Ashok Kumar vs PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK on 14 October 2026

**DEBTS RECOVERY APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, DELHI**

Appeal No. 305/2026

In TMA No. 11/2025

Arising out of O.A. No. 33/2015 (DRT-I, Delhi)

Item No. 02

Ashok Kumar

Vs

Punjab National Bank and Ors.

**14.10.2026**

Present: Mr. Mohammad Nausheen Samar and Ms. Khushboo Thakur, Counsel for appellant in person.

This matter has been taken up by me through Hybrid Mode.

The Registry has raised an objection regarding a deficit court fee of ₹29,750/-, stating that the appellant has paid only ₹250/- against the requisite court fee of ₹30,000/-.

2. Learned counsel for the appellant contests the objection and submits that the court fee of ₹250/- already paid is sufficient. It is submitted that an ex parte final order was passed against the appellant, whereafter she filed a miscellaneous application before the Debts Recovery Tribunal seeking to set aside the said order and restore the proceedings. The miscellaneous application was dismissed on the ground of limitation. The present appeal challenges the order dismissing that application and does not challenge the ex parte final order itself. Accordingly, learned counsel submits that, for the purpose of court fee, the appeal is to be treated as an appeal against an interlocutory order. In support of this submission, reliance is placed upon the decision of the Hon'ble Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, Allahabad, in S. P. Kanodia v. IFCI Limited, 2005 SCC Online DRAT 77.

3. Heard and perused the record.

sd -

4. I have examined the record and heard learned counsel for the appellant at length. The question presently requiring determination is confined to the sufficiency of the court fee. Accordingly, the following issue arises for consideration:

Whether the court fee of ₹250/- paid by the appellant is sufficient by applying Rule 7 of the Debts Recovery Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1993, instead of the fee prescribed under Rule 8 of the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1994, where the appeal challenges the dismissal of an application to set aside an ex parte final order, rather than the final order itself?

5. In S. P. Kanodia (supra), the Hon'ble DRAT, Allahabad, distinguished a direct appeal against an ex parte final order from an appeal against the rejection of an application under Section 22(2)(g) of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993. A direct appeal against the final order attracts the fee prescribed under Rule 8(2) of the DRAT (Procedure) Rules. Where, however, the aggrieved party pursues the remedy of setting aside the ex parte order before the DRT and thereafter appeals against the rejection of that application, the fee applicable to an application under Rule 7 of the DRT (Procedure) Rules governs the appeal.

6. The reasoning proceeds on the analogy of an application under Order IX Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and an appeal against its rejection under Order XLIII Rule 1(d). Although Section 22(1) of the Act provides that the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal are not bound by the procedure laid down in the Code, it does not preclude recourse to analogous procedural principles where the Act and Rules are silent. The decision thus treats an appeal against the rejection of a revival application as attracting the application fee under Rule 7.

7. Similarly, in Shiv Ganga Organic Chemicals Ltd. v. State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur, 2003 SCC Online DRAT 71, the Hon'ble DRAT, Delhi, held that an appellant challenging an interlocutory order could not be required to pay court fee calculated by reference to the amount directed to be recovered under the final order. In the absence of a specific provision in Rule 8 prescribing a fee for such an appeal, the sd - fee prescribed under the DRT Rules for an application seeking an interlocutory order was held applicable.

8. Applying the aforesaid principles to the present case, the impugned order is the order dismissing the appellant's miscellaneous application on the ground of limitation. That application sought to set aside the ex parte final order and restore the original proceedings. The present appeal does not directly challenge the final order determining the liability of the appellant. Its subject matter is the rejection of the miscellaneous application.

9. For the limited purpose of determining the court fee payable, the present appeal therefore falls within the category considered in S. P. Kanodia (supra). The dismissal of the miscellaneous application on the ground of limitation does not convert the present appeal into a direct appeal against the ex parte final order.

10. The objection raised by learned counsel for the appellant to the Registry's demand for deficit court fee appears satisfactory and is accepted. Accordingly, the court fee of ₹250/- already paid is held sufficient, and the Registry's objection requiring payment of a further sum of ₹29,750/- is overruled. The Registry is directed to process the present appeal and to follow the same principle in all similarly situated cases wherever applicable, subject to compliance with other applicable requirements.

11. Hence, as there are no further objections, list the matter before Hon'ble Chairperson for 04.11.2026.

Sd-

**(SRIKANTH)** **Registrar**

-Tanuja