ARBAPPL/167/2025 of Sintnet Advanced Technology Solutions LLP Vs M/s. Opple Lighting India Private Limited on 8 June 2026

[ 3168 I IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA AT HYDERABAD MONDAY, THE EIGHTH DAY OF JUNE TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY SIX PRESENT THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE K.LAKSHMAN ARBITRATION APPLICATION NO: 167 OF 2025 Between: Sintnet Advanced Technology Solutions LLP, having its office at H.No. 12- 50/4A, Next to lndustrial Estate, Medchal, Hyderabad rep. by its Authorised Signatory Mr. Govindarajan Srinivas S/o.Late S.Govinda Rajan, aged about 54 Years. ...APPLICANT AND M/s Opple Lighting lndia Private Limited, Having its office at DJ-1012, DJ- 1014, DTJ-1015, 1Oth Floor, DLF Tower-B, Jasola, South Delhi, New Delhi- 110 025. ...RESPONDENT Arbitration Application under Section 11 Sub-Secs. (5 & 6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 R/w Para (3)(i)(c) Scheme for Appointment of Arbitrator, 1996 praying that the High Court may be pleased to:

a) appoint a sole arbitrator in terms of Clause 26 of the Procurement Contract dated 5th January 2019 between the applacant and the respondent to resolve the disputes.

b) Award costs of the application. Counsel for the Petitioner : Mr. Srikanth Hariharan Counsel for the Respondent : - The Gourt made the following: ORDER

IN TI{F] HICFI C]OTJRl' I.'OR'T}IE S'I-ATE OF TELANGANA A1': IIYDIltABAD TIOYBL}, SRI .IUSTICE K. I,AKSH]\IAN ARI]ITRATION APPT,ICATI ON No. 167 OF 2025 DA'[E: : y.06.2026 Betrvccn : S ir-rtcn t .,\dr ancccl Icchnology Solutions L.l-P, har in.{ its olllce at tl.No. ll-50-/4 \i. lriext to Indusrrial Estate. Meclchal. IIl,derabaC. rep. by its .{utholisctl Signatorr. NIr. (iovintlra.jan Srini"lis. S,o Inte S (iovindra-1an. agcd aboLrt 5J rcars. Occ: I lcatl C omtnercial. Rio Hvderabad. Applicant ,,\ nd \4rs Opplc I ighring Priratc Ltcl,, having its of tlcc at D I'J- 1012. 10i4. DI.l-1015, 1Oth floor. '['owcr-l]. Jasola. South I)clhi. Delhi- Il00l5 I)1 J- DI-F -\ C\\ Respondent -['his ('Lrurt passeci the lbllou rng oRDF:R Ilcalcl \4r.. Srikantlt Ilariharan, learncd cou.rsel tbr thc Applicant. Despite selr icc ol'notice. the Respondent lid not enter appeailance

2. The present arbitration application has been filed under Section I l(6) of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter ,.the Act, 1996,,), seeking appoinrment of a sole arbitrator to resolve the disputes between the parties.

3. The Applicant claims that it is in the business of manufacturing and selling LED light sources, LED Light luminaries, and other LED products. It claims that the Respondent is also in the business of LED lights and products. According to the Applicant, in January 2019, the Respondent had approached it wirh a request to manufacture and supply LED products as per certain required specifications. After negotiations and factory visits, the parties entered into a Goods procurement Contract dated 05.01 .20 I 9. As per the agreement, the Applicant was to manufacture and suppry LED products as per the specifications and quality required by the Respondent.

4. The contract dated 05.01.2019 was for a period of two years, i.e., from 01.01.2019 ro 3l .12.2021 . After the expiry of the said period, the contracr was extended fiorn 01.01.2 022 to 3l'12'2027. The Applicanr states that between 18.07.2023 and

04.08.2023, it had supplied goods and rraterial to the Respondent at their llengaluru olflce. In relation to the said supply. the Applicant clairns that thr- Rcspondent owes an outstanding sum of Rs.32.33.938,-

5. l.ikervise. the Applicant claims thaL it had manulactured ploducts \\'or1h I{s. 56.68.571 - on the request ol the Respondent These prodr"rcts, according to the Applicant, were designed and madc as pcr the technical spccifications of thc Respondent. These products. be ing tinishcd goods. ate ly ing vacant and the Respondent is not taking delivery of the sarne. The Applicant contencls that the products. being madc accorrling to the speciiications of the Respondent. cannot be sold in the market Fufther. the ApplicanL contends thar the title in the finished goods has alre'ad1 passed to thc Respondent. -lherefore, the Applicant claims thc monies to\\'ards thc price of the flnished goods, and the storage chalges ttorn 20. 12.2023. The follorving are the amounts claimecl by thc Applicant Arnount to be paid b1 Opplc in respect of the supplies a ll'ec ted bl' Sintnet Rs. 32.33.928t- Arnount to be paid by Opple in respect ol the finished goods rnanulactured by Sintnet and lying in the godown as per the profbnna invoicc dated 03.02.2025 Rs. 25,00,000/-

Rs. 56,68,573l- Rs. 14.00,000/- Godown/Storage charges lrom December 2023 at the rate ol Rs. 1,00,000/- per month Damages tbr breach of contract lor non-payrnent Total Rs. 1,28,02,501i-

6. The Applicant claims to have written multiple letters/emails to the Respondent seeking his dues. However, as no reply was received, the Applicant invoked Clause 26 of the contract dated 05.0 1.2019 secking resolution of disputes through arbitration. For the sake of convenience, Clause 26 is extracted below:

26. DISPUTE RESOI-TJl ION Any dispute. controversies and diiferences which may arise betu,een the Parties in relation to or in connection with this Contract or any breach thereof shall be mutually settled arnicably by the Par-ties, by rnaking a reference of the dispute within a period of30 (thirt)) days frorn the date olreceipt of' a written notice of such dispute by a Partl fiorn the other Pany. The attempt to bring about an an-ricable settlement will be considered to have failed as soon as one of the I)artics hereto. altcr reasonable atternpts. rvhich attcrnpt shall continuc fbr not less than 30 (thirt),.) dars. gives 7 (sei,en) dar,s notice thereof to the otllcr l)ilrt\ in rvriting lor cornmencement of Arbitration Proceedinss. I'hc r\rbitral TrihLrnal shall consist ol 3 (three) arhitrators one of * horr shall be appointed by each Partr- I'he r\\o arbilralors shall.jointly appoint the third arbitrator. l'hc lces of the arbitrators shall be borne br the respcctite Pafties norninating them and the t'ee of the presiding arbitrator. cost and other e\penses incidental to the arbitration procccdings shall bc borne equally bv the parties. An-1' tlispute, controversy, difference or cloim ari.sirrg ortt of or relming lo this Controct, inclurling Ihe e.ristence, vatiditl', interpretotion, perfornttnce, breach or terminolion thereof or on)t disp te regording non-contra(.lual obligations uising out of or relating to it shall be reJerrcd to and Jinolly resolved by arbilration administered by the IIong Kottg International Arhitn ion Centre (llKIAC) under the HKIAC .4dnrinistered .lrbitrttiott Rules in force when the Notice of Arbitration is submi ecL Tlte orbitrotiort proceedings sholl be hettt at llong Kottg und sltoll be in English. 'l hc urbitraLion ariirrul sl.rall bc llnal and binding on bolh l)urt ics. ?. The arhitration norice dated 12.02.2025 was delivered to thc Responde,[. I [o\,\,cvcr, thc [lcspondent did not come lorward to 'csolr e the disputes through arbitration. 'l'heretbre, the present application has been fi led t,

8. At the outset, this Court holds that the present application under Section l1(6) of the Act, 1996, in not maintainable A bare perusal of Clause 26 indicates that the seat of arbitration is Hong Kong. It is pertinent to note that the law in relation to the determination of seat of arbitration is settled' Where the seat of arbitration is not expressly mentioned, it is presumed that the place of arbitration shall be treated as the seat' ln BGS SGS SOMA JV v. NHPCT, the Hon'ble Supreme Court adopting the Shashoua principle held as follows: Tests for determination o;f "seat"

60. The judgrnents of the English courts have exarnined the concept of the "juridical seat" of the arbitral proceedings. and have laid down several irnportant tests in orcler to determine whether the "seat" of the arbitral proceedings has, in fact' been indicated in the agreetnent ben{'een the parties The judgment of Cooke' J ' in Shashoua fshashoua v Sharma, 2009 EWHC 957 (Comrrr) : (2009) 2 Lloyd's Law Rep 3761 ' states: . 31. London arbitration is a ,"vell-known phenotnenon which is olten chosen by tbreign '(2020) 4 SCC 234

nationals rirth a dill'crent laq. such as thc la\! of Ne-rr York. g.o\ crning thc substanti\ e rishts ol the parties. lhis is because of the legislative framervorli trncl supervisory powers of the courts herc uhich ntartr parties are keen to adopt. When therclirrc thcrc is an e\press desienation ol'the arbitration \cnLlc AS l.ondon and no designatioti ol an1 alternatir e placc as the seat. cornbined wirh a supranatioual bodr of rules eoverning the arhitration .rntl no other signilicant contr.ar) incLicia. thc incrorablc conclusion is. to nry rnind. thal London is thc.iuridical seat and English Law the curial las. In rnr .judernent it is clear that eirher London has bccn clcsignated br the parties to the arbitratron allrcctnent as the seat of the arbitratron. or. havins rcqard to thc parties' agreement ancl all the relevant circumstances. it is the seat to be determined in accordance with thc final fall back pror ision ol'Section I ot'thc Arbitration Act."

61. lt will thus be seen that wherever there is an express desipnation of a "venue". and no desisnation ol anv alterna tive place as the "seat", combincd lyith a supranation al bodv of rules govern in the arbitration. and no othe r sisnificant contrarv indicia, the inexora ble conclusion is thal the stated venue is actually the iurrdical seat of the arbitral oroceedins

9. Likewise, in Mankastu Impex (P) Ltd. v. Airvisual Ltd.2, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that where a place of arbitration is specified and no other place is referred to, such place of arbitration is deemed to be the seat of arbitration. Furlher, determination of the seat of arbitration has to be gathered from the intention ofthe panies and from the other clauses of the agreement' The relevant paragraphs are extracted below:

20. It is well settled that "seat ol arbitration" and "venue ol arbitration" cannot be used interchangcably. It has also been established that mere expression "place of arbitration" cannot be the basis to deterrnine the intention ol the parties that they have intended that place as the "seat" of arbitration.'fhe intention of the parties as to the "seat" should be determined from other cla uscs in the asreement and the conduct of the parties.

21. ln the present case, the arbitration agreement entered into between the parties provides ttong Kong as the place of arbitration' The agreement between the parties choosing "Hong Kong" as the place of arbitration by itsetf wilt not lead to the conclusion that the parties have chosen Flong Kong as the seat of arbitration The '1zozo; s scc 399

\\ords. "the placc tll'arbitration" shall be "Hong Kong''. havc to be lead along with Clause 17.2. Clause 11 .2 provides that ''... any dispute, contro\ers.r', di/iit cnce ari.sing out oJ or relating to Mol,- shall ll( tc./!rr(.1 ro and JinalLy resolved by urbitratiott udntinisteretl in l{ong Kong....". On a plain readins of thc arbitration asreement, it is clear that thc referencc to Hons Kons as,,nlace of arbitration" is not a simple reference as th e "venue" for thc arbitral Droceedinss; but a referencc to Hong Kong is for final resolution by arbitration administered in Hon Kone. The agreement betrveen the pa rties that the dispute "shall be rcl'errcd to and finallv rcsolved bv arbitration administered in Hons Kong" clea rlv susscsls that thc parties have agreed that the arbitration bc seated at Hons Kons and that lau's of Ilong Kone shall govern the arbitration proceedings as well as have power of iudicial review over thc arbitration awa rd

22. ,\s pointcd out earlier. Clause 17.2 of MoU stipulatcs thal the clisputc arising out tlf or relating to MoLl rncluclitrg the existence, i,alidity, interpretation. breaclt or termination thereof or any dispute arising our of or relating to it shall be reterred to ancl llnallr resolved b) the arbitration trdnr in is tercd in llonc Kons 'Ihe words in Cla use 17.2 that "arbitration administered in I{ons

Kong" is an indicia that the seat of arbitration is at Hong Kollt Once the parties have chosen (Hong Kon " as the place of arbitration to be administered in Hons Kons. the laws of Hons Kons would govern the arbitration. The Indian courts have no iurisdiction for appointment of the arbitrator

10. In Arif Azim Co. Ltd. v. Micromax lnformatics FZE3, the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down factors to be considered white determining the seat of arbitration. The Court held that, in the absence of a contrary indication, place of arbitration shall be treated as the seat of arbitration. Further, goveming law and institutional rules applicable are also factors to be considered while determine the seat. The relevant paragraphs are extracted below: E. Concl usion

77. From the above exposition of Iaw, the following position of law emerges: '7'7.1. Paft I of the 1996 Act and the provisions thereunder only applies where the arbitration takes place in tndia i.e. 'uvhere either (I) the seat of arbitration is in lndia OR (ID the law governing the arbitration agreement are the laws of India tlzozsl e scc 750

77.2. Arbitration asreen'tents executed alter 6-9- 2012 uherc thc scat ol'arbitration is outside India. Part I of the I996 Act and the provisions thereunder rr ill not he applicable and would thll beyond the j u ri:d ic tion (,t Indidn e( rurt \. "7.3. Lven thosc arbitration agreements that have been erccuted prior to 6-9-2012 Part I of the I996 Act u ill not be appiicable. il its application has been excluded br thc parties in the arbitration agreernent either explicitll b1 designating the seat o1- arbitration orrtsicle India or implicitly b.v-' choosing the larr grtvelnins. the agreetnent to be an] othet law other than Indian la* . 7'7.4.'Ihe rnolncnt "seat" is determined. it w,ould be akin to an crclusire jurisdiction clause whereby onl) thc.jurisrlictional courts of that seat alone n,ill har e the .iLrlisclicLion to regulate the arbritral proceedings. I'hc notional doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction has been expressly rejected and overruled bv rhis ('ourt in its subsequent decisions.

77.5. 'l-ht- "( krscst Connection l-est" fbr determirrine rhe scar ol'arbirration b) identifl ing the las riith rihich thc agrcclnenl to arbitrate has its closest and rnost real connection is no longer a viable criterion lirr de tcrmination of the seat or situs of arbitration in I icu of lhc Shashoua Principle. l'hc seat ol arbitratiou cannot be detennined bv formulaic and unpredictable application of choice ol law rules based on abstract connecting factors to the underlying contract. frven if the law goveming the contract has been expressly stipulated, it does not mean that the law goveming the arbitration agreement and by extension the seat of arbitration will be the same as lhe lex contractus. 77 .6. The more aDDropriate criterion for determining the seat of arbitration in view of the subsequent decisions of this Court is that where in an arbitration agrcement therc is an exDress desisnation of a olace of arbitration anchorin s the arbitral proceedings to such olace. and there being no other significant contrary indicia to show otherwise. such plac e would bc the "seat" of arbitration even if il is desienated in the nomenclature of "venue" in the arbitration agreement.

77.7. ll/here the curi law of a parlicular place or anational botlv of rules has been slipulaled in an arbilralion aPreemenl or clause, such slipulation is a posilive intlicium thal llte Dlace so desisnated is actuallv the "seal", as more often lhan not the low eovernins tlte arbitratiott agreemenl and bv exlension the seal of the arbitration tends to coincide with the curial law.

77.8. Merclr because rhe parties have stipulated a \enuc uithoLrt anr express choice of a seat. the courts cannor sidelinc the specil'ic chorces rnrde by the parlics in thc arbitration agreement by imputing these stipulaLions as inadvefience at the behest of the parties as regarcls the seat of arbitration. Delerence has to be sltitun to cach and ercrr choirr: and stipulations nrade b1 thc parties. afier all, the courts arc onll a conduit or freans to arbitration. ald the surn and subsrance o1'thc arbitration is deriverl frorn thc choiccs ol' thc partics and their intcntions containecl in thc trbitratiou aqreement It is thc d uly of the court 1o gtve rveight and due consideration to each choice made by the pa rties and to construe the a rbitration agreement in a m:lnner that aligns lhc nrost with such stip u la tion s and intentions.

77.9. Wc rlo not lbr a trolnent say that, the Closest Conncction Test has no application uhatscrcrcr. uhcrc thc-rc is no express or irnplied design.rtion,rl a placc ol arbitration in the agrectnent either in thc firrm of' "r enue'' or ..curial law... there the closest conncction test tna) be more suitable lor det,.'rrnirrirr-pt thc:cat uf arh itralion.

77.10. Wltcrc t\\,o or rrore possible places that have been dcsignatcd in the arbitration agreelnent either erpresslr or irnpliedll. equalll, appear to be the seat of arbitration, then in such cases the conflict may be resolved through recourse to the doctrine of forttm non conveniens. and the seat be then detenrined based on which one ol the possible places may be the most appropriate forum keeping in mind the nature of the agreement, the dispute at hand, the parties themselves and their intentions' The place most suited lbr the interests of all the parties and the ends ofjustice may be determined as the "seat" of arbitration. i 1. The decision in Arif Azim (supra) was affirmed and approved by a Full Bench of the Supreme Court in Disortho S'A'S' v. Meril Life Sciences (P) Ltd'1

12. Now coming to the facts of the present case, Clause 26 clearly states that the arbitration proceedings shall be conducted in Hong Kong. Further, such arbitration proceedings are to be administeredbytheHongKonglntemationalArbitrationCentre. Likewise, the goveming law clause, i'e', Clause 25 of the contract' states that the agreement shall be govemed by the laws of Hong Kong. Nothing in the contract indicates that the parties intended the seat of arbitration to be in India Therefore' in the absence of proof 4(zozo)zscc s99

of anr contrarv intention. this Courl holds that the seat of albitlation is [ long Kong I 3. It ri as argued on behalf of the Applicant that the present application nraintainable. as both parlies are incorporated in ls India. It \\ as conlcnL]ed that thc agreement was entered into in India. Further. the [o conduct thc proceediugs soods uere manulactured and supplied tn Hyderabad. According to the Applicant, the cause 01'action arose in IJy clcrabacl. and the sarnc ought to bc treated as thc seat of arbitration. With regard to the reference to Hong Kong in the arbitration clar.rse, it \\ as contended that there was neither any causal relationship u'ith thc lau s of Hong Kong nor ,rnv necessity tn Hong Kong. The contentions advanced on bchalfo1'the Applicant arc Iiable to be re ected.

1.1. As strLtcd abovc rcl-crrcd judgrncnts, unless a contrary intention is estahlished, the place of arbitration shall be treated as the seat of arbitration. \{ere11' because both the parties are incorporated in India. it cannot be conlended that Hong Kong cannot be the scat o1'arbitrarion. It is perlinent to rote that two Indian par-ties carr designate lbreign seat fbr arbitral proceedings. In

Pasl Wind Solutions (P) Ltd. v. GE Power Conversion (India) (P) Ltd.5, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows

91. Nothing stands in the way of party autonomy in designating a seat of arbitration outside India even when both parties happen to be Indian nationals, as has been held hereinabove.

15. Once the parties have consented to a particular place and seat of arbitration, they cannot resile from the same. The Applicant, having consented to arbitration in Hong Kong to be administered by the Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre, cannot rely upon the fact that the cause of action arose in Hyderabad, India lt is trite law that designation of seat of arbitration is akin to an exclusive jurisdictional clause. ln BGS SGS SOMA JV (supra), the Suprem Court has held as follows:

53. In Indus Mobile Distribution (P) Ltd' [Indus Mobile Disrribttion (P) Ltd. v. Datawind Innovations (P) Ltd.. (20t1) 7 SCC 678 : (2011) 3 SCC (Civ) 7601 , after clearing the air on the meaning of Section 20 of the Arbitration Act. I996, the Court in para 19 (which has already been sct out hereinabove) made it clear that the moment a seat is deslgnated bv agreement 51zoz t; z scc t proccedings Lrnde| Section I I ol the Act, I996. betw'een the parties, it is akin to an exclusive iurisdiction clause, which would then I est the courts at the "seat" with exclusive iurisd iction for ur oscs of re ulatin arbitral roceedin s arlsrn out of the agreement between the pa rties XXX

98. FIouocr. the fact that in all the three appeals befbre us thc proccedings rvere finally held at New l)elhi. anrl the a\\ ards ri crc signed in New Delhi. and rlot at Iaridabad. uould lead to the conclusion that both partios have chosen Ncw Delhi as the ''seat" of arbitration under Section 20( I ) of the Arbitration Act. 1996. 'l hi: being the case. both parties have. thcrelbrc. chrrsen that thc courts at Nerv I)elhi alone rvould harc exclusivc .jurisdiction over the arbitral proceedinu s. 'Iherefore. the fact that ADart of the cause of action may have arisen at Faridabad rvould nol be relevanl once the "scat" has been chosen which would thcn amount to an crclusive urisdiction clause so far as courts of the "seat" are concerned

16. As Hong Kong is the scat of arbitration, the present are not maintainable. Section 212) ol the Acr, 1996, states that part-l shall only apply in cascs where the place ol arbitration is in India

Therefore, rvhere the place of arbitration is not in India, no application under Section 11 for appointment of an arbitrator is maintainable. tn this regard, reference may be made to the lollowing paragraphs of Balaji Steel Trade v. Fludor Benin 5.4..6, wherein the Supreme Court has held as follows:

25. Respondcnt no. I has ursed that Part I includins Section 1l is not applicable to the BSA datcd 06.06.2019. At the threshold, it is corttnon ground that the relationship between the petitioner and respondent no. I was crystallised in the BSA and its Addendum dated 09.01.2021. These agreernents constitute the principal amangements betrveen the trvo contracting entities The arbitration clause contained in Article 11 of the BSA ex licitly provides that in th vent of disoutes. arbitration ee shall "take place in Bentnl" while Article 5 of the Addendum makes it further exolicit that the BSA shall be "cazs,ruetl, governed and inler\reted in accordonce wilh the lows of llenin." ln Mankasttt (supra). this Court ernphasised that the seat of arbitration is to be ascertained liom the intention of the parties as gathered from the agreement as a whole. Further, in BGS SGS SOMI ./V v. NHPC l-td. this Court observed that; uzozs scc online SC 2517

''61. It till tltus be seett lllol )Nherever lhere is an crltress desigttotion oJ a 'venue". and no designation oJ.ctnl altet nutite place as lhe 'seat". combined with tt .s upranct liotrtl bod: q/^ rules governing the ttt bitrcttion om:/ no olher significant contrary indic'io, tltr irtizxoruhle t'oncLusion i.t that the stated venue is ut tuaily the jtu idicaL seat oJ the arbitral proceeding.''

30. [n vieu ol'the aloresaid discussion. both the legal prrsition antl thc t'actual rnatrir conr crqe to a single. inescapablc conclusion. 'l he verl nature of the prcsent dispute is that ol an "international commercial arhitration" as defined under Section 2(1)(l) ol the 1996 Act. rcspondent no. I bcing a corporation incorporaLetl rrnder the larvs ol'Benin. 'I his statutor)' characterisation necessarill' triggers the application ol I'arr II of thc I996 Act rvhen the arbitration is foreign- scated. ancl not Part l. Scction 2(2) fnakes the Dosition ex plicit br providins that Part I aoolies onh rvherc the place of arbitration is in India; consequcnlly, recoursc to Section ll, located li'ithin Part I. is available solcly in respect of India-- scalcd arbilrations. As this Court explained in BALCO rcaffirmed in Mankuslu BGS SGS SO,ltA JV. and emphaticallv reiterated in P,4SZ W'itrd Solulions. Indian Courts have no iurisdiction lo appoint an arbitrator for a foreign-seated arbitration, irresoective of the nationality or domicile of the pa rties On the lacts as w,el[, the BSA and its Addendum constitute the mother agreement, containing a clear and deliberate choice of Benin as the juridical seat of arbitration ancl []enin law as the governing and curial law. The subsequent Sales Contracts and HSSAs are merely ancillary. lacilitating perfonnance of isolated shipments. and cannot override the dispute resolution fiarrework ol- the BSA. -fhLrs. both in principle and in the factual circuntstances of the case. the arbitration agreement in the BSA prevails. The disputes raised by the petitioner arise squarely frorr the BSA, and the parties' chosen tbrum fbr their adjudication is arbitration in Bcnin. Accordingly, the invocation ol Part I and the prescnt request under Section I l(6) of the 1996 Act is fundarnentally misconceived, legally untenable. and cont|ary to thc statutory scherre as well as the autonomv of the parties' contractual design.

17. In light of the aforesaid discussion, the present arbitration application fbr appointmcnt of a sole arbitrator is dismissed. However, liberty is granted to the Applicant to pursue all the available remedies under law.

Conscqucntlr'. pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, in this Arbitration AppLication shall stand closed SD/- K.SRINIVASA RAO JOINT REGISTRAR //TRUE COPY// To, SECTION OFFICER

1. One CC to Mr. Srikanth Hariharan, Advocate tOpUCl

2. Mls. Opple Lighting lndia Private Limited, Having its office at DJ-1012, DJ_ '1014, DTJ-1015, 1Oth Floor, DLF Tower-B, Jasota, South Dethi, New Delhi_ 110 025

3. Two CD Copies hil. DL/KA

HIGH COURT DATED: 0810612026

ORDER

ARBAPPL.No.167 ot 2025 DISMISSING THE ARBITRATION APPLICATION

STAT€ o 11,!|]N ?.i!2$ "i L tq' tL t.)o\) l t: lt -l vpt