WP/40454/2025 of Shri. B. Sreenivasa Gandhi Vs Adjudicating Authority on 8 January 2026

E ii il* ii : \\\ [ 348e I rN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE qT-ATE OF TELANGANA AT HYDERABAD (SPecial Original Jurisdiction) THURSDAY,THE EIGHTH DAY OF JANUARY TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY SIX PRESENT THE HONOURABLE SRI J-USTICE P.SAM KOSHY AND THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE SUDDALA CHALAPATHI RAO WRIT PETITION NO 40454 0F

Between AND

Shri.B.SreenivasaGandhi,slpgl.B.Narasimha.RaoAoedabout5Tyears' occ Govt Emplovee, Bl-o Plot N; '56b'"'ii;; G' Is' vasant Nasar' 5[Lt''ll;,Hj,",il8oJoor_:$ir1a9a Gandhi,- A.g."d about 4e vears, occ Business, R/o proi r'r1' :96, noJo -16' J's' Vtt'ni Nagar' -Kukatpally' 3ilfl".6oRX,.11tff,: Rao, ,lo r-^qtq B subbaiah, Ag_ed about 82 ve{s, occ Retired Govt Employeer-R/o pfot "No1"55, tii''p'i"n Colony' Poranki' ijJ,i.rrrrru trlanoht, krishna District- 521 137 ' M! Bollineni-Sai ffin)siruiii'',-pro ^snl a' si"qniva'sa 3.'1t'' #Si^i',ii'nZl, vears, occ ar.in.lsl -B1;^,i,- No' 596' Road N 5H|.1"*rtl?"J:Bi$&:i^?o r chandra shekhar Rao' 4g"! about 58 vears, Occ B usin..:.i il;' Hrri lo +OI','Tiriiarf J towers' Poranki' Penamalu ru illtar';;l, kiitn"i Distiict-52 1 137 ...PETITIONERS AdiudicatingAuthority,Ul9q,PreventionofMoneyLaunderingAct2oo2 Rebresented by Regidtrar/AoministrliiiJ'b#i""i-o("" li'ii;;,""rrio-26' 4th Floor, Jeevan D"iH;it;i;;'i;;;iifi6iii st,""t New Delhi 110001 ij#;i;,--,"t,; ei E;i&ffi"nil-qsp tv ii? 'r:illrrb.:n:':i.",",Xf:Sl"?J'Xltfl: tii.l;itv;i Finrn"e, Zonat office at Hyderdbad- 5oo oo4. ...RESPONDENTS Petition under Article 226 of the constitution of lndia praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit fired therewith, the High court may be pleased to issue a Writ, more particularly one in the nature of Certiorari calling forrecordinCaseNo'PtVlLA/oCl375tDEL/2025(FilingNo 2025010202020395) on the file of Respondent No'1 and set aside Show cause Notice dated 12t0g12025 i.e., lntimation of Notice to Show cause Under section ti it N- 'i : i .j .l i I tl ! i i, t" ! ,i i, I I I t. t. i t'

8ofPMLAct2002issuedbyCoramNonJudice,asrespondentNo.lisnot constituted as per Mandatory requirement of Section B(2) of PML Act 2002 as non-est in the eyes of law, highly illegal' arbitrary contrary to law laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Opto Circuits (lndia) Ltd Vs Axis Bank reported in 2021(6) SCC 707, retreated in interim order dated 13-09-2023 passed W P No 25457 of 2023 IA NO: 20F 2021i Petitionundersectionl5lCPCprayingthatinthecircumstancesstated in the affidavit filecl in support of the petitron' the High Court may be pleased to stay of all further proceedings in Case No PMLA/OC/37S tDELt2O2s (Filing No 2025010202020395) on the files of Respondent No 1 including show cause notice dated 12llgt2o25 pending disposal of the main Writ petition Counsel for the Petitioner: SRI' MIR MUKARRAM ALI Counsel for the Respondent No'1: SRt N' BHUJANGA RAO - DEPUTY SOLICITOR GENERAL OF INDIA counsel for the Respondent No'2: sRlB?31$'3-?="H[r?=-? DtREcroRArE The Court made the following: ORDER

IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA AT HYDERABAD AND DATE OF ORDER: OB.OL,2026 Between : Shri. B.Sreenivasa Gandhi, S/o. Sh. B.Narasimha Rao, Aged about: 57 years, Occ: Govt. Employee, R/o. Plot No.596, Road No.15, Vasant Nagar, Kukatpally, Hyderabad - 500 085 and 4 others. ...Petitioners AND Adj ud icati ng AuthoritY, Under Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2OO2 Represented by Registrar/Administrative Officeq Office at Room No.26, 4th Floor, Jeevan Deep Building Parliament Street, New Delhi - 110001 and 1 other' ...Respondents ORDER: (per the Hon'bte Sri )ustice P'Sam Koshv) Heard Mr. Syed Ahmed saud, learned counsel representing Mr. Mir Mukaram Ali, learned counsel for the petitioners; Mr. B.Mukherjee, learned counsel representing Mr. N.Bhujanga Rao, learned Deputy Solicitor General of India for respondent No'1, and :{a

Mr. Dominic Fernandes, learned Standing Counsel for Enforcement Directorate, appearing for respondent No.2.

2. Tht: present writ petition has been filed by the petitioners under Ar:icle 226 of the Constitution of India sebking quashment of the shovr-cause notice dated L2.09.2025, issued by respondent No.1, unCer Section B of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2OO2 (for short'PMLA Act')'.

3. Tht: brief facts of the case relevant for adjudication of the present <iispute are that petitioner No.1 is a government employee and has been implicated in an First Information Report registered by CBI, ACB, Hyderabad Branch, vide RC.No.10(A)/2019- CBI/ACB,rHyderabad, dated 08.07.2019, under Section 13(2) read with 13( 1)(b) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 19BB (as amendec in the year 2018) and under Section 109 of the Indian Penal Oode, 1860. Subsequent to the lodging of the aforemerrtioned First Information Report and charge-sheet being issued, the Enforcement Directorate registered an ECIR under the provisions of the PMLA Act vide ECIR No.ECIR/HYZOILg/2Ot9, and invoking Section 5(1) of the PMLA Act issued Provisional Attachmernt Order (PAO) No.30/2025, dated 06.08.2025, attaching various movable and immovable properties standing in the name of petitioner No.1 and his family members. Thereafter, the impugned show-cause notice was issued on L2.O9.2025 under Section B of the PMLA Act. 4, The impugned show-cause notice was assailed primarily on the ground of Coram non judice.

5. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners or the primary ground oi challenge was that the impugned show- cause notice is not issued by the proper adjudicating authority under the statute. Another ground raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners was that the authority who had issued the impugned show-cause notice is not a judicial member.

5. According to the learned counsel for the petitioners, the adjudicating authority mandatorily requires three persons i.e. the Chairperson and two other members. Whereas in the present case, show-cause notice has been issued by only one person. Therefore, the impugned show-cause notice is attracted by doctrine of Coram non judice. He further contended that since the show-cause notice has been issued not by the adjudicating authority as defined under the statute, inasmuch as the show-cause notiiE"ffaving not been issued rnder the seal and signature of the three member adjudicating authority as is defined under Section 6(2) of the pMLA Act, the entire show-cause notice and the proceedings drawn thereon would get vitiated.

7. Per contra, the learned Standing counsel for Enforcement Directorrrte referring to the provisions of Section 6 of the pMLA Act contendr:d that Section 6(2) is not to be read in isolation so as to reach tr> a conclusion or give an impression that the terrn 'adjudicerting authority' has to consist of a Chairman along with two members and in the absence of which the adjudicating agency cannot be treated as an adjudicating ar-rthority and it would amount to Coran non judice. whereas, according to the learned Standing counsel for Enforcement Directorate, entire Section 6 has to be read as ;l whole and on reading entire Section 6 by itself would give a clear indication that the provisions of Section 6(2) does not mean that every proceedings initiated by the adjudicating authority has to be rooted through three member Bench. Rather; it could also be initiated by a single Bench committee which is also permissible under Se:ction 5.

8. In the course of his contentions, the learned Standing Counsel for Enforcement Directorate also took the Bench through the entire provisions of Sectiorr 6 and the provisos attached to the said Section.

9. Having heard the contentions put forth on either side and on perusal of records, it would be trite at this juncture to refer to the provisions of Section 6 of the PMLA Act. For ready reference, Section 6 of the PMLA Act is reproduced hereunder: "The Central Government shall, by notification, appoint 1[an Adjudicating Authorityl to exercise jurisdiction, powers and authority conferred by or t,nder this Act.

(2) An Adjudicating Authority shall consist of a Chairperson and two other Members: Provided that one Member each shatt be a person having experience in the field of law, administration, finance or accountancy.

(3) A person shall, however, not be qualified for appointment as Member of an Adiudicating Authority,-- (a) in the field of law, unless he--

(i) is qualified for appointment as District Judge; or

(ii) has been a member of the Indian Legal Service and has held a post in Grade I of that service; '',' :

(b) in the field of finance, accountancy or administration unless he possesses such qualifications, as may be prescribed.

(4) fhe Central Government shall appoint a Member to be the, Chairperson of the Adjudicating Authority.

(5) Subject to the provisions of this Act,-- (a) the jurisdiction of the Adjudicating Authority may be exercised by Benches thereof; (b) a Bench may be constituted by the Chairperson of the Adjudicating Authority with one or two Members as the Chairperson of the Adjudicating Authority may deem f it;

(c) the Benches of the Adjudicating Authority shatt ordinarily sit at New Delhi a: d at such other places as the Central Government may, in consultation with the Chairperson, by notification, specify; (d) the Central Government shall, by notification, specify the areas in relation to which each Bench of the Adjudicating Authority may exercise jurisdiction.

(6) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (S), the Chairperson may transfer a Member from one Bench to ancther Bench.

(7) If at any stage of the hearing of any case or matter it appears to the Chairperson or a Member that the case or mat.ter is of such a nature that it ought tg.Q_e* heard by a Bench consisting of two Members, the case or matter may .'1

be transferred by the Chairperson oL as the case may be, referred to him for transfer, to such Bench as the Chairperson may deem fit. (B) fhe Chairperson and every Member shall hold office as such for a term of five years from the date gn which he enters upon his office: Provided that no Chairperson or other Member shalt hold office as such after he has attained the age of 2(sixty-five) years. Q) fhe salary and allowances payable to and the other terms and conditions of service of the Member shall be such as may be prescribed: Provided that neither the salary and allowances nor the other terms and conditions of service of the Member shall be varied to his disadvantage after appointment.

(10) If, for reasons other than temporary absence, any vacancy occurs in the office of the Chairperson or any other Member, then, the Central Government shall appoint another person in accordance with the provisions of this Act to fill the vacancy and the proceedings may be continued before the Adjudicating Authority from the stage at which the vacancy is filled.

(11) The Chairperson or any other Member may, by notice in writing under his hand addressed to the Central Government, resign his office: Provided that the Chairperson or any other Member shal[ unless he is permitted by the Central Government to relinquish his office sooner, continue to hold office until the expiry of three months from the date of recdipt of such

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noiice or until a person duly appointed as his successor en,:ers upon his office or until theexpiry of his term of office, whichever is the earliest. (1./) The Chairperson or any other Member shall not be rernoved from his office except by an order made by the Cettral Government after giving necessary opportunity of hearing.

(13) In the event of the occurrence of any vacancy in the office of the Chairpeison by reason of his death, resignation or otherwise, the senior-most Member shall act as the Chairperson of the Adjudicating Authority/ until the date on which a new Chairperson, appointed in accordance with the prctvisions of this Act to fill such vacancy, enters upon his off,;ce.

(14) When the Chairperson of the Adjudicating Authority is unable to discharge his functions owing to absence, illness or any other cause, the senior-most Member shall discharge thet functions of the Chairperson of the Adjudicating Aulhority until the date on which the Chairperson of the Ad.iudicating Authority resumes his duties. (1:;) The Adjudicating Authority shall not be bound by the procedure laid down by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1905 (5 of 1908), but shall be guided by the principles of natural justice and, subject to the other provisions of this Act, the Ad,iudicating Authority shall have powers to regulate its own procedure."

10. Now if we dissect the said Section, what is clearly reflected iS, what is meant by Sub-Section (2) of Section 6 is that the adjudicating authority shall consist of a Chairperson and two other members. Further reading of Section 6, particularly Sub-Section

(5) goes to show that the adjudicating authority can function in Benches as well and a Bench has always to be constituted by the Chairperson. Sub-Section (5) also shows that a Bench can consist of one or two members as the Chairperson deems fit. Sub-Section

(6) also empowers the Chairperson to transfer a member from one Bench to another. Likewise, Sub-Section (7) also empowers the Chairperson for allotting a matter to a Bench of one or to a Bench consisting of two memberi,

11. In addition, if we read Sub-Section (13) and Sub-Section (14), it further clarifies the fact that the statute also mandates that when the post of Chairperson is lying vacant on account of death, resignation or otherwise, the senior-most member shall act as the Chairperson until a new Chairperson is appointed. In addition, the senior-most member shall discharge the functions of the Chairperson and is also empowered to discharge all the duties that are otherwise to be discharged by a duly appointed Chairperson which includes taking up of matters and hearing the same.

t2. It would be relevant at this juncture to refer to a recent decision of the Division Bench of this High court in Directorate of Enforcement vs. M/s. Karvy rndia Rearty t-i-it.o and ors.1 wherein the appeal was preferred against the order of the learned Single Bench in I.A.No.1 of 2o2z in w.p.No.4i133 of 2022, which was allowed on the ground of coram non judice and also on the ground rf the adjudicating authority not being a judicial member. The Div sion Bench in the said case, in paragraph Nos.23 to 25, while setting aside the order of the learned Single Bench has held as under': "2.7. Tltus, powers under Section 6 can be exercised by an Ad.iudicating Authority comprising single member. Th=refore, the proposition that powers under Section B of PN'LA can be exercised by the Adjudicating Authority comprising only from member in the field of law does not de.;erve acceptance as the same would render provisions of Section 6(5) and 6(7) of 7MLA nugatory and ineffective.

24. Insofar as decision in Utility llsers, Welfare Association (supra), on which reliance has been placed, it is noteworthy that the supreme court in aforesaid decision de,zlt with Section 86(1)(f) of the Electricity Act, 2073 and he,'d that Commission has the option of adjudicating the disputes between the licensees and generating companies or refer. the same to arbitration. In the aforesaid context, ' WritAppe:rl No 6'11 of 2023, dated 12.02.2024

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the Supreme Court dealt with the issue whether the State Regulatory Commission constituted under Electricity Act which necessarily performs the function of adjudication is required to have one member who was or is holding a judicial office or a person possessing professional qualification with substantial experience in the practice of law. The aforesaid decision is of no assistance to the respondents.

25. It is also pertinent to note that the validity of Sections 6(2), 6(3)(a)(ii) and 6(5)(b) ot PMLA was challenged before the Madras High Court. A Division Bench of Madras High Court in Pay Perform India Private Limited vs. the Union of India (judgment dated 31.01.2024 passed in W.P.No.12925 of 2023 and batch) has uphetd the vatidity of the aforesaid provisions and has held that composition of Adjudicating Authority in the absence of j,tldicial officer is not bad in law. A Division Bench of Calcu'tta High Court in R.P.Infosystems Limited (supra) has also held that . Adjudicating Authority can comprise of a single member bench. We are in agreement with the view taken by the Division Benches of Madras High Court and Calcutta High Court. "

13. In another case of the Delhi High Court in Naresh Bansal and Ors vs. Adjudicating Authority and Anr2, in paragraph Nos.45 to 49, it was held as under: ,, non iudice? 'w.R 1c; 11361t2015 and connected matters

45. Since the present issue concerning the validity of the SCN has been argued on two distinct limbs, this Court de=ms it appropriate to bifurcate the contentions under distinct heads and deal with thern separately, the issues are as follows: i. Whether the SCff rssued by AA is valid in view of the AA allegedly acting coram non judice under Section 6 of the PN|LA; and ii. Whether an SCN can be issued even in the absence of prior attachment of properties by the Directorate.

(i) Whether the SCff rcsued by AA is valid in view of the AA allegedly acting coram non judice under Section 6 of the PMLA? 46, Section 6 (2) of the PMIA provides that AA shall comprise of a Chairperson and two other members; whereas, Section 6(5)(h) authorizes the Chairperson to cottstitute Benches with either one or two members, as de,=med necessary/ thereby enabling functional flexibility of thet AA. Section 6(7) of the PMLA, also enables the Chairperson to formulate a two-mernber Bench, wherein she/he is of a view that the matter is of such a nature which needs to be heard by a Bench consisting of two members. Th'=se three provisions when read W.P.(C) 11361/2015 and connected matters Page 33 of 36 in harmony, reveal that alt,\ough the statute provides a prescription for the cornposition of AA, nevertheless, the usage of word 'shall' under Section 6(2) cannot be considered in isolation so as to suggest that a three-member compositilon is a cornpulsory and only acceptable composition, enabling the

AA to exercise the power vested in it by the statute. It further reveals that the statute provides a threefold legislative design, permitting the AA to function in three distinct configurations, either as a three-member authority or for purposes of functional expediency, as a two'member Bench or even as a single-member Bench, depending on the nature of the matter before it.

47. The aforesaid interpretation of the provision also aligns with the fundamental principle of statutory interpretation, ut res magis valeat quam pereat, which mandates that every statutory provision must be given effect and shall not be rendered as ineffectual, inoperative or redundant. In view of the aforesaid, if the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the Petitioner is accepted and the provisions of Section 6 of the PMLA are interpreted in a manner that it prohibits the existence or constitution of AA as a single- member Bench, such interpretation would nullify the effects and intention behind adding Section 6(5)(b) and Section 6(7) of the PMLA, which is impermissible under the recognised principles of statutory provisions. A similar view has also been taken by the Division of Bench of Telangana High Court in Enforcement Directorate v- Karuy India Reatity Limited and Other€.

48. The Court in Karvy India (supra) further clarified that although AA performs quasi-iudicial functions, it is neither a tribunal within the meaning of Articles 3234 or 3238 of the COI, nor has it been vested with any adiudicatory function transferred from traditional courts. Additionally, it was also ' zo2q scc online TS 18

Page J-6 of 23 no,:ed that the powers under Section B of the pMLA may vatidly be exercised by a single-member bench, even in ab:;ence of a judicial officer. While elaborating further, it was observed by the Court that under pMLA there exist sulficient checks and balances, since the order of the AA is subject to challenge before the AT undei Sei:ction 26 of the PMLA, which is presided over by a retired Chief lustice.

49. To conclude, applying the aforesaid principles to the pre:sent case, this Court is of the view that the SCN issued by a Bench, comprising of a technical member, was valid. Consequently, the contention that the AA was acting coram non jurlice is founded on a misinterpretation or ignorance of thet statutory framework. Thus, in the view of this Court, the isstance of the SCN is well within the contours of the pMLA, and as such, the first limb of argument advanced by the Petitioners, in furtherance of validity of SCN, is devoid of me rit." t4. As regards the ground of the show-cause notice being bad on the ground that it has been issued by non-judicial membe[ it is relevant to take note of an another decision of the Delhi High Court in J.sekar vs. Union of rndia & ors.a, wherein in paragraph Nos.79 and 80, it has been held as under: "Composition of the AA and AT 79, The Court next takes up the question of the composition of lhe AA on which extensive arguments were advanced by o 2018 scc online Del6523

the learned counsel for the Petitioners. In this context, it must be noticed that under Section 6 PMLA, the AA is supposed to consist of the Chairperson and two other members - one of whom shall be a person having experience in the field of law. Section 6(3) further sets out what the qualifications for appointment as.a member of an AA should be. One of those qualifications is that the person has to be qualified for appointment as a District Judge or a person in the field of law or a member of an Indian Legal Service. The other qualification /s possession of a qualification in the field of finance, accountancy or administration as may be prescribed. It is, therefore, not the case that all the members of the AA should be judicial members.

80. It is seen that under Section 5 PMLA, the jurisdiction of the AA "may be exercised by the Benches thereof". llnder Section 6(5)(b) PMLA, a Bench may be constituted by the Chairperson of the AA "with one or two members" as the Chairperson may deem fit. Therefore, it is possible to have single-member benches. The word 'bench' therefore does not connote plurality. There could, even under Section 6(5)(b) PMLA, be a 'single member bench'. When Section 6(6) PMLA sfafes that a Chairperson can transfer a member from one bench to another bench, it has to be understood in the above context of there also being single-member benches."

15. Another reason which compels this Bench not to entertain the present writ petition is that an alternative statutory remedy is I j

.:. Page lB of 23 availabler to the petitioner under the PMLA Act itself, rather than seeking quashment under Article 226 of the constitution of India. Recently, the Hon'ble Supreme court in pHR rnvent Educational Society vs. UCO Bank and Ors.u, in paragraph Nos.15,29,30, 32 and 33, has held as under: "7!;. It could thus be seen that, this Court has ctearly held that the High court will ordinarily not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person. It has been held that thi:; rule applies with greater rigour in matters involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public money ancl the dues of banks anci other financial institutions. The court clearly observed that, while dealing with the petitions inv,tlving challenge ta the action taken for recovery of the public dues, etc., the High Court must keep in mind that the legtlslations enacted by parliament and state Legislatures for recovery of such dues are a code unto themselves inasmuch as they not only contain comprehensive procedure for recovery of the dues but also envisage constitution of quasi- judi'cial bodies for redressal of the grievance of any aggrieved person. It has been held that, though the powers of the High court under Article 226 of the constitution are of widest amplitude, still the courts cannot be obtivious of the rules of self-imposed restraint evolved by this Court. The court further held that though the rule of exhaustion of alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of con,pulsion, still it is difficutt to fathom any reason why the tArR zo2+ sc 1894

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High Court should entertain a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution.

29. It could thus clearly be seen that the Court has carved out certain exceptions when a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution could be entertained in spite of availability of an alternative remedy. Some of them are ihus:

(i) where the statutory authority has not acted in accordance with the provisions of the enactment in question;

(ii) it has acted in defiance of the fundamental principles of judicial procedure;

(iii) it has resorted to invoke the provisions which are repealed; and

(iv) when an order has been passed in total violation of the principles of natural justice.

30. It has however been clarified that the High Court will not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective alternative remedy is available to the aggrieved person or the statute under which the action complained of has been taken itself contains a mechanism for redressal of grievance.

32. We are therefore of the considered view that the High Court has grossly erred in entertaining and altowing the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution.

33. While dismissing the writ petition, we will have to remind the High Courts of the following words of this Court in the case of Satyawati Tondon (supra) since we have Page 2O of 23 co'ne across various matters wherein the High Courts have been entertaininq petitions arising out of the DRT Act and the SARFAESI Act in spite of availability of an effective alternative remedy: "55. It is a matter of serious coticern that despite repeated pronouncement of this Court, the High Courts continue to ignore the availability of statutory remedies under the DRT Act and the SARFAESI Act and exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 for passing orders which have serious adverse impact on the right of banks and other financial institutions to recover their dues. We hope and trust that in future the High Caurts will exercise their discretion in such matters with greater ca ution, care and circumspection. ""

16. A :;imilar view was also taken by the High Court at Hyderabad in Sri P.Trivikrama Prasad vs. Enforcement Directorate6, wherein in paragraph Nos.33,34,37 and 38, it has been held as u nder: "3-1. Thus, there is no merit in the contention urged by the pedtioners that they have no effective or efficacious remedy under the Act necessitating institution of the writ petition by invoking extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court. Entertainment of writ petition at this stage would amount to sct,ttling the statutorily engrafted mechanism on attachment of properties. u 2014 SCC online Hyd 819

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34. Article 226 of the Constitution vests wide discretion in the Writ Court to entertain the writ petition on any grievance and to grant appropriate relief. It is an extraordinary jurisdiction vested in the writ Court. The Writ Courts observe self-imposed restraint in exercising the jurisdiction under Article 226. Availability o'f alternative remedy is not a bar to entertain a writ petition. Ordinarily the writ petition is not entertained under Article 226 if the aggrieved person has an efficacious and effective remedy provided by concerned statute where under an adverse decision is taken against the person, which he seeks to assail in the writ petition. Notwithstanding availability of alternative remedy in a case of exceptional nature or a case of glaring injustice writ Court can entertain a writ petition. Constitutional Courts have laid down parameters for exercising of such discretion.

37. The petitioners have effective and efficacious statutory remedies to prove the nature of acquisition of assefs and to ventilate their grievances. Furthermore, at the stage of provisional attachment the person concerned is not dispossessed of the property, but is only prevented from dealing with the property till orders are passed by the adjudicating authority under Section B(2). Against order of the adjudicating authority under Section B(2), appeal shall lie to the Appellate Tribunal under Section 26 and further appeal to the High Court under Section 42. The statute has provided enough safeguards and layers of redress mechanism. The writ Court cannot go into the merits of the issue at this stage even before the attachment order has become final, investigation is completed and trial concluded ?age 22 of 23 and issue of attachment is considered by Adjudicating Authority, first Appellate Authority and second Appellate Authority. It is premature to go into the validity of atrachment order at the threshold and even before the Aa'judicating Authority consii-lers the issue. It is also to be born in mind that any observations made by the Court wc,uld have bearing on the pending investigation and trial.

38. The loint Director is competent to pass orders of atrachment. It is not a case of lack of jurisdiction to Enforcement Directorate. Violation of principles of natural ju:;tice at the provisional attachrnent stage does not arise as st;ttute has not made provision of opportunity of hearing pr,or to provisional attachment. Decision to attach is based on the assessment by Enforcement Directorate as per material in its possession. It is a tentative decision. Such decision is to be placed before the Adjudicating Authority. Riqht' of hearing is provided before adjudicating authority. Sections 5(1) and B are in the statute book and have stood the test of judicial scrutiny. It is not a case of exceptional nature warranting interference by writ Court at the threshold. Not a case of glaring injustice demanding aft'irmative action notwithstanding an effective statutorily engrafted layers of remedies." L7. For all the aforesaid reasons and the judicial precedents referred to in the preceding paragraphs, it is hard to accept the contenticns put forth by the learned counsel for the petitioner of the impugned show-cause notice being hit by Coram non judice. '**"4 t., i.: Ii I:

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The writ petition thus being devoid of merit, deserves to be and is accordingly, dismissed

18. As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions pending if doy, shall stand closed. HoweveL there shall be no order as to costs. SD'. //TRUE COPY/' One fair coPY to THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTI .S (For His LordshiP's Kind Per AND One fair coPY to THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE SUDDALA T. SRINIVASA REDDY sisraur REGISTRAR SECTION OFFICER AM KOSHY CHALAPATHI RAO (For His LordshiP's Kind Perusal) To,

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4. 11 L.R. Copies. -( r-r:^ rr/rinicrnr nf I aw. Justice an The Under Secretary, Union of lndia' Ministry of Law' rd ComPanY High Court ERAL OF +[3'"611?y,3niln'r","nsana Advocates Association Library' B*'"'ue"'."5h::^f 'slgyfft stHa:ba$tw's6?BYft*n,* One CC to SRl. N rNotn toPUCl &:?i1; sni. oorr,rlNlc FERNANDES' oinecroRATEloPucl Two CD CoPies SC FOR ENFORCEMENT B IVI BS dJ-

d, 4F HIGH COURT DATED:08,10112026 o t) ,E ir 2 B [[B ?t]2[ * *

ORDER

WP.No.40,l54 of 2A25 DISMISSING THE WRIT PETITION WITHOUT COSTS pt ,a\z\/'