CMA/3197/2026 of THE SECRETARY, PWD Vs M/S JAINCO ENTERPRISES PRIVATE LIMITED, on 20 July 2026

1. The Secretary, PWD, Public Works Department, Government of Rajasthan, Secretariat, Jaipur, Rajasthan.

2. The Executive Engineer, Public Works Department, Division-Mangrol, District Kota, State of Rajasthan Through Officer-In-Charge of Case Superintendent Engineer

(C.R.I.F.),

Public

Works

Department, Government of Rajasthan, Jaipur, Rajasthan. ----Appellants Versus M/s Jainco Enterprises Private Limited, Through Its Director Shri Prakash Chand Jain Son of Shri Harak Chand Jain, Director, Registered Address 592, Welcome Tower, Modi College Road, Dadabadi Extension Kota (Raj.) ----Respondent For Appellant(s) : Mr. Vigyan Shah, AAG Mr. Sankalp Vijay Ms. Tanvisha Pant For Respondent(s) : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN MONGA HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ASHUTOSH KUMAR Order (Oral) 20/07/2026 Per: Arun Monga, J. CMCC No.1532/2026

1. For the reasons stated in the application, delay of 56 days in filing the appeal is allowed.

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2. Accordingly, application stands disposed of. D.B. Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 3197/2026

1. Appellants herein seeks quashing of order dated 02.05.2026 passed by learned Commercial Court vide which objections filed by the appellant under Section 34 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 against Arbitral Award dated 23.11.2024 were rejected as being barred by limitation. Pertinently, yet again the instant appeal has also been filed after the period of limitation expired, though of course, vide an order of even date we have condoned the delay.

2. The facts, briefly stated, are these. The Public Works Department, Division Mangrol, District Kota, awarded to the Respondent, M/s Jainco Enterprises Private Limited, the work of "Widening and Strengthening to Two-Lane Carriageway on NH-76 (Anta) to Nagda–Rajpuriya Road MDR" (Job No. CRF-713-RJ-2009) vide Work Order No. 3555 dated 11.10.2010 (Agreement No. 75 of 2010-11), for a contract value of ₹9,63,67,700/-. The work was to be executed between 21.10.2010 and 20.01.2012, but was actually completed on 20.05.2013, a delay of 486 days. By order dated 04.07.2019, the Chief Engineer (NH & PPP), PWD, apportioned this delay i.e. 119 days to the contractor and 367 days to the Department. 2.1 As the contract did not incorporate Price Adjustment Clause 47.1 of the Standard Bidding Document, the Department recovered ₹57,12,000/- as compensation for delay and settled the Respondent's final bill. The Respondent invoked the dispute resolution mechanism before the Standing Committee (Dispute Review Expert), which rendered its decision on 01.03.2021, whereupon the Respondent's Security Deposit of ₹19,61,051/- was released on 22.03.2021.

(3of 6) [CMA-3197/2026] 2.2 The Respondent thereafter sought appointment of an Arbitrator on 24.05.2021. Although the Chief Engineer (NH & PPP) declined the request on 01.07.2021 with reference to Clause 25.2 of the General Conditions of Contract, arbitration proceedings nonetheless ensued and culminated in an Award, a signed copy of which was admittedly received by the Appellants on 24.12.2024. In subsequent execution proceedings, the Respondent claimed ₹2,92,80,793/-; the Executing Court, by order dated 05.05.2026, determined the payable amount at ₹1,86,20,253/-. 2.3 According to the Appellants, upon receipt of the Award, the matter was routed through the prescribed departmental channels for legal opinion and administrative approval to challenge the Award. Only upon completion of that process did the Appellants file objections under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, on 07.10.2025, accompanied by applications for condonation of delay and stay of the Award. 2.4 By order dated 02.05.2026, the learned Commercial Court No. 3, Jaipur Metropolitan-II, dismissed the objections as barred by the limitation prescribed under Section 34(3) of the Act. The Respondent has meanwhile instituted execution proceedings before the Commercial Court No. 4, Jaipur Metropolitan-II. 2.5 Hence, the present appeal.

3. We have heard learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the Appellants.

4. The solitary question is whether the learned Commercial Court erred in rejecting the Section 34 objections on the ground of limitation, without adjudicating them on merits ? 4.1 The answer turns on two settled propositions:

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(a) As is borne out from the plain language deployed in the statute, the limitation under Section 34(3) is absolute. An application to set aside an award must be made within three months of receipt of the award; the proviso permits a further extension of thirty days on sufficient cause being shown, "but not thereafter." The Court has no jurisdiction to entertain an application beyond this outer limit of 120 days.

(b) The State enjoys no special dispensation. Delay attributable to internal administrative processes, movement of files, obtaining sanctions, appointment of counsel, does not constitute sufficient cause, and in any event cannot enlarge a limitation which the statute itself declares unextendible.

5. In light of the above position in law, the learned Commercial Court proceeded on the Appellants' own admission in the objection petition that the copy of the Award was received on 24.12.2024. Applying the settled principle that admitted facts require no proof, it computed limitation thus: the three-month period expired on 23.03.2025; the further condonable period of thirty days expired on 22.04.2025; yet the objections were presented only on 08.10.2025 i.e. more than five months beyond the outermost permissible date. 5.1 The plea that the Appellants, being a Government Department, required time for administrative approvals and appointment of counsel was rejected, and in our view also, rightly so, holding that the law of limitation binds the Government as it binds every other litigant; that departments staffed with persons conversant with court proceedings cannot claim a separate period of limitation; and that the excuse of "impersonal machinery" and file-noting bureaucracy is unacceptable in

(5of 6) [CMA-3197/2026] the age of modern technology, absent a plausible explanation for each day of delay. 5.2 The Commercial Court accordingly held that (a) the internal administrative reasons pleaded did not amount to sufficient cause, and (b) even if they did, the Court was denuded of jurisdiction to condone any delay beyond 120 days. Having found the petition time-barred, it rightly declined to examine the objections on merits, and dismissed the petition on the ground of limitation alone.

6. We find no legal infirmity in this approach. The matter is concluded by the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India v. Popular Construction Co.1, which construed the words "but not thereafter" in the proviso to Section 34(3) as an express exclusion within the meaning of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, thereby barring recourse to Section 5 of that Act. To permit an application beyond the extended period would render the phrase "but not thereafter" wholly otiose. The scheme and object of the 1996 Act reinforce this conclusion. The Act was enacted, inter alia, "to minimise the supervisory role of courts in the arbitral process," an objective given statutory expression in Section 5, which mandates that no judicial authority shall intervene in matters governed by Part I except where so provided in that Part. The time limit under Section 34 is therefore absolute and unextendible by the Court under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

7. Tested on this anvil, the Appellants' case admits of no answer. On their own showing, the Award was received on 24.12.2024 and the objections were filed in October 2025, long after 22.04.2025, the last date on which even a condonable filing could have been made. 1 (2001) 8 SCC 470

(6of 6) [CMA-3197/2026] Whatever the merits of the explanation offered, the statutory bar operates; the Commercial Court had no jurisdiction to condone the delay, and neither do we in appeal have any warrant to direct otherwise.

8. The appeal, being bereft of merit, is accordingly dismissed.

9. All pending applications also stand disposed of (ASHUTOSH KUMAR),J (ARUN MONGA),J 28/Aman/Prateek