WP/32844/2025 of Sri. Surendar Bantia Vs Union of India on 3 September 2026

ORDER:

The letter dated 10.10.2025 issued by respondent No.2-Executive Officer, Secunderabad Cantonment Board, rejecting the representation dated 06.12.2023 submitted by the petitioner, seeking regularization of construction in the property premises bearing Bungalow No. 207, situated at Tarbund, Secunderabad Cantonment, is challenged in this writ petition. The respondentNo.2, by the impugned letter, directed the petitioner to vacate the subject property.

2. Heard Mr. B. Vamshidhar Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioner; and Mr. K.R. Koteswar Rao, learned Standing Counsel for 2nd respondent- Cantonment Board. Perused the record.

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PETITIONER’s CONTENTIONS:

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner purchased Bungalow No.207, situated at Tarbund, Secunderabad Cantonment, from its owners under a registered sale deed dated 22.04.1965 and has remained in absolute and uninterrupted possession and enjoyment of the property ever since. The said sale deed describes the land as freehold and records that the earlier vendors had not paid any leasehold assessment. It is therefore contended that the subsequent assertion of the respondent authorities that the entire property is B-3 land belonging to the Government of India is wholly untenable.

3.1. Learned counsel submits that the subject property is situated in Tarbund, which formed part of the erstwhile Moglai village known as Sikh Village and, more broadly, the Civil Area of Secunderabad Cantonment. According to the petitioner, when the British Army established the Cantonment at Hyderabad, the then Government of Hyderabad under HEH The Nizam transferred police jurisdiction over 13 Moglai villages, including Sikh Village, to the British military authorities only for the limited purpose of exercising police jurisdiction. Reliance is placed upon the Firman issued by HEH The Nizam in 1906 A.D., which, according to the petitioner, expressly reserved civil and revenue jurisdiction to the Nizam and protected the rights of the Government of Hyderabad, Jagirdars and private landowners. It is therefore contended that neither the said 13 Moglai villages nor the privately owned lands situated therein were ever transferred to the British authorities or to the then Government of India.

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3.2. Learned counsel further submits that the provisions of the Cantonment Act, 1924, must be understood in the context of the peculiar status of Secunderabad Cantonment. While the Act was enacted to consolidate and amend the law relating to Cantonments and to facilitate their administration and the accommodation of military authorities, Secunderabad Cantonment was situated within the erstwhile Hyderabad State ruled by HEH The Nizam and was distinct from Cantonments established in territories directly governed by the Government of India. It is contended that Cantonment authorities could acquire rights over privately held lands only if the Nizam’s Government had transferred such lands to them, and no such transfer took place in respect of the 13 Moglai villages.

3.3. In support of the said contention, learned counsel relies upon the report dated 10.10.1926 prepared by Sir William Barton concerning land tenure in areas administered by the Government of India. According to the petitioner, the report records that the British authorities exercised only police jurisdiction, together with sanitary control, over the 13 Moglai villages and that no land had been assigned to the Government of India by the Nizam’s Government. Reliance is also placed upon the report dated 05.02.1934 of Capt. C.M. James, Special Lands Officer, Secunderabad Cantonment, which, according to the petitioner, records that no land within the Secunderabad and Bollaram Cantonments belonged to the Government of India, the sovereign rights of HEH The Nizam and the rights of private individuals having been reserved.

3.4. Learned counsel submits that the General Land Register prepared in 1933 is of considerable significance. It is contended that, following the enactment of the Cantonment Act, 1924, the Government of

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India called for particulars of landholdings in Cantonment areas and, accordingly, the 1933 GLR recorded most of the lands, including the subject property, as private lands, with the origin of occupation shown as “unknown”. Significantly, according to the petitioner, the Government of India did not at that stage assert ownership over the lands situated in the 13 Moglai villages, nor was the subject property described as an “Old Grant”. The petitioner therefore contends that the 1933 GLR constitutes contemporaneous material which militates against the subsequent claim that the subject property was Government land.

3.5. It is further submitted that, under the Rendition Agreement entered into in 1945, the Cantonment Areas were reverted to HEH The Nizam, including the police jurisdiction over the relevant villages, while only municipal administration continued to remain with the Cantonment authorities. Learned counsel submits that, notwithstanding the earlier entries in the 1933 GLR, a fresh GLR was prepared in or about 1956 and, without notice to the affected landholders, the nature of several landholdings was altered, including the classification of the petitioner’s property as an “Old Grant”. Such unilateral reclassification, it is contended, was illegal, arbitrary and contrary to the principles of natural justice. An administrative entry made without notice, it is submitted, cannot retrospectively extinguish, alter or create proprietary rights, and the 1956 description of the property as an “Old Grant” cannot, by itself, establish title in favour of the Government of India or defeat the petitioner’s registered title.

3.6. Learned counsel submits that the petitioner subsequently reconstructed a portion of the property and leased the reconstructed premises to M/s. Blue Star Limited. When the respondent authorities

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threatened demolition of the structures, the petitioner approached the competent Civil Court and other forums to protect his possession and proprietary rights. In this context, the respondent authorities, by letter dated 05.02.2003, asserted that the property was B-3 land belonging to the Central Government and rejected the petitioner’s request for regularization of the alleged unauthorized construction on the ground that the construction stood upon Government land.

3.7. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner instituted W.P. No.2528 of 2003. During the pendency of the said writ petition, the respondent authorities, by letter dated 14.08.2003, sought police assistance, escort, vehicles and other arrangements for demolishing the disputed structures with heavy machinery. In view of the threatened coercive action, the petitioner instituted O.S. No.75 of 2003 before the Judge-Cum-Additional Chief Judge, Family Court at Secunderabad, seeking declaration of title and permanent injunction restraining the respondents from interfering with his peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property.

3.8. Learned counsel submits that O.S. No.75 of 2003 was ultimately decreed in part by judgment and decree dated 31.12.2014. The trial Court directed the plaintiffs to approach the defendants for regularization of their possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property and the structures thereon and directed the 2nd defendant to exercise the powers available under Section 248 of the Cantonments Act, 2006 within a reasonable time. The defendants were also restrained from evicting the plaintiffs except by due process of law. According to learned counsel, the said judgment and decree attained finality and was neither set aside nor suspended.

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3.9. Pursuant to the said decree, the petitioner submitted a representation dated 13.12.2016 seeking regularization of his possession and the structures standing on the subject property. Learned counsel submits that the representation remained pending without consideration for a considerable period.

3.10. It is further submitted that, although W.P. No.2528 of 2003 had remained pending, the petitioner was not aware of its listing as his counsel failed to inform him, resulting in the writ petition being dismissed in his absence by order dated 05.09.2022. Learned counsel contends that the respondents, who participated in the said proceedings, failed to bring to the notice of this Court the material fact that, in the interregnum, the competent Civil Court had rendered the judgment and decree dated 31.12.2014 in O.S. No.75 of 2003. It is therefore contended that the respondents cannot derive any advantage from the dismissal of W.P. No.2528 of 2003 so as to defeat the rights and protection subsequently declared by the Civil Court. According to learned counsel, in view of the decree dated 31.12.2014 and the petitioner’s pending request for regularization, the respondents could not have proceeded as though no such decree existed.

3.11. Learned counsel further submits that, notwithstanding the decree in O.S. No.75 of 2003 and the petitioner’s representation seeking regularization, respondent No.2 again issued a vacation notice dated 10.04.2023 directing the petitioner to vacate Bungalow No.207, Sikh Road, Secunderabad Cantonment, within three days, purportedly for demolition of the alleged unauthorized construction. The said notice, it is contended, was issued despite the respondents’ knowledge of the pending

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claim and the protection granted by the Civil Court against eviction except by due process of law.

3.12. The petitioner submitted a detailed reply dated 11.04.2023 and thereafter instituted W.P. No.10352 of 2023 challenging the notice dated 10.04.2023. Learned counsel submits that this Court, by order dated 06.11.2023, disposed of the writ petition by directing the petitioner to submit a detailed representation within two weeks seeking compounding of the structure erected over 500 Sq. Yds. of the subject land. The 2nd respondent was, in turn, directed to consider such representation within four weeks in accordance with law and in conformity with the principles of natural justice, after affording the petitioner a reasonable opportunity of hearing. Until such consideration, the respondents were directed not to take coercive steps pursuant to the vacation notice dated 10.04.2023.

3.13. In compliance with the said order, the petitioner submitted a detailed representation dated 06.12.2023 seeking regularization/compounding of the construction. However, respondent No.2 rejected the representation by the impugned letter bearing Lr. No. SCB/EB/B No.207/GLR/SY. No.678/2414, dated 10.10.2025, once again directing the petitioner to vacate the subject property.

3.14. Learned counsel submits that the impugned order is vitiated by patent illegality, non-application of mind and failure to consider the binding judgment and decree dated 31.12.2014 in O.S. No.75 of 2003. Particular reliance is placed upon the findings recorded by the trial Court on Issues Nos.5 and 7, wherein, according to the petitioner, the Court accepted the property as freehold and permitted the petitioner to approach the 2nd respondent for regularization under Section 248 of the Cantonments Act, 2006. It is contended that the respondent authority could

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not mechanically reject the petitioner’s request by reiterating that the property was B-3 “Old Grant” land belonging to the Government of India, Ministry of Defence, without addressing the findings and directions contained in the said decree.

3.15. Learned counsel further submits that the trial Court had specifically noticed the petitioner’s title flowing from registered sale deed bearing Document No.842 of 1965, dated 22.04.1965, as well as the title of his vendors under the registered sale deed dated 11.08.1947, marked as Ex.A1 and Ex.A2 respectively. It is therefore contended that the impugned order, in ignoring the petitioner’s registered title and the findings of the competent Civil Court and proceeding solely on the basis of the subsequent B-3 “Old Grant” classification, is arbitrary and unsustainable.

3.16. Learned counsel also challenges the rejection of the petitioner’s request on the ground that the Floor Space Index (FSI) was restricted to 0.5 and that the construction did not satisfy the prescribed setback requirements. It is submitted that the Secunderabad Cantonment Board itself had issued guidelines enhancing the permissible FSI to 1.5 and that the authority failed to examine the petitioner’s request for regularization/compounding in the light of the applicable provisions of the Cantonments Act, 2006 and the National Building Code, 2016. According to learned counsel, these aspects were required to be considered on their own merits instead of rejecting the representation by mechanically treating the land as Government-owned B-3 “Old Grant” land.

3.17. It is therefore the submission of learned counsel that the respondents, having been directed by the judgment and decree dated 31.12.2014 to consider the petitioner’s request for regularization by exercising their powers under Section 248 of the Cantonments Act, 2006,

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could not disregard the said decree or the petitioner’s subsequent representations. The decree having attained finality, and there being no order setting it aside or suspending its operation, the petitioner’s claim was required to be considered in accordance with the said judgment and decree and on its own merits.

3.18. Learned counsel consequently submits that the impugned proceedings dated 10.10.2025, which proceed on the assumption that the subject property is Government-owned B-3 “Old Grant” land and reject the petitioner’s request for regularization without properly considering the judgment and decree in O.S. No.75 of 2003, the petitioner’s registered title, the historical revenue and land records, the 1933 GLR, the subsequent representations and the applicable building regulations, are arbitrary, illegal and unsustainable. The respondents, it is contended, cannot dispossess the petitioner by relying upon a unilateral classification in the GLR or by ignoring the binding findings and directions of the competent Civil Court. The impugned proceedings are therefore liable to be set aside and the respondents ought to be directed to reconsider the petitioner’s request for regularization/compounding strictly in accordance with law and in the light of the judgment and decree dated 31.12.2014 in O.S. No.75 of 2003.Learned counsel relies on the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Roshan Minoo Patel v. Union of India1.

CONTENTIONS OF RESPONDENT NO.2 (inthe Writ Petition)

1 2011 SCC OnLine AP 402

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4. Learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2, referring to the counter affidavit filed in the writ petition as well as the separate counter affidavit filed opposing I.A. No.3 of 2025, submits that the writ petition is not maintainable either on facts or in law and that the impugned speaking order dated 10.10.2025 was passed strictly in accordance with the provisions of the Cantonments Act, 2006 and pursuant to the directions issued by this Court in W.P. No.10352 of 2023. It is contended that the petitioner was afforded adequate opportunity to submit his representation, the same was duly considered, and the impugned order was thereafter passed for reasons recorded therein. There is, therefore, no violation of the principles of natural justice or any procedural illegality warranting interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

4.1. Learned counsel submits that Bungalow No.207, GLR Sy.No.678, Sikh Road, Secunderabad Cantonment, forms part of land admeasuring approximately Ac.5.29 guntas, which is classified in the General Land Register as B-3 “Old Grant” land. The said land is under the management of the Defence Estate Officer and the proprietary rights therein vest in the Union of India, Ministry of Defence. The petitioner’s claim of absolute ownership and freehold title is therefore disputed. It is further contended that even the petitioner’s registered sale deed dated 22.04.1965 contains a reference acknowledging the proprietary rights of the Government.

4.2. Learned counsel submits that the question of the petitioner’s title cannot be adjudicated in the present writ proceedings, particularly when the title itself is disputed and is also the subject matter of civil litigation. It is contended that the petitioner has suppressed material facts concerning the pendency of O.S. No.892 of 2005, in which declaration and

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injunction were originally sought in respect of the property and the relief was subsequently confined to perpetual injunction after the Court required payment of appropriate Court fee. According to learned counsel, the petitioner cannot convert the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution into proceedings for adjudication of disputed questions of title or for determining the validity of the GLR entries.

4.3. Learned counsel further submits that the petitioner’s constructions have consistently been treated as unauthorized and that the history of litigation demonstrates that the constructions were raised without obtaining the requisite permission. In O.S. No.676 of 1998, the Civil Court found that new constructions had been raised without sanction and held that the Cantonment Board was entitled to take action in accordance with law. The appeal in A.S. No.59 of 2001 was also dismissed, and the appellate Court recorded that construction had continued despite the subsistence of a status quo order. In the contempt proceedings, an order dated 19.10.2002 was passed directing payment of Rs.25,000/- as compensation for disobedience of the Court’s orders. The subsequent S.A. No.881 of 2002 was dismissed on 22.01.2003, wherein this Court also recorded findings concerning the unauthorized nature of the constructions and violation of the status quo order.

4.4. Learned counsel submits that, pursuant to the order dated 24.01.2003 in W.P. No.1442 of 2003, the petitioner’s representation dated 23.01.2003 seeking regularization/compounding was considered and rejected by a speaking order dated 05.02.2003. The said rejection was challenged by the petitioner in W.P. No.2528 of 2003, which came to be dismissed on 05.09.2022, this Court having found no ground to interfere with the decision of the Cantonment Board. It is therefore contended that

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the petitioner’s earlier request for regularization had already been considered and rejected and cannot be revived merely by relying upon subsequent proceedings.

4.5. Learned counsel submits that O.S. No.75 of 2003 was decreed in part by judgment and decree dated 31.12.2014. However, it is contended that the said decree was confined to the extent of 500 Sq. Yds. and directed the petitioner and his mother to approach the Cantonment Board for regularization under Section 248 of the Cantonments Act, 2006. According to the respondent, Bungalow No.207 comprises approximately 22,372 Sq. Yds. and the constructions now sought to be protected substantially exceed the extent of 500 Sq. Yds. covered by the said decree. The petitioner, therefore, cannot rely upon the judgment in O.S. No.75 of 2003 as though the entire property or all the existing structures stood protected or regularized thereunder.

4.6. It is further submitted that, after dismissal of W.P. No.2528 of 2003, respondent No.2 issued the vacation notice dated 10.04.2023 directing the petitioner to vacate the premises for demolition of the unauthorized constructions. The said notice, according to learned counsel, was not a fresh or arbitrary action but a continuation of the proceedings initiated in respect of the unauthorized construction. The petitioner challenged the said notice in W.P. No.10352 of 2023, whereupon this Court, by order dated 06.11.2023, directed the petitioner to submit a detailed representation seeking compounding of the structure erected over 500 Sq. Yds. and directed respondent No.2 to consider the same in accordance with law and after affording reasonable opportunity to the petitioner.

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4.7. Learned counsel submits that, pursuant to the said order, the petitioner submitted his representation dated 06.12.2023. The representation was considered in accordance with the directions of this Court and was rejected by the impugned speaking order dated 10.10.2025. It is therefore contended that the impugned order cannot be characterized as a mechanical or non-speaking order or as one passed in violation of natural justice.

4.8. Learned counsel further submits that the constructions existing at the site substantially exceed the extent of 500 Sq. Yds. referred to in O.S. No.75 of 2003 and W.P. No.10352 of 2023. According to the site plan submitted by the petitioner, the building footprint is approximately 534.88 Sq. Yds. on a site area of 1534 Sq. Yds. The inspection records disclose RCC Ground and First Floor structures having a built-up area of approximately 9,717 Sq. Ft., besides other structures including GI/Aluminium roof sheds, a generator room, transformer yard and security room. It is contended that these structures are inseparable and collectively occupy approximately 1534 Sq. Yds., thereby materially exceeding the 500 Sq. Yds. in respect of which the petitioner relies upon the earlier decree.

4.9. It is also submitted that the constructions do not conform to the applicable setback requirements prescribed under the relevant orders, including the orders of the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Southern Command, Pune, dated 23.07.1984. Further, since the property is classified as B-3 “Old Grant” land and is subject to a permissible FSI of 0.5, the constructions are stated to be contrary to the applicable Building Bye-Laws and FSI restrictions. The petitioner’s reliance upon any subsequent guidelines allegedly enhancing the FSI to 1.5 does not,

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according to the respondent, confer any automatic right to regularization of an unauthorized construction.

4.10. Learned counsel submits that the proceedings pursuant to W.P. No.10352 of 2023 were confined to consideration of the petitioner’s request for compounding/regularization of the unauthorized construction and did not involve adjudication of disputed title. The respondent authority was therefore entitled to examine whether the constructions satisfied the statutory and regulatory requirements for regularization. The order dated 06.11.2023, according to learned counsel, did not confer upon the petitioner any vested right to regularization or prevent the competent authority from rejecting the representation after consideration on its merits.

4.11. Reliance is placed upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rajendra Kumar Barjatya v. U.P. Avas Evam Parishad, Civil Appeals Nos.14604 of 2024 and 14605 of 2024, to contend that unauthorized constructions raised without competent sanction or contrary to sanctioned plans ought not ordinarily to be regularized and that demolition of such constructions cannot be avoided on considerations of sympathy. It is therefore submitted that the petitioner cannot claim regularization as a matter of right when the constructions are beyond the permissible parameters and were raised without the requisite sanction.

4.12. Learned counsel further submits that there is no merit in the petitioner’s contention that the impugned order ignores the judgment and decree dated 31.12.2014 in O.S. No.75 of 2003. According to the respondent, the decree merely directed the petitioner to approach the competent authority for regularization under Section 248 of the Cantonments Act, 2006; it did not itself regularize the construction or direct that regularization must necessarily be granted. The competent

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authority was consequently required to examine the petitioner’s representation in accordance with the statutory requirements and, upon such consideration, rejected the representation for the reasons recorded in the speaking order dated 10.10.2025.

4.13. It is therefore submitted that the respondents have acted strictly in accordance with the statutory framework and the orders passed by this Court. The petitioner was afforded an opportunity to make his representation; the same was considered; and the impugned order dated 10.10.2025 was passed for reasons recorded therein. The writ petition, according to learned counsel, therefore discloses no ground warranting interference under Article 226 of the Constitution. Additional contentions in I.A. No.3 of 2025

4.14. Insofar as I.A. No.3 of 2025 is concerned, learned counsel for respondent No.2 submits that the petitioner seeks an interim direction permitting construction of a compound wall around the entire premises of Bungalow No.207 and has also claimed damages of Rs.1,75,00,000/-, comprising Rs.1,25,00,000/- towards alleged reconstruction costs and Rs.50,00,000/- towards mental agony, on the allegation that approximately 80% of the structure was illegally demolished during the pendency of the writ petition. The said allegations are specifically denied.

4.15. Learned counsel submits that the demolition carried out on 05.12.2025 was pursuant to the speaking order dated 10.10.2025 and the statutory proceedings initiated in respect of the unauthorized construction. There was no interim order staying the operation of the speaking order or restraining the respondents from taking further action. It is also specifically

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denied that any undertaking was given by the learned Standing Counsel on behalf of the respondents that demolition would not be undertaken.

4.16. Learned counsel further submits that the alleged status quo order passed in O.S. No.71 of 2023 did not operate in respect of the structure that was demolished. According to the respondent, the demolished structure was not included in the suit schedule of the said suit. The respondents had already filed their written statement along with an application seeking vacation of the status quo order and, upon receiving communication dated 05.12.2025 from the XII Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Secunderabad, furnished clarification that the structure demolished by the authorities did not form part of the suit property. It is therefore contended that the allegation that the respondents violated the status quo order is factually incorrect.

4.17. Learned counsel submits that the construction in question has consistently been held to be unauthorized in the earlier proceedings referred to above and that the demolition cannot be characterized as illegal merely because the petitioner’s challenge to the speaking order dated 10.10.2025 was pending. In the absence of any stay or other prohibitory order from the competent Court, the respondents were entitled to proceed in accordance with the statutory orders and notices already issued.

4.18. The respondent categorically denies the petitioner’s allegation that approximately 80% of the property was illegally demolished or that the demolition was undertaken in breach of any undertaking or subsisting Court order. It is consequently submitted that the claim for damages of Rs.1,75,00,000/- is wholly untenable and unsupported by any legal or factual basis.

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4.19. As regards the petitioner’s prayer for permission to construct a compound wall, learned counsel submits that the petitioner has not even submitted an application before the Chief Executive Officer seeking such permission. Section 261 of the Cantonments Act, 2006 prescribes the procedure for construction of a compound wall and requires the applicant to submit the requisite application and documents, including a plan clearly indicating the boundaries of the property and the applicant’s right over the property. Unless the petitioner follows the statutory procedure and establishes his entitlement in accordance with law, he cannot seek a direct judicial direction permitting construction of a compound wall over the entire premises.

4.20. Learned counsel reiterates, in this context, that Bungalow No.207, situated in GLR Sy.No.678, forms part of approximately Ac.5.29 guntas of B-3 “Old Grant” land under the management of the Defence Estate Officer, TS & AP Circle, with proprietary rights vested in the Central Government, Ministry of Defence. The respondent further relies upon the petitioner’s sale deed dated 22.04.1965, contending that the document contains an acknowledgment of the Government’s proprietary rights. Thus, according to the respondent, the petitioner cannot seek an interim direction enabling him to undertake further construction without first establishing his legal right over the land and obtaining the requisite statutory permission.

4.21. Learned counsel accordingly submits that I.A. No.3 of 2025 is devoid of merit. There is no interim stay against the impugned speaking order or the demolition, the alleged status quo order does not cover the demolished structure, no undertaking against demolition was given on behalf of the respondents, the claim for damages is unsupported, and the

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petitioner has not followed the statutory procedure under Section 261 of the Cantonments Act, 2006 for obtaining permission to construct a compound wall. The application is therefore liable to be dismissed.

4.22. For the aforesaid reasons, learned counsel submits that both the writ petition and I.A. No.3 of 2025 are liable to be dismissed.

CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT:

5. Having considered the respective contentions and perused the material placed on record, it is evident that the principal challenge in the present writ petition is to the speaking order dated 10.10.2025, whereby the petitioner’s request for regularization/compounding of the constructions in Bungalow No.207, Sikh Road, Secunderabad Cantonment, was rejected.

6. The petitioner asserts title and uninterrupted possession over the property on the strength of the registered sale deed dated 22.04.1965 and contends that the property is freehold and cannot be treated as B-3 “Old Grant” land belonging to the Union of India. The respondents, on the other hand, dispute the petitioner’s claim of absolute ownership and assert that the property comprised in GLR Sy.No.678, admeasuring approximately Ac.5.29 guntas, is classified as B-3 “Old Grant” land, under the management of the Defence Estate Officer, with proprietary rights vested in the Central Government.

7. The petitioner has placed considerable reliance upon the historical material concerning the 13 Moglai villages, the position prevailing during the erstwhile Hyderabad State, the reports relating to the exercise of

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jurisdiction by the British authorities, and the entries contained in the GLR, particularly the 1933 and subsequent entries. In this context, reliance has also been placed upon the judgment of the erstwhile Andhra Pradesh High Court in Roshan Minoo Patel (supra).

8. In Roshan Minoo Patel, the petitioners claimed ownership over property situated in the Secunderabad Cantonment on the strength of their title documents and long possession, while the Defence Estate Officer treated the property as B-3 “Old Grant” land belonging to the Central Government and proceeded against the petitioners under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971. The Court considered the historical material relating to the 13 Moglai villages, including the circumstances in which jurisdiction had been transferred by the then Government of Hyderabad, the historical reports and the entries in the GLR. The Court found that the question whether the property constituted Government/public premises involved a complex dispute concerning title and could not appropriately be determined in the summary proceedings under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971. The Court, in the facts of that case, therefore interfered with the proceedings of the Defence Estate Officer.

9. The said decision, however, does not by itself advance the petitioner’s claim for regularization in the present proceedings. The distinction lies in the nature of the proceedings and the relief which fell for consideration in Roshan Minoo Patel. In that case, the proceedings were under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971, and the determination as to whether the property constituted “public premises” was foundational to the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer under the said enactment. The Court found that such a disputed and complex

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question of title could not appropriately be determined by the Estate Officer in the summary proceedings before him.

10. The present case stands on a different footing. The immediate challenge herein is not to an order passed by an Estate Officer under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971, determining the petitioner to be an unauthorised occupant of Government premises. The impugned order dated 10.10.2025 arises out of the petitioner’s request for regularization/compounding of the construction. The petitioner had been directed to approach the competent statutory authority for consideration of his request, and, pursuant to the order dated 06.11.2023 in W.P. No.10352 of 2023, the petitioner was afforded an opportunity to submit a detailed representation. The question before the competent authority was consequently whether the construction sought to be regularized/compounded satisfied the requirements under the applicable statutory and regulatory provisions.

11. It is therefore not necessary for this Court, in deciding the present writ petition, to pronounce upon the ultimate title to the subject property or upon the correctness of the competing historical claims concerning the GLR classification. A disputed question of title, particularly one requiring examination of documentary material, is more appropriately adjudicated before the competent civil Court, especially where such issue is already the subject matter of civil proceedings. At the same time, the principle laid down in Roshan Minoo Patel (supra) cannot be understood to mean that the mere assertion of freehold title or a challenge to a B-3 “Old Grant” entry confers upon the petitioner an enforceable right to regularization of a construction. The said judgment also does not lay down that a claim of

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ownership by itself renders the statutory requirements governing construction and regularization inapplicable.

12. The record further discloses that the issue regarding the unauthorized nature of the construction is not one which has been raised for the first time in the impugned proceedings. The petitioner and his predecessor had earlier instituted O.S. No.676 of 1998 seeking to restrain demolition of the structures in Bungalow No.207. The said suit was dismissed on 04.06.2001, with a finding that new constructions had been raised without sanction. The appeal in A.S. No.59 of 2001 was also dismissed, and the appellate Court recorded that construction had continued despite an order of status quo. In the proceedings arising therefrom, an order dated 19.10.2002 was passed directing payment of Rs.25,000/- as compensation for disobedience of the Court’s order. The subsequent S.A. No.881 of 2002 was dismissed on 22.01.2003, wherein this Court also recorded findings concerning the construction having been raised without obtaining permission from the Cantonment Board.

13. The petitioner thereafter pursued the remedy of regularization. Pursuant to the order dated 24.01.2003 in W.P. No.1442 of 2003, his representation dated 23.01.2003 was considered and rejected by a speaking order dated 05.02.2003. The said rejection was challenged in W.P. No.2528 of 2003, which was ultimately dismissed on 05.09.2022. The petitioner’s contention that the said order should be treated as non est merely because his counsel allegedly failed to inform him about the listing of the matter cannot be accepted in the absence of any order recalling, setting aside or otherwise nullifying the said judgment. The order dated 05.09.2022 therefore continues to operate in accordance with law.

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14. The petitioner places substantial reliance upon the judgment and decree dated 31.12.2014 in O.S. No.75 of 2003, particularly upon the findings concerning the freehold character of the property and the direction to approach the Cantonment Board for regularization under Section 248 of the Cantonments Act, 2006. The said judgment and decree undoubtedly required the competent authority to consider the petitioner’s request for regularization. However, the operative direction cannot be construed as itself granting regularization or directing that the request must necessarily be accepted. The statutory power under Section 248 was left to be exercised by the competent authority in accordance with law.

15. At this juncture, it is relevant to refer to relevant portions of Paragraph No. 5(c), and 5(g), of the impugned Letter dated 10.10.2025, with facts borne out by the record, which read as follows: “5(c). …… Furthermore, apart from the Notice dated 20.06.1998 issued u/Sec.185(1) of the Cantonments Act 1924, the Cantonment Board had also issued a Final Notice dated 26.08.1998 u/Sec. 256 of the Cantonments Act 1924 to carryout demolition of unauthorized construction. The above referred Notices were challenged in a Suit in O.S. No. 676 of 1998 which was dismissed on merits, then filed an Appeal Suit in A.S. No. 59 of 2001 which is also dismissed on merits, then filed a Second Appeal before the Hon’ble High Court in S.A.No. 881 of 2002, the same was dismissed vide Judgment 22.01.2003 holding that huge structures were erected with RCC Columns and Slabs and the said constructions were exhibited in Ex.B12 to B15 photographs which indicates that the construction was in progress. The Hon’ble Court further observed that, they completed the construction under the guise of Status Quo Order and they faced legal consequences, hence Second Appeal was dismissed. ….

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5(g). ……. Since the subject property is classified as B3-Old Grant, the FSI (Floor Space Index) Restrictions is 0.5 and, in your case, you have erected the unauthorized construction without leaving requisite setbacks in the land Adm. 1534 Sq.Yds, which is contrary to the Building Bye-Laws and FSI Restrictions that are in force. Therefore, request for regularization of unauthorized constructions which were erected contrary to the above guidelines, cannot be considered….”

16. Consequently, the question before this Court is not whether the petitioner had an absolute right to have his representation accepted, but whether the subsequent decision of the competent authority rejecting the representation is contrary to the judgment and decree in O.S. No.75 of 2003, contrary to the directions issued by this Court, or otherwise arbitrary, unreasonable or vitiated by non-application of mind.

17. In this regard, it is relevant that, pursuant to the order dated 06.11.2023 in W.P. No.10352 of 2023, the petitioner was afforded an opportunity to submit a detailed representation seeking compounding/regularization of the construction. The petitioner accordingly submitted his representation dated 06.12.2023. The same was considered by the competent authority and culminated in the impugned speaking order dated 10.10.2025. The order records reasons with regard to the nature and extent of the construction, the alleged unauthorized nature thereof, setbacks, FSI restrictions and the status of the property. There is, therefore, no material to conclude that the authority mechanically rejected the representation without consideration or in breach of the principles of natural justice.

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18. The respondent authorities have also placed material to contend that the construction sought to be regularized extends beyond the extent of 500 Sq. Yds. referred to in the earlier proceedings. According to the site plan submitted by the petitioner, the ground coverage/building footprint is approximately 534.88 Sq. Yds. over a site area of 1534 Sq. Yds., while the inspection records disclose RCC Ground and First Floor structures having a built-up area of approximately 9,717 Sq. Ft., besides GI/Aluminium roof sheds, generator room, transformer yard and security room. The petitioner has not placed any material before this Court demonstrating, prima facie, that the construction dealt with in the impugned proceedings is confined to the extent of construction covered by or protected under the judgment and decree in O.S. No.75 of 2003. This aspect, therefore, cannot be ignored while considering the petitioner’s claim for regularization.

19. The contention of the petitioner that the permissible FSI was subsequently enhanced also does not, by itself, advance his case. Even assuming that there was a subsequent enhancement of permissible FSI, such enhancement does not automatically or retrospectively legalize a construction which was raised without the requisite sanction. The petitioner was required to establish his entitlement to regularization/compounding under the applicable statutory and regulatory provisions, and the competent authority was entitled to examine the construction with reference to the applicable parameters, including FSI and setback requirements.

20. The mere passage of time also cannot, by itself, confer legality upon a construction which was raised without the requisite sanction. The record shows that the issue of unauthorized construction had been the subject matter of proceedings as early as O.S. No.676 of 1998 and continued

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through the subsequent civil and writ proceedings. The petitioner, therefore, cannot contend that the respondents raised the objection regarding unauthorized construction for the first time in the impugned proceedings. The Supreme Court in Rajendra Kumar Barjatya v. U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad2has also reiterated that unauthorized construction cannot ordinarily be legitimized merely on account of delay, inaction or the expenditure incurred by the person responsible for the construction.

21. The reliance placed by the petitioner upon the historical reports, the 1933 GLR and the subsequent classification of the property as “Old Grant” may have relevance to an appropriate adjudication of title. The principle emerging from Roshan Minoo Patel that a disputed and complex question of title cannot, in the circumstances of that case, be conclusively determined in summary proceedings before an authority exercising limited statutory jurisdiction, is also kept in view. However, the present proceedings do not require this Court to finally determine that title controversy. The petitioner’s assertion of freehold title, even if kept open for adjudication before the competent forum, does not by itself establish a substantive right to regularization of the construction.

22. The distinction between the two questions is material. The question as to who ultimately holds title to the land is one matter; the question whether a particular construction, admittedly or otherwise found by the competent authority to have been raised without the requisite sanction, satisfies the statutory requirements for regularization or compounding is another. The latter question was the subject matter of the representation considered by the competent authority pursuant to the orders of this Court.

22024 INSC 990

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The impugned order has rejected the request on grounds relating not merely to the nomenclature of the land but also to the extent of construction, setbacks, FSI and other applicable requirements. Therefore, the decision cannot be said to rest solely upon the B-3 “Old Grant” classification.

23. The Court is also unable to accept the contention that the impugned order is contrary to the judgment and decree dated 31.12.2014 in O.S. No.75 of 2003. The decree required the petitioner to approach the competent authority, and the subsequent proceedings before this Court required the representation to be considered in accordance with law after affording reasonable opportunity. Both requirements have been complied with. The fact that the competent authority ultimately rejected the representation does not, by itself, establish disobedience with the earlier judicial directions.

24. Accordingly, this Court finds no sufficient ground to hold that the impugned speaking order dated 10.10.2025 is arbitrary, unreasonable, contrary to the earlier judicial directions, or vitiated by violation of natural justice. The challenge to the said order therefore fails.

I.A. No.3 of 2025

25. Insofar as I.A. No.3 of 2025 is concerned, the petitioner seeks permission to construct a compound wall around the premises and claims damages of Rs.1,75,00,000/- on the allegation that approximately 80% of the structure was demolished during the pendency of the writ petition.

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26. The allegation that the demolition dated 05.12.2025 was undertaken in breach of an undertaking given on behalf of the respondents cannot be accepted in the absence of any order or other material placed before this Court recording such an undertaking. Likewise, the pendency of the writ petition, by itself, did not operate as a stay of the impugned speaking order dated 10.10.2025. No specific interim order restraining the respondents from taking further action pursuant to the impugned proceedings has been brought to the notice of this Court.

27. As regards the status quo order stated to have been passed in O.S. No.71 of 2023, the respondents contend that the structure demolished on 05.12.2025 did not form part of the suit schedule. The respondents further state that they had already filed their written statement and an application seeking vacation of the status quo order and, upon receiving communication dated 05.12.2025 from the XII Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Secunderabad, furnished clarification that the demolished structure was not part of the suit property. In the circumstances, and in the absence of material establishing that the demolished structure was covered by the subsisting status quo order, the allegation of deliberate violation of the said order cannot be accepted in these proceedings.

28. The claim for damages of Rs.1,75,00,000/-, comprising Rs.1,25,00,000/- towards alleged reconstruction costs and Rs.50,00,000/- towards mental agony, is likewise not supported by sufficient material establishing any illegality on the part of the respondents. The mere fact that demolition was undertaken while the challenge to the impugned order was pending, in the absence of a subsisting order restraining such action, does not by itself establish a basis for awarding damages.

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29. Insofar as the prayer for permission to construct a compound wall is concerned, the petitioner has admittedly not submitted an application before the competent authority seeking such permission. Section 261 of the Cantonments Act, 2006 prescribes the statutory procedure for such construction and requires the applicant to furnish the requisite particulars and documents, including the plan and material demonstrating the boundaries of the property and the applicant’s right over the property. The petitioner cannot bypass the statutory mechanism and seek a positive direction from this Court permitting construction without first approaching the competent authority in accordance with law.

30. For the aforesaid reasons, the writ petition is dismissed. I.A. No.3 of 2025 is also dismissed. No costs. Consequently, all miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in the writ petition shall stand closed.

________________________________ JUSTICE NAGESH BHEEMAPAKA 03rd September, 2026 ksm

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THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE NAGESH BHEEMAPAKA

WRIT PETITION No. 32844 of 2025

03rd SEPTEMBER, 2026

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