCC 81, authoritatively held that the right to a speedy trial is an essential and integral part of Article 21, and that any procedure which permits prolonged incarceration without expeditious trial cannot be regarded as fair, just or reasonable. The aforesaid principles are in consonance with the Constitution Bench decisions in A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, 1992 (1) SCC 225, and P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka, 2002 (4) SCC 578, wherein it was held that the right to a speedy trial is a fundamental right flowing from Article 21 and constitutional courts are duty-bound to intervene wherever inordinate and unexplained delay results in denial of substantive justice.

9. Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Tapas Kumar Palit v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 322 and in Arvind Dham v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2026 (2) SSC(Criminal) 271, the Court categorically held that "the right to a speedy trial, enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution, is not eclipsed by the nature of the offence." It was further held that prolonged incarceration of an undertrial, without commencement or reasonable progress of the trial, effectively converts pre- trial detention into a form of punishment and cannot be constitutionally sustained. The Court observed that if the State or the prosecuting agency is unable to secure an accused's fundamental right to a speedy trial, it cannot oppose the grant of bail merely on the ground of the seriousness of the allegations, as Article 21 prevails over statutory restrictions where continued incarceration becomes oppressive and unjustified.

10. This constitutional position has acquired greater significance in prosecutions under special statutes containing restrictive bail provisions. The Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 is undoubtedly a stringent penal statute enacted to combat the menace of illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. The principle was specifically applied to prosecutions under the NDPS Act in Mohd. Muslim @ Hussain v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2023 SCC OnLine SC 352. The Apex Court held that Section 37 of the NDPS Act cannot be construed so rigidly as to compel indefinite incarceration of an undertrial merely because the trial has not progressed. The Court observed that a literal interpretation of Section 37, divorced from constitutional values, would amount to sanctioning punitive detention before conviction. It was emphatically held that where the State is unable to conclude the trial within a reasonable time, the rigours of Section 37 necessarily yield to the constitutional mandate of Article 21. The Court further observed that Section 436A

Cr.P.C. applies even to prosecutions under special statutes and constitutes an important legislative safeguard against indefinite pre-trial detention.

11. Recently, in Rabi Prakash v. State of Odisha, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1109 and Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 SCC Online SC 1693, the Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated that prolonged incarceration militates against the most cherished fundamental right under Article 21. The Court observed that where the accused has remained in custody for an unduly long period and the trial is nowhere near completion, constitutional liberty must prevail over the statutory embargo contained in Section 37 of the NDPS Act. The Court succinctly held that conditional liberty must override the statutory embargo when the constitutional guarantee itself stands threatened. Similarly, the Apex Court has recently reaffirmed these constitutional principles in.

12. Thus, the legal position that emerges from the above authorities is that while offences under the NDPS Act are undoubtedly grave and the statutory conditions governing bail are stringent, the constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial under Article 21 remains paramount. Courts are required to balance the societal interest in effective prosecution with the individual's fundamental right to personal liberty. Prolonged incarceration of an undertrial without meaningful progress in the trial cannot be justified merely by invoking the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act. In such exceptional circumstances, Constitutional Courts are duty-bound to harmonise the statutory restrictions with the fundamental right to personal liberty and ensure that pre-trial detention does not degenerate into punishment before adjudication of guilt. Where delay is inordinate and not attributable to the accused, constitutional courts are empowered to grant appropriate relief so as to prevent violation of Article 21.

13. It is equally relevant to note that while Section 37 prescribes stringent conditions for grant of bail, the NDPS Act itself reflects the legislative intent that such prosecutions should proceed expeditiously. Section 36 empowers the Government to constitute Special Courts for the very purpose of ensuring speedy trial of NDPS offences. Therefore, the statutory scheme itself proceeds on the assumption that greater restrictions on bail are constitutionally sustainable only when accompanied by equally expeditious adjudication. Where the State fails to provide the infrastructure necessary for speedy disposal, continued reliance upon Section 37 alone would produce an unconstitutional imbalance between individual liberty and societal interest. Delay defeats that legislative premise. If trials remain pending for years because of systemic inadequacies, repeated adjournments, non-production of witnesses, or institutional delays not attributable to the accused, continued incarceration ceases to be preventive and assumes a punitive character.

14. It is not in dispute that the alleged recovery of 26.100 kilograms of ganja was effected from co-accused Kamla, who has already been granted the concession of regular bail by the learned Trial Court vide order dated 06.02.2024. Furthermore, co-accused Manoj Kumar has also been granted the concession of anticipatory bail by this Court vide order dated 20.03.2024 passed in CRM-M-65008-2023. The petitioner has remained in judicial custody since 27.10.2024 and has undergone incarceration for approximately one year and nine months. The trial is

progressing at a sluggish pace, with only five prosecution witnesses having been examined thus far.

14.1. In the totality of the circumstances, this Court is of the considered view that the petitioner cannot be subjected to indefinite pre- trial incarceration merely because the allegations involve a commercial quantity under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985. The object of pre-trial detention is to secure the presence of the accused during trial and not to impose punishment before conviction. Once the investigation stands concluded and the delay in conclusion of the trial is not attributable to the petitioner, continued detention would assume the character of punitive incarceration, thereby infringing the petitioner's fundamental right to a speedy trial guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Moreover, the trial is not likely to attain finality in the near future and is expected to consume considerable time before reaching its logical conclusion. Consequently, no useful purpose would be served by prolonging the petitioner's incarceration pending trial.

14.2. Consequently, without expressing any opinion on the merits of the case, lest it may prejudice either party during the course of trial, the present petition is allowed. The petitioner is ordered to be released on regular bail, subject to his furnishing adequate bail and surety bonds to the satisfaction of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate/Illaqa Magistrate/Duty Magistrate concerned, as the case may be, and further subject to the following conditions:- i. The petitioner(s) shall not, directly or indirectly, make any inducement, threat, or promise to any person acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the case so as to dissuade such person from disclosing such facts before the Court or to the Investigating Agency. ii. The petitioner(s) shall not tamper with the prosecution evidence in any manner whatsoever, nor shall the petitioner(s), directly or indirectly, attempt to influence, intimidate, or contact any prosecution witness. iii. The petitioner(s) shall not leave the territorial limits of India without obtaining the prior permission of the learned Trial Court. In the event any of the petitioner(s) is in possession of a passport, the particulars thereof shall be furnished before the Investigating Officer as well as the learned Trial Court. iv. Before accepting the bail and surety bonds, the learned Illaqa Magistrate/Duty Magistrate/C.J.M. concerned shall obtain from the petitioner(s) the permanent residential address as well as the present correspondence address, duly supported by appropriate documentary proof. The Investigating Officer shall verify the correctness of the said addresses within 48 hours of the acceptance of the bail bonds and place a verification report on record. In the event any of the addresses is found to be false, fictitious, or incorrect, it shall be open to the prosecution to seek cancellation of the concession of bail in accordance with law. v. The petitioner(s) shall furnish before the learned Trial Court, either at the time of furnishing the bail bonds or within such period as may be specified by the Court, the Permanent Account Number (PAN), Aadhaar Number, particulars of all operative bank accounts, and a declaration disclosing details of immovable properties, if any. Any concealment of material particulars or furnishing of false information shall constitute a valid ground for seeking cancellation of the concession of bail in accordance with law.

vi. The petitioner(s) shall intimate the Investigating Officer as well as the learned Trial Court, in writing, of any change in residential address or mobile number within seven days of such change. vii. The petitioner(s) shall not commit any offence of a similar nature during the pendency of the trial and shall remain present before the learned Trial Court on each and every date fixed, unless personal appearance is exempted in accordance with law. The petitioner(s) shall not absent from the proceedings without obtaining prior permission of the learned Trial Court. In the event of violation of any of the aforesaid conditions or unauthorized absence from the trial proceedings, it shall be open to the learned Trial Court to proceed in accordance with law, including cancellation of the concession of bail and issuance of appropriate coercive process, including warrants of arrest.

15. In light of the final disposition of the captioned matter, all pending miscellaneous and interconnected applications are hereby deemed disposed of. The adjudication of the primary dispute has spent the force of these ancillary proceedings, rendering them infructuous ex facie. Consequently, no independent or supplemental orders are warranted or required in respect thereof.

( VIRINDER AGGARWAL) 27.07.2026

JUDGE Gaurav Sorot Whether reasoned / speaking? Yes / No Whether reportable? Yes / No