WP/35604/2025 of RISHI KANTH NARESH BETHA Vs HE SECUNDERABAD CANTONMENT BOARD on 25 February 2026

ORDER:

Heard Sri M. Hareesh Kumar, learned counsel representing Sri Zeeshan Adnan Mahmood, learned counsel for Petitioner, Sri K. R. Koteswara Rao, learned Standing Counsel for Respondent No. 1, Sri. P- Venugopal, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri Ch. Jaya Krishna, learned counsel for Respondent No.2-

2. It is the case of Petitioner that he is the owner of H. No' 2-6-7 18, admeasuring 65.55 Sq. Yards or 54.34 Sq Meters situated at Sikh Village, Secunderabacl Cantonment, Telangar-ra having inherited t]-e same from his father Betha Mallesh, who expired on 20.06.2015. The said Mallesh purchased the same from Ganta Sangeetha, wife of Ganta Rana Pr'akash Yadav by virtue of a registered Sale Deed dated 19.09.2OO2 bearing document No' 1425 of 2OO2 of tlre oltce of Sub Registrar, Bowenpally. ----- ,7 &-:.-

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Ir is rhe further case of peritioner that in 1992, their prt'deccssor-in tirlc viz. Ganta Sangeetha hled O.S. .No. l lg2 ot 1992 on rhc filc Of thc I Assistant Judge, City Civil Courts, Secunderabad against thc fathcr of the Respondent No.2 by name Capt. Ramalingam, seeking perpetual injunction contending that he is inlcrfering with the ingress and egress from the 15 feet pubtic road. Thc father of Respondent No. 2, being the sole Defendant in the aforesaid suit, had taken an identical stand as talen by Respondent No. 2 in thc present proceedings and contended that the passage in qu('stion u.as a private passage which was being used by them for clcaning thc septic tank. The Civil Court had frarned an issue as to whether the suit property is a public passage and plaintiff is entitled for perpetual injunction as prayed for?

2. '2. It is further contended that civil Court had a:lswered the issut: in tht: affirmal ive and held as follows: ' .. I therefore conclude on this issue the suit property is a pu blic passagt' and the Plaintiff and the general public will have got righl of access through this passage_..', 2.3. Aggrievcd by the Judgment and Decree in the above suit, A.S No. 141 ol l99i' rvas preferred by the father/ predecessor-in_title of Rt,spondent No. 2 namely Capt. Rarnalingam before the I Additional Chiel Judge. City Civil Courts at Secunderabad and the sarne was also dismissed on 05.O9.20O3. petitioner contended that despite the Ordcr of injunction, Respondent No- 2 made constructlons wlthout an-y )ermission on the public passage/road. petitioner thereforc, is J i-i stated to have submitted representations to Respondent No. I on 22.02.2025, 03.05.2025 and 03.10.2025 complaining of the illegat acts of Respondent No. 2, who, in order to circumvent his illegal acts, Irled Writ Petition No. 6231 of 2025 with a fa_lse and baseless prayer by suppressing a-II these facts, and is tr5,rng to re-agitate the issue which has already been settled try the civil Court.

3. I-earned counsel for petitioner after reiterating the pleadings, took this Court to the Judgment in O.S. No. ll82 of 1992, in detail, by showing this Court the contertion of the father/ predecessor in title of Respondent No. 2 in the suit which is nearly identical to his case in the present proceedings, the issue framed by the Civil Court and the ultimate decision rendered by the Civil Court. He vociferously contended that once the civil Court has decided the issue and categoncally held that ttre subject lane is a public lane and the said judgment has attained finality on the dismissal of the appeal against it, it is the statutory duty on the part of Respondent No. 1 to ensure ttrat access to the said lane is not restricted in any malner and there is no construction made on the said public lane. Placing reliance on the photographs and the representations dated 2O.O2.2O25, 03.03.2025 and 30.10.2O25 given by Petitioner, it is contended that there is a clear dereliction of duty by Respondent No. 1, as such, Petitioner was constrained to file the present Writ Petition.

4. Learned Standing Counsel for Respondent No. 1 contended that the Board would abide by the Judgment and Decree in ) ,,,

+ O.S. No. 1182 of L992 and take all the necessa_rJr steps to ensure that public lane is protected from all the encroachments and would further ensure that access to the pubric la,e is not restricted in anv ma,ner whatsoerrer

5. Learned Senior Counsel Sri. p. Venugopai, based on the counter-afhdavit, argued that petitioner is seeking ,,enforcement of a judgment" (o. S. No 1 i82 of 1992) alter the rimitation period for filing an Execution Petition expired; writ cannot bypass the Limitation Act. It is further contendcd that though the simple injunctron suit was decreed in 1992, since petitioner failed to file an Executlon petition wlthin time, they c:mnot now move to the High Court. According to learned Scnior Counsel, Writ petition is not maintainable under Arlicle 226 because it involves serious and substantial disputed questions of fact regarding existence of public lane and ingress/egress rights, which require cogent evidence before the common law court. It is asserted, btrrden is on petitioner to prove ,,private property,, is a ''public lane vi: a cir il suit.

5.1. Reference is made to the judgment of [he Hon'ble Supreme Court in Gout. of Ind.ia u. p. Venkolteshr, to contend that unless representatiolt is traced to a statute, it cannot be considered.

5.2. Learned Senior Counsel argued that Respondent No.2 clarms his grardfather purchased the property in an auction (1340 Fasli) and obtained building permission. He explicitly avers that ,,there is no public place or lar-re therein, and the entire property rs a private ' 12oto; ts scc 613 l I I \

) (-j property". It is clarmed, Section 261 (regarding boundary wa,11s/fences) is misquoted and inapplicable. He relies on 1997 letter from the Cantonment Board stating they do not maintain land records for Sikh Village to assert the lale in question is a private [ane.

6. Learned counsel for petitioner has very articulately repelled each of the contentions advanced by the learned Senior Counsel. It is argued that the Decree passed by the civil Court on merits ih 1992 categorically established the legal status ofthe land as a "public passage-" This declaration does not expire. Further, by reading the proviso of Article 136 of the Limitation Act, it was contended that period of limitation for execution of decrees would not apply to decrees of perpetual injunction. According to learned counsel, there are no disputed questions of fact in the prescnt case. The status of the land was conclusively adjudicated in O.S. No. 1182 of 1992 after a full-fledged trial. Reference is rnade to Para No. 13 of the judgrnent, wherein the competent Civil Court held as follows: ".., As such the contention of the defendant that this dispured lane is exclusively belong to him is not at all established. Further more his own document speaks that it is a public lane. I the.efore conclude on this issue the suit property is a public passage and th€ Plaintiff and the general public rvill have got right of access through this passagc". 7 . It is further contended that A.S. No. 141 of 1997 was also dismissed on O5-09.20O3. Thus, the judicial finding that the lale in question is a public larte has attained finality. lrarned counsel vehemently contended tllat there is no provision in law requiring a hnding given by the competent civil Court to be reconfirmed by hling a

subsequent suit. as srrch, the contention that petitioner shoulcl approach the ci,.,il Court the second time is wholly untenable and unknou.rr to law. 7 .1. It is further contended that petitioner is not merely asking for his representations to be disposed of; he is seeking a mandamus to compel the Board to perform its statutory duty under Section 26 1 of the Cantonments Act, 2O06, to remove encroachments from a public lane (as declared by the civil Court) in ttre cantonment area and further praver is sought to ensure that ingress and egress from the public road is not obstructed. According to him, the judgment of the lJon,ble Apex Court referred to above, in fact, is in Iar.our of Petitiont:r as this Court has righfly followed the procedure enumerated therein ancl instead of disposing of the case at the admission stage, has rightly called for a counter to be filed by Respondents and heard thc matter on mefits. Therefore, reliarce placed on p. Venkatesh (suprd.)is to the petitioner,s advantage and not uice-uersa.

7.2. It is further contended that the claim of Respondent No.2 is false based on hrs own flow of title. SaIe Deed bearing Doc. No. 1538 of 1979 executed in favour of his mother, M.R. Saroja. Schedule of Property lists ,l,ane' as the boundaqz on the North and West, thereby proving that the lane is extemal to his plot. The plan sanctioned by the Car-rtonment Board (CBR No. SC (2g) dated 10.01. 198O) shows IS_feet passage as ,,Road/1ale,, bordering his

( propertyr not part of it. Furthermore, the competent civil Court in Judgment dated 1 1.O8. 1997 in O.S. No. 1182 of 1992 held that: "Further more his own document speaks that it is a public lane.._-".

7.3. It is further contended that Respondent No. 2 is guilty of suppression of facts as he has deliberately not filed the Sale Deed bearing Doc. No. 1538 of 1979 in his counter, which shows that lane is public lane. Section 261 of the 20O6 Act is directly applicable because Respondent No.2 has erected unauthorized fencing and structures on a public lane. The Board has the power to remove fences and structures that are unsuitable or encroach on public land falling under the Cantonment area. Reliance placed by Respondent No. 2 on a purported letter, \trritten 2 months after passing of the Judgment by the civil Court apart from being self-serving is wholly untenable. No statutory authority can sit in appeal over the judgment passed by the civil Court. Once the civil Court has held that the lane in question is a public lare, only a Court of Appeal/superior jurisdiction can set asidc the hnding. When the Appeal itself has been dismissed, the question of placing reliance on a letter to overcome the judgment of the civil Court is unknown to law and cannot be countenanced.

8. This Court has considered the argumenLs on behalf of Petitioner ald Respondents has also gone through the complete record and finds considerable force in the submissions advanced by lear{ed counsel for Petitioner \ Insofar as the contention that Writ

Pctition cannot bypass the Limitation Act and that since no Execution Petition was filed wrthin 12 years, therefore, the Writ Petition is in the form of an Execurion Petition is concerned, the same cannot be accepted. As rightly contended by Petitioner, as pcr the proviso to Article 136, therc is no period of limitation prescribed for execution of perpetual injunction decrees. Article 136 of the Limitation Act is extracted hereunder: I]6 tor the exc.ulron ol any decree (othcr than x dccrce granlrng a manda(or\ rntun.honl or ordcr o[ (Emphasis supplied) Furthcr, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bhudeu Mallick alias Bhudeb Mallick u. Ranajit Ghoshq.Iz, held as follows ''41... The decrcc for permanent inJunclion can be enforccd or becomes enforceable rvhcn Lhe judgment debtor. rries to disturb the peaceful possession of Lhc decree holder or Lrics to dtspossess Lhc dccree irolder in some manncr or the other or creates obsrruction in the pcaceful enjoyment of the property over lvirich he has a dcclararion ol utle from rhe civil court in the form of a decree- .+2. ht thc albresaid contexL, wc ma] refer- to Article 136 of the Limitation Act. I963 rvhich rcads lhus:

43. l'he proviso to Scction 136 of the Limitation Act referred to above makes it [urthcr c]ear th:rt fot- che enforccment or execution of a decree granting a perpetual injuncLion shall not be subjccr to any period of limitation.',

When thc decree or order beco tes enforceablc or whe.e thc decree or any subsequent order dtects any payment of money or the delivery of any popert! 10 bc made at a certarn date of at recunins pcnods, when default rn making thc payment or delivery in respcct of whjch executron is soughL, lakes place Providcd that an application for lhe enforcemcnt or executlon of a decrec granling a perpetual injunctron shall nor bc subtect to any penod of hmitation 'roT SCC Online SC 36O

10. Therefore, the contention that the present Writ Petition is a vague attempt to revive a non-executable decree is wholly misconceived and is rejected.

11. [n so far as the submission of Respondent No. 2 tiat Writ Petition is not maintainable since disputed questions of facts are involved and Petitioner ought to have invoked the common law remedy is concerned, the same cannot be accepted. As rightly contended by learned counsel for Petitioner, there is no requirement in larv to seek conhrmation of the decree passed by the civil Court by hling another suit. Once civil Court, after a fullfledged trial by exarnining the evidence and pleadings threadbare, has framed a categorical issue and conclusively decided that the lane in question is a public tane and Judgment of the trial Court has been conhrmed in appeal, there is no need for Petitioner to once again approach civil Court for the sarne relief. The contention of Respondent No.2 is directly in the teeth of the principles of res-judicata and is therefore, rejected. L2. Respondent No. 2 placed relialce on the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in P. Venkatesh's case (supra), in particular, Para No. 8, which is extracted hereunder: "8. This 'disposc of the reprcsentation" mantra is increasingly permeating the judicial process in the Hlgh Courts and the Tribunals- Such orders may make for a quick or easy disposal of cases in overburdened adjudicatory institutions. But, they do no service to the cause of justicc The litigant rs back again before the court, as this case shows, having incurred attendant costs and suffered delays of the legal process. This would have been otriated by calling for a counter in the lirst instance, thereby resutting in linatity ,1 ,/ /

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13. A readrng of the said para makes it crystal clear that the Honble Supreme Court deprecated the prac(ice of disposing of the Writ Petitions at the admission stage by passing Orders directing consideration of representations However' in the present case' this Court being conscious of the Judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court' has aJlorded an opportunity to Respondents to frle their counters and conducted a detailed hearing in the matter. The procedure as adopted by this Court is in Iine with the procedurc prescribcd by the Hon'tle Supreme Court- Therefore' the Judgment in P' Venkatesh (supra) is of th' time the High Court issuc(l its direction on 9 a 2016' """r" t*""O'-"e years frd elapsed since the date o[ the employee'' spondent No 2' The other contentions advanced by Respondent No' 2 pertaining to his <:laim over thc public lar-re ' have been decided by the civil Court and the same cannot be opened by way of a collateral cha,llenge in thc present proceedings Therefore' the contendons aclvanced by learned Senior Counsel trying to re-agitate the issue conclusivelv decided by the civil Court are without a:ry merit and are therefore, rejected'

15. Petifloner contends that Respondcnt No 1 has a statutory duty under Section 261 of thc Cantonments Act' 2006 to protect a public lane and ensure free ingress and egress therefrom' Section 261 of the Cantonments Act is extracted hereunder' I/I I \ no aid to Re t4.

1l ''261. Boundary u,alls, hedges aj]d fences.-(l) No boundary wall, hedge or fence of any matcrial or descriptron shall be erected in a cantonment without the permission in writing oI t].e Chief Executive Offtcer.

(2) The Chief Executive Officer may, by noticc in writing, require the owner or lessee o[any land in the cantonment (a) to remove from the land any boundary wall, hedge or fence which is in his opinion unsuitable, unsightly or other('ise objcctronable; or (b) to construct on the land sufficient boundary walls, hedges or fences of such material, description or dimensions as may be specilied in the notice; or

(c) to maintain the boundary walls, hedges or fences of such lands in good order: Provrded that in the case of any such boundary wall, hedge or fence which was erected with the consent or under the orders of the Chief Executive Ofhcer or which was in existence at the commencement of this Act, the Board shall make compensarion for any damzrge caused by the rcmoval thcreof

(3) Thc Chiet Executive Officer may, by notice ln u'riLing, rcquire the owner, Iessee or occupier of any such land to cut or trim any hedge on the land in such manner and within such time as may be specificd in thc notice." i6. At ttre cost of repetition, once the cit'tl Court has categorically held the lane in question to be a public lane, this Court in exercise of its plenary jurisdiction under Article 226 would not re- exzunine the issue or denude the judgrnent of the civil Court in any manner. Once it is established that lane in question is a public lane, Respondent No. I Cantonment Board has statutory duty to ensure that public lane is not encroached and that ingress and egress from public lane is not hindered /obstructed in any manner. As rightly conLended by learned counsel for Petitioner, Petitioner has sought a mandamus compelling the statutory duty of Respondent No. I under Section 26 I. l7 Petitioner has shown existence of a legal right

1. e. existAce of a ) public lane declared by the civil Court and confirmed in ) Appeal, nor.r-pcrformance of a statutory duty, which is evident from thc photograplrs, u,trich clcarly show that l:rne has becn encroached :rnd ingress rrnd cgress is being restricted, has sensitized the authorities by grving represcntations dated 20.O2.2O25, 03.03.2025 and 3O.10.2025 clearll' stating the facts aforementioned and Respondent No. I Board has, admittedly, n()t taken any action on the said represen tation s. Learned Standing Counsel for Respondent No. 1 has lairly contenderl that it would abide by the decision rendered by thc ciwil Court and u'ould take aJ[ necessary actions to ensure that encroachment in public lane is removed and furttrer ensured that there is no o bstruction / hinclrance in the ingress and egress from the public lane. Therefore, this Court holds that Petitioner made out a clcar case for grant of mandamus. I8. Roads. public streets, lanes etc., are not matters of private convenience but the very arteries o[ urban life, dcdicated to thc use of pubhc at large. Thcy exist ro secure safe and unobstructed movement for all persons, including children, senior citizens and persons with disabilities, whose ability to access the city with safety and dignity is now recognizcd as an incident of the nght to life under Article 21. No inclividual, however placcd, can assert a legally- enforceable cli m to encroach upon, appropriate or otherwise obskuct these ways frrr private bencfit. Any such act is, in substance, a trespass upon public property and rs liable to be removed in acc, rrdance \',r th Ia\\'. T

19. These spaces are held by the State ard 1ocal authorities in trust for the community, and the public trust doctrine obliges them to use and regulate such property only for public purposes and in furtherarce of fundamental rights. It is, therefore, a constitutiona_l as well as statutory duty of these authorittes to ensure that public streets and footpatls are kept free from obstruction and encroachment, so that the guarantees under Articles 14 and 2l equality before the law, meaningful mobility, personal safety and right to live wrth dignity should not remain a mere statement of principle but rnust be ensured and realized in the darly life of every citizen.

20. In view of the above, Respondent No. I is obligated to protect the public lale in question and ensure tllat the same is free from al1 encroachments ald that general public have a free arrd unfettered right of access and usage in respect of the said public lane. 2L. The Wrir petition is therefore allowed, directing Respondent No. 1 to ensure that 15 feet public lane as declared by the Judgment and Decree in O.S. No. 7182 ot 1992, dated 1 1.08. 1997 on the file of the I Assistant Judge, City Civil Courts, Secunderabad as confrrmed in A.S. No. t41 of 1997 by the I Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Courts at Secunderabad dated O5.O9.2O03 is free from all encroachments and further ensure that ingress and egress to the said public lane is not restricted or obstructed in any mzrnner. The entire exercise shall be completed wrthin four weeks from the date of receipt ofa copy of this order. No costs. / / ( (

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22. Consequcntly, shall stard closed. To, the miscellaneous Applications, il any Sd/-P.PONNA KRISHNA AS ANT REGI //TRUE COPY// CTION OFFICER 1 The Chief Executive Officer, Secunderabad-Cantonment Board' Office at ' Coutt Co.pound, S.P. Road' Secunderabad' TS - 500 003 2 One CC to SRI ZEESHAN ADNAN MAHMOOD' Advocate [OPUC] 3 One CC to SRI CH.JAYAKRISHNA, Advocate [OPUCI 4, ONE CC tO SRI K.R.KOTESWERA RAO, ST. SC FOR CANTONMENT loPUCl 5 Two CD CoPies BSR PMK 4'D--

HIGH COURT DATED: 2510212026

ORDER

WP.No.35604 of 2025 ALLOWING THE WRIT PETITION, WITHOUT COSTS t iHE. oo 2 f t'lAB 7rl2r l| ,-

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