WP/17016/2026 of Kondapuram Dasari Kusi Reddy Vs State of Telangana on 21 August 2026

ORDER:

This Writ Petition is hled aggrieved b1'the common order dated 21.O5.2026 passed by the 2"a Respondent in Appeal Nos. F2l2152 12025 and F21215512025, exercising appellate powers under Sections 90 and 91 of the Andhra pradesh (Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Lancls Act, 1950, whereby the 2"d Respondent allowed the appeals preferred by Respondent No. 5 and set aside tw.o orders that had earlier been passed in favour of Petitioners, namely, the restoration order daled 27 .O1.2017 passed by the 4th Respondent in Case No. B I 2199 12016 under Section 32( 1) read with Set:tion 98 of the said Act, and the consequential order dated 24.09.2019 passed by the 3rd Respondent in Proceedings No. L/S88/ 2016 granting Ownership Certificate under Section 38-E of the Act in favour of the Petitioners in respect of Acs.10-00 guntas out of Ac'10-05 guntas comprise d in Sy. No. 414 situated at Bommaraspet Village, Shamirpet Mandal, M edchal-Malkaj giri District'

2. Petitioners state that the subject land in Sy No' 414 aL Bommaraspet Village originally formed part of the protected tenancy holdings of Late Kondapuram @ Dasari Chandraiah @ Chandra Reddy and Late Nomula Laxmaiah @ Laxma Reddy, the ancestors of Petitioners, who were recognised as Protected Tenants under the provisiorrs of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act' 1950. lt is submitted that the names of the predecessors of the Petitioners were reflected in the Protected Tenancy Registers maintainedundertheActinrelationtotheprotectedtenancy lands situated in Bommaraspet Vi11age, and further that their names were also shown in the subsequent revenue records' namely, the Khasra Pahani of 1954-55, the Chessala Pahani of 1955-58, and the year-wise Pahani Patrikas' as possessors and Protected Tenants in respect of the said land' 2.1 . Petitioners contended as follows: a. After the demise of the original Protected Tenants' their legal heirs and successors, namely Petitioners' succeeded to the protected tenancy rights under Section 40 of the Act' and that the 4th Respondent, after due enquiry' passed orders irr Proceedipgs No. A/30/2003 dated 14 'O2'2OO3 and Proceedings

No. A/ l22l2OO3 dated 01.05.2003 recognizing Petitioners as the legal heirs and successors of the original Protected Tenants. Rival parties, aggrieved by the succession proc:edings, carried the matter in appeal before the Joint Collecto-, Ranga Reddy District, in Appeal Proceedings Nos. F213226/2OO4 and F2/3227 l2OO4, which were dismissed by comnron order dated 21.12.2OO4, confirming the succession rights ol the Petitioners and their predecessors. Civil Revision Petitrons Nos. 597, 598, 599 and 600 of 2005, filed before this Court cL allenging those orders, were dismissed as withdrawn or not pressed by order dated 28.03.2O12, rendering the succession proceedings and recognition of protected tenancy rights in favour of petitioners fina1 and binding. b. Thereafter. Petitioners initiated pror:eedings under Section 32(1) read with Section 98 of the Act before the 4h Respondent in Proceedings No. Bl2199 l2016, seeking restoration of possession o[ the subject land in S-r. No. 414, and that the 46 Respondent, after enquiry and considering the protected tenancy records and connected procer:dings, allowed the proceedings by order dated 27.Ol.2Ol7 and restored possession to Petitioners. Consequently, Petitioners approached the 3'd Respondent seek.ing an Ownership Certificate under Section 38-E of the Act in Proceedings No. L/58g,'2016, and the 3'd Respondenl, after considering the material records, succession proceedings, tenancy records and restoraLion proceedings, granted the Ownership Certificate in favour of Petitioners by proceedings dated 24.O9 '2019 in respect of Acs.10-00 out of Acs. 10-05 guntas in Sy No 4l4 Pursuant thereto, the revenue authorities mutated Petitioners' names by issuing Pattadar Pass Books and Title Deeds, and the statutory tenancy and ownership rights of the Petitior-rers attained finality and continr.red to subsisl for several years' These rights were also reflected in the due diligence reports and records prepared during the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process concerning Respondent No. 5, and in the Committee of Creditors proceedings before the National Company Law Tribunal at Hyderabad, clearly acknowledging the protected tenancy rights and ownership claims of the Petitioners in Sy No 414' c. The claim of Respondent No 5 over the land admeasuring Acs. 10-05 guntas in Sy No 414 is that it purchased it from one Sri Medi Krishna Reddy through a Sale Deed dated 15.06.2004, registered Document No' 74776 of 2005, with title traced to an alleged unregistered sale said to have been executed. by the original pattadar Smt' Ramaraju Laxmi Narsamma, the 7th Respondent, in favour of one Mamidipally Yadagiri Rao, which was subsequently sought to be regularised under Section 50-B of the Act in File No' 82 l2412l1g7l before the Tahsildar, Medchal' who by -\__-- proceedings dated 08.O2.1.972 purportedlv regularised the alienation. The predecessors of Petitioners, as Protected Tenants, questioned the validity of these Section 50-B proceedings on the ground that they were contrary to Sections 38-D and 5O-B(3) of the Act, and preferred ApF,eals before rhe Joint Collector, Ranga Reddy District, in Prrtceedings Nos. 84 / 156 to 160/ 1992, covering Sy. Nos. 41,4, 476 417 and other survey numbers at Bommaraspet Village. The .loint Collector, after a detailed enquiry, passed common orders dated 1I.O8.1997 holding regularisation procet.dings dated 08.02.1972 contrary to Sections 38-D and 50 B(3), and ser aside the Tahsildar s proceedings, thereby nullifS,ing rhe very foundation of Mamidipally Yadagiri Rao's claimed rights. d. Petitioners contended before the authorities that Respondent No. 5 was only claiming derivative r.ights through conveyances originating from the invalidated proceedings, whereas Petitioners asserted independent statu _ory rights as Protected Tenants recognised through successio r proceedings under Section 40, the restoration proceedings trnder Section 32(1) read with Section 98, and the Ownership Certihcate proceedings under Section 38-E, which could not l>e nullified b1, subsequent private conveyances flowing from proceedings already declared illegal by the competent authoritl . Respondent No. 5 w'as fully aware of and had actively parricipated in rhe )

tenancy, succession, restoration and ownership certihcate proceedings prior to Iiling the Appeals, having been arrayed as Respondent No. 3 in Proceedings No. 812199 12016, ftled detailed counters and contested the matter on merits, and having likewise Proceedings No. objections, those been arrayed as Respondent No. 3 in Ll 58812016, engaging counsel and filing proceedings culminating in the order dated

24. O9.2019 and consequential mutation entries, e-Pattadar Pass Books and Title Deeds. Apart from contesting before the revenue authorities, the tenancy claims, restoration proceedings and Ownership Certilicates in the Petitioners' favour were specihcally reflected in the Due Diligence Reports prepared during the CIRP of Respondent No. 5 and in the Committee of Creditors proceedings before the NCLT, Hyderabad, clearly disclosing the subsistence of the protected tenancy rights and orders in Sy. No.414. e. Notwithstanding this, Respondent No. 5, through its present management, filed the Appeals before the 2nd Respondent making false and self-serving averments of no knowledge of the earlier proceedings, whereas it had actively participated in all of them by fi1ing counters, engaging counsel and fully prosecuting the matter through its authorised re presentatives. Despite this admitted participation and the detailed records, pleadings, orders, due diligence reports, CIRP records and Committee oI Creditors proc eedings clearly reflecting the tenancy claims and Ownership Certificates, the present management falsely claimed it learnecl of the Section 38-E Certificate and other proceedings only on O8.08.2025, projecting that date to overcome a nearly six-year delay. f. Petitioners raised a preliminary objection on limitation and maintainability, requesting the 2nr Respondent to first adjudicate hmitation under Section 93 of the Act, but the 2"d Respondent, without proper enquiry into condonation of delay, without any petition to condone delay, without recording sufficient cause, and without following mandar,ory procedure, casuallv entertained and allowed the Appeals by invoking Section 17 of the Limitation Act, 1963 on merc a.llegations of fraud without adjudication or proof. On th s footing the Petitioners contend the impugned order is without jurisdiction, contrary to the statutory limitation under the A:t, and suffers patent illegality, on grounds including: thar rhe impugned common order dated 21 .O5.2026 is illegal, arbitrary and violative of natural justice; that the 2nd Respondent erred in entertaining Appeals filed after an unexplained c:elay of nearly six years from the proceedings d,ated, 24.09 .20 19 r.r,ithout a proper condonation application, rendering the Appeals barred by limitation under Section 93; that ResponCcnt No. 5,s admitted participation in Proceedings No. B/2199/2O16 and No. Ll588l2016 gave it full knowledge from inception, so limitation running from the new management's alleged discovery of fraud is contrary to settled principles governing corporate bodies; that a change in management, Directors, or approval of a Resolution Plan does not create a fresh cause of action or extend limitation; that invoking Section 1 7 of the Limitation Act absent legaliy established fraud was a jurisdictional error, mere allegations not sufficing unless specifically pleaded and strictly proved; that findings of suppression, collusion, interpolation, manipulation and fraud were recorded without trial, issues, evidence or forensic examination, rendering them perverse and unsuslainable; that the Section 38-E proceedings attained statutory finality and could not be annulled in collateral appellate proceedings without setting aside the foundational tenancy and succession proceedings; that the impugned order is self-contradictory, repeatedly noting the need for detailed examination and strict scrutiny while refraining from conclusive hndings, yet finally allowing the Appeals and cancelling vested Section 38-E rights; that, having found detailed examination necessary, the only permissible course was remand, not fina1 extinguishment of rights; that the Section 40 succession proceedings in Al30l2OO3 and Al122l2OO3 had attained finality, confirmed before the Joint Collector and this Court in

C.R.P. Nos. 597-600 of 2005, and could nc,t be indirectly reopened; that vested Section 38-E ownershrp rights, granted after due enquiry and followed by mutations and title entnes, could not be lightly interfered with on suspicion; that hndings of interpolation and difference in ink, style and aiignment in the Protected Tenancy Register were made without expert or forensic evidence, rendering them speculative; that statutory revenue records carry a presumption of correctness unless disproved through proper evidentiary procecture, that the Authority erred in entering complicated litle qu3stions relating to conveyances, mortgages, SARFAESI and CIFIP proceedings, beyond the limited scope of Tenancy Act proceedings; that such rival title claims could only be adjudicated by a,:ompetent Civil Court; that protected tenancy is a statutory righ, not presumed extinguished absent strict compliance with thr Act; that the Section 32 and 38 E proceedings, independentll. conducted by competent authorities after due enquiry, could not be brushed aside on subsequent allegations; that the petitioners, predecessors had consistently asserted protected tenancy rights for decades, recognised in various statutory proceedings, which the impugned order unsettles without proper adj udication; that the order suffers non-consideration of relevant material and consideration of irrelevant factors, evidencing arbitrariness: and lhat allegations of fraud must be specifically pleaded and t0 strictly proved, not inferred from assumptions' and absent conclusive findings the 2nd Respondent could not annul the statutory proceedings and vested rights of the Petitioners' g It is further stated that Writ Petition was filed during Summer Vacation as the impugned order dated 2|.os.2o26fallswithinmattersentertainablebytheVacation Court, and that Pursuant to it, collusion with ResPondent No 5, the Revenue Authorities, 1n were taking active steps to delete the Petitioners' names from revenue records and cancel consequential entries, while Respondent No' 5 was attempting to dispossess the Petitioners without due process' warranting urgent interim protection against irreparable loss The impugned order, by directing cancellation of Section 38-E Certificates, mutation entries, Pattadar Pass Books and title records, would, if allowed to stand, cause irreparable loss and serious prejudice to the Petitioners' vested rights The Appeals were listed before the 2nd Respondent on 16'05 2026' when the Petitioners hled written submissions and an interlocutory application seeking dismissal for want of any petition to condone delay, but the matter was neither reserved for orders nor notified for a further date, and the Petitioners learned of the impugned order only when their counsel personaily enquired at the office of the 2"d Respondent, conduct which' they submit' demonstrates undue haste and denial of fair opportunity' On this premise, the Petitioners submit thev have no other eflrcacious remedy except to invoke Article 226, and pray that the impugned common order dated 2\.O5.2026 tre quashed and the orders dated 27.O1.2O17 and 24.O9.2OI9 be restored. h. Petitioners relied on several precedents. The Full Bench judgment of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Sada

u. Tahsllda4 Utnoorl was cited for the proposilion that under Sections 38-E and 38(5) of the Act, as amendr:d by Act 2 of 7979, a protected tenant need not be in physical possession on the notihcation datc to obtain an ownership certificate, that holding protected-tenant status as on the notifierl date suffices, thal restoration of possession is not a conditiotr precedent to Section 38-E(2) proceedings, and that a certificate trndcr Section 38-E(2), once fina1, is conclusive and cannot be re-agitated in delivery proceedings. The Supreme Court s dccis,ion in B. Bo,l Redd.g u. Teegala Naragana Reddg2 was cited for the proposition that a protected tenant's interest continues so Iong as the tenancy is not validly terminated; loss of possession alone does not terminate it; legal heirs mav clai:n restoration, and under Sections 32 and 38-D, a landholder rllrst first offer the land to the protected tenant before sale, fail ng lr.hich the sale is u,ithout legal effect. Thota Srtdhar Reddg a Mq.nd.ala ' 1987 SCC Online AP 187 ' 1zotol rs scc 102

t2 Ramulammas was cited, under Sections 19, 36, 44 and 46 for the proposition that a protected tenant may recover possession under Sections 36 and 44, th,at the proviso to Section 44(1) bars a landholder's resumption unless reservation was sought within eighteen months of the Act's commencement per the 1955 Amendment Act, and that absent such reservation and the requisite enquiry and Deputy Collector's certificate, the tenant's rights cannot be defeated. On limitation, Ragho Slngh u. Mohan Singh+, was cited for the proposition that condonation is impermissible without an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, and a belated appeal without such Application is liable to dismissal for want of jurisdiction. Reliance was also placed on the judgment in Santosh Devi a' SundeF, concerning correction of revenue / mutation entries obtained through a fraudulentiy and forcibly obtained sale deed; on Kosaraju Bataji a. Stdte of Telangana6, on the effect of a belated challenge to mutation entries after several years; on Kerala High Court's decision in Tripenta Hotels (P) Ltd.. rt. Emtrttogees' Sta:te Insutance CorporationT, on applicability of the Limitation Act (including Section 5) to statutory forums and the effect of a change of management on limitation, on the (202 l) 16 SCC i (2001) 9 SCC 717 2025 SCC Online SC 1808 2015 SCC OnLine Hyd 604 201_qSCC OnLine Ker 16942 j common order of a learned Single Judge of this Court in C.R.P. Nos. 5279 of 2Ol7 and batch, and Writ Petiticns No. 3860 of 2OO8, 6759 of 2OI7 and 11157 of 2019, on surrender of a tenancy claim and the consequences of a declared NIL tenancy.

3. Respondent No. 5 fi1ed Counter Afficlavit contending the Writ Petition is misconceived and is liable to be dismissed, more particularly as under: a. Respondent No. 5 is the contesting .lespondent and successfui Appellant, and by the commolr order dated 21.05.2026 in Appeal Nos. F21215212025 and F212155/2025, the Additional Collector, Medchal-Malkajgiri Dis;trict, exercising powers under Sections 90 and 91 of the Act, allc,wed its Appeals and set aside two orders obtained, it contends, by fraud, collusion and suppression, the restoratiorL order dated 27 .Ol .2017 in Case No. B I 2\99 I 2016 and Section 38-E Certificate dated 24.O9.2019 in Proceedings Nc. L/588/2016. Petitioners, having iost before a competent authority on a reasoned order, have invoked Article 226 in a ciisguised appeal on facts. An order obtained by fraud, collusion zLnd suppression is a nullity conferring no right, fraud vitiatirrg even solemn proceedings and rendering such orders non est and open to challenge in collateral proceedings, and a litigant securing an order by fraud cannot invoke Article 226 to protect it, that

jurisdiction being exercisable only in aid of the honest and diligent b. It is stated, petitioners approached with unclean hands, suppressing material exposing the falsity of their claim: that Sy. No. 414 does not figure in the Final Protected Tenancy Register of their predecessors, recorded as protected tenants only of Sy. Nos. 417 lA, 421, 426 and 427; that Section 38-E certificate dated 19.05.1975 (Proceedings No. 196lLREl75) granted to their predecessor was conlined to those survey numbers, excluding Sy. No. 474; that the MOU dated 01.09.1989 under Section 39 recorded Sy No.414 as in the possession of Sri Medi Krishna Reddy; that the counter frled by predecessor Sri Kondapuram Chandra Reddy dated 12.lO'1.993 in Proceedings No. L/5737/ 1993 admitted Sri Medi Krishna Reddys entitlement over Sy. No.414; that the Mandal Revenue Officer s lreld verification report dated 19.O2.20O4 conlirmed Sri Medi Krishna Reddy's actuai, physical and cultivatory possession; and that a subsisting Section 38-E Certificate had already been granted to him over the same land vide Proceedings No. Ll360ll2003 dated 05.06.2004, challenged in Appeal No. F2l511112OO4, which remains pending. Such suppression of material facts disentitles the Petitioners to discretionary relief.

l5 c. Petitioners selectively filed documents, omitting several placed record by Respondent No.5 r.yith its Appeals, including: the NCLT order dated 25.02 .2o2ii approving the Resolution Plan in C.P.(L.B.) No. a3lT lHDB/nLB showing the 2019 Section 38-E order was passed after CIRp admission; the Provisionai and Final Protected Tenancy R,:gister extracts, shor,r'ing Sy. Nos. 41.4 and 430 were absent frore the provisional Register and interpolated by hand iater; the MOU showing the original Protected Tenants' own admission of ptssession by the vendor of Respondent No. 5; the registered Sale Deed No. 14776l2OOS dated 15.06.2004, showing an urbroken chain of registered documents flowing from the Section 38-E Certificate holder; the 1975 Section 38-E Certificate confned to Sy. Nos. 417/A, 421, 426 and 427, showing even the petrtioners' predecessors claimed no rights over Sy. Nos.414 and 430; the 2004 Section 38-E Certificate over Sy. No. 414 in favour of the vendor of Respondent No. 5; the Registered l{emorandum of Deposit of Title Deeds No. 1868 of 20L2 date(l 2Z.Og.2Ol2 jn favour of Bank of Baroda, showing the land was mortgaged as a secured asset by erstwhile promoters; and O.A. No. 164 of 201S before the DRT, Hyderabad, showing the alleged collusive revival of stale claims to defeat the mortgage rights of lending banks. d. Sy. No. 414 was never part of the protec ted_ tenancy holding of the Petitioners' predecessors, whos,e tenancv was confined to Sy. Nos. 417 lA, 421, 426 arrd 427, and that they themselves executed the MOU recognising Sri Medi Krishna Reddy's right over Sy. No. 414. Respondent No' 5 sets out a detailed chronolory: per the 1975 Protected Tenancy Register extract, Kondapuram Chandra Reddy's tenancy is shown only in Sy. Nos. 417 lA, 421, 426 and 427. not Sy' No 414; bv Section 38-E Certif,rcate dated 19.05.1975 (Proceedings No' lg6lLR9l75l, ownership of Ac.3O-25 guntas was granted in those survey numbers only, later set aside on appeal and remanded by order dated 27 'O3'1979 in Appeal No' 84 19678175, without including Sv. No' 414; by MOU dated 01.09.1989, the Petitioners' predecessors and Sri Medi Krishna Reddy acknowledged his exclusive possession of Sy' No' 414 (Ac.lO 05 guntas) and agreed to have this recorded; in 1992' Irve appeals were fiied before the Joint Collectot agair.st 1972 Section 50-B certiltcates in File Nos' P212411171 and 82l24t2l7r, namely 84 l156ls2 (Sv' No' 419)'84lts7 192(sv' No. 417), B4 lt58lg2 (Sy. No. 4r9), 84 1159 192 (Sv No' 416) and, B4 l160192 (Sy. No. 414); in 1993, Medi Krishna Reddy applied for a Section 38-E certifrcate over Sy' No 414 (Case No' L15737 11993); on 12.1O.1993, Kondapuram Chandra Reddy and five others admitted his entitlement in their counter; on

27. lo.lgg3, the RDO granted him the certificate on that basis and on a finding that Sy. No. 414 had been declared surplus t7 and the Section 5O-B certificate to Yadagiri Rao was void under Section 38-D; on 1L12.1995, the Joint Collector in Appeal No. B414717 194 set aside that RDO order and certificate, holding the land had vested in Government and the.t verification of tenancy records was lacking; on I 1.08. 1997 , the Joint Collector in Appeal Nos. B4l156-160/1992 set aside tee Section 50-B certificates as violative of Section 38-D, holding the protected tenants eligible for Section 38-E certificates; on 01.05.2003, the MRO granted Section 40 succession (Froceedings No. Al 122 l2OO3) to the 1egal representatives, submitted to be purely declaratory of heirship and incapat,le of enlarging tenancy to include Sy. No, 414; on 12.11.2OO3, the legal representatives applied for a Section 38-E cer'-ificate including Sy. No. 414 (Case No. L/3601/03); on 19.02.2004, the MRO reported Sri Medi Krishna Reddy's actual possession; on 05.06.2004, the RDO in Case No. L/3601/03 granted him the Section 38-E Certificate over Ac.10-05 guntas, rejecting the iegal representatives rival claim for lack of possession and their having foregone nghts under the 1989 MC,U, a certificate submitted to subsist unset-aside, its challenge in Appeal No. F2l51lll2OO4 remaining pending; on 15.06.2004, Sri Medi Krishna Reddy sold the land to Respondent No. 5 by registered sale deed No. 14776120O5; on 01.04.2010, the RDO permitted non-agricultural conversion (proceedings No. Ll4353/2OOg), taking the land outside the Tenancy Act's purview, after which Respondent No. 5 constructed buildings and a golf course; on

27. O8.2012, Respondent No. 5's erstwhile management mortgaged the property to Bank of Baroda (Document No. 1868 of 20 l2); in 2015, the Bank consortium initiated O.A. No. 164 of 20 15 before the DRT, Hyderabad, with para11el SARFAESI action; in 2016, thirteen years after succession, the legal representatives fi1ed Section 38-E applications (Case Nos. L/58812O16 for Sy. No. 414 arrdLl587 12016 for Sy. No. 430) and restoration applications (Case Nos. B/2199 12016 ar,d B I 2lg8 I 2016), allegedly in collusion with the erstwhile management to defeat the Banks' recovery/ SARFAESI action; on 27.Ol.2Ol7, the Tahsildar ordered restoration in Case No' B l2lgg I 2016 without verifying foundational records or possession, wrongly assuming Appeal No. F2/5111/2OO4 was disposed of when it remained pending, a subordinate authority in any event lacking competence to override the RDO's subsisting certificate, the erstwhile management deliberately not appealing this order; on 29 .ll.2Ol7 ' a papet Panchanama recorded handover but was never acted upon, Respondent No 5 continuing in physical possession as shown by satellite imagery; ot 09.O4.2019, the NCLT admitted Respondent No. 5 into CIRP (C.P.(I.B.) No. 4317/HDBI2ol8l, commencing the Section 14 moratorium and removing the erstwhile Board; on 24 09'2019'

l9 the RDO, Keesara Division, granted the Section 38-E certificate (Proceedings No. L/588/2016) founded entirely on tl:,e 2Ol7 restoration order and passed during the nroratorium, the removed erstwhile management allegedly collu(ling to withhold it from the Resolution Professiona)-; on 25.02.2025, the NCL approved the Resoiution Plan and a new Board took over; on O8.O8.2O25, the new management discovered the 24 .O9 .2019 order and underlying proceedings during post-CIRP scrutiny; on

26. O9.2025, it Illed Appeal No. F21215212025 tqainst the 2019 order; fraud was conclusively ascertained per counsel's legal opinion daled 29.09.2025; on 28.IO.2O25, it hled Appeal No. F21215512O25 against the 2Ol7 restoration order, invoking Section 17 of the Limitation Act; and on 121.05.2026, the impugned common order allowed both Appea s, setting aside the 2Ol7 and 2Ol9 orders as to Acs.10-00 g-tntas in Sy. No. 414, with cancellation of consequential mutations, e-Pattadar Pass Books and Title Deeds. e. Respondent No. 5, incorporated on 15.01.2001 originally as M / s Leo Meridian Resorts and Dr velopers Private Limited (since renamed), for developing an in -egrated leisure, hospitality, recreation and sports destination, is the absolute owner and lawful possessor of Ac.10-05 guntas in Sy. No. 414, Bommarasipet Viilage, Shamirpet Mandal, cleveloped for over two decades as part of its golf course and res()rt projecl, with compound wa11, internal roads, electricity, landscaping and security, paying property tax, the Petitioners never having actually possessed the property nor impiemented their restoration order on the ground. Current photographs and Bhuvan satellite imagery establish the land as a developed golf course with permanent structures and no agricultural activity attracting the TenancY Act. f. As to title: Smt. R. Laxmi Narsamma, the proforma Respondent, was originally pattadar; the Final Protected Tenancy Register recorded Sri Dasari @ Kondapuram Chandra Reddy as protected tenant only over Acs.30-25 guntas in Sy' Nos. 417lA, 421, 426 and 427, not Sy. No. 414, consistent with his Section 38-E certificate dated 19.05.1975 (Proceedings No' 196|LRElTS), later challenged and merely remanded for fresh enquiry by order dated 27.03 1979 without extending to Sy' Nos. 414 and 430. Sri Dasari Narsimha Reddy possessed Sy' Nos. 416-418 and.427, while Sri Medi Krishna Reddy, vendor of Respondent No. 5, possessed Sy. No. 414, acknowledged in the MOU dated 01.09.1989 under Section 39 among the named parties. Pursuant thereto, the RDO by order dated 27 'lO'7993 in Case No. L I 57 37 I 1993 granted Medi Krishna Reddy a Section 38-E certihcate, set aside on appeal by order dated 11.12.lgg1 in Appeal No. 84 1471'7 / 1994 (itself the subject of C.R.P. No. 99 of 1996, dismissed 08 06' 1999), but superseded 2t by the fresh independent grant dated 05.06.2004 in Case No. Ll360l l2OO3 following the 19.O2.2OO4 verLfication report, expressly rejecting the legal represen tatives' clztim, a certihcate submitted to subsist, unassailed save for the pending Appeal No. F2/511112OO4. Pursuant to that certificate, Sri Medi Krishna Reddy executed the registered seJe deed dated 15.06.2004 (Document No. 1477612005) favour of Respondent No.5, which has since remained in continuous, lawful possession, later converting the land to non- agricultural use vide Proceedings No. Ll4353l2OO8 dated 01.02-.2010, taking it outside the Tenancy Act. g. As to the mortgage and recoverv proceedings: during the erstwhile management of Sri Gok:araju Srinivasa Chakravarthi Raju, the property was mortgaged to Bank of Baroda by registered deed dated 27.O8.2OI2 (Document No. 1868 of 2Ol2) on the strength of the Comparry's title via the Section 38-E Certificate and sale deed; subsequent default led to proceedings under the RDB Act, 1993 and SARFAESI Act, 2002, including O.A. No. 164 of 2015 before the DRT, Hyderabad. h. As to the alleged fraud and r:ollusion: it is contended that Sri Gokaraju Srinivasa Chakravarthi Raju, then Managing Director, acting to defraud creditors and frustrate recovery proceedings, colluded with the legzLl herrs of the

ProtectedTenantstofabricatefalsetenancyclaimsdespite knowledge of the subsis ting 2OO4 certificate in favour of Sri Medi Krishna Reddy, resulting in the 2016 applications (Case Nos. L/588/2016 and Bl2lgg12016) founded solely on the 2003 Succession Certificate, thirteen years old and purely deciaratory, the long unexplained delay itself exposing fraud' aimed at defeating the banks' mortgage rights and SARFAESI enforcement. Material records, including the 1989 MOU' the 2004 MRO report and the 2OO4 Section 38-E Certificate' were allegedly suppressed, the erstwhile Director and Petitioners collusively misleading the RDO and Tahsildar into entertaining barred, jurisdiction-less proceedings The Tahsildar mechanically passed ltLe 2Ol7 restoration order without enquiry or field inspection, disregarding the 2010 non-agricultural conversion and erroneously treating Appeai No' F2/51lll2OO4 as disposed of when it remains pending, lacking competence overthesubsistingcertificate.Thisorderwasneverappealedby the erstwhile management, an inaction alleged to be part of the fraudulent design. The alleged fraud by Sri Chakravarthi Raju has resulted in pending CBI and Enforcement Directorate cases against him. i. As to passing of orders during the insolvency moratorium: consequent on the erstwhile management's mismanagement, Union Bank of India (then Andhra Bank) ltled Z) a Section 7 IBC petition (C.P.(I.El.) No. 4I\lT lHDB/2018), admitted 09.O4.2O19 , commencing CIRP and ap,pointing an IRP. During this moratorium, the RDO passed the order dated

24. O9.2OI9 founded on the 2Ol7 restoration orcler, submitted to be an abuse of process furthering the frar:dulent scheme, obstructing secured credilors' claims and defez ting the Section 14 moratorium. j. As to discovery by the new management: the Resolution Plan of M/ s Jalav Entertainment Private Limited Consortium was approved on 25.02.2025 and new Board took over on a clean slate, discovering the 2Ol9 orde". and underlying 2017 order on 08.08.2025 during record verification, and realising both were procured by fraud. The Company filed Appeal No. F2l2152l2025 on 26.09.2025, obtained legal opinion conlirming fraud on 29.09.2025, and hled Appeal No. F2/215512025 on 28.10.2025 invoking Secrion 17 of the Limitation Act. The Appellate Authority, having -reard both sides on the preiiminary limitation question, held bi' common order dated 21.05.2026 that the Appeals were not time-barred, limitation running under Section 17 read with Slection 93 of the Tenancy Act from discovery of fraud, and, on :rrerits, recorded reasoned findings that Sy. No. 414 was never the petitioners, predecessors' protected-tenancy holding and thzrt the impugned orders were obtained by fraud and suppression, setting both aside and directing correction of revenue entries, a compiete, self-contained order calling for no interference. Allegations of bias against Respondent No. 2 are denied as an afterthought, the matter having been transferred to him at the Petitioners' own instance after they doubted the impartiality of the earlier Appellate Authority, k. Respondent No.5 denies the impugned order is il1ega1, arbitrary or violative of Articles 14 and 30O-A, submitting the Petitioners never held any subsisting right in Sy. No. 414 and that it is Respondent No. 5's rights that the Petitioners seek to defeat. A single writ petition is said to be not maintainable as the common order disposes of two separate, independent Appeals, F21215212025 against the 2Ol9 order and F2l2l55l2025 against LLre 2017 order, each a distinct cause of action requiring separate challenge. Paragraph 4 of the writ affidavit is said to misdescribe the land as Survey No 43O (the case concerns Sy. No. 414), evidencing careless drafting, and reliance on the 1954-55 Khasra Pahani and 1955-58 Chessala Pahani is said to be misconceived, those entries being interpolated. The mutation, Pattadar Pass Books and Title Deeds, being consequential to a certificate obtained by fraud, were rightly cancelled; no due-diligence or insolvency record is said to have validated the Petitioners' ownership, at most noting it as a disputed encumbrance outside the clear marketable asset base. Section 93 of the Tenancy Act is said to confer no power to reject an appeal on an interlocutory application, Iimitation being decidable only while hearing th: appeal, as was done here. 1 . Reliance is placed on Alchemist Asset Reconstrttction Co. a. Hotel Gaudaaan (P) Ltd.8 and Innooentiue Industries Ltd. !. ICICI Banke, fo: the proposition that proceedings conducted during the moratorium, with liable to be treated as non est, management displaced, were grven the overriding effect of the IBC. The inrerim protection sought, it is submitted, would merely perpetua'-e the fraud and prolong the cloud on Respondent No. 5's lawful ,-rtle, the balance of convenience favouring it.

4. Petitioners hled a Reply denying the Counter Affidavit's allegations as false, more particularly as under: a. The Appellate Authority exceeded the scope of the Appeals by entering into questions of tir1e, validify of conveyances and fraud, matters for competent forums. The Tenancy Act, 1950, being beneficial social wr:lfare legislation protecting cultivating tenants and securing e.grarian justice, requires liberal, purposive interpretation, relyirrg on Edukanti Kistrrrln;md. a. S. Venkatareddgro, as apprrved in Thota '(2018) 16 scc 94 ' (2018) 1 scc 407 o (2010) 1 scc 756

to SridharRed,dgu.MandalaRamulamlrrrallfortheproposltlon that the Act must be construed to advance social and economic justice without depriving protected tenants of valuable rights' b. While the MOU dated 01 09'1989 and the subsequent Medi Krishna Reddy proceedings are admitted to have been relied upon by Respondent No 5' it is denied that they extinguished, surrendered or divested the Petitioners' predecessors' protected tenancy rights over Sy No' 414' Protectedtenancyrights'beingstatutory'cannotbe extinguished except as prescribed under the Act' and Respondent No 5 has neither pleaded nor established any valid surrender or termination' Petitioners claim through recognised protected tenants whose heirs were recognised under Section 40 and whose rights were affirmed by llrre 2017 restoration order and 2019 Certificate, and Respondent No 5 cannot defeat these by disputed private documents' Sri Medi Krishna Reddy having no tenancy-record entitlement in any event' c. It is denied that Sy No' 414 never formed part of the predecessors' protected tenancy holding; the certified Final Protected Tenancy Registei is said to reflect it' such statutory record s carrying a presumption of correctness unless set aside by competent authority' The Chessala Pahani and other Pahanies ard relied upon: the 1955-58 Pahani records Ac'10-07 ..:t-i2O2r\ 16 scc 1

guntas in Sy. No. 414 with Venugopal Rao, Suclarshan Rao and Tulisamma as Pattadar and Kondapuram (lhandraiah and Nomula Laxmaiah as possessors, cultivation recorded as "Kavuldar"; the 1972-73 Pahani records the sanre extent with R. Laxmi Narsamma as Pattadar and the same two as Protected Tenant possessors, cultivation recorded as "Kal,ulu", corroborating their protected tenancy. Succest;ion Proceedings No. A112212003 dated 01.05.2003 recognised the Petitioners as Iegal heirs of the Protected Tenants including for Sy. No. 414, attaining finality after dismissal of Appeals F2 1 322612OO4 and F213227 l2OO4 (order dated 21.12.2004) and of C.R.P. Nos. 597-600 of 2005 (order dated 28.O3.2O12l , such that Respondent No. 5 cannot now dispute the Petitioners' status or rights. Protected tenancy rights may be surrt:ndered only as prescribed under the Act; Section 38-D mande.tes the tenant's right of purchase before any tran sfer, and mere private arrangc,ment does not amount to valid surrender absent strict cornpliance, which Respondent No.5 has neither pleaded r:or established. Respondent No. 5 is also said to approbate ar-rd reprobate by claiming title through Medi Krishna Reddy',s Section 38-E certificate while denying Sy. No. 414 forms parr of the tenancy records, notwithstanding that its own relied-upon MOU records statutory execution of a sale deed or the Petitioners' predecessors as Protected Tenants in the Final Register. d. As to the alleged 05.06.2004 certificate in favour of Sri Medi Krishna Reddy and pending Appeal No. F2l51lll2OO4, it is submitted that rival proceedings do not extinguish the Petitioners' independent statutory rights flowing from the Register, the Section 40 succession, and the 2Ol7 ar,d 2Ol9 orders, and that the pendency of Appeal No. F2l5llll2OO4 itself shows Medi Krishna Reddy's claims have not attalned finality. e. The allegations of fraud, collusion, conspiracy, suppression and fabrication are denied as fa1se, the Petitioners' rights being founded on statutory records and proceedings that cannot be branded fraudulent merely because adverse to Respondent No. 5, no competent authority having previously so found. The present physical condition of the land (go1f course, buildings, etc.) is irrelevant to the statutory tenancy question, which turns on whether the predecessors were protected tenants; once such rights culminated in the 20L7 and 2Ol9 orders, they could not be defeated by a subsequent change in land use effected by Respondent No. 5 or its predecessors' A mortgagee, secured creditor or resolution applicant acquires no better title than the mortgagor/ corporate debtor possessed, and the moiigage, recovery proceedings or inclusion in insolvency proceedings does not extinguish the Pro,ected Tenants' statutory rights. f. As to the claimed 2025 discove{r of fraud, it is submitted that Respondent No. 5 remains the same corporate entity despite the change in management, and its knowledge cannot be disowned; it had, through its officers;, fu1l knowledge of Lh.e 2Ol7 and 2019 proceedings which it its:lf contested, as shown by the Committee of Creditors proceerlings (73,d, 741J1 and 75ft meetings) and due diligence records establishing knowledge well before Plan approval. Having ac,luired assets on an 'as is where is", "as is what is", "whatevr:r there is" and "without recourse" basis, Respondent No. 5 is Lr,tund by existing claims and encumbrances, and a change in management does not create a new entity or greater rights, nor permit reopening of proceedings long frnal. The Appeals, filed after eearly eight and six years respectively, and absent any hnding of fraud by a competent authority, could not invoke Secr-ion 17 of the Limitation Act. g. It is further submitted that reliance on the CIRp and Section 14 of the IBC is misconceived, the Tenancy Act proceedings relating to pre-existing rights and not being recovery proceedings against the corporate debtor, the protected Tenants' rights having accrued long before CI Rp commenced,

such that Section 38-E Certificate dated 24 .O9.2019 was merely recognition of already-vested rights unaffected by the moratorium. The impugned order is said to be llIegal and unsustainable, the Appellate Authority having entertained long- delayed Appeals without legal basis for invoking Section 17 , ard without first deciding limitation, having entered disputed questions of fact, title and fraud never adjudicated by any competent forum, based on assumptions rather than evidence, exceeding its jurisdiction. It is denied that the Petitioners were never in possession: pursuant lo the 2Ol7 restoration order, possession was delivered through official proceedings never challenged for years, so Respondent No 5 cannot now claim continuous possession or non-implementation' It is further submitted that Respondent No. 5, Lreing neither a party to the original tenancy proceedings nor a person directly aggrieved, had disputed maintainability to appeal, an objection the Appellate Authority failed to examine before entertaining the Appeals.

5. Heard Sri E Aj ay Reddy, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Ms. E. Anisha Reddy, learned counsel for petitioners, learned Government Pieader for Revenue on behalf of Respondents 1 to 4 and Sri S. Niranjan Reddy, learned Senior Counsel assisted bi Ms. Rubaina S. Khatoon, learned counsel for Respondent No.5.

6. Before proceeding further, it is nei:essary to clarify two matters of nomenclature that recur throughout the record. First, the impugned restoration order dated 27 )1.2017 and the impugned Section 38-E Ownership Certificate dated 24.O9.2019 relate only to Acs. 10-00 guntas out of the tota.l extent of Acs. lO 05 guntas comprised in Sy. No. 414; whe:ever the record refers to the entire extent of Acs.10-05 guntas, including in the Memorandum of Understanding dated 01.09.1939, Section 38-E certificate dated 05.06.2004 in favour of Sri Medi Krishna Reddy, and the possession and title asserted by Respondent No. 5, such reference is to the larger survey extent .vithin which the impugned Acs.10-00 guntas is comprised, and this distinction is maintained throughout this order. For convenience, the said extent of Acs. 10-00 guntas out ofAcs. 10-O5 grntas in Sy. No. 414, being the extent actually covered by the impugned proceedings and forming the subject matter of the present writ petition, is hereinafter referred to as "the sub- ect land", while the expression "Sy. No. 414" or "the entire survey extent" is used where the discussion concerns the larger extent of Ac.10-05 guntas as such. Secondly, the record disclose.s three distinct stages of proceedings under Section 38-E of thr: Act concerning the lands in question, namely, the Section 38-E certificate dated 19.05.1975 granted to Petitloners' predecessor liri Kondapuram Chandra Reddy in respect of Sy. Nos. 417 lA, 421, 426 and, 427, hereinafter referred to as "the 1975 certificate"; Section 38-E certihcate dated 05.06.2004 granted to Sri Medi Krishna Reddy in respect of Sy. No. 414, hereinafter referred to as "the 20O4 certificate"; and the impugned Section 38-E certifrcate dated

24. Og.2O19 granted to the Petitioners in respect of the subject land, hereinafter referred to as "the 2019 certihcate" These three certihcates are referred to distinctly in this order and are not to be conflated with one another'

7. The controversy in the present Writ Petition essentially turns upon two distinct but interlinked questions' namely, whether the Appeals preferred by Respondent No' 5 before the 2'd Respondent, being Appeal Nos' F2l2l52l2O25 and, F2 I 2155 I 2025, were maintainable in point of limitation' and, if so, whether the findings recorded by the 2"d Respondent on merits warrant interference in the exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of t}:e Constitution of India. It is necessary, at the outset, to be clear about the nature of the exercise upon which this Court is engaged. This Court, whiie exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 over an order passed by a statutory Appellate Authority under the Tenancy Act, does not sit as a further court of appeal over disputed questions of fact, and it is not for this Court to substitute its own appreciation of the documentary record for that of the lla Respondent. The task of this Court is conhned to -)J examining whether the findings of the 2"d Respondent are vitiated by tack of jurisdiction, violation of the principles of natural justice, error apparent on the face of the record, or perversity, in the sense of being hndings that no reasonable authority, acting on the material before it, coulc have arrived at. The discussion that follows is undertaken wit,hin this limited framework, and any reference in the succeedirLg paragraphs to the documentary material is to be understood as an examination of whether that material was capable of sustaining the findings of the 2"d Respondent, and not as an independent adjudication by this Court of the underlying fac -ua1 controversy.

8. On the question of limitation, rt is, no doubt, correct, as urged on behalf of Petitioners, that the Appeals came to be filed before the 2"d Respondent long after the orders impugned therein, namely nearly six years afte:- 2019 certificate and nearly eight years after the restoratirn order dated 27 .Ol .2017 . However, this Court is unable to accept the contention that the invocation of Section I 7 rrf the Limitation Act, 1963 by the 2"d Respondent was without basis or was otherwise perverse. It is well-settled that wh,lre an authority accepts, upon the material before it, that an or<ler or proceeding was procured by fraud or suppression of material facts, limitation for challenging such order runs not from the date of the order but from the date of discovery of the fraud. The 2"d

Respondent, in the present case, had before it a documentary chronologr which included the following circumstances: that Respondent No. 5 traces its title to the subject land through a registered sale deed dated 15.06.2004, bearing Document No' 1477612OO5, executed by Sri Medi Krishna Reddy, who himself held the 2004 certificate, which, on the material on record, has never been set aside and continues to subsist, the challenge thereto in Appeai No. F2/ 51 1l l2OO4 remaining pending even as on date; that the 1975 certihcate obtained by the Petitioners' own predecessor Sri Kondapuram Chandra Reddy was confined to Sy. Nos. 417 lA, 421, 426 arrd 427 and did not extend to Sy' No. 414; that the Memorandum of Understanding dated 01.09.1989, to which Petitioners' predecessors were signatories, records the possession of Sri Medi Krishna Reddy over Sy' No' 414 and, the agreement of the signatories to approach the revenue authorities accordingly; that in Case No' L|5737 I 1993, the predecessor of Petitioners, Sri Kondapuram Chandra Reddy, fi1ed a counter dated l2.lo.lgg3 admitting the entitlement of Sri Medi Krishna Reddy over Sy. No. 4L4; and that the field verihcation report of the Mandal Revenue Officer dated lg.O2.2OO4 recorded Sri Medi Krishna Reddy's actual, physical and cultivatory possession of the land. Having regard to this body of contemporaneous statutory and documentary material, and the explanations offered by the Petitioners in response thereto, this Court is unable to hold that the 2r1d Respondentrs conclusion, that the restoration order dated 27 .O7.2O77 and 2019 certifrcate were procured without referenc<. to this material and hence by suppression, is perverse or wittLout foundation. Whether, on a full and independent re-app:-eciation of the evidence, a different view was also possible is r-rot the question that arises for consideration in these proceedingls; what matters is that the view taken by the 2nd Respondent was reasonably open on the malerial belore it.

9. This Court is also unable to accept the submission that the knowledge of the erstwhile management of Respondent No.5, which, admittedly, contested the procr:edings in Case Nos. B/2199l2016 and L/58812016, must, in Law, be imputed to the Company so as to render perverse the 2'd Respondent's Iinding on limitation. The material before the 1)na Respondent indicated that it was the very erstwhile Managing Director of Respondent No. 5 who was alleged to have acted in collusion with the Petitioners to bring about the restoralion order dated

27. OI.2077 and the 2019 certihcate, at a time when the Company was under financial distress and exposed to recovery action by its secured creditors, and that the said orders were, on the finding of the 2"0 Respondent, deliberz.tely not put to challenge by that very management. The o:.dinary rule of attribution of a company's knowledge to the company itself is notaninflexibleone,anditdoesnot,withoutmore,operateto shieidafraudpractiseduponacompanybyitsowndirecting mind, particuiarly where that fraud is directed against the company itself and the company' through a subsequently and independently constituted management' is the party seeking to undo its consequences' Once the corporate debtor was placed under the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process with effect from 09.04.2019 and its Board was superseded' and once a new management assumed control only upon approval of the ResolutionPlanon2s'O22)25'itwasreasonablyopentothe

2. d Respondent to treat the discovery of the impugned orders by that new management on 08 08'2025' followed by the ftling of the Appeals on 26'09'2025 and 2A rc '2025' as a genuine discovery within the meaning of Section 17 of the Limitation Act. 1963. This Court accordingly' hnds no error' still less any perversity, in the approach of the 2'd Respondent in taking up the question of limitation as a preliminary issue' hearing the parties thereon, and holding' upon a consideration of the material, that the Appeals were not barred by limitation'

10. T\rrning to the merits' the primary grievance of the Petitioners is that the 2nd Respondent' while purporting to decide only the question of limitation' in fact travelled into disputed questions of title' the validity of competing conveyances, and allegations of fraud' without a full-fledged )t trial, without framing issues, and without rr:cording oral or forensic evidence, and that such a course wzrs impermissible within the confines of an appeal under Sectior-rs 90 and 91 of the Tenancy Act. This Court is unable to accept this submission in the facts of the present case. The findings recorded by the 2"a Respondent are not shown to rest upon any oral evidence requiring cross-examination or upon any disputed question that could only be resolved by a civil court; rather, they rest upon a comparison and appreciation of the statutory a.rd documentary record itself, namely the protected Tenancy Register, the 1975 certificate, the 2OO4 certificate, the Mr:morandum of Understanding dated 01.09.1989, the counter dated 12.10.1993 hled by Petitioners' own predecessor, and the teld verihcation report dated 19.O2.2OO4, all of which were placed before the 2"d Respondent by the contesting parties. An Appellate Authority exercising statutory appellate jurisdiction und:r the Tenancy Act is not denuded of the power to examine su<:h documentary material and to draw conclusions therefrom merely because the resulting hnding touches upon the question of iaud; what the law requires is that fraud be specifically pleaded and be capable of being sustained upon the material on record, and this Court does not find, on a reading of the record placecl before it, that the finding of fraud recorded by the 2nd Responclent was a bald or unsupported one. The hnding of the 2,d Respondent

concerning suppression and fraud cannot, in the view of this Court, be characterised as perverse or unsupported by the material relied upon before it, the Petitioners not having, either before the 2"d Respondent or in the reply affidavit hled before this Court, directly met the speci{ic documents relied upon by Respondent No. 5, nameiy the Memorandum of Understanding dated 01.09.1989, the counter dated 12.10'1993 admitting Sri Medi Krishna Reddy's entitlement, and the subsisting 2004 certificate in his favour, choosing instead to reiterate the existence of the succession proceedings and the entries in the Protected Tenancy Register. This Court clarifies that it is not, by the foregoing observations, rendering any independent or absolute hnding that the Petitioners or their predecessors in fact committed fraud; it is only holding that the finding to that effect recorded by the 2na Respondent, being a finding reasonably open on the material before it, does not call for interference in writ jurisdiction. 1 1. As regards the Memorandum of Understanding dated O 1.09.1989, this Court clarifies that the said document is not treated, either by the 2"d Respondent or by this Court' as an instrument that by itself and automaticaily extinguished any statutory protected tenancy that may otherwise have existed; protected tenancy rights, being creatures of statute, can only be surrendered, terminated or extinguished in the manner provided under the Tenancy Act, and a privar.e memorandum cannot, by itself, achieve that result. The lllemorandum of Understanding dated 01.09.1989 has been treated, both by the

2. d Respondent and by this Court, as a signihcant contemporaneous circumstance bearing upon the possession and the conduct of the parties, material to the question of whether the foundational record supports the t,etitioners' claim that Sy. No. 414 formed part of the protected terlancy holding of their predecessors, rather than as an independent instrument of extinguishment.

12. As regards the contention that the succession proceedings under Section 40 of the Act, culminating in Proceedings Nos. A/30/2003 and All22/2OO3 end confirmed in appeal and in the Civil Revision Petitions before this Court, had attained hnality and could not be reopened, this Court notes that a certificate of succession under Section 40 is, by its very nature and as fairly acknowledged in the counter affidavit of Respondent No. 5, a document that is declaratory of heirship alone; it identifies the legal heirs of a deceased Ixotected tenant but does not, by itself, either create or enlarge ttLe extent of land over which the protected tenancy subsisted. This Court clarifies that it does not treat Proceedings No. Al l22l2t)03 as factually irrelevant merely because of this 1ega1 characteri sation, nor does it doubt that the said proceedings refer to S5r. No. 414 among the lands succeeded to; rather, the point is a narrower one' namely, that even where succession proceedings refer to a particular survey number, the 1ega1 effect of such proceedings is confined to identifying the persons who succeed to whatever protected tenancy rights actually existed, and such proceedings donotthemselvesconstituteanadjudication,bindingonrival claimants, that protected tenancy rights existed over that survey number in the first p1ace. The finality attaching to the succession proceedings of 2003 is, accordingly, confined to the issue actually decided therein, namely the identity of the successors,anddoesnotextendto,orforeclose,examinationin subsequent proceedings of whether the underlying protected tenancy right over Sy. No. 414 existed at all, a question which' on the material before the 2'd Respondent, appears to have been consistently answered in the negative in the contemporaneous statutory record commencing from the year 1975 itself. The finality of the succession proceedings' in these ircumstances,Cannotbereadashavingconclusivelyfastened protected tenancy upon Sy No' 414, and the 2"d Respondent cannot be said to have impermissibly reopened a settled question by examining this distinct and anterior aspect'

13. As regards the objection that the restoration order d'ated2T.ol.2OlTandthe2Olgcertificatehadattainedlrnality for want of challenge over several years and that vested rights'

.ll once created and followed by mutatron, Pattalar Pass Books and Title Deeds, could not be lightly disturbed, this Court is of the view that such finality and the presumptioa of correctness ordinarily attaching to revenue entries were, rn the material before the 2"d Respondent, capable of yielding :o a finding that the foundation of those entries was the product of fraud or suppression practised upon the authorities that passed them. A party cannot found a claim of vested rrght upon an order that is found, upon a fair opportunity of hearing, tc, be vitiated by fraud, the settled position being that fraud vitiates even the most solemn of proceedings and that an orier procured by fraud confers no right capable of protection, r:gardless of the length of time for which it may have gone unchrllenged, always provided that the delay in unearthing the fraud is itself satisfactorily explarned, a requirement this Cou rt finds, for the reasons already recorded, to have been reasonarly found by the 2"d Respondent to have been satisfied in the present case.

14. This Court also considers it necessary to clarify the precise 1ega1 significance attributed to the subsistence of the 2004 certihcate. The subsistence of 2OO4 certrf-rcate is not, by itself, treated by this Court as conclusively rJetermining the validity or invalidity of the 2019 certificate; the two certihcates were issued upon different applications, at diiferent points in time, and neither automatically nullihes the other by its mere existence. The relevance of the 2004 certiflcate' as accepted by the 2nd Respondent and as this Court finds it was reasonably open to the 2nd Respondent to accept' lies in the fact that it demonstratesthatthequestionofentitlementoverSy.No.4l4 had already been the subject of statutory adjudication in favour of a rival claimant, upon a record that included the Petitioners' predecessor's own admission dated l2'lo'lgg3 and the field verification report dated lg 'O2'2OO4 ' and that the subsequent proceedings culminating in the 20 19 certificate did not satisfactorily address or displace that earlier statutory record' It an automatic or mechanical is in this sense, and not as consequence of the mere subsistence of the 2OO4 certificate' that the reliance placed upon it by the 2"d Respondent is found by this Court not to be Perverse'

15. This Court further clarihes upon by Respondent No' 5, tracing through Sri Medi Krishna Reddy and the subsequent registered sale deed and other transactions, and the question of whether Petitioners' predecessors held protected tenancy rights over Sy No' 474' are analytically distinct questions' and this Court has not procegded on the footing that the existence of a title chain in fariour of Respondent No' 5 automatically negatives any protected tenancy that may otherwise have existed' The title documents, possession records and the 2004 certificate relied that title chain reiied upon by Respondent No. 5 have been treated, both by the 2"d Respondent and by this Court, as material circumstances properly considered by the 2"d Respondent rvhile examining whether the Petitioners' claim of continuing protected tenancy over Sy. No. 414 was supported by the founclational tenancy record, and not as an independent or self-executing answer to that question.

16. This Court has also considered the batch of precedents cited on behalf of Petitioners. The decision of the Full Bench in Scdc u. Tahsildar, Utnoor cor:-ect1y lays down that a protected tenant need not be in physiceLl possession on the notified date for grant of an ownership c ertihcate under Section 38-E and that such a certificate, once final, is conclusive evidence not liable to be re-agiteLted in delivery proceedings; that proposition, however, pre-supposes that the claimant held the status of a protected tenant jn respect of the very survey number in question, which isr precisely the threshold matter on which this Court has found no perversity in the adverse finding of the 2"d Respondent, atd the decision accordingly furnishes no assistance to Petitioners on the facts of the present case. Similarly, the decision in B, Bal Reddg v. Teegala Naragana Reddg12, correctly holds that a protected tenancy continues to be operative until validly r.erminated, that '' 12oto1 l5 scc 1o2

mere loss of possession does not terminate it, and that a sale effected without following the procedure under Sectlon 38-D is without legal effect; this proposition, too, operates only where a protected tenancy is shown to have existed over the land in question, and does not assist a party wtrose claim to such status over the specific survey number has been found by the 2nd Respondent, without perversity, to be unsupported' The decision rn Thoto. Sridhor Reddg a' Mandala Ramulamma' besides being relied upon for the principle of beneficial construction already noticed, was also cited for the proposition that a landholder's right of resumption is subject to a complete embargo under the proviso to Section aa(1) of the Act in the absence of a reservation sought within eighteen months of the commencement of the Act; that decision, however' concerned a landholder's attempt at resumption against an admitted protected tenant, a fact situation materially different from the present controversy, which turns not upon resumption but upon whether the Petitioners' predecessors ever held protected tenancy status over SY. No of that decision does not, 414 in the first Place, and the ratio therefore, advance the case of the Petitioners here. As regards Ragho Singh a' Mohan Singhts ' cited for the proposition that condonation of delay 1S impermissible without a formal application under Section 5 of '' (2001) 9 scc 7.17

.15 the Limitation Act, this Court finds that ttLe said decision proceeded upon Section 5 of the Limitation Act simpliciter, whereas the 2"d Respondent in the present case invoked Section 17 of the Limitation Act, a distinct provisi<>n under which limitation itself begins to run only from the da-e of discovery of fraud, so that no separate application for conclonation of delay under Section 5 was called for once the 2"d Respondent accepted, upon the material placed before it, that time had not commenced running until the discovery o . the fraud on 08.08.2025; the decision in Ragho Slngh, restir:g as it does on a wholly different statutory provision, is accordingly distinguishb.ble and of no avail to the Petitioners. The decisions in Santosh Devi a. Sunder and Kosaraju BulaJi u, State o;f Telangana cited in the context of correction of sale deeds and mutation entries and the effect of belated challenges thereto, turn upon their own individual facts and do r.ot 1ay down any proposition that would preclude the correc,ion, upon final adjudication, of a mutation or certihcate found by the competent authorit5z to have been procured by fraud, and if anything, these decisions are consistent wjth, rather than opposed to, the power of a competent authority to correct entries shown to be tainted. The decision tn T?ipenta Hotels (P) Ltd. a. Emplogees' Sto'te Insurd.nce Corporation cited on the applicability of the Limitation Act to proceedings before a

statutory forum and on the relevance of a change of management to the running of limitation, is, in this Court's view, consistent with and supportive of the approach adopted by the 2nd Respondent in the present case, rather than being an authority in favour of the Petitioners, since it recognizes that a change of management may bear upon the question of limitation, which is the very basis upon which the 2nd Respondent proceeded. Lastly, the common order relied upon in Civil Revision Petition Nos. 5279 of 2016 and the connected batch, concerning surrender of a tenancy claim and declaration ol NIL tenancy in respe-ct of survey numbers situated at Gachibowli Village, arises out of an entirely distinct set of facts, proceedings and survey numbers unconnected with Bommaraspet Village or Sy. No. 414, and does not bear upon the specific documentary controversy that falls for determination in the present writ petition. None of the precedents cited on behalf of the Petitioners, therefore, detracts from the view this Court has taken above, each being either premised upon a factual foundation not shown to exist in the present case or being, on a closer reading, supportive of the very approach adopted by the 2"d Respondent. t7 . As regards the objection to the maintainability of a single writ petition assailing what is, in substance, the disposal of two distinct Appeals bearing different numbers, arising from two different original orders passed by two different authorities under two different provisions of the Act, this Court, while noting the force of the submission that the two Appeals constituted independent proceedings, does not consider it necessary to rest its decision on this technical ground alone, since the writ petition, in any event, fails on merits for the reasons recorded above.

18. Having regard to the totality of the facts and circumstances, this Court is of the considererl view that the impugned common order dated 21.05.2026, passed by the 2"d Respondent in Appeal Nos. F2l2152 12025 and F212155/2025, does not suffer from any jurisdictional infirnrily, procedural impropriety or perversity warranting interferenc e by this Court in the exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The 2"d Respondent examined the competing statutory and documentary record concerning the subject land; its findings concerning the lirnitation of the Appeals, the absence of protected tenancy over r-he subject land in the foundational record, and the suppression attending the restoration order dated 27 .Ol.2Ol7 and the 2O 1,) certificate, are not shown to be perverse, without jurisdiction, or vitiated by any illegality, and this Court does not find ;t a fit case to substitute its own view for that of the 2nd Re spondent, more particularly when the findings impugned are essentially findings of fact based upon an appreciation of documentary material that was equally availabie to, and was before the 2'd Respondent' addressed bY, both sides 19 . For the foregoing reasons' this Court finds no merit in the writ petition. The conclustons of the 2'd Respondent on the maintainability of the Appeals in point of limitation' on the insufficiency of the foundational record to support the Petitioners' claim of protected tenancy over the subject land' on the limited legai effect of the succession proceedings of 2003 ' and on the suppression attending the restoration order dated 27.01.2017 and the 2019 certificate' are not shown to be perverse, without jurisdiction' or otherwise vitiated so as to warrant interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The common order dated 2l '05'2026 passed by the 2"4 Respondent in Appeal Nos' F2l2152 12025 arld F21215512025 is accordingly upheld The Writ Petition is dismissed' No costs'

20. ConsequentlY' the any shail stand closed miscellaneous APPlications' if SD'. P.PONNA KRISHNA ASSI TANT REGISTRAR /TTRUE COPY" CTION OFFICER To, one CC to Ms E ANISHA REDDY, Advocate [OPU One CC to Ms. RU Two CCs to GP F Hyderabad IOUT] Two CD Copies BN BAINA S KHATOON, Advocate IoPUCI

1.

2. J

4y OR REVENUE, High Court for the State of Telangana, at HIGH COURT DATED: 2110812026

ORDER

WP.Nos.17016 OF 2026 DISMISSING THE WRIT PETITION WITHOUT COSTS J

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