CRM-M/71608/2025 of RAJESH Vs STATE OF HARYANA AND ANOTHER on 23 July 2026

1. Petitioner seeks quashing of FIR No. 183 dated 19.07.2023 under Sections 406, 420 Indian Penal Code, Police Station Sanoli, District Panipat and all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom.

2. The facts, per FIR: Sanjeev Kumar son of Rameshwar Dass stated that he was running a car repair shop at Bus Stand, Sanouli Khurd. On 03.09.2021, Rajesh sold to him a Santro car bearing registration No. HR-05-AE-2332, Model 2011, white colour, for a sum of ₹1,55,000/- and received the amount in cash against receipt. He also made over to him form Nos. 28, 29 and 30 and sale letter signed by Ramesh, owner of the car, along with his Aadhar card and PAN card. Complainant further alleged that on 16.09.2021, when he approached the Registration Authority, Kharkhoda for transfer of the vehicle, he met Naveen son of Balwinder Singh, who tore the vehicle transfer papers claiming that he was owner of the car and had already filed a complaint in Police Station, Sonipat in that regard. He made a call to the police but the police did not respond, whereafter he returned to his house. Later, he received telephonic call from Police Station Sonipat, that the Santro Car in his possession was stolen property. He was called to the Police Station, where he was pressurized to hand over the car to the police or to settle the matter with Naveen by paying him money. Under pressure, he paid ₹1,00,000/- to Naveen. Thus, Rajesh had cheated him by giving him forged papers regarding sale of the car. He made several complaints to the SHO, Police Station Sanauli and to superior authorities, but no action was taken.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that petitioner had been falsely implicated in the case. He was a bona fide dealer, in sale and purchase of used cars. He lawfully purchased Santro car from Ramesh Kumar, the registered owner with all the documents and sold the car to the complainant in ordinary course of business. At the time of sale, he handed over all original documents to the complainant. Later on, complainant met Naveen in registration office, who claimed to have purchased the car from Ramesh. A compromise was allegedly executed between the complainant Sanjeev and Naveen. Petitioner was never joined in the compromise, nor called by the police at the time of compromise. The entire conflict arose from double sale by Ramesh, who sold the car, first to the petitioner and later to Naveen. Ramesh was not joined as an accused, while petitioner, though bona fide purchaser, was being prosecuted. The complainant had already compromised with Naveen. Petitioner was victim of fraudulent dealing between Ramesh and Naveen. The dispute was purely civil in nature. There was an unexplained delay of 02 years in lodging the FIR. Police never joined the petitioner in investigation. The FIR, which was lodged with ulterior motive, deserved to be quashed as no ingredient of offences under Sections 406 and 420 IPC were made out.

4. In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, Hon’ble Supreme Court has laid down following parameters for exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. (now 528 BNSS) for quashing of FIR: “(a) where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the ac- cused; (b) where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the F.I.R.do not disclose a cogniz- able offence, justifying an investi- gation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code;

(c) where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or 'com- plaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not dis- close the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused; (d) where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investiga- tion is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magis- trate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code;

(e) where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so ab- surd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused; (f) where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the pro- visions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institu- tion and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the griev- ance of the aggrieved party; (g) where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.”

5. The observations of Hon’ble the Supreme Court in Hira Lal v. State (Govt. of NCT) Delhi, 2003 SCC(Cri)2016, also need to be referred as under:- “It is a firmly established principle that, while examining a peti- tion for quashing under Section 482 of the Crpc, the court must re- frain from conducting a mini-trial or undertaking a detailed evalu- ation of the evidence. The inherent power to quash criminal pro- ceedings is to be exercised only in rare and exceptional circum- stances, such as where the allegations in the FIR are patently ab- surd, inherently improbable, or fail to disclose any cognizable of- fence. When the FIR or complaint, on its face, discloses the basic ingredients of a cognizable offence, the appropriate course is to al- low the process of investigation and trial to continue, rather than prematurely terminating the prosecution at an interlocutory stage. Interference at this stage would not only impede the investigative process but also defeat the very object of criminal justice.”

6. The inherent power to quash criminal proceedings in the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 528 BNSS is to be exercised in rare and exceptional circumstances only where continuation of proceedings would amount to gross miscarriage of justice or would result in abuse of the process of law. While considering a petition for quashing FIR, Court cannot undertake a detailed scrutiny of evidence nor it can adjudicate disputed questions of facts. A bare reading of the FIR, contents whereof are reproduced hereinabove prima- facie discloses basic ingredients of cognizable offence(s). From the copy of the FIR placed on record, it transpires that the matter was inquired into and it was found that Naveen had purchased the car from its registered owner Ramesh Dahiya on 04.08.2021 and the car was taken away by his neighbour, petitioner Rajesh on 06.09.2021 on the pretext of taking his family to Agra. It was further revealed that Rajesh did not return the car, whereafter Naveen made a complaint to Police Station, Sonipat on 10.09.2021. By that time petitioner had already sold the car to complainant Sanjeev.

7. The question whether the car in question was sold by the registered owner Ramesh to petitioner Rajesh in his capacity as a car dealer or the car was borrowed by the petitioner from Naveen, who had purchased the same from

Ramesh are questions, which required evidence to be led and cannot be determined in quashing proceedings. It is only on appraisal of the oral and documentary evidence led during the trial of the case, that defence raised by the petitioner can be appreciated. Disputed questions of facts cannot be examined while exercising jurisdiction under Section 528 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023. Delay in lodging FIR, per se, cannot be a ground to quash the FIR. The instant case does not fall within the parameters of law laid down by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in Bhajan Lal’s case (supra). Present is not a case which needs to be quashed at the inception, without trial.

8. The petition is bereft of merit and is hereby dismissed.

9. All pending CRM(s), if any, also stand disposed of.

10. Nothing observed hereinabove shall be construed as an opinion on merits of the case. (SHALINI SINGH NAGPAL) 23.07.2026

JUDGE Ajay Goswami Whether Speaking/Reasoned : Yes/No Whether Reportable : Yes/No