WA/10/2019 of The State of Telangana, Vs Smt. L. Sujatha Reddy on 3 February 2026

1. The State of Telangana, Rep. by its Secretary, Dept. of Revenue (UC-ll), Secretariat Buildings, Hyderabad.

3. The Special Officer and Competent Authority, Urban Land Ceilings, Hyderabad (now present District Collector, Ranga Reddy District).

4. The District Collector, Ranga Reddy District, Lakdikapul, Hyderabad. ...APPELLANTS AND

Mr.Narsing Prasad Shroff, (Died per LR) Sint. L. Sujatha Reddy, Wo L. Sudhakar Reddy, R/o. 6-3-1176, Begumpet, Hyderabad

3. The State of Telangana. Rep. by its Secretary, Department of Tourism and Culture, Secretaraat Buildings, Hyderabad.

4. The Director, Department of Tourism, State of Telangana, Hyderabad.. 5 Sanjay Shroff, S/o Late Narsingh Prasad Shroff R/o lnterpid Online Retail (p) Ltd,No.20,Ward No93/7B,Bth Main,6th Cross,Vasanthnagar, Bangalore - 560052. Respondent No.S is brought on record as Lr of deceased respondent No.i as per Court Order dated '14.03.2023 Vide lA No. 1 of 2O22 in WA No.1723 of 20'18.

W.A.No.1723 OF 2018

lA NO:2 OF 2018 Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to suspend lhe operation of the judgment in WP No 21914 of 2008, dt.29.12.2017, pending disposal of the Writ Appeal Counsel for the Appellants : GP FOR ASSIGNMENT counser for the Respondent No'1&5 ' :#:.ttH:r:rlb:il8'^iilf"', Counsel for the Respondent No.2 :

W.A.NO: 1741 OF 2O1A Writ Appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent Against the Order dated.29.12.2017 in W.P No 19512 ol 2008 on the file of the High Court. Between:

1. The State of Telangana, Rep. by its Secretary, Dept. of Revenue(UC-ll), Secretariat Buildings, Hyderabad.

3. The Special Offlcer and Competent Authority, Urban Land Ceilings, Hyderabad (now present District Collector (ULC), Ranga Reddy District).

4. The District Collector, Ranga Reddy District. Lakdikapul, Hyderabad. ...APPELLANTS AND

Smt L. Sulatha Reddy, W/o. L Sudhakar Reddy, Aged about 68 years, House Wife. R/o. 6-3-1176, B.S.Makhta, Begumpet, Hyderabad Mr.Narsing Prasad Shroff, S/o.Late Bhuramull Shroff, Aged about 75 years, Rlo 211/14, Bright Street, PS Karaya, Kolkata - 700 019 The State of Telangana, Rep. by its Secretary, Department of Tourism and Culture, Secretariat Buildings, Hyderabad. The Director, Department of Tourism, State of Telangana, Hyderabad.

lA NO: 2 OF 2018 Petition under Sectron 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to suspend the operation of the judgement in WP.No.19512 Of 2008, dL.29.122017, pending disposal of the Writ Appeal. Counsel for the Appellants : GP FOR ASSIGNMENT Counsel for the Respondent No.1 : -- counser for the Respondent No'2 ' t-1"';:tHi3.1';.ilii3;ffi"rl

W.A.No.10 OF 2019 Writ Appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the order dated 29-12-2017 in writ petition No. 15224 of 20'1 1 on the file of the High Court. Between:

1. The State of Telangana, Rep. by its Secretary, Dept. of Revenue(UC-ll), Secretariat Buildingsl Hyderabad

3. The Special Officer and Competent Authority, Urban Land Ceilings, Hyderabad (now present District Collector (ULC), Ranga Reddy District

4. The District Collector, Ranga Reddy District, Lakdikapul, Hyderabad ..APPELLANTS AND

Smt. L. Sujatha Reddy. Wo L Sudhakar Reddy, Aged about 71 years, House wife, R/o. 6-3-1176. B.S.Nilakhta, Begumpet, Hyderabad Mohd.Fakruddin, S/o.lVlohd. Kareemuddin, aged about 72 yearc, Occ- Agriculture, R/o.H.No.8-112, Narsingi Village, Rajendranagar [t/andal, R. R, District

3. Mohd.Ghousuddin, S/o.Mohd Bhurhamiddin, Aged about 50 years, Occ- Agriculture, R/o.H.No.1-38, Narsingi Village, Rajendranagar [Vlandal, Ranga. Reddy District

4. tVlohd.Moinuddin, S/o.Mohd. Nizamuddiri, Aged about 63 years, Occ- Retd,Govt.Servant, R/o.H No 12-2-41813120, Vishwas Nagar Colony, Gudimalkapur, Mehdipatnam, Hyderabad 5, Mohd.Hafeezuddin, S/o.lvlohd. Muneeruddin, Aged about 39 years, Occ- Agriculture, R/p.H.No.'1 8-8-684137, Edi Bazar, Aulia Bagh, Hyderabad

6. I\r1ohd. Faheemuddirr, S/o. Mohd.Ameenuddin, Aged about 43 years, H.No.'1- 76, Narsingi Village, Rajendranagar Mandal Ranga Reddy District

7. The State of Telangana, Rep. by its Secretary, Department of Tourism and Culture, Secretariat BUildings. Hyderabad. B. The Director, Department of Tourism, State of Telangana, Hyderabad lA NO: 2 OF 2019 Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to suspend the operation of the orders in W.P.No. 15224 o'f 2011, dated :29-12-2017 , pending disposal of writ appeal. Counsel for the Appellants : GP FOR ASSIGNMENT Counsel for the Respondent No.1to6 : -- Counsel for the Respondent No.7&8 : GP FOR TOURSIM The Court made the following: COMMON JUDGMENT

I{lGH COURT FOIt'l'Htt S'l'A'l'll OF TFILANGANA A'I' IIYDEIIABAI) TH E I{ONO U IL,\I}LE SII.I .I USTICF] K. I,AKSH M AN ANI) THE HONOURAI}LE SRI JUSTICE VAKITI Ii.AMAKRISHNA REDDY WRIT APPEAL Nos. 1723 l7{l ol'20lll antl l0 of 2019 D;\'fE: 03.02.2026 Writ Appcal No. 1723 of 2018 Behyeen: The State ofTelangana Rep. bf its Secretarv, Department of Revenue (UC II), Secretariat Buildings, Hyderabad and othcrs ... Appellants r\ ncl Narsing Prasad Shroff ar.rd others Respondents Writ Appeal No.l74l of 2018 Betu een: The State ofTelangana Rep. by its Secretary, Department of Revenue (UC - II), Secretariat Buildings, I-{yderabad and othL'rs ... Appellants And Smt. L. Sujatha Reddy and others ... l{espondents Writ Aprreal No.l0 r.rf 2019 Betrveen: The State of Tclar.rgana l{ep. by its Secletary, Depaftment of Ilevenue (lJC tl), Secretariat Iluildings, Hyderabad and othcrs ... Appcllants A ncl Smt. L. Sujatha Reddy and others ... Respondents

KL,J&VRKR,J wA 1723, l74l of2018 and lOol2019 CoN{N,I ON,' TiDGM I.-NT (Per llorttttrt-ahlc ,\ri .lrrstice Vt*iti RannArishtn Reddy\ These three intra courl appeals arise out of a common order datcd l9.ll.l0 l7 passed by the leamed Sinele Judgc in W.P. Nos 195 l2 and 21914 ol 2008 and 15224 ol 2011. Since the issues involved in all these appeals are substantially common, they rvere hearcl together and are bcing disposed of by this comrnon judgrnent.

2. The appellants (State) assail the order of the leamed Single Judgc rvhereby the impugned proceedings initiated under the Urban I-anc1 (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, I976 ("the Act") were set aside on the ground that mandatory statutory notices, particularly under Sections 8(3) and l0(5 ) of the Act, were nol served on the declarant or the pcrson irr posscssion. i. The material lacts. shorn of unnecessary detail. are tliat the lancls in disprrte are situated in Survey Nos. 157 and I 58 of Narsingi Village, Raiendra Nagar Mandal, Ranga Reddy District (for short "the Subiect Lands"). The sub.lect lands are recorded as agricultural lands, a lact which is not seriously disputed. The respondents / writ petitioners clairn ownership and possession on the strength of a I. BRIITF FACTUAL BACKGROUNI)

KL.J&VRKR,J wA -1723, t741of2018 and tooJ20t9 registered Sale Deed and an Agrcement ol Sale dated 24.0i.1983, supported by continuor-rs revenue entries (Pahanics) evidencing their' possesslorl.

4. The particulars ol the writ petitions instituted by the respondents and the corlesponding writ appeals prel-erred by the State are as lollorvs: S.No. W.P.No. W.A.No. 219t4/2008 1123120t8 J 15224120lr 10/10 r9

5. The case of the appellar.rts is that the sub.iect lands constitute "vacant land" within the nreaning of Section 2(q) o1'thc Act, that they were held in excess of the ceiling lirnit, and that upon completion of proceedings under the Act against the original declarants, the lands stood vested in the Goverrrrnent by operation ol'Section 10(3)

6. Before the lcarned Single Judge, the controversy clystallizcd around the following questions:

(i) Whether actual possession ol tlie subject land was taken in accordance with Sections 10(5) or 1 0(6) ol the Act? li. lrs5[/]008 lfi41t2ot8 | l:.

KL, J ai l,?KR, J U't\ _1723, I74I of 2018 and IO ol2019

(ii) Whethel tlre mandatory requirerrent of Section 8 ol the Act was cornpiied with and (iii; Whether the petitioners were in possession of the land as on thc relevant cut-off date.

7. '[he lcarned Single Judge, upon an exhaustive exarnination of thc statutor! tiamework and binding judicial precedents, held that the proceedings under Section 8 ol the Act wet'e vitiated due to non- serr icc ol'thc nrandatorv notice under Section 8(3). In the absence of such service. the consequential order under Section 8(4) was declared illcga l.

8. [t rias lirthcr held tliat there was a clear lailure olapplication of rriind on tlrc part ol the competent authority in declaring the land as sur|lr.rs. inasrnuch as r.ro consideration was given to the crucial issue ri hcthcr thc land 1'ell u ithin the deflnition of "r"rrban lar-rd" or "vacant lancl" under Sectiorrs 2(o) and 2(q) of the Act. The report ol the I-.nqtriry Olllcer datcd 31.07.1979, which categorically recorded that thc land ir as aqricultulal in nature and reflected as such in the revenue records. rias ignored n,ithout assigning reasons, contrary to Section 2(oXB) of'the Acr.

KL J & VRKR, J WA t723, 1741 of2018 a .1 1o oJ2019

The learned Single Judge further tbund that the State f'ailed to cstablish larvtul and actual plil,sical possession of the land under Se'ction l0 ol the Act. There \\,as no proof of service ol noticcs under Sections l0(5) or l0(6). The allegcd taking over of possession on 28.08.1995 was found to be merely symbolic. The panchanarna dated 25.08. 1995 did not disclosc the precise extent or ide'ntifiable boundaries of the land altegedly taken over. On the other hand. the revcnue records consistently rcf1ected the writ petitioner i.c., Smt. Su.jatha Ileddy, as pattadar ancl persor.r in possession tlour 1983-84 to t00l -2002.

10. In the absence of valid notice and proof' ol actual physical possession, the leanred Single Judge conclr.rded that the alleged taking o',,er of'possession was invalid in thc eye of law, and accordingly allo*,ed the writ petitions. I l. Aggrieved by the said order', the State has prelerrcd ihe present writ appeals, contending that the learned Single Judge errcd ir.r lau,and on lacts in interfering with proceedings which, according to the appellants, had attained fi n a litl'.

KL, J & \'I?KR. .J tVA _1723, l74I oJ20l8 and 10of2019

12. We havc- heard the learned Goverrunent Pleader for Assignment appearing firr the appc llants-State, Mr. V. Ramesh, the learted Senior Cor,rnscl representing Mr. D.S.V.G. Nagaraju, appearing for the respondents / rvrit petitioners. and the leamed Standing Counsel appearing lor'l-or.rrisrn. We have also carefully perused the pleadings, the rnaterial placed on record, and the leasoning and conclusions recorded br thc learrrc<l Singlc Judge in the impugned order. II SUBNIISSIONS OF THE PARTIES: a) Sulttrtissiotrs on hahtlf o/ the Appellonts (State): l:i. Lcarlcd Govcrrrrncnt Pleader for Assignment, appearing for the appellants Statc. contcnded that the respondents / writ petitioners lack loc'tt,t stanclito maintain thc writ petitiorrs. as they are neither absolute o\\ncrs nor pcrsons cntitlcd in law to question proceedings initiated undcr tlre Act. lt u'as Lrrged that once the lands stood vested in the Govcmment pursuant to 1'rroceedings under Section I 0(3 ) of the Act, no right, title ol intcrcst survived in favour of the respondents.

14. It was lurlhcr contcnded that possession of the subject lands u'as tal<cn orcr b1 thc authorities on 28.08.1995, and therelore, the respondents \\iere ne\/er in posselsio-n so as to claim any benefit under -t KL, J & VRKR..' WA 1723, l74l of2Ale otd tOoI20t9 the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) I{epeal Act, 1999(fbr short "llcpeal Act"). According to the appellants, the alleged possession of [he respondents is neither lawlll nor supported by any entbrceable li-qht

15. Learned Govemment Pleader submitted that the respondenls' claim to title and possession had already been adjudicated and had attained finatity in earlier proceedings, particularly in W.P. Nos 24i98 and 25156 ol 1995, and in the absence ofany challenge to the saitl j udgments befbrc the I Ionourable Supreme Cour1, the findings therein operate as res judicura, precluding re-agitation of the issue ol possession or entitlement to regularization under any Govemment Orclers

16. It w,as also urged that the subject lands rvere allotted to thu' 'l'ourism [)cpartment fbr the purposc of establishrncnt ol an Artists" Village, ancl that the lespondents' claim rlrns contrary to larger public interest. Mere entries in the revenr:e rccords, it was contended, do not conf-er title or lawful possession, nor can they defeat concludeci proceedings under the Act

KL,J&VRKR.J wA -1723. 1741 of2018 and to ol20I9

17. l-earned Governlncnt Plcader further submitted that reliance placed b1' the respondents olr an Agreemcnt of Sale does not corrf'er any enlbrccablc light. title or intercst in immovable property unless such richt is declared or rccognized by a competent civil couft. In the absence ol such ad.iudication. the rvrit petitions were asserted to be not maintainable and rrotivated bv a t-). attempt to usulp valuable Govemnrent Iand

18. R.cliarrcc w'as placed on lhe decision of the Honourable Suprerne Coum in lllahulakshni lt,lotors Limitedd. v. MRO & othersl to corrtcnd that individr-ral claims cannot override public interest and those persons rvithout a subsistirrg legal right cannot invoke rvrit jurisdiction to def'cat statutory acquisitions. b) Subnrissions on hcltulf of the Rcspott I e rtts/Writ Petitioners

19. l)ar L'ot?tt'tt. lcalncd Scnior CoLrnsel appearing for the respondents/writ pctitioners subrnitted that the initiation of proccedings under the Act itsell was without jurisdiction, as the subject lancls are agricultural in natr-rre, continuously used as such, and 'loozlttysccla

KL,J&I'RKR.J tvA -r723. 174t of2olaand tooI2Ol9 therefbre expressly excluded lrom the purview of the Act by virtue of Sections 2(o) and 2(q).

20. lt w,as contcndecl that the subjcct lands rvere never included in an),notillcd Master Plan, lie outside the municipal limits, and i'all only u,ithir.r the peripheral limits of the urban agglomeration" ln the absence ol stalutory inclusion in a Master Plan, the lands cor-rld not have bcen treated as urban or vacant lands, rendering the ploceedings void ab inilio

21. Learncd counsel lirrther subrnitted that the respondents, having entered into possession under an Agreement of Sale, being reflected as possessors in thc revenue records, and having been in actual, continLrous possession and enjoyment ol'the lands, scluarely tall rvithin the exprcssion "persons concemed" under Section 8(3) olthc Act and iverc thcretbre entitled to mandatory notice and an oppofiunity of hearing.

22. [t rvas ernphatically urged that non-service ol notices under Sections 8(3) and l0(5) strikes at the root of the proceedings. lssuance and service ol'such notices is mandatory and constitutes an integral I

KL,JEVRKR,J wA - 1723, 1741 of 20t8 and to of2019 lacet of thc principles of'natural .justice. Proceedings undertaken in violation thereol'are r oicl ar-rd unenfbrccable.

23. Lastly. it was contL'nded that. in an1' cverrt, by operation of the Repeal Act, all procccdings stood abatcd, inasrnuch as no larvlul or actual physical posscssion ot' the sub.icct land was taken by the competent authority prior to the rcpeal. lt was submitted that the requirement of taking possession in accordance with Sections 10(5) and 10(6) of thc Act is nrandatorl , arrcl that mere notional or paper vestinr: undcr Scction l0(31 clocs not dir est the landholder or the person in possessior-r ol actual possession. In the absence of cornpliance s,ith thc statLltorv procedure, the proceedings initiated urrder the principal Act cannot surlivc alicr rcpeal and stand extinguished b1' operation of lau. I{eliarrcc r.r,as placed on a consistent line ol following decisiorrs to subnrit that unless actual, physical possession is taken strictl-v in accordance sith Sections 10(5) and l0(6) prior to repeal. the yrroccedings cannot survive:

l. State of |Jttar Pracleslt r,. Hari Rtutt),

2. Vinayak Kashinath Shilkar v. Collector Authoriqt3, and Competent ' (20 t3 ) a scc :80 t (2012) a scc I tg

KL- J 6r VRKR. J wA ,1723, 174 I ol2018 aad lO ol2Ol9

3. The Commissionet' of Land Reforms & another V. Libra Electrical Meters (P) Limitedr,

4. G. Krishnanoorthy and others v. Government of Tamilnadus,

5. The Stare t{'Tumil Naclu and another Vs S.L. Chitale & others6,

6. T.V. .lrttortl r'. .S/nlc' o/.Tanil h'adu & others.:,

7. Benjamin il[ohuntt,r,. State oJ.Orissa and anothers,

8. Pratima Paul cl others v. The Competent Authority ancl otherse,

9. G.V. Mohun & othars v. State of Andhru Pradesht(', l0.Mongalsen v. State of LJttar Pradeshtt , ll.Governmettt oJ'Tamil Nadu v. Mecca Prime Tanneryt2, l2.Gajanun Kaml),a Pcrtil t,. Aclditional Colleclort3,

13. Competent uuthctrin' t,. Barangore Jute Factory & otherstl,

14. Raghbir Singh Sehrutat v. State of Haryanat5,

15. Union of Inttiu v. Ibrahi, tlddin ancl anothert6, I 6. Comm iss ioner o/' Lctnd Reforms v. M. VenkataramantT

17. The Goventment oJ'Tamil Nadu v. l. Richardsonts lS.llnion oJ tnclia ancl Others V. Vasavi Cooper:atire Housing Sr,tcieq, Limitetl uncl ol herste IIt. POI\ t-S I.()rr Dr._rt,.lrlil\.\TIoN:

24. Upon consideration ol the pleadings, the rival submissions, and the material placed on record, the following issues arise for cletclnrinatiorr: n 1997 SCC Online tuad lir)-l t N4adras High Cou{: w.l' No. .17.10 ol200l dccided on 07.08.2009 o2oo2(l)crc 18 ''/ 20 t9 scc oniine sc 1.]86 t ntn t982 oRtssn:16 ' ntn tqgo caLCUttn ts> 'o APHC: w.P. No.gl98 ol'2007 decided on 08.10.2010 " 20 rz 13; sce.Lr: -s ra 't 2o l2 't 2ol4 '' loo5 't (20 l2

4) SCC 718 l2) scc 523 ri) scc 477 I S('C 792 'u (20t2) 8 scc 148 r? 20l4 scc onLinc Mad 450-i 't zot+ (i) Lw :zg '' 1zot,t; z scc z6e

'12- KI..J&ITRKR,J Lt'A 1723. 174t oJ20I8 and lO of2019 ( i) Whether the respondents/,'r'rit petitioners have /oczs standi Lo assail tl"re proceedings initiated under the Urban Land (Cciling and Regulation) Act. 1976?

(ii) Whether the subject lands constitute "vacant land" within the meaning of-Sectiorrs 2(o)and 2(q) olthe Act?

(iii) Whether non-service ol rrotice under Section 8(3) of the Act vitiates the proceedings?

(iu) Whether possession of the subject lands was tawfully taken in cornpliance with Sections l0(5) and l0(6) of the Act?

(v) Whether the proceedings stood abated by operation of the lJrban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act. 1999?

(ui) Whether the order ol the learncd Single Judge warrants interlerence in appellate jurisdiction? I\" ANALYSIS,.\NDFINDINGS: Issrre (i): Locus Standiof the Respontlcnts / Writ Petitioners

25. The llrst contention urged on behall'ol-the appellants is that the respondents/rvrit petitioners lack locus startdi to question the proceedings initiatecl undcr the Act, as thel,arc not absolute orvners of the sub.iect lands. Accor ding to the appeliants, once the lands were declared surplus and vcsted in the Government,, no right, title or KL,J&VRKR,J t[.i 1723, 1741 ol2018 and lAof2019 interest survived in lavoul ol the respondents so as to enable them to invoke writ j urisdiction.

26. Per contra, it is thc case of the respondents that they are in lawlul and settled possession ot' the subject lands, either under registered sale deeds or under an agreemcnt ol sale coupled with long- standing possession rctlected in the revenue records. It is subrnitted that they are persons dircctly allected by the impugned proceedings and lace imrninent thleat ol dispossession, thereby entitling them to maintain the writ petitior r\.

27. The issue ol /oc'rrs stttruli in proceedings under the Act cannot be cxamined in a narrori or peclantic mlurner. -l'hc scheme of lhe Act, particularly Section 8(i) rcad riith [{ule 5 ol'the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) ltules. makes it clcar that notice is required not only to be served on the declarant but also on all persons who have, or are likely to have, an,v claim to. or intcrcst in. the orvnersliip or possession of the land. The statutor) recognition ol'such persons itself indicates that the light to question procccdir-rgs is not confined only to absolute title holders.

KL,JAVRKR.J wA 172.), t741 of2018 and 10 of20t9

28. [t is rvell settled that a person in lawful, recognized or settled possession, r.r'hose rights are tikely to be adversely alfected by statutor), proceedings. has sulllcient standing to seek judicial review. The writ jurisdiction under Afticle 226 of the Constitution is available to any person rvho demonstrates a real and substantial grievance arising frorr.r an action rvhich is alleged to be illegal. arbitrary or rvithout j urisdiction

29. -l-he contention ol' the appellants tl-rat vesting under Section l0(3) ol'the Act automatically extinguishes all rights olthc landholder or Derson in possession cannot be accepted. The law is now settled that vcsting undcr Seclion l0(3) is or.rly a de .lure vesting ol title and does not, by itself', anrount to de facto possession. Actual physical posscssion can be taken only in the manner prescribcd r-rndcr Scctions l0(-5 ) and l0(6) oi the Act. In the abserrce ol larvlul taking ol posscssion, the landholder or the person in possession cannot be divested of their right to question the procccdings.

30. In the present case, the respondents asseft continuous possession of the subject lands for several decades, supported by revenue records. They further iit.g",nu, the authorities sought to deal

KL,J&VRKR,J wA -1723, l74l ol2018 and 10 of 2019 with the lands by treating them as surplus and proposing allotrnent to another Deparlment, thereb-v- posing a direct and immediate threat to third parlies to the procecdings.

31. The objection based on res jrulicuta is equally nrisconceived. The question ol' locus sl.rr./i must be examined with re l'erence to the legality of the impugned proceedings and the nature of the right asserted. Where proceedings arc allegcd to be i,itiated by non- compliance with mandatory statutor) rcquirclrents and violation of principles of natural justice, the plca of linatity cannot be invoked to shut out judicial scrutinv

32. This Court, thcretbrc, has no hcsiLation in holding that the respondents / writ petitioners, being persons in possession and directly alf,ected by the inipugned proceedings. possess the requisite /oczls standi Lo mainlain the writ petitions ancl to challenge the validity ol the proceedings initiated under the Act. their possession. Such persons cannot be characterized as strangers or t

KI, J&\'RKR J WA 1723, 174t oI20t8 and l0 oI2At9 Issue (ii): Whcthcr the subject lands constitute "vacant Iand" w ithin thc nrcaning of Sections 2(o) and 2(q) of the Act

13. Issuc (ii) strikes at thc very jurisdiction of the compctent auth()rit) to initiatc proceedings r-rnder thc lJrban Land (Cciling and Rcgulation) Act, 1976. The applicability of the Act itsell depends upon whether the sub.ject lands fall within the statutory definitions ol "urban Iand'' and consequently "vacant land" under Sections 2(o) and 2(q) olthe Act.

34. At this stage. it is apposite to extract the relevant statutory provisions. Scction 2(o) oltlie Act deflnes "urban land" as lbllorvs: Section: 2(o) "urbun land" means,

(i) ary land rituated u'ithin the litnits o/'an urban agglotnerutitttt und re-ferred to cts such in lhe masler plon: or

(ii) itl d case u,here lhere is no master plan, or where llte rustar plan does not re./cr to any land as urban lttnd, any land v,ithin the lintits o/'un urban agglomerotion dnd silualed in any orea includcd rithin thc ktcol limit-s o/ u ntunicipalitl,(b1 rhatever nama t'olletl1. u tnlified urea commiltee , a lown afco commitlee, a cil1, and tov n tommittet'. a sntttll-tovtt utntmillce. u canlonment botu'tl or u lrunchavat. lbr the purn but doa.s nol include ant'stch land v,hich is muir ose o/ usricuhure

Section 2(q) defines "vacant land" thus: " 2(q) 'wcant land' means land, not being land mainly used .for the purpose ofagriculture, in an urban agglomeralion.... "

KL.J&I'RKR,J l{A 1723. 1741 of 201A and lo ol2019 A conjoint reading of the above provisions leaves no manner of doubt that lar.rd mainly used lor agricultural purposes is expressly excluded from the detlnitions o1'both "urban lar-rd" and "vacant land".

36. The consistent case ol the respondents is that thc subject lands situated in Survey Nos. 157 and 158 ol Narsingi Village, Rajendra Nagar Mandal, Ranga l{eddy District, it fc agricultural lands, continuously used tbr agricultural purposes and recorcled as such in the revenue records. This assertior-r stands corroborated by the E,nquiry Officer's repofi dated 31.07.1979. which catcgorically recorded the lands as agricultural, and by the ceftitlcate dated 13.03.1983 issued by the otfice ol the Special Ofllcer cerrilying that thc lands u'ere situated olrtside the municipal lirnits, within the peripheral lirnits ol the urban agglomeration, and were not urban lands so long as thc-y continr.red to be used for agriculture.

37. It is not the casc of the appellants that thc sub,iect lands rvere ever converted fbr non-agricu ltu ra I use or that they ceased to be agricultural prior to initiation of procecding.s undcr the Act. No rnaterial whatsoever has been placed on record to establish that the ,18, KL.J&VRKR.J wA -1723, 1741 ol2018 an t to of 2019 lands ri,ere put to anl use other than agriculture so as to attract the statutory defi nition ol "vacant land".

38. 1'he legal position in this regard is no longer res integra. -[he Honourable Supreure Court, while interpreting Sections 2(o) and 2(q) of the Act, has consistently held that agricultural land stands excluded frorl the purview olthe Act, and that the character and use of the land are determinative. In State of Gujarat v. Manoltarsinh.ji Pradyutnans itthj i Jadeja2i, the Honourable Supreme Courl observed that land mainlv used fbr agriculture, even if situated within an urban agglorncration, does not fatl within the definition of vacant land undcr the Act. The Apex Court held thus: '' 11. l.lndar the ,4ct. 1976 while de.fining 'vacant land'. the saitl definition specilically excludes a 'land' used for the purpose of 'ugriculture 'l'ht lc.finition of 'Urban Land' again makes thc position cleor lhal any land situated within the urban agglonteration ref<'rred to as such in lhe Master Plan would exclude any such land rhich is nruinlS' usecl .[or the purpose of 'agricullure'. "

39. I he principle tlrat the actual and dominant use ol thc land is decisivc for deterurinirrg its character under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act has evolved consistently through judicial to:o ti (2) scc 3oo KL,J&'t'RKR,J WA 172i. t74l of2Ata end lAof2019 (supra), the Madras High Courl held that land can bc tleated as "vacant land" only when it is established that it is nrainiy used fbr a purpose other than agriculture and that rrere location rvithin an urban agglomeration or potential fbr urban use does not altcr its statutorl, character. This position was reiterated in S.L. Chitctle s case (supra), wherein it was emphasized that land recorded and used as aglicultr-rral cannot be brought within the sweep ol the Act mele lv because it lies within urban or peripheral limits, unless there is clear evidence of conversion to non-agricultural use. The Honourable Supreme C]ourr. in T.V. Antony s case (supra), subsequerrtly afllnned ancl authoritatively crystallized this principle by holding that, so long as land continues to be mainly used for agricultural purposes and is not divcrtcd to a non- agricultural use, it stands excluded from thc detlnition of "r"rrban land" under Sectior-r 2(o) and cannot be treated as "\,acant iand" under thc Act

40. An additional and equalll, determinativc jurisdictional requirement under the Act is the inclusion ol tl-re land irr a notifled or statutory Master Plan. The definition ol "urban land" under Section '19- 2(o) predicates either an express ref'erence to such land in a Master pronouncements. ln Libra Electrical Meters (P1 l,imited's case ,20- KL.J&'||RKR,J wA -172s, 1741 ol2018 and lO of 2019 Plan or, in the ahsence thcreol, its location within municipal liniits. In the abscnce ol' cithcr conditiorr, the competent authority lacks jurisdiction to proceed undcr the Act. 41 . 1-his position has been consistently recognized in Pratima Paul and Otltcrs (supt'rt), a Division Bench ol the Calcutta High Court held that agricultural lands rvhich are recorded as such in the revenue recolds and arc in Iact uscd lol agricultural purposes do not lose their' statutory charactcr mercly because of their location, unless they are shorvn to be included in a rrotifred Master Plan. The Courl emphasized that \laster I)lln incltrsiorr is r-rot a procedural formality but a loundational -i urisd ictional lact.

12. lrr the prcserlt ciise. the material on record unequivocallv establishcs that thc sub.jcct lands were not covered by any notified or statutory Mastcr P lan. I n the absence ol such statutory inclusion, thc ver')' assulnption ol j urisdiction by the competent authority stands vitiated. When rcacl in conjunction u,ith the established agricultural use ol the land, the initiation of proceedings under the Act is rendered wholly unsustainable in lau,

KL.,I & VRKR. J Lt'A -1723, I74 t ol 2018 and l0 of 2019

43. tn the light of thc forcgoing discussion, this Court concurs rvith the conclusion leached by the learned Single Judge that the cornpetent authority proceeded on an el'roneous premise and failed to advcft to the statutory exclusions and jurisdictionaI r'equirenrents cnrbodicd in Sections 2(o) and 2(q) ol the Act. Such failure to consider loundational jurisdictional facts amounts to non-application ol rnind ancl vitiates the proccedings at their inception.

41. l'his Court accordingly holds that thc subject lands. bcir.rg agricultural lands, not shown to be included in any notified Master Plan, do not constitute "urban land" or "vacant [and" rvithin the' nreaning ol Sections 2(o) and 2(q) ol the Act. Consequentll', the initiation and continuation of proceedings undcr the Act in respcct of tlre subject lands are without jurisdiction and unsustainablc in lart lssue (iii): Whethcr non-service of notice under Scction 8(3) vitintcs thc proceedings

45. Issue (iii) concerns cornpliance u,ith thc marldatot'y proccdural sateguards plescribed under the Act prior to dctermination ol surplus land. Section 8(3) of the Act obligates the competent authority to scrve the' drafi sratement on the declarant and allbrd an opporlunity to file objections before passing final ordels under Scction 8(4)" 'Ihis 1'' KL,J&I'I?KR,J WA 1723, t74t oI2018and IooJ2019 statutorv rcquirenlcnt is anrplified and operationalised by Rule 5 of the Urban I.and (Ceiling and Rcgulation) Rules. 1976.

46. At this juncture. it is neccssary to extract Rule 5(1) and Rule 5(2)(a) olthe Rulcs, whicli read as fbllows: '' Rule 5 Particular.s to ha contained in draft slatement as regards vacanl lands and monner ofservice of the same:

(l) Eter.v draft stdtcnrcnt prepared under sub-section (l) q.f Section 8 shall cotltoin tfu l)orticulurs specificd in Form Ill.

(2) (u) The druli .rtarent'nt sltoll bc sert,ed, together with the notice reJbrred to in.\ub-sectiotl (3) of Section 8, on- (, tha holder of tht vocant land; and

(ii) all olhar persotrs. .to.far as may be known, who have, or are likely to have, an1' cluim lo. or interes! in, the ownership or po.s.scssion or hoth. ol the vacant lond, b1, sending the same hy registered post addressed lo lhe person concerned- (, in tha ca.se ol' tlr holder of the tacant land, to his address as giycn in Ihe \letemei lilad under Section 6: ond

(ii) in thc tu.se of otlt'r pcrsons, lo thcir la.tt known addresses." 41 . A plain rcading of' IlLrle 5 rnakes it abundantly clear that thc otrligation to servc the drali statentcnt and notice under Section 8(3) is rrot confined to the declarant alone. but expressly extends to all persons who have. or are likely to have, any claim to or interest in the o\rynership or possession ol the land. The rule thus embodies the plinciple ol attdi alteram l)drtetn and statutorily recognises the rights

KL,J&VRKR,J wA 1723, l74 t of 20 Ia a^d 1o of 2019 of persons in possession or having an interest in the land to parlicipate in the adjudicatoD, process.

48. Cornpliance rvith Rulc 5 is. therefore, not a merc procedural lbrrnalitl,, but a mandatorl, ru1- trur, designed to ensure that no person is divested ol rights or possession without notice and ait opportr"rnity of being heard. Any determinatior.r of surplus land made in violation of this rccluire mcnt stands vitiated in lar.v.

49. In the present case, the learned Single Judge has recorded a clear tincling that no rnaterial was produced by the authorities to cstablish service of noticc undel Sectior-r 8(3) either on the dccltrrant or on the rcspondents, who rvere admittedly in possession and whose rrarles stood ref'lected in the revenue records.'fhe alleged reliance on an untlaccable rvritten staternent dated. 28.07.1983. said to have been tilecl b1 thc declarant was rightly rejected in the absence oi- anr conlemporrne'or:s record.

50. Thc legal position is well settlcd that t-ailr-rre to sclvc notice under Section 8(3) ol the Act, read with Rule 5 ol'the Rules, vitiates the entire proceedings. Where the statute mandatcs service ol'notice

KL,J&VRKR,J wA -1723, 1741 of20l8 and lOof20l9 on persons concerne(l. corrlpliance is not a rnatter of discretion but a corrditiorr pre'ccclent to thc assunlption oljurisdiction. Non-service of such noticc strikes at the ver1, root of the proceedings. In G. Kri.shnantoot thr's crr.sr, (su;rra). it has been categorically hetd by the Madras High Courr that detcrrnination of surplus land without issuing notice to persons in possession is irnpermissible in law and renders thc proceedings void. Thc Court ernphasized that persons whose possession or intelest is likely to be affected cannot be excluded fi'orn the statutory process, and any adjudication undertaken behind their back is a nullitv

51. -fhe []onourable Supre me ('ouft repeatedly emphasised that statutory presclipLions governing notice and hearing cannot be diluted on considerations ol expcdiency. Whcre thc statute itself incorporates the principlcs ol natural .ir-rsticc. conrpliance therewith is rnandatory, and all) action tal<en iu violation thcreol is rcndered non est

52. Irr vierv of the express languagc of Rule 5(2)(a), the respondents. beir-rg persons in possession and having a dernonstrable interest in the land, were entitled to service of notice and an opportunity of filing objections. Thc failure of the competent authority

KL,J&'y?KR,J WA 1723, l74l of2018 and Io of2019 to do so rcnders the proceedings under Section 8(4) illcgal and unsustainable.

53. '[his Court, theletble, holds that non-service ol notice under Section 8(3)olthc Act, read with Rule 5(l)and 5(2)(a) olthe Rules, vitiates the entire proceedings, and the learned Single Judge rvas Issue (iv): Il4tclher possession of the subject lsuds wos low./irlllt taken itr contpliance x:ilh Scctions l0(5) ond l0(6) of the Act

54. Issue (iv) conccrns the State's assertion that possession of the subject lands was taken prior to the coming into force ol the Urban Land (Cieiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999. 'l'he legality o[ such asscrliou nrust bc tcsted strictly on thc anvil of Sections l0(5) and l0(6) ol the Ulban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, I976, which exclusively govern '.he manner in ri,hich physical possession may be assurred bv tl-re State .

55. Section l0(5) mandates that where vacant land is vested in the State under Scction l0(3), the competent authority shall, by notice in writing, require the person in possession to sulrender or deliver justitied in setting aside the sarnc on this ground.

K1..J&VRKR.J wA _ 172-r, 1741 of 20 18 and 10 ol2019 possession \\'ithin the stipulated period. Section l0(6) permits forcible dispossessiorr on11,upon lhilure to conrply u,ith such notice.

56. The statutory schcrne thus rnakes a clear and conscious distinction betu'cerr r estirrg of land under Section l0(3) and taking of actual physical possession. Vesting under Section l0(3) is not self- executory so far as possession is concemed and does not, by itself, divest the landholdel or the person in possession ol physical control over the lancl

57. The law on the r.nanner in which possession may be taken under the Act, starrds authoritativell, settled by the l-lonourable Suprerne Court irr lluri Ram't cuse (supra7, rvherein it rvas held that vesting under Section l0(3) results only in de.jure vesting, and that de facto possession can be talten only by strict compliance with Sections l0(5) and l0(6). l'he issuance and sen'ice ol- notice uncler Section l0(5) was held to he mandatorv

58. The Ilonourable Suprerne Courl lurther explained that Section l0(5) conternplates peaceful dispossession pursuant to notice. whereas Section l0(6) conternplates forcible dispossession, which can be

KL,J&VRKR.J WA 1723, 1741of20t8and to oI2019 resorted to only upon t-ailure to comply with the notice issued under Section l0(5). Any deviation lrom this statutory sequence renders the act ol dispossession legalll, inrpennissiblc. -['he Honourable Court I-re lcl as under: ''30. Vacont land, it may be noted, is nol aclually acquired but deemed to have been acquiretl, in lhat deeming things to be what they are not. Acquisition, tlrcre.fbre, does not lake possession unless there is an indicati<tn to the L'ontrort. lt is trite law lhat in construing a deeming provision, il is ntces.sury lo bear in mintl the legi,slutive purpose. The purpose oJ tha lct is to impose ceiling on vacant land, for the acquisition of lcnd in ercess of the ceiling limit thereby to regulate conslruction on such lunds. lo prevenl concenlration of urban lunds in hands of .feu' p(tsons. so as lo bring about equitable distribution. For uchieving that object, various procedures hove to be Jbllowed for acquisition and vesting. I4hen u,e look at those words in the above setting and the provisions to follou' such as sub-seclions (5) and (6) o/Section 10, the v'ords acquired' and 'vested' have dilferent tneaning (lnd content. []ttdcr Stttion l0(3), what is vested i.s dejure possession nol de larcto, Jbr nutre raasons lhon one because we are lesting the expression on o stalulory hypothesis and such a hypothesis can be carried only 16 11ru t\tenl necessary lo {tchiete the legislative Voluntory Surrendrr 3 I . The 'vesting' in sub-section (3) of Section 10. in our view, means vesling of lille absolutely ancl not possession though nolhing slands in the v,ay oJ'a persttn voluntarily surrendering or delivering possession. The courl in Maharai Singh v. Stale of UP and Others (1977) I SCC 155. u'hile inrerpreting Section 117(1)of U.P. *'....-

KL.J&VRKR.J wA t723, 174 t ol2018 a^d to of2019 Zamindari Abolition and Land Re.form Act, 1950 held that 'vesting' is a u'ord ral slipper.t, inlporl and has mary nrcaning and lha contexl controls tlte lefl atul the purpose und schene project thc porticultu' rcmantic shade or nuonce o/ nrconing. The court in Rajendra Kumar t. Kalyan (dcad) by L.rs. (2000) ll SOC 99 held as.[ollou,s: "tVe dofind some conlentious substance in the conlcxlual facts, sirce wsting shall hat'e to be a "vesting" certoin. "To lest, generally,neans to give a property in." (Per llrelt, L.J. C'overdale v. Churlton. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, 5th edn. l/ol. VI.) l,esting in.favour qf the unhorn person and in the contexlualfocts on lhe ha:;is of a subsequent adoption qfter about 50 years t,ithout ony authorizotion connol however but be lermed to bc a conlingent etent. 'l'o "vesl'. connol be lermed to be an execulor devise. Bc il rtotcd hou,ct'cr, lhal "t'csted" does not ncccssuril.r' and alv,a1,s meun "rest in possession but includes "r'csl in interest" as well. "

32. We are of the tieu, that so far as the present case is concerned, the word "resling" lakes in eler)) interest in the property including de jure pos.session and. nol de.facto but il is aluavs open to o person to voluntarily surrender and deliver 7t<t.tsession, Lmder Seclion l0(3) of the Act.

33. Before we eytninc suh-seclion (5) ond sub-sL'cliot (6) oJ' ,\ection 10, let us cxamine tht meaning ef sub-section (4) ofScction l0 of the A(t. \,hich .\avs tlrut during the period comntent'ing on the date o/ puhlication uncler .vLlt-section (l), ending with the day tpecified in tlte decloration nade under sult-seclion (3). no person shull lrans-fcr lt1,wa.v of salc. nnrtgage. gifl or otheru,ise. un-r excess vacant land. specificd in the noti,fication arul any such trun.s.f'ar made in contr(lvenlion of lhe Ac't .rhall be deemed to be null and yoid. Further, it also sttys that no person shall alter or catlse b be altered the use of such excess vacanl land. Therefore, from thc dote of ltublicalion of the notification under sub- section (t) and ending with the date speci"fied in the decloration made in sub-section (3), there is

KL,J&VRKR,J vA 1723, 1741 oJ2a18 and IOoI20l9 no question of disturbing the possession of u person. the pttssession, therefore, continues to be with the holder of the land. Peaceful clispossess io n 3l- Sub-secthn (5) o.l Section lU,.lbr the Jirst time, speaks of "possession" which says u'hcrc any land is vested in the State Government under sub-seclion (3) of Section 10, lhe competenl uulhorily may, by notice in u,riling,, order uny person, who may be in possession of it to surreruler or trans.fer possession to the State Government or to any other person, dulS, attthor'zed by the State Government.

35. lf de facto possession has alrcadl, pctssed on to the State Government by the tu,o cleenting provisions under sub-section (3) to Section 10. there is no necessity oJ using the erpression "where any land is vested" under sub- sectiott (5) to Seclion 10. Surrendering or transler of possession under sub-se.'tfut't (3) to Section l0 can be voluntary so thdt the person may gel the compensation os provided under Section ll of the Act eurl1,. Once there i.s no voluntary surrender or delivery oJ posses.sion, necasscrrily the Slole Government has to issue notice in writing uruler sub-sct'tiort (5) to Scction l0 to surrender or deliver possession. Sub.rcction (51 oJ Section l0 visualizes o situalion of surrcndering and delivering pctssession, peacefully v,hile sub-section ((t1 o/ Sectiorr l0 contamplate-s a situalion o./ fo r c eJil tl i s p osselsirrrr. Fo rceful tl is poss e ss i o n

36. The Act providcs Jbr force/ul dispossession but only when a person reJuses or.fails to comply with un order under sub-seclion (5) of Section 10. Sub-section ((t) to SLc'tion l0 again speaks oJ' "possession" which says. if any person reJuses or fails to comply with the order made under sub- seclion (5), the compelenl aulhorily may take possession of the vacant land to bc given lo lhe Stale Government

K/-, .-/ & YRKR, J tvA 1723, I74 I oJ 2A l8 atld l O of 2019 and for that purpose. -force - as may be necessary - can be used. Sub- section (6). lhere.fore, contemplates o silutttion ofa person refusing or /uil.s to crtttplt' v,,ith the order tutdersuh-.teclion (5). in lhe ercnt of v hith tht Lompetetll ntlhtsrily may teke 1tos-tassion by use o.[ force. Forciblt rlisposscs.siott ol the land, thereJbre, is being resorted only in u situalion wltich.falls under sub-section (6) and not under sub-seclion

(5) to Section 10. Sub-.sections (5) and (6), therefore, take care of botlt lhe situations, i.e. toking possession by giving notice lhat is " peace.ful disposses.rion" antl on .failure to surrender or give delivery oI possession under Section l0(5), than "forcefr,il dispossession" under sub-.section (6) ofSection 10. J1. Requirentent of giving nolice under sub-sections (5) arul

(6) qfSection l0 is mandatory. Though the word 'may' has been used lherein, the u'ord ma-y' in both the sub-sections has lo be understood crs "shall" because o court charged with the task qf enforcing the .\tdtltte needs to det:ide the consequences thol lhe legislature intended to.follou,.from failure to implement the requirement. Effect of non- i.tsue of notice under .sub-section (5) or sub-saction (6) ofSection I I i.; lhat it might result the land holder being dispossessed without notice. tln'raforc. rhe v'ord may' has tn he reutl u: 'shall .

59. 'fhis principle has been consistently reiterated and reinlbrced in subscquent decisions includir-rg M/s. A.P. Electrical Ecluiltnent Corporalion's case (.tupra) and Mangalsen's case (supra), wherein tlie Honourable Supreme Court held that possession claimed by the State rvithout issuance and service ol notice under Section l0(5) cannot be recognised as lawful possession. The Court deprecated

-31, KL, J &, VRKR, J t'" A _1723. 174 I of 2018 and 10 of 20I9 reliance on intemal records, possession meulos or panchanamas prepared without statutol'y compliance, characterising such possession

60. The Honourable Supreme Court in M/s. A P Electrical Equipment Corportttion's c'ase (supra) lurthcr held that the procedure under Sections I 0(5 ) and I 0(6 ) is not an e mpty lbrmality but a substantive safeguard, and unless disposscssion is efhcted strictly in the manner known to [aw. the State cannot clairn the benefit olvesting SO AS to defeat the operation of the ltepcal Act. l he Llonor-rrable Supreme Courl made the following pertinent obscrvations: "21. Sub-secrions (5) and (6) rf Sectbn l0 oJ rhe Act, 1976 respectively which are relevant.fbr lhe purpose o/ leciding the present Appeals read as under: " 10. Acquisition of vucunl larul in exccss o/ ceilinp limit-

(5) Where any vacant land is vested in the SIdl( (iorernment under sub-sectktn (3). the contpetent mihorit)' nn),'. by noricc in wrilinu, orcler any person u,ho nury he in possessiotr ol il lo su"rencler or deliver possession thereol'to the Slale Oovernmtnt or to any parson duly authorized by the State Govarnment in this behoff v,ithin thirry days of the service ol notice-

(6) IJ any person reJiscs or fails to comply with un ortlar made undar sub section (5), the competenl anlhori0' ntay lake possassion of the vacant land or cause it lo bc giwn tu lhe conccrntd Slule (iot'ernmettl or lo any person duly authorised by such State Go"-crnmenl in this behalf and may for thal purpose use such.force us nruy be necessory' . as illusory or paper possession.

KL, .I & VRKR. ,) tuA 1723, 1/4t of20t8anct 1aof2019

22. On a plain reading of the aforesaid provisions, it is un)urtnl lhal tlrc .\l(.ttule contentplales giving an opportunit-\/ to thc lundhrtllt'r or an.\' per.\ot1 in possession ol escess racanr land lo .;urrender or delivcr posscssiolt thereof ut lhe State Governmenl und /or lhis purpose prorides.for gh'ing notice in v,riting, ordering such pcrsotl t() surrendcr or deliver possession qf such lund. lt is only u,hcn put'\ttltrlt to .\uch notice, such person refuses orfails lo comply with dn onler under sub-.scction (5) within a period of thirty days of the strricc of notice, thut the compelcnl aulhoriry is required to take oter possessiorr of llte racant land and for thal purpose may use force, if ne(c\stu'r There/'ore. the provisions of sub-section (6) are to be resorted to onLy v,hcrt there is re-fusal or non-compliance of an order unler suh-.sectit)n (5) o.f Section l0 of the Act, 1976 u'ithin tha ltrcstrihetl pcriod. )3. In Srure o.f Muharashn'a t'. B.E. Billinnria, (2003) 7 S(:C -;-]6. thi.\ (.'(,ttt-t i tl : L'ontext ol the Act, 1976 held that rhc said Act lrcitt,g un .'x|)rol)riot()r!- lcgislation shoukl he construed strictly. )1.'l lti; ( ourt itt thc tasc oJ llhavnagar University v. Polilanu Sugar .llill /P) Ltd.. (2001) 2 SCC I I l, in the context of the Cuiarat Tou,n l'lututirt.q ar I'rhan Devclopment Acr, 1976 held thus: ''l lrc .slututory inlerdict of use and eniownent of the proDerlv nut.\t l)(' \triclly ton.struacl. lt is x'ell selll(,d lhal when a stat lor\: ittrtlntrin i.\ )ttlut L,Ll to do o llting in a porliculut ntanne r. llrc snnt nlu.\t l)c &)ne in tlrut nrunner a' not at all. The state ond ollrcr tu lk)t'iti(,\ vl lt uctirry under the suid Act ure only treolure of st.ttulc .llu,r rntlst ttti v illtitt tlte our corners thereo ( [i r n p h u.r i.s .t upp I i L: tt ) 25.7'hus. applying the principle of strict construction as axplained in the uforesaid ru,o deci.rions, the aulhorities are required -3 3, KI,.J&VRKR,J tvA -1723, t74t of2018 and lOof20t9 lo act strictly in accordance v'ith lhe slatutory provisions. Thus, when sub-section (5) of Section l0 mandates giving notice ofan order under the said sub-section to lhe person in possession, the some is requiretl to be complied rvirh in its true letter and spirit. Considering the noture o.[ rights involved, mere i.ssuance of notice rithout sen,ite thereol, cannot be suid to be due compliance x'ith lhe provisions oJ the stdute. Besides, the provisions of subsection (6) ofSection ]0 cun he resorted to only if the person fails to usmply with an order under sub-section

(5) thereof v,irhin u period q/ thirry days of sarvice of n<ttice. tlence. possession cannot be taken ovcr under Section l0(61 of the Act, 1976 unless a period of thirty days from the date of service of notice has elapsed. In absence of sertice oJ notice undcr sub-.sectktn (5) of Section 10, there will be no sturting point for culculating the period oJ' thirty days. In other u,ords. time v'ill not slurt running, hence the question of tdking over possession under sub-saction (6.1 o/ Section l0 ofthe Act, 1976 will not arise at all. ln lhis view oJ the matter, in the clse on hand, it was not open to the respondent aulhorities to rasort to the provisions ofsub-section (61 qfSection 10 o.l the Act. 1976 without lirst strictly cotnplying tvith lhe provisions of sub-sectiotr (5) thereof. Hence, such dction being in controvention 4'the stotutory provisiotts cannot be sustained and deserves to be struck down. Validin' of Transactions - Rclevancc to Possession Procecdings

61. It is in the above sl.atutor)' and jurisprudcntial backdrop that the contention of the appellants regarding the alleged invalidity of the sale decds and agreernents of sale relied upon by thc respondcrtts / writ petitioners is required to bl: examined. Proceedings under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 197 6 are not proceedings for

KL,J&VRKR,J WA 1723, l741of 2018 nnd IOof20l9 adjudication ol title, and the competent authority is not vested with .iurisdiction to pronounce upon the validity of private convcyances.

62. For the f urposes ol- conrpliance rvitli Sections 8(3), I0(5) and I 0(6 ) of thc Act. thc dcte lminative consideration is not the ultimate validity ol thc transaction. but whether thc person concerned is in possession or has a clainr or interest in the land. Even where the State dispLrtes the validitl, ol a private ffansaction, such dispute cannot .iustifl' denial of statutory notice nor legitimise dispossession othcrrvisc than in accordance with law. Questions relating to titlc can bc adjudicated onh, by a cornpetent civil court and cannot be collateralll, lrresurnerl against thc resporrdents in proceedings under the Act

63. It is a scttlcd principle that even a person in settled possession r.r'ithout perlectccl title cannot be dispossessed except by authority ol law. Where the statute itsell tnandates notice and prescribes a specific procedurc tbr taking possession, the State cannot circurnvent such salesuarcls by' qucstioning the validity of underlying transactions. Any such atternpl rvould aurount to deprivation of possession rvithout due process.

KL,J&VRKR,J wA 1723, 1741 of 2014 a^d tool20)g

64. 1-urning to the facts of the present case, the appellants asserl that posscssion was taken on 28.08.1995. l{owever. the record discloses that no notice under Section l0(5) was ever sen,ed eithcr on the dcclarant ol on the respondents. who rvere adrnittedly i It possession. -l'herc is also no material to show tl-rat proceedings r"rnder Section l0(6) were initiated or that fbrcible dispossession \\'as lau tully eflected

65. 'fhe panchanarrra dated 25.08.1995 relied upon by the appellants neithcr specifies the precise extent nor identities the boundaries olthe iand allegedly taken possession of, nor does it evidence actual physical dispossession. In the absence ol statutory cornpliance, it can only be characterised as evidencing paper possession

66. On thc contrary, the revenue recerds consistently reflect the rcsporrdents as pcrsons in possessior-r everr subsequent to the alle'gecl date- ol taking possession. These contemporaneous public records str.t)ngl), support the rcspondents' CASC that possess ion \\,2IS IlCYC r la* tully taken by the State.

-3 6- KL.J&IIRKR.J wA 1723. 1741 oJ20t8 ond 1o oI20t9 61 . This C'ourt accortlingll holds that the appellants have f'ailed to establish lau'lul taliing of possession ol the subject lands in accordancc rvitlr Sr'ctions l0(5) and l0(6) of the Act. The possession clainred by thc State is nrercly syrnbolic and is non-est in law. Issue (v): Whethcr thc proccedings stood abated by opcration of thc Urban Land (Ceiling and Rcgulation) ltepcal Act, 1999

68. [ssue (r ) conccrns the el'l'ect of the Repeal Act on the proceedines initiated against the subject lands. The determinative question is ri,hether thc Statc had taken lawful and actual physical posscssion ol'thc lancls lrrior to the commencement of the Repeal Act.

69. Section 3 ol- thc Repeal Act provides that all proceedings relating to anl. ordel rnaclc or purported to be made under the principal Act shall stand abated. crccpt in cases whele possession of the surplus land has bcerr tal<crr ovcr bv the State Government ol any person duly authoriscd b"v it. 'l'he savinq clause thus rtrakes it abundantly clear that onlv thosc cascs u herc- actual possession had been lawfully taken prior to repeal s u rv ivc.

70. T'he legal position governing-the scope and effect of Section 3 of the Repeal Act is'on,*,ell settled. The Honourable Supreme Court

KL,J&VRKR,J WA 1723. 1741 of 20t8 an.l lOof20l9 ln Hari Ram's cese (supra) held that for the purpose of saving procccdings tl'om abaterl]ent, possession contemplated uncler Section i o1' the Repeal Act must be actual, physical possession, taken in accordance rvith law, and that mere vesting under Section l0(3) or prcparation of inte|nal reco|ds does not sufllce.

71. This principle has been consistently reiterated in Vinayak Kasltinath Shilkar's case (supra), Gajanan Kanlya Patil's case (sul)ru) urtcl L'ipincltarulru l,'odilul Bavishi Stete (t'Gujarat:t, Il whcrein it has been held that unless the State establishes lawful disyrossession in compliance with Sections 10(5) and 10(6) of the Act prior to rcpeal, the proceedings autornatically abate. '72. ln l4is. A.P. Electrical Equipment Corporatictn's case (supra), thc Honourablc Supreme Court, after examining thc interplay betrvccn the principal Act and thc Repeal Act, reiterated that papcl possession or syrnbolic posscssion cannot be treated as possession in the eve of Iarv tbr the purpose of invoking the saving clallse under Section 3 ol thc Repeal Act. l'he Court held at paragraph Nos.20 and 40 as under: '' (20 to) a scc 5: t

KL,J&VRKR.J WA 1723, l74I ol20l8and tooJ20l9 "20, Thus. h.t virtue of llte provisions of Section 3 of the Repeal ,lct. 1999. i/ po.tsession of racant land has been laken otar on hchul.f oI the State (iovernntcnt hefore thc cominq into.force of the Rcpeal .1t'r. 1999. tfu rr:1teul ol tht' Principal ,,1c1 v,ould nol olfect the vsling ol .suth ldtll utklcr srb-sL'ttiort (3) ofSution l0 of AcL 1976. llence. tht' i.ysut a.s lrt v,hethcr uclLd Stossession oJ land declared excess under the .|tt has hcan kften or'('r or nol assumes grea! significarce ofter the coming into force of the Repeal Act, 1999 inasntuch as if possesskn has nol lteen taken over. the proceedings v:ould ohate wtder Section 1 of the Rcpeol AcL 1999 and the ov,nership of the land, if va.sted in the ,ftate Government under Section l0(3) of the .1tr. l9;6 vould be rcquired to be restored to lhe original land-holdar suhiect to rcpaymcnt o.f any smount that has hcen ytkl by'the ,\lult,Oovetnnte nt *,ith reslvcl to such land. " ''10.'tltc t,llbtt of Repeul ,lct, 1999 is further clear. lf the londou ner remain.s irt Pb,sical possession, then irrespective of his land being declurerl surplus uruL/or entry being made in.favour of the Sltue in retetrue re ttnds. he u ill not hc tlirested of his rights. Even if contpetxetion is retci', cd llrut ul.ut u'ill not dis-entille him to claim the hetrcfit i.[ contrynsatiott is re.limdetl. provided he is in actual physicul ltossessiott. l'aymenl of cotnpcnsution hos no co-relation v'ilh the tuking o/ rtt'trnl ph.ttitttl ltt.r.se.ssiott us u'ith lhe vesting land LUmpcnsdtit)n bt'conrt.s prt.vrhlt' t ltich cun ha paid wilhout toking acl ual l)h-\'.\ icul lro.r.r('JJio/r.

73. In thc present case. as alrcady held while dealing with Issue

(iv) . the al)l)ellants har,e f-ailed to estahlish that possession of the subiect lands r.vas taken in accordarrce wirh Sections l0(5) and 10(6) of the Act. No notice under Section l0(5) was serued, no lawful

KL,J&VKKR,J t|A 1723, 174t of20lsand looJ2019 proceedings under Section l0(6) were undertaken, and the so-called possession clain.red by thc State is unsupported by any Iegally sustainable uraterial

14. ln the absence ol lawlul and actual phl,sical possession haviug bccn taken prior to the cornurenceurent oi the Repeal Act, the inevitable conscqucncc is that all proceedings initiated under the principal Act stood abated by operation of Section 3 ol the Repeal Act. The State, thercfbre. cannot assert any subsisting right over the subject lands on thc basis ol tl.re repealed legislation.

15. l'his Court accordingly holds that the proceedings under the Urban [.and (CeilinS. anci I{cgLrlation) Act. 1976, in respect of tl.rc subject lands. stood abated on the corring into lorce of tlie Repeal Act, and no lurlher action colrld have been larvf ully taken thereunder. lssue (r i): Whether thc ortlcr ol'thc learned Single Judgc \r 2lrr:rnts intcrfcrence in appcllatc jurisdiction

16. lssue (vi) r'elates to thc scope ol interttrence by this Court in Single Judge. It is *,ell settlcd that an appellate courl would interfere intra-court appellate.jurisdiction with the order passed by the lcarned

KL,J&VRKR,J rrt4 1723, t741 ol20l8 ond 10 of2019 only where thc findings recorded are shorl,tt to bc perverse, contrary to law, or based on mis-appre ciation o1'tnaterial on record. 11 . In thc prcsent case. the learncd Single Judge undeftook a detailed and nreticr-rlous exanrination ol' thc statutory pror isions governing the Act. the IJrban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Rules, and the binding prccedents of the IIonourable Supreme Court. The conclusions arrived at b1, the learned Singlc Judge are firmly founded on the statutory scherne and the settled legal position.

78. The learned Singlc Judgc con'ectly held that the subject lands are agricultuml in nature. cxclLrdcd lrorn the purvierv ol the Act under Sections 2(o) and 2(q). and that the cornpetcnt aLrthority lacked jurisdiction to treat thc samc as vacant land. This hnding is supltofted by conternporaneous revcnue rccorcls. thc' cntluiry report. and the absence of ir-rclusion ol tlrc lands in arry notificd i!{aster Plan

79. The Irnding that thc proccedings stood \itiated on account of non-service of nrandatory noticc undcr Sectiorr 8(3), read with Rule 5( l) and 5(2)(a) of the Rules, is fully in consonance with the sratutory -41,, KL.J&VRKR,J WA -1723, 1741 of2018 and lOoJ2019 mandate and the principlcs ol natural justice. No material has been produced by the appellants to dislodge this finding.

80. The leamed Single Judgc lirrther recorded a correct finding that lawtul and actual physical possession ot'the lands was never taken by the State in accordance rvith Sections l0(5) and l0(6) ol the Act. This finding is squarely suppolted by the consistent line of decisions of the Honourable Suprenre Court, including t[ari Ram's case (supra), Mh. A.P. Electric'al Equipnertt Corporution's ca.se (supro), and the other authorities referred to hercinbc fbre.

81. Once it is hcld that llo-sscssion was not lawfltly taken, the conclusion that the procceciings stood abated by operation of the Repeal Act necessarily' fbllolr s. '['he lcarned Single Judge, therefore, committed no error in larr irr setting aside the proceedings initiated under the principal Act.

82. The appellants have lailc-d to derronstrate any perversity. illegality, or jurisdictional crror in the reasoning or conclusiot-ts recorded by the learned Singlc Judge. The contentions advanced in

KL. J & VRKR, J l|A 172.1. l741ol20lAaad lO of 20l9 appeal merely seek a re-appreciation ol lacts and settled legal principles. u'hich is irnpermissiblc in appcllate jurisdiction.

83. This ('our-t is. therelore. of the considered vicrr, that the order of the leamed Single Judge does not sul'ler fl'onr any irrfirmity warranting interGrencc. The rvrit appeals are de',,oid ol'merit \,'I. CONCLUSIONS:

84. On a holistic considelation ol' thc statutory liameu'ork ol the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) ,Act. 197(r. the Rulcs frarred thcreunder, the Urban Larrd (Ceiling and Rcgulation) Repeal Act, 1999, and the binding precedents governing the t-reld, this Court records the following conclusions.

85. Thc subject lands are agricultural in character, continuously recorded and used ers sucl-r, and are llot sllo\vlt to havc been included in any notified Master Plan. In view ol the express cxclusion containcd in Sections 2(o) and 2(q) ol the Act, they do nor lall within the deflnition of either "urban land" or "vacant land". 'l'he initiation of proceedings under the Act in respect thereol was, therefore, without jurisdiction.

KL,J&\RKR.J IVA 1723, 1741 ot 20l8 and lO,tt20l9

86. The respondents/writ petitioners, being pelsons in possession and having a demonstrable clairn or int..rcst in the subject lands. tall within the ambit of "persons concerned" under Section 8(3) read with Rute 5( i ) and 5(2)(a) ol the Rules. l he admitted fhilure to serve mandatory notice upon thent stril<cs al the root of the proceedings and renders Ihe deterrnination unsustainable-

87. The Vesting Contenrplated undcl Section 10(3) ol the Act is only de jure and does not by itscll result in divestment of physical possession. Lawful assurltption o1'ph1'sical possession can be eflected only upon strict compliance rvith Sections l0(5) and 10(6). In the absence of service of notice Lrnder Scctior.r l0(5) and lawful dispossession in thc nranner knou'n to larv. lhe possession claimed by the State is merely symbolic or papcr posscssior.r. rrhich is non-est

88. The challenge raised by, thc appeiiarrts to the validity of the sale deeds or agreemcnts ot' salc leliecl Lrlron b1' thc respondents IS misconceived. Procecdings under tl're Act are not proccedings fbr adjudication of title, and disputed questions relating to the validity of

KL,J&VRKR,J WA 1723, 1741 ol 20l8 dnd 1O of2019 pri\,ate transactions cannot be invoked to deny statutory notice or to bypass r-naridatory proccdural saleguards.

89. In thc abscnce of lawful arrd actual physical posscssion of the subject lands w.rs taken prior to the coming into l'orce of the Repeal Act, all the proceedings initiated under the principal Act stood abated by operation of Section 3 thereof. No right, title or intcrcst can theleafter bc clainred by the state orr the basis ol' sr.rch abated procecdings.

90. The learncd Single Judge, upon a correct appreciation of statutory scherle and the binding precedents governirrg the treld, rightly intcrl'ered with proceedings which were vitiated by lack of iurisdiction and non-compliance with rnandatory statLrtory requirerlents. l'his Court finds no error, j r.rrisdictiona I or others'ise u,arranting intell-erence in intra-court appellate jurisdiction.

VII. RIrSt l.'l'

91. In vicri ol the conclusions lecorded hereinabove. and lbr the reasons statcd. all the Writ Appeals fail and are accordingly disrnissed.

KL,J&\'RKR.J wA 1723, 1741 of2018 and 10 ol2019 9L The common order dated 29.12.2017 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P. Nos. 195 12 and 21914 of 2008 and 15221 of 201 I is hereby affirmcd.

93. It is held and declared that the proccedings initiated under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 in lespect o1- the subject lands are without j urisdiction, vitiated fbr non-compliance with n-randatory statutor) requirements, and stood abated by operation ol'the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999. 9+. There shall be no order as to costs. As a sequel, all pending rriscellaneous applications. if any, in thesc appeals, shall stand closed. SD/-A.V.S. PRASAD DEPUTY REGIS //TRUE COPY// One Fair Copy to the Hon'ble Sri Justice ECTION OFFICER SHIVIAN To, (For His Lordship's Kind Perusal & One Fair Copy to the Hon'ble Sri Justice VAKITI RAIVIAKRISHNA REDDY (For His LordshiP's Kind Perusal)

1. Two CCs to GP FOR ASSIGMENT, High Court for the State of Telangana at Hyderabad. [OUT]

2. One CC to SRI D.S V G NAGARAJU, Advocate lOPUCl

3. Two CCs to GP FOR TOURISM, High Court for the State of Telangana at Hyderabad. [OUTI

4. 1'1 LR.Copies I

The Under Secretary, Union of lndia, Ministry of Law, Justice and Company Affairs, New Delhi. The Secretary, Advocates' Association Library, High Court Buildings, Hyderabad Two CD Copies. BSK BS

HIGH COURT DATED:0310212026 tHES .:..\. C /'. ':. "^d\ o2n F) +-)// t, D

f ) t

COMMON ORDER

WA.Nos.1 723, 17 41 of 2018 & 10 0F 2019 DISMISSING THE WRIT APPEALS WITHOUT COSTS q I li