WP/33035/2017 of The Depot Manager, APSRTC (Now TSRTC), Vs G. Mohan, on 8 September 2026

O R D E R:

In this Writ Petition, petitioner Corporation questions the Award dated 05.08.2013 in I.D. No.69 of 2010 on the file of the Chairman, Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court- cum-VI Additional District & Sessions Court, Godavarikhani.

2. The case of petitioners, as disclosed from the pleadings, is that respondent was initially engaged as a Conductor on contract basis with effect from 25.01.1985 and his services were regularized from 28.08.1985. It is stated, respondent was bereft of clean service record and he was censured 14 times, his annual increments were deferred 19 times and he was suspended on two occasions. The disciplinary proceedings in question arose out of an incident dated 04.05.1998, on which date, respondent while was conducting Bus bearing No.3756 on route Karimnagar – Ootur, a check was exercised, during the course of which, the Checking Officials found that respondent had violated the rule “Issue and Start”. He had also failed to collect fare and issue ticket to one passenger who had boarded the bus at Karimnagar and was bound for Ootur ex-stages 01-07. The Checking Officials obtained the top punch ticket and recorded the statements of respondent and passengers also; thereafter, a charge memo was issued on the spot, which was duly attested by the respondent.

2.1. Respondent was issued charge sheet dated 18.05.1998 for which, he submitted explanation; after considering the explanation and the material available on record, petitioner-Corporation vide Office

Order

dated 18.06.1998 imposed upon respondent the punishment of deferment of annual increment for two years with cumulative effect. Being aggrieved, respondent preferred Appeal before the

Deputy Chief Traffic Manager, Adilabad which was rejected on merits by order dated 03.09.1998. In the review petition before the Regional Manager, Karimnagar, by proceedings dated 11.05.1999, the punishment was modified purely on humanitarian grounds to that of deferment of annual increment for one year which shall have its effect on his future increments. It is therefore the case of petitioners that the departmental process had proceeded through the disciplinary authority, the appellate authority and the reviewing authority. Respondent thereafter raised I.D. No.69 of 2010 after an inordinate delay of 11 years from the proceedings dated 11.05.1999 without furnishing any justifiable grounds or reasons for such delay. Petitioners therefore, contend that the very entertainability of the Dispute after such prolonged inaction was required to be examined by the Labour Court.

2.2. The Labour Court thereafter, passed the impugned Award, set aside the order dated 11.05.1999, directed the Corporation to release the deferred annual increment to respondent with all consequential benefits after notional fixation of salary and further held that he was entitled to arrears of salary.

3. Learned Standing Counsel for petitioners Sri N. Chandra Shekar submits that Labour Court acted as an appellate authority and exceeded far beyond the scope of the powers conferred upon it by Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The jurisdiction available to the Labour Court under Section 11-A could not be exercised as an unrestricted appellate jurisdiction over the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority and subsequently modified by the reviewing authority. The Labour Court ought to have examined whether the punishment suffered from any legal infirmity warranting interference, rather than substituting its own view merely because a different punishment could be considered appropriate.

3.1. The main contention of learned Standing Counsel is that, respondent slept over the matter for more than 11 years after the proceedings dated 11.05.1999 and that no justifiable explanation for such delay was placed before the Labour Court, which ought not to have decided the dispute at such a belated stage without first addressing the issue of delay and the absence of any justifiable explanation.

3.2. In support of the objection regarding delay, learned Standing Counsel relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Prabhakar v. Joint Director, Seri Culture Department1. Further reliance is placed upon the judgment of this Court in K.R. Reddy vs. Industrial Tribunal-II, Hyderabad2.

4. Heard Sri P. Govinda Rajulu, learned counsel for respondent. He relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in KV Pathrose v. The Divisional Controller, KSRTC (Civil Appeal No. 4390 of 2025), the orders of this Court in Writ Petition No. 2053 of 2010 and 3138 of 2018 and contends that petitioners have not conducted any enquiry before imposing the major punishment which is contrary to the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Kulwant Singh Gill v. State of Punjab3.

5. From a perusal of the material on record, it is to be seen, the prime contention of petitioner Corporation is that respondent approached the Labour Court after an inordinate delay of 11 years without any justifiable grounds. In catena of decisions, the Supreme Court considered the scope of Section 1 2016 (4) ALD 175 (SC) 2 2017 (1) ALD 317 3 1991 Supp (1) SCC 504

10(1)(c) of the Act and appreciation of provisions of the Limitation Act vis-à-vis the Industrial Disputes Act. The Constitutional Court has taken a consistent view that even though Limitation Act is not applicable to claims arising under the Industrial Disputes Act, primary requirement to refer a dispute/raise a dispute before the Labour Court is the dispute must be live. Thus, the manner in which a workman was espousing his grievance is an important factor to assess whether there were laches in setting up the claim.

6. In Prabhakar’s case (supra), similar issue has come up for consideration. The Hon’ble Supreme Court extensively considered the scope of relevant provisions and precedent decisions. It has been held that there was inordinate, unexplained delay in referring the dispute. It is useful to extract the observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court as under:

“8. It maybe stated that the question is of utmost importance as it is seen that many times, as in the instant case, the workers raise dispute after number of years of the cause of action.

Whether the dispute can still be treated as surviving? Or whether it can be said that dispute does not exist when the concerned workmen after his say termination kept quiet for number of years and thus acquiesced into the action?

(9) to (35) xxxxx

36. It is now a well recognized principle of jurisprudence that a right not exercised for a long time is non-existent. Even when there is no limitation period prescribed by any statute relating to certain proceedings, in such cases Courts have coined the doctrine of laches and delays as well as doctrine of acquiescence and non -suited the litigants who approached the Court belatedly without any justifiable explanation for bringing the action after unreasonable delay. Doctrine of laches is in fact an application of maxim of equity delay defeats equities.

38. Likewise, if a party having a right stands by and sees another acting in a manner inconsistent with that right and makes no objection while the act is in progress he cannot afterwards complain. This principle is based on the doctrine of acquiescence implying that in such a case party who did not make any objection acquiesced into the alleged wrongful act of the other party and, therefore, has no right to complain against that alleged wrong.

42. To summarise, although there is no limitation prescribed under the Act for making a reference Under Section 10(1) of the Act, yet it is for the appropriate Government to consider whether it is expedient or not to make the reference. The words at any time used in Section 10(1) do not admit of any limitation in making an order of reference and laws of limitation are not applicable to proceedings under the Act. However, the policy of industrial adjudication is that very stale claims should not be generally encouraged or allowed inasmuch as unless there is satisfactory explanation for delay as, apart from the obvious risk to industrial peace from the entertainment of claims after long lapse of time, it is necessary also to take into account the unsettling effect which it is likely to have on the employers financial arrangement and to avoid dislocation of an industry”.

7. In view of the above settled law, it has to be held that respondent has failed to explain the delay of 11 years before the Labour Court. He did not make any claim/representation before any authority against the modified order at any time before raising the ID. The judgments relied on by learned counsel for respondent to the effect that Limitation Act, 1963 has no application to reference made by appropriate Government to Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial dispute, though delay could be a factor in determining the relief to be granted to the workman, has no application to the facts of the present case. Here, it is to be seen, the review authority passed modified order on 11.05.1999 as against which, respondent preferred the subject ID in 2010. Though the Joint Commissioner of Labour, Warangal made reference of this case under Section 10(1)(d) of the Industrial Disputes Act vide proceedings dated 10.11.2010, the Labour Court ought not to have decided the dispute at such a belated stage without first addressing the issue of delay and the absence of any justifiable explanation.

8. In view of the same, without going into the other aspects, this Court is of the view that petitioners are entitled to the relief claimed by them.

9. The Writ Petition is therefore, allowed. The Award dated 05.08.2013 in I.D.No. 69 of 2010 on the file of the

Chairman, Industrial Tribunal-cum-0Labour Court-cum-VI Additional District and Sessions Court, Godavarikhani is set aside. No costs.

10. Consequently, the miscellaneous Applications, if any shall stand closed.

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NAGESH BHEEMAPAKA, J 08th September 2026 ksld