CRLA/683/2025 of Nakka Vamshi Vs State of Telangana on 22 September 2026

IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA AT HYDERABAD TUESDAY, THE TWENTY SECOND DAY OF SEPTEMBER TWO THOUSAND AND TWENW SIX PRESENT THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE K.LAKSHMAN AND THE HONOURABLE SMT JUSTICE K, SUJANA CRIMINAL APPEAL NO: 683 OF 2025 Criminal Appeal filed under Section 415(2) ot BNSS against the Judgment dated 30.05.2025 passed in Sessions Case No. 04 of 2021 on the file of the Court of the Principal District and Sessions Judge, Jagitial. Between: Nakka Vamshi, S/o. Anjaiah, age 25 years, It/adiga, R/o. H.No.6-11/2, R/o.Laxmipur village, Jagitial Mandal and District. ...Appellant /Sole Accused AND State of Telangana, Rep.by its Public Prosecutor, High Court, Hyderabad ...Respondent l.A. NO: 1OF 2025 The lnterlocutory Application filed under section 430(1) of BNSS Act for the grounds stated in the act for the grounds stated in the criminal Appeal, the praying that in the circumstances stated in the Criminal Appeal, the High Court may be pleased to enlarge the PetitioneriAppellant on Bail in Sessions Case No.04/2021 passed by the court of the Principal District and Sessions Judge, Jagitial, by suspending the sentence imposed to the Petitioner/ Appellant vide Judgment dated 30.5.2025 pending disposal of the Criminal Appeal.

Counsel for the Apperllant : Sri C Raghu, Senior Counsel representing Sri Kona N.D.V.Ramana Rao Counsel for the Resprondent : Sri RamaChandra Reddy, Additional Public Prosecutor The Court delivered t:he following: Judgment IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF'TELAITGANA AT TIYDERABAI) THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE K.LAKSHMAN AND THE HONOURABLE SMT. JUSTICE K. SUJANA CRIMINAI APPEAI.No.683 of 2o25 CNR.No. HBrrco103763920/2s DATED: Reserved ou 2o.o8.20126 Pronounced on: Uploaded on: Betseen: Nakka Vamshi ... Appellant/Sole accused AND The State of Telangana ..Respondent JUDGMENT: @s per Honhle Smt. JtLstice K. Sujar.lc.) This Criminal Appeal is filed challenging the judgment dated 3O.05.2O25 passed by the learned principal District and Sessions Judge, Jagtial, in S.C.No.O 4 of 2021, whereby the appellant/accused was convicted for the offences punishable under Sections 302 and 2Ol of the Indian penal Code and \1 ,1?'\1 1I.t

Y

xl,.r & sKs,., Crl,A.I{o.683 of2O2S sentenced to trndergo imprisonment for life and to pay a hne of Rs.2,00O/-, in default to suffer simple imprisonment for three months. for the offence under Section 302 IPC and to undergo simple imprisonment for three years and to pay a fine of Rs.1,OOO/-, in default to suffer simple imprisonment for two months, for tL.e offence under Section 201 IPC'

2. The prosecution case, in brief, is that the deceased, Manda Swap na, was a divorcee having one son and was acquainted with the appellant/ accused, who was a student and also used to attend coolie work for his livelihood' According to the prosecution, the appellant went to Hyderabad on O4.O7.2O78 for his livelihood and worked at Ratnadeep Super Marke1., Medchal, Hyderabad. During that period, the appellant anrl deceased used to meet at various places in Hyderabad arLd developed a relationship with each other. It is alleged that they had sexual intercourse ald subsequently decided to m€rry.

3. It is fu:'ther the case of the prosecution that thereafter the appellant left his job and returned to Laxmipur village' The deceased allegedly used to call the appellant over phone and insist tlrat he should marry her. According to the xr,", & sxs,., Crl.A,[o.683 of 2025 prosecution, the appellant became irritated with her conduct and decided to eliminate her. In furtherance of the said intention, the appellalt allegedly called the deceased on 19.1O.20l8 to come to his village.

4. It is alleged that on 2O.lO.2Ola, the deceased came to Jagtial and boarded a private bus to proceed towards Vengalapur vil1age. The driver and conductor of the said bus, who were examined during investigation as LWs.14 and 15, allegedly recorded their statements under Section 164 Cr.P.C. before the learned Magistrate. According to the said statements, the deceased disclosed that her narne was Swapna and that she was going to meet Vamshi, with whom she was in love. When the bus reached Peddamma Gudi of Venga-lapur village, she allegedly got down from the bus and was received by a male person wearing a pink-coloured towel around his neck.

5. According to the prosecution, the said person was the appellant/ accused, who took the deceased to a land situated near Bandam Bore and cartway bushes, where there would ordinarily be no public presence. It is alleged that both of them talked for some time and t-hereafter quarrelled with each !-E-

I{r,J & SXS,J Crl.A.Ito'683 of 2025 other. The prrlsecution further alieges that while the deceased was taking rerst, the appeilant intentionally caused her death by tying a tovr'el around her neck and strangulating her and thereafter attempted to cause disappearance of the evidence of the offence.

6. On rect:iving information regarding the presence of an unidentified l'ema1e dead body in the shivar of Vengalapur village, P.w. I , the VRO of Gollapalli village, lodged Ex'Pl report, based on which initially a case was registered under Section 174 'Jr.P.C. The police visited the scene of offence' conducted sicene observation and inquest proceedings' photographeci and videographed the dead body and recorded the statements of the witnesses. As the dead body was in a decomposed condition, post-mortem examination was conducted at the scene.

7. P.W.10, the Medical Officer, conducted the post-mortem examination and found a ligature mark around the neck measuring altproximately 2O inches in length and one inch in width, which was horizontal and running through the middle of the neck zrnd was suggestive of strangulation or throttling' The hyoid 'tone was preserved for forensic examination'

---t // !

BLr' & $Gt,.r Crl.A.[o.583 of2O2S Subsequently, on receipt of the FSL report, p.W. 10 gave his final opinion under Ex.p8 that ttre cause of death was ,,due to asphyxia due to strangulation". On the basis of the medical opinion, the case was a_ltered from Section 774 Cr.p.C. to Section 3O2 IPC.

8. During investigation, the identity of the deceased was established as Manda Swapna with the assistance of p.Ws.S and 8. The Investigating Ofhcer also examined the persons acquainted with the deceased and collected the relevant call data records. On O1.11.2018, the appellant was apprehended and, according to the prosecution, in the presence of mediators, he made a disclosure statement and led the police to the scene of offence, from where a towel allegedly used in the commission of the offence and the mobile phone of the deceased were recovered from nearby bushes. His mobile phone was also seizcd from his possession.

9. The prosecution further relied upon the statements of LWs. 14 and 15, the driver and conductor of the private bus, recorded under Sectio n 164 Cr.P.C. According to the had stated that they could prosecution, both witnesses identiff the person who received the deceased at vengalapur F

xr,J & sKs,J Crl.A.[o.6tg of2025 viilage. As L\Vs.14 and 15 died before they couid enter the witness box, their statements were marked as Exs.P22 and P23 through P.W.14, the learned Magistrate who recorded the said statements. A Test Identification Parade was also conducted by P.W. 14, in which P.Ws.5 and 7 and LWs'14 and 15 allegedly irlentified the appellant.

10. The carre was taken on hle for the offences punishable under Sectiorrs 302, 201 arrd 4O4 of IPC and, after compliance with Section 2O7 of Cr.P.C., was committed to the Court of Sessions. Clrarges were framed against the accused for the said offences. The accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.

11. In order to substantiate its case, the prosecution examined P.\Vs.1 to 14, marked Exs.Pl to P23 and produced M.Os.l to 1l . After completion of the prosecution evidence, the accused was examined under Section 3 13 Cr.P.C' with reference tc the incriminating circumstances appearing against him. He denied the allegations and did not adduce any defence r:vidence.

12. The trial Court, after appreciating the oral and documentar; evidence, held that the prosecution had

I{rrJ & SHS,.' Crl.A.[o.683 of2025 established the homicidal death of the deceased through the evidence of P.W. 10 and Exs.p7 and p8. The trial Court further relied upon the evidence of p.Ws.5 and 7, the Section 164 Cr.P.C. statements of LWs.14 and 15, Ex.p21 - Test Identification Parade proceedings, and the recovery of the towel at the instance of the accused, and concluded that the last-seen theory and the chain of circumstances connected the appellant with the offence.

13. The trial Court further held that the recovery of M.O.6/towel at the instalce of the accused, coupled with the evidence of P.W.9 and the Investigating OfIicer, established the offence under Section 2Ol of IpC. However, insofar as Section 4O4 of IPC was concerned, the trial Court held that the prosecution tailed to establish that M.O.9/mobile phone belonged to the deceased and, accordingly, acquitted the accused of the said offence.

74. Consequently, the trial Court convicted the appellant under Sections 3O2 and 201 IpC, convicted for the offences punishable under Sections 3O2 and 2Ol ol the Indian penal Code and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs.2,OO0/-, in default to suffer simple

I(r,", & $<s,J Crl.A.lfo.6t3 of 2O25 imprisonment for three months, for the offence under Section 3O2 of IPC and to undergo simple imprisonment for three years and to pay a fine of Rs'1,OOO/-, in default to suffer simple imprisonment for two months, for the offence under Section 201 of IPC. Aggrieved thereby, the present Crimina'l Appeal has beren preferred.

15. Heard Sri C. Raghu, learned Senior Counsel representing Sri Kona N.D.V. Ramana Rao, iearned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant and Sri M. Ramachandra Reddy, learne'd Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the respondent-State.

16. Learnetl Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that the trial Court erred in convicting the appellant as the prosecution failed to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt and that the entire prosecution case rests upon circumstantiai evidence and that the circumstance s relied upon by the prosecution do not form a complete ancl unbroken charn leading to the conclusion that the appellar t alone committed the offence. He further submitted that the evidence of P.Ws.S and 7, who are stated to be colony clders, does not establish that they had witnessed

Rr,J & $(Ii,J Crl.A.[o.6E3 of2O2S the deceased being taken by the appellant on the date of occurrence. Their evidence, at the most, establishes that the appellant and deceased were acquainted with each other and that they intended to marry, which by itself ca,not connect the appellant with the homicidal death of the deceased.

17. Learned Senior Counsel contended that the trial Court principally relied upon the statements of LWs. 14 and 15, the driver and conductor of the bus, recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. However, both witnesses died before entering the witness box and, therefore, their statements were not subjected to cross-examination and that such statements couid not be treated as substantive evidence of t.Ile fact that the appellalt was the person who received the deceased at VengaJapur village.

18. Learned Senior counsel further submitted that the Test Identification parade was not conducted in a proper manner and that the persons who participated in the parade were not of similar features and appearance. Therefore, the identihcation proceedings could not safely be relied upon to establish the identity of the appellant. Further, he challenged tl're recovery of M.O.6/towel, contending that the alleged

r- xr,,J & srs'", Crl.A.tIo.683 of 2025 disclosure an<l recovery do not establish that the towel was used in the commission of the offence and that the prosecution lailed to establish any scientihc connection between the t':wel and the deceased and that the recovery' by itself, cannot :omplete the chain of circumstances'

19. Learne<l Senior counsel further contended that although P.W. 10 opined that the cause of death was asph5n<ia due to strangulation, the medical evidence does not establish the identity of th,: assailant' He contended that the presence of a ligature marl: and the medical opinion regarding strangulation only establish the cause of death and do not' by themselves' connect the appellant with the offence Therefore' he submitted that the prosecution failed to establish the circumstancr:s of motive, last seen, identifrcation and recovery beyond reascnable doubt and that the circumstances relied upon by tt.e trial Court are capabie of more than one interpretation. He contended that the benefrt of doubt ought tohavebeerrextendedtotheappellantandprayedforsetting aside the corrviction and sentence and acquitting him'

20. In support of his submissions, he relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Gcorge and others

I(I,' & $(s..' Crl,A.IIo.6t3 of2O2s v. State of Kerala and anotherr, wherein paragraph No.36, it is held as follows: "36. We may now turn to the eyidence of pW 50, detailed earlier. From the judgment of the trial court we notice that the substaltial pa-rts of its comments, (quoted earlier) are based on his statement recorded under Section 164 CrpC and not his evidence in court. The said statement was treated as substantive evidence; as would be evident from the following, amongst other observations made by the learned trial court: "If Ext. p-42 (the statement recorded under Section i64 CrPC) is found to be a genuine statement it can be used as an importalt piece of evidence to connect the accused with the crime.. In making the above and similar comments the trial court again ignored a fundamental rule of criminal jurisprudence that a statement of a w.itness recorded under Section 164 CrpC ca-nnot be used as substantive evidence and can be used only for the purpose of contradicting or corroborating him. Instead of appreciating the evidence of pW 50 from that perspective the trial court confined its attenton mainly to his statement so recorded and discredited him. This legal infirmity apart, factuaily a-lso the trial court committed patent enors. As earlier noticed, one of the grounds for disbetieving him was that in the trip_sheet t-he name of the person who performed the journey, namely, A-1 was not shown. If the trial court had cared to look into the other trip_sheets which form part of Ext. P-54 it would have found that in none of them the narne of the person who hired the car is mentioned. 1 (1998) 4 scc 605

xr,r, & sKs,J Crl.A.IIo.6t3 of 2025 The triat court was, therefore, not at all justifred in commenting upon such non-mentioning of the name of the hirer and concluding therefrom that the document was suspect. The comments of the trial court that PW 50 madr: the statement before the Magistrate (Ext. P-

42) to olrlige the police as his brother was arrested in connection with an excise case is also without any basis whatsoever. In drawing the above inference the trial court was much influenced by the fact that the car in qlestion, namely, KEK 3114 was seized by the police orr 31-5- 1990 and that it was released on 28-6- 1990. A:cording to the triat court it was wrongfully detained by the police for such a long period to compel PW 5O lo make a statement according to its dictate. Once a car is seized in connection with a case it can be returned pursuant to the order of a competent court only ani there is nothing on record to indicate that in spite of such an order the car was not retumed so as to entitl-- the tria,l court to comment that the long detentiou of the car was itself a suspicious circumstance. Havilg gone through the evidence of PW 50 we furd that each of the reasons canvassed by the trial corrrt for disbelieving PW 50 is either legally unsustainable or factually incorrect." 2I. He further relied upon the judgment of the Hon'bie Supreme Court in Pandurang Kalu Patil and another v. State of Maharashtra2, wherein paragraphs Nos.S, 14 and 15, it is held as follows: "5. Even the recent decision in State of Maharashtra v. Damu I(2O0O) 6 S(lC 269 ; 2000 SCC (Cri) 10881 this Court followed 'etn 2ooz supnevE :ouRT 733

rG,J & SXtt,J Crl.A.Ito.683 of2O2S Pulukuri Kottaya IAIR 1947 PC 67 : 48 Cri u 533] vrith approval. The fallacy committed by the Division Bench as per the inpugned judgment is possibly on account of truncating the word "fact" in Section 27 of the Evidence Act from the adjoining word "discovered". The essence of Section 27 is that it was enacted as a proviso to the two preceding sections (see Sections 25 and 261 which imposed a complete ban on the a&nissibility of aly confession made by an accused either to the police or to anyone while the accused is in police custody. The object of making a provision in Section 27 was to permit a certain portion of the statement made by an accused to a police oflicer admissible in evidence whether or not such statement is confessional or non-confessional. Nonetheless, the ban against admissibility would stand lifted if the statement distinctly related to a discovery of fact. A fact can be discovered by the police (investigating ollicer) pursuant to an information elicited from the accused if such disclosure was followed by one or more of a variety of causes. Recovery of an object is only one such cause. Recovery, or even production of object by itself need not necessarily result in discovery of a fact. That is why Sir John Beaumont said in Pulukuri Kottaya [AIR 1947 PC 67 : 48 Cri LJ 5331 that (AIR p. 70, para 10) 'it is fallacious to treat the Tact discovered' yrithin the section as equivalent to the object produced'. The following sentence of the learned Law Lord in the said decision, though terse, is eloquent in convefng the message highlighting the pith of the ratio: (AIR p. 70, para

'Information supplied by a person in custody that 'I will produce a knife concea-led in the roof of my house' does not lead to the discovery of a knife; knives were discovered many years ago. It leads to the discovery of the fact t].at a knife is concealed in the house of the informant to his knowledge, and if the knife is proved t4 fia,J & sKs,J Crl,A.lto.683 of 2qr5 to have been used in the commission of the offence, the fact discovered is very relevant." (emphasis supplied)

14. Learnr:d counsel then contended that the High Court had gone wrong in relying on the evidence of PW 18 Dy SP who said that wherr A-2 was arrested and interrogated, a gun was disinterrerl pursuant to the information supplied by him' It is on the saJd aspect that the Division Bench of the High Court considererl the ratio in Pulukuri Kottaya [AIR 1947 PC 67 : 4A Cri LJ 5li3l What PW 18 said in the Court is that the statement made by A-2 had been recorded in Ext 91 memoran(lum. We have noticed from the said memorandum the following ritatement of A-2 as recorded therein: 'I have kept the firearm concealed behind the old house in a heap ofwood "

15. The feLct d.iscovered by PW 18 is certainly not the gun The fact discogered is that A-2 had concealed the gun (Article 5/2) behind the old house under a heap of wood lt was the same gun with which A-2 had fired at PW 2 and that asPect has been proved wiLh the help of other evidence."

22. Per ccntra. learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the respondent-State supported the judgment of the trial Cc,urt and submitted that the prosecution had established the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonabie doubt through a c:omplete chain of circumstantial evidence' He further submitted that the evidence of P'Ws'S an.d 7 establishes 1.he close relationship between the deceased and the appellalt and that the deceased had left the house to meet the appellant pursuant to their decision to marry and that the ;FFF7'

xL,J & SKSi,J Crl.A.Ito.683 of2O25 evidence of the bus driver and conductor, as recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C., establishes that the deceased travelled by bus on the date of occurrence and was received by the appellant at Vengalapur village.

23. Learned Additional Pubiic Prosecutor submitted that LWs. 14 and 15 died before they could be examined in Court and, therefore, their statements recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. were rightly brought on record through P.W.14, the learned Magistrate who recorded them and that the said statements are corroborated by the Test Identifrcation Parade proceedings, wherein the appellant was identifred by the relevant witnesses. He further submitted that the medical evidence of P.W.10 and Exs.P7 and P8 establishes that the death of deceased is a homicidal death due to asphyxia caused by strangulation and that the medical evidence is consistent with the prosecution case regarding the manner in which the deceased was killed.

24. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor contended that the recovery of M.O.6/towel at the instance of the appellant is an importalt incriminating circumstance. The recovery was proved through P.W.9 and the Investigating Officer and d i,/

xl,J & sKlt,J Crt.A.lgo.6t3 of 2O25 colToborates .J:re prosecution version regarding the manner of commission of the offence. He further contended that the last-seen circumstance assumes significance as the deceased was seen prrtceeding to meet the appellant on the date of occurrence and was subsequently found dead arld that the time gap between the deceased being last seen with the appellant an<l the discovery of her dead body was suffrciently proximate explaration a ed that the appeliant failed to furnish any deceased dierl.

25. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor further contended that the discrepancies and omissions pointed out by the defence are tninor in nature and do not affect the core of the prosecution :ase and that when the evidence of P'Ws'S, 7, 9 and 10, the evidence of the Investigating Officer, the Section 164 Cr.P.C statements of LWs. 14 and 15, the Test IdentihcatiorL Parade proceedings and the recovery of M'O'6 are considered cumulatively, they establish a complete chain of circumstances connecting the appellant with the homicidal death of the deceased. Therefore, he prayed the Court to dismiss the tlriminal Appeal. 1.6 regarding the circumstances in which the

IG,J & SKTi,J crl.A.Io.6a3 of 2orl5

26. In support of the submissions of the learned Additional Public Prosecutor, he relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Vijaya Singh and another v. State of Uttarakhand3, wherein paragraph No.31, it is held as follows: "31. Having said so, we deem it f1t to observe that a statement under Section 164 CrPC cannot be discarded at the drop of a hat and on a mere statement of the witness that it was not recorded correctly. For, a judicial satisfaction of the Magistrate, to the eflect that the statement being recorded is the correct version of the facts stated by the witness, forms part of every such statement and a higher burden must be placed upon the witness to retract from the same. To permit retraction by a witness from a signed statement recorded before the Magistrate on flimsy grounds or on mere assertions would effectively negate the difference between a statement recorded by the police offrcer and that recorded by the Judicial Magistrate. In the present matter, there is no reasonable ground to reject the statements recorded under Section 164 CrPC and retance has correctly been placed upon the said statements by the courts below." 27 . The following points arise for consideration in the Criminal Appeal Whether the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the deatl of Manda Swapna was homicida-l and that the appellant/accused was responsible for causing her death by strangulation, thereby committing the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC?

'202a nsc ao5

XI,J & SKII,J Crl.A.fo.683 of2025 Whether the prosecution has established beyond reasonacle doubt that the appeflant caused disapperuance of evidence of the offence, or gave false informa ion with the intention of screening himself from legal punishment, thereby committing the offence punishable under Section 201 IPC? Whethe:' the judgrnent of conviction and sentence passed by the trial Court under Sections 3O2 arrd' 2Ol IPC warrants interference by this Court?

28. In the light of the submissions made by both the learned cour-" se1 and a perusal of the material available on record, the fc,llowing points arise for consideration. Since the prosecution r)ase rests entirely upon circumstantial evidence and there is no direct eyewitness to the actual occurrence, it is necessary Lo examine each of the circumstances reiied upon by the prosecution independently and thereafter consider whether all l;uch circumstances, taken cumulativelli, form a complete ch ain pointing oniy towards the guilt of the appellant/ ac cused.

29. At the outset, it is not in dispute that the deceased Manda Swaltna died an unnatural death. P'W' 1O is the Medical Offi<:er who conducted the post-mortem examination over the dea.d body. According to his evidence, he found a ligature mark around the neck measuring approximately 20

G.

I{I,,J & SXS,J Crl.A.Ito,6t3 of2O2S inches in length and one inch in width, which was horizontal and running ttrrough the middle of the neck and was suggestive of strangulation or throttling. He also preserved the hyoid bone for forensic examination. Subsequently, after receipt of the FSL report, he gave his final opinion under Ex.P8 that the cause of death was due to asphyxia due to strangulation.

30. The evidence of p.W. 1O, therefore, establishes the nature and cause of death of the deceased. The evidence of P.W. 1, the VRO, and P.W.2, the VRA, further establishes that an unidentified female dead body was found near Bandam Bore in the shivar of Vengalapur village and that the matter was initially reported as a suspicious death. p.Ws.3 and 6 are the panch witnesses to the scene observation and inquest proceedings, while p.W.4 is the photographer who photographed the dead body and scene of offence. Their evidence supports the fact that the dead body was found at the place in question and that the police conducted the necessary proceedings.

31. However, the fact that the deceased died due to stralgulation, though an important circumstance, by itself -

Br.,J & Srls,J Cd.A.lto.683 of 2025 does not establish the identity of the person who caused her death. Mt:dical evidence can establish the nature and cause of death, but in the absence of other reliable evidence connectin5l the accused with the occurrence, such medical evidence ,lannot by itself form the basis for conviction against the accused. Therefore, recording a the crucial question irs whether the prosecution has established the nexus between the appellant and the homicidal death of the deceased '-hrough legally admissible and reliabie evidence'

32. The prosecution mainly relies upon the circumstances of the rel,etionship between the deceased and the appellant, the allegt:d last-seen circumstance, the Test Identifrcation Parade, the statements of LWs.14 and 15 recorded under Section 154 Cr.P.C', and the alleged recovery of M'O'6/towe1 at the instance of the appellant. Each of these circumstances requires c arelul scrutinY.

33. So far as the evidence of P.W.5 is concerned, he is stated to be a colony elder who had provided shelter to the deceased. His evidence establishes that the deceased was residing in the colony and that the appellant had come to his house arLd expressed his intention to marry the deceased'

2t 81,., & sxs,.,

P.W.S also identilied the dead body of the deceased from her clothes and footwear when the police showed the photograph of the dead body. His evidence further indicates that the deceased had left the house during the Dussehra festival and had gone with the appellant.

34. P.W.7 is another coiony elder. His evidence is to the effect that he knew the deceased for a considerable period and that the appellant used to visit her. He also stated that the appellant had expressed his intention to marrJr the deceased and that the deceased had informed him tiat the appellant would marry her. Thus, the evidence of p.Ws.S ald 7 establishes that the deceased and the appeliant were acquainted with each other and had a close relationship and that there was an intention on their part to marry.

35. However, the said circumstance has to be appreciated within its proper iimits. The existence of a relationship between the deceased ald the appellant is not, by itself, sufficient to establish that the appellant committed the murder of the deceased. The said circumstance may provide a background to the proseculion case, but it cannot substitute the requirement of proving the essential link connecting the

Kr,., & gI(Il,J Crl.A.[o.663 of2025 accused with the actual occurrence. Even assuming that the appellalt anrl deceased were last known to be acquainted with each other, the prosecution must establish by reliable evidence that the appeilant was with the deceased at or immediately 1:rior to the time of her death.

36. The prosecution, therefore, heavily relies upon the evidence of LWs. 14 and 15, the driver and conductor of the private bus in which the deceased allegedly travelled from Jagtial towards Vengalapur on 20.10.2018. Admittedly, both LWs. 14 and L5 died before they could be examined before the trial Court. Their statements recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. were marked as Exs.P22 an-d P23 through P.W. 14, the learned Magirrtrate who recorded the said statements. 37 . Accord Lng to Exs.P22 and P23, the deceased allegedly boarded the bus at Jagtial at about 09.3O a.m. and informed the driver/ conductor that her name was Swapna and that she was going to meet Vamshi, with whom she was in love. It is further state(l that when the bus reached Peddamma Gudi of Vengalapur liilage, the deceased requested the driver to stop the bus and got down, whereupon a male person wearing a TF' /

xr,., & sxti,J Crl.A.[o.683 of 2oil5 pink-coloured towel around his neck received her. The said witnesse s further stated that they could identify that person.

38. The trial Court treated Exs.P22 and P23 as substantive evidence and relied upon them for establishing the last-seen circumstance. The trial Court proceeded on the premise that as LWs.14 and 15 had died, their statements recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. became relevant and could be used as evidence after examining the Magistrate who recorded them. In our considered view, the said approach requires reconsideration in the light of the settled principles governing statements recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C.

39. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of George (cited supra), has reiterated that a statement of a witness recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. cannot be treated as substarrtive evidence and ordinarily can be used for the purpose of contradicting or corroborating the testimony of such witness. The Court specihcally disapproved an approach where the trial Court treated the statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. as substantive evidence instead of appreciating the evidence of the witness before the Court.

F

XI,J & SIG,J Crt.A.ro.6ag of 2O25

40. The si1;nificance of the said principle becomes even greater in the present case because LWs.14 and 15 did not enter the wittress box at all. Therefore, there is no substantive testimony of either of those witnesses before the trial Court which could be corroborated or contradicted by their eariier statements under Section 164 Cr.P'C. Their statements, therefore, callnot be elevated into substantive evidence merely because the'ritnesses died before trial. 4t. The evidence of P.W. 14, the learned Magistrate, establishes that he recorded the statements of LWs'14 and 15 under Section 164 Cr.P.C. It also establishes the fact that the statements vrere recorded by him in the course of his judicial duties. Horvever, the evidence of the Magistrate as to the recording of the statements does not transform the contents of those stateraents into substantive testimony regarding the facts narra':ed by the deceased bus passengers' The Magistrate vras not an eyewitness to the occurrence and had no persona. knowledge as to whether the deceased was actualiy rece,ived by the appellant at Vengalapur village'

42. The rlistinction between proving the fact that a statement was recorded and proving the truth of the contents

I(IJ & SKS,J Crl.A.Ito.683 of2O25 of that statement is material. P.W. 14 can establish that Exs.P22 and P23 were recorded before him, but he cannot give substantive evidence regarding the truth of the matters stated therein merely because he recorded them. Consequently, the contents of Exs.P22 and P23 cannot, in the facts of the present case, be treated as substantive evidence establishing that the appellant was the person who received the deceased from the bus.

43. The contention of the learned Additional Public Prosecutor that the statements become substantive evidence because the witnesses died before entering the witness box cannot be accepted merely on that ground. The death of a witness may affect the availability of his testimony, but it does not, by itself, convert every previous statement made by him into substantive evidence unless the statement falls within a specilic statutory exception permitting its use for that purpose. The trial Court, therefore, ought to have examined the precise statutory basis on which Exs.P22 and P23 could be treated as substantive proof of the last-seen circumstance.

44. The reliance placed by the trial Court upon Sections 6 and 35 of the Evidence Act also does not cure the /,,

E

Rr,J & SKS,.' Crl.A.lto.6t3 of2025 fundamental defect. Section 6 relates to facts forming part of the same tralsaction ald is concerned with the relevancy of facts. Relevancy and admissibility are distinct from the question whr:ther a particular statement can be treated as substantive proof of the truth of its contents. Similarly, Section 35 (:oncerns entries in public records made by a public servant or by a person performing a duty specially enjoined by law. The mere fact that a Magistrate recorded a statement in the discharge of judicial duty does not mean that every assertion contained in that statement becomes substantive proof of the truth of the assertion.

45. .The prosumption regarding regularity or genuineness of an offrcial acl. also cannot be confused with proof of the truth of the facts narrated by the person whose statement was recorded. At the highest, the evidence of P.W.14 establishes that the stat,lments were recorded in the manner stated by him. It does not establish, from his personal knowledge, that the person <lescribed by LWs. 14 and 15 was in fact the appeliant or that the deceased was actually received by the appellant at the bus stop. Further, the judgment relied upon by the proser:ution is also not helpful, as there is a factual t

XIJ & SBS,J Crl.A. 0.6A3 of 2()2s difference in the present case, since the said driver and conductor were not examined by the Court.

46. The Test Identification Parade evidence also requires consideration in this context. Ex.P2l relates to the identification proceedings conducted by p.W.14. The trial Court relied upon the identification of the appeilant by p.Ws.S and 7 and by LWs.14 and 15. However, insofar as LWs.14 and 15 are concerned, their identihcation cannot independently supply substantive evidence of the last-seen circumstance when the witnesses themselves were not examined before the trial Court. The identihcation proceedings cannot be treated as a substitute for substantive testimony which was never given in Court. 47 . As regards P.Ws.S ard 7 , their identification of the appellant only establishes that they identified the person whom they already knew as Nakka Vamshi. Their evidence, as noticed above, establishes acquaintalce and relationship between the appellant and the deceased. It does not establish that they saw the appellant taking the deceased to the place where her dead body was subsequently found or that they saw the appellant with the deceased immediately before her death.

2a r(l,J & sas,J Crl.A.fo,663 of 2925

48. The prosecution has, therefore, not been able to establish through substantive evidence the crucial circumstance that the deceased was last seen alive in the company of tre appellant immediately prior to her death. This is not a min,:r discrepancy. In a case resting entirely upon circumstantial evidence, the iast-seen circumstance assumes importance cnly when it is established by cogent and legally admissible evidence and when the proximity between the time of last seen zrnd the time of death is such that the possibility of intervention by another person is substantiaily excluded.

49. In the present case, once Exs.P22 and P23 are excluded from consideration as substantive evidence, there remains no direct or substantive evidence showing that the deceased was last seen with the appellant immediately before her death. P.Ws.S and l/ establish the relationship between the two, but not the last-s;een circumstance on the date and at the relevalt place of occurrence.

50. The prosecution next relies upon the alleged disclosure statement arLd recovery of M.O.6/towe1. P.W.9 is stated to be one of tht: mediators to the confession-cum-recovery proceedings and P.W. i 3 is the Investigating Offrcer. Their .,: .r r(r,J & sxs,J Crl.A,No.663 of2O2S evidence is relied upon to establish that the appellant gave information leading to the recovery of M.O.6/towel from the bushes near the scene of offence. M.O.7 is stated to be the mobile phone of the accused which was seized from his possesslon.

51. The evidentiar5r value of such recovery has to be examined in the light of Section 2Z of the Indian Evidence Act. The principie iaid down by the Hon,ble Supreme Court in Pandurang Kalu Patil (cited supra), is that the fact discovered under Section 27 is not necessarily synonymous with the object produced or recovered. The admissible portion is that part of the information supplied by the accused which distincfly relates to the fact thereby discovered. Recovery of an object by itself does not automatically establish that the accused committed the offence.

52. Applyrng the above principle to the present case, even assuming that the recovery of M.O.6/towel at the instalce of the appellant is proved, the recovery establishes only such fact as is legally discoverable from the information furnished by the accused. The prosecution must further establish the

IIL,J & SXS,J Crl,A.Ito.683 of 2025 incriminating character of the recovered article and its nexus with the comnrission of the offence

53. In the present case, there is no reliable evidence establishing that M.O.6/towel belonged to the appellant or that it was th: very towel used for strangulating the deceased' Significantly, the prosecution relies upon the Section 164 Cr.P.C. statements of LWs.14 and 15 to suggest that the person who received the deceased was wearing a pink- coloured tow':I. Once the statements of LWs'14 and 15 are not available as substantive evidence, the circumstalce that the towel alk:gedly recovered from the bushes was the same towel noticec. by the bus driver and conductor also loses its evidentiary fcrundation.

54. Further, there is no satisfactory scientifrc evidence placed on rer:ord establishing that M'O'6 contained any blood' biological Inaterial or other incriminating substance connecting it with the deceased' In the absence of such corroborativt: evidence, the recovery of an ordinary article such as a towel from bushes near the scene' even if proved' cannot by itr;elf establish that the appellant used that towel to cause the death.

xr,, & sxs,, Crl.A.IYo.683 of2O2S

55. The same reasoning applies to M.O.Z , the mobile phone of the appellant. The evidence of p.W. 12, the Nodai OfIicer, establishes the relevant mobiie connection in the name of the appellant. However, recovery of the appellant,s own mobile phone from his possession is not an incriminating circumstance unless it connects him with the commission of the offence. It does not establish that he was present with the deceased at the place of occurrence or that he committed the murder.

56. It is also significant tllat the trial Court itself found the prosecution evidence insuffrcient to establish the charge under Section 404 IpC concerning the alleged mobile phone of the deceased. The trial Court held that there was no sufhcient evidence to establish that M.O.9 belonged to the deceased. This finding demonstrates that the prosecution failed to establish the ownership and evidentiary nexus of the deceased's mobile phone. Therefore, the alleged recovery of mobile-related material cannot be given greater evidentiar5r significalce than what the record permits.

57. The evidence of p.W. 1O, though reliable to the extent of establishing the cause of death, also does not connect the xr,", & sBs,., Crl.A.tro.683 of 2025 appellant with the commission of the offence. The medical evidence estabiishes strangulation, but it does not identify the person who r:aused the strangulation' There is no scientific evidence on record which connects the appellant with the iigature mark: or with the towel allegedly used in the offence.

58. P.Ws.1 and 2 are also not eyewitnesses to the commission of the offence. P.W. 1 merely set the criminal law into motiorL on receiving information regarding the unidentified dead body. P.W.2 informed P.W.1 about the presence of the dead body. Their evidence is therefore relevant to ttLe discovery of the dead body and the initiation of investigation, but it does not establish the involvement of the appellant.

59. P.Ws.3 and 6, the panch witnesses, speak about the scene obsen'ation and inquest proceedings and the articles found at the scene. Their evidence establishes the investigative steps undertaken by the police. P.W.4 speaks about photc,graphing the dead body and scene. These witnesses d': not connect the appellant with the actua'l commission ,rf the offence .

xIrJ & sxs,., Crl,A. o.6ag of 2025

60. P.W.8, the sister of the deceased, assisted in identiSring the deceased. Her evidence is relevalt to the identity of the deceased and the surrounding circumstances, but there is no substantive evidence from her that she saw the deceased in the company of the appellart immediately before the occurrence or that the appellant caused her death.

61. P.W.9 is the mediator to the alleged confession-cum_ recovery proceedings. His evidence may establish the proceedings undertaken by the police ald the recovery of the article, subject to the admissibility of the information leading to discovery. However, as already discussed, recovery alone cannot establish the commission of murder unless the recovered article is shown to have a reliable and incriminating connection with the crime.

62. P.W. 1 1/P.W. 13, the police ofhcers connected with registration and investigation of the case, can establish the steps taken during investigation. Their evidence regarding investigation, however, cannot substitute substantive evidence regarding the actual commission of the offence. The prosecution must independenfly establish the incriminating circumstances through legally admissible evidence.

IG,J & SIIS,J Crl.A.l{o.6t3 of2O25

63. Thus, :n an overali appreciation of the evidence, the prosecution has established certain foundational facts, namely, tha1. Manda Swapna died an unnatura-i death by strangulatior., that her dead body was found near Bandam Bore in the shivar of Vengalapur, that she was acquainted with the apgrellant and that a towel was allegedly recovered during inve stigation. However, the crucial connecting circumstanct:s between the appellant and the homicidal death have not b:en estabiished with the degree of certainty required in a criminal tria1.

64. The present case is admittedly one based entirely on circumstantial evidence. The iaw relating to circumstantial evidence is u'ell settled.

65. At this stage, it is pertinent to note the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtraa, wherein paragraph No.153, it is held as follows:

153. A ctose ana-lysis of this decision would show that the fotlowing conditions must be fulfrlled before a case against an accused <ran be said to be fully established: n ltss+1 + scc rto

+-@7 I/t'

8r,", & srs,J Crl.A.Ito.6a3 of2025

(1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances concerned "must or should" and not "may be" established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between "may be proved" and "must be or should be proved" as was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra lll97 31 2 SCC 793 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 1033 : 1973 Crl IJ 17831 where the observations were made: [SCC para 19, p. 807: SCC (Cri) p.7047] "Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not merely may be guilty before a court can convict and the mental distance between ?nay be'and tnust be'is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions."

(2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty,

(3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature ald tendency,

(4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and

(5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent urith the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused.

66. In the case of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda (cited supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down the five principles which have to be satisfied before a conviction can be founded solely

I{r,J & SKII,.' Crl.A.[o.6E3 of 2025 on circumstantial evidence: the circumstances must be fully established; l.he established facts must be consistent only with the hypothesis of guilt; the circumstances must be conclusive in nature and tendency; they must exclude every possible hypothesis e;<cept guilt; and the chain of evidence must be so complete as to leave no reasonable ground consistent with innocence artd must show that, in all human probability, the act must h.ave been committed by the accused. These principles cc,ntinue to govem appreciation of circumstantial evidence.

67. Applying the aforesaid principles to the present case, the first circumstance, namely, the relationship between the appellant and the deceased, is established only to the extent that they were acquainted and intended to marry. Such circumstanc,: is not conclusive of guiit' The second circumstanc:, namely, the last-seen theory, has not been established lhrough substantive evidence because LWs 14 and 15 did not erlter the witness box and their Section 164 Cr'P C' statements cannot, in the circumstances of the case, be treated as sr.tbstantive evidence'

I(I.n, & sxs,J Crl.A. o.6a3 of 2orrs

68. The third circumstance, namely, the Test Identification Parade, does not independently establish the last_seen circumstance. The identification of the appellant by p.Ws.S and 7 only confirms his identity as the person whom they already knew. The identifrcatibn attributed to LWs. 14 and 15 cannot be used as substantive proof of their assertions when they were not examined before the Court.

69. The fourth circumstance, namely, the recovery of M.0.6/towel, also does not complete the chain. Even accepting the recovery as proved, the prosecution has not established by independent evidence that the recovered towel was the instrument used in strangulaling the deceased or that it conta-ined any material connecting it with the deceased. As held in Pandurang Kalu patil, the discovery contemplated by Section 27 is the discovery of a fact within the knowledge of the accused and not merely the production of an object. The evidentiary value of the discovery therefore depends upon the further evidence connecting the discovered fact or article with the offence.

70. The medica,l evidence establishes homicidal death but does not connect the appellant with that death. The identity

RJ.,J & SfiL,J crl.A.Ito.683 of 2025 of the deceasr:d is established, but the identity of the assailant is not estaclished through any direct evidence. The prosecution ltas not placed before the Court any independent circumstance which conclusively establishes the presence of the appellant at the scene of offence at or immediately before the time of dt:ath. 7l. It is al.so important tc.r bear in mind that the burden upon the prosecution in a case based on circumstantial evidence doers not become lighter merely because the deceased and the ar;cused were acquainted or because certain circumstanct:s create suspicion against the accused' Suspicion, however strong, cannot take the place of proof' The circumstances must form a continuous ald complete chain and eerch important link must be established by legally admissible e'zidence

72. The lezrrned Additional Public Prosecutor contended that the circums.:ances have to be considered cumulatively and that the lzlst-seen circumstance, recovery and medical evidence together point towards the guilt of the appellant' There can be no dispute with the proposition that circumstantial evidence has to be appreciated cumulatively.

xr,, & sxlt,J Crl.A.IIo.683 of2025 However, the cumulative effect can be considered only after each material circumstance is independently established by admissible and reliable evidence. A missing or legally defective link cannot be supplied merely by combining other circumstances which, individually or collectively, do not establish the missing link.

73. Likewise, the contention that the appellant failed to explain the circumstances surrounding the death cannot relieve the prosecution of its primary burden. The prosecution must hrst establish the foundational circumstances from which arr inference of guitt can legitimately be drawn. The absence of an adequate explanation from the accused cannot be used to hll serious gaps in the prosecution evidence.

74. In the present case, the prosecution has failed to establish the most signihcant link, namely, that the deceased was last seen alive with the appellant shortly before her death. Once Exs.P22 and P23 are not treated as substantive evidence, there is no reliable evidence to establish this circumstance. The evidence of p.Ws.s and 7 does not fill this gap, as their evidence relates principally to the relationship xLr, & sKs,J Crl.A.Ito.683 of2025 between the rleceased ald the appellant and not to the events immediately y>receding the death.

75. The prosecution has also failed to establish an unbroken ne:<us between the recovered towel and the murder. The recovery, standing alone, is insufficient. The medical evidence doe,s not connect the towel with the death. There is no substantive evidence that the towel recovered at the instance of the appellant was the same towel a1legedly seen around the neck of the person who received the deceased, because the very statements of LWs.14 and 15 on which that circumstanct: rests cannot be treated as substantive evidence.

76. Therefore, the circumstances relied upon by the prosecution do not satisly the hve principles laid down in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda (cited supra). The circumstances are not ful1y established in the manner required by law. They do not, even when taken cumulativeiy, exclude every reasonable hypothesis consistent with the innocence of the appellant and the chain of circumstances is not complete so as to lead to the conclusion that, in all human probability, the appellant alcne committed the offence.

XI,J & SKS,J Crl,A. 0.683 of 2025 77 . Consequenfly, though the evidence establishes that the deceased suffered a homicidal death, the prosecution has not established beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant was the person who caused her death. The beneht of the missing links in the chain must necessarily go to the appellant.

74. Coming to the offence under Section 2Ol of IpC, the trial Court found the appellant guilty principally on the basis of the alleged recovery of M.O.6/towel. Section 2Ol of IpC requires proof that the accused caused disappearance of evidence of the offence or gave fa,lse information with the intention of screening the offender from legai punishment. Mere recovery of an article at the instance of the accused, without establishing the essential ingredients of the offence and the connection of the accused with the under\ring offence, cannot by itself sustain a conviction under Section 201 of IpC.

79. Once the prosecution has failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant committed the murder and has further failed to establish that M.O.6 was the article used in the commission of the offence and that the appellant caused its disappearance with the requisite intention, the conviction under Section 201 IpC also calnot be sustained.

I(J.J & SBS,J Crl,/Lfo,6t3 of2025

80. The evidence relating to Section 404 of IPC need not be reconsidered in detail, as the appellant was already acquitted of the said oflence by the trial Court and there is no challenge by the prosecution to the said acquittal before this Court. 8 1 . On an overall consideration of the entire material on record, this Court is of the view that the prosecution has established the factum of homicidal death of Manda Swapna, but has fail,:d to establish the identity of the perpetrator beyond reasonable doubt. The relationship between the appellant and the deceased, the alleged last-seen circumstanc<: based upon the Section 164 Cr.P.C. statements of deceased witnesses, the Test Identification Parade, the recovery of M.O.6/towel and the medical evidence, when examined individually and cumulatively, do not form a complete chzLin of circumstances leading only to the guilt of the appellant.

82. The principles relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant in George and Pandurang Kalu Patil (cited supra), when applied to the evidence on record, reinforce the conclusion that the Section 164 Cr.P.C. statements of LWs. 14 and 15 canlrot be treated as substantive evidence in the xL,J & SXS,J Crl.A.tro.683 of 2(}25 absence of their testimony before the trial Court and that the recovery actually under Section 27 must be confined to the fact discovered and cannot, by itself, establish the commission of the offence '

83. At the same time, the principle relied upon by the learned Additiona-l Public Prosecutor that circumstantial evidence must be considered cumulatively is accepted as a matter of law. However, the cumulative assessment must still satisSr the requirement laid down in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda (cited supra) that the chain must be complete and must exclude every reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence. In the present case, the prosecution has not crossed that threshold.

84. Therefore, this Court finds that the prosecution has failed to prove the guiit of the appellant for the offences punishable under Sections 302 and 2Ol of IPC beyond reasonable doubt. The appellant is consequently entitled to t]le benefit of doubt.

85. In the result, the Criminal Appeal is allowed. The judgment dated 30.05.2025 passed by the learned Principal District and Sessions Judge, Jagtial, in S.C.No.O4 of 2021,

I

r{r,,J & srls,J Crl.A.I{o.6E3 of 2O25 convicting th,: appeilant/ accused for the offences punishable under Sectiorrs 302 and 201 IPC, is hereby set aside'

86. The appellant/accused is acquitted of the offences punishable under Sections 302 and 201 of IPC by extending the benefit c,f doubt. The appellant sha,tl be set at libert5r forthwith, if lre is not required in any other case. Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shal1 stald closed. SD/. M MANJULA, JOINT REGISTRAR //TRUE COPY// SECTTON OFFICER One F:rir Copy to the Hon'ble Sri Justice K.Lakshman (For His Lordship's kind Perusal) AND One Fair Copy to the Hon'ble Smt Justice K. Sujana (For Her Lordship's kind Perusal) The Principal l)istrict and Sessions Judge, Jagitial The llAdditioral Judicial First Class lVlagistrate, Jagitial The Station House Officer, Gollapalli Police Station, Jagitial 4 LR Copies The Under Ser:retary, Union of lndia, Ministry of Law, Justice and Company Affairs, New Delhi The Secretary Advocates Associatron Library, High Court for the State of Telangana, Hi1lh Court Buildings at Hyderabad The Superinterdent, Central Prison, Cherlapally, Medchal-Malkajgiri District (By Special Messenger) One CC to SRI KONA N.D.V.RAMANA RAO, Advocate tOpUCl Two CCs to PUBLIC PROSECUTOR High Court for the State of Telangana, at Hyderabad iOUTI Two CD Copies i I J

+'; 5: To, ?.r e g: ,10'l ADK

HIGH COURT DATED: 22109t12026

JUDGMENT

CRLA.No.683 of 2025 ALLOWING THE CRLA d ?t sEt 216 .-\ \4E 5'rAIA i7 -!. ' ) rl -,.

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