SHRI MANOJ KUMAR AGARWAL vs UV ASSET RECONSTRUCTION COMPANY LIMITED on 17 July 2026

Sne Order Sheet (continuation) Case No. NDN/664/2025 SRI MANOJ KUMAR AGARWAL Vs UV ASSET RECONSTRUCTION COMPANY LIMITED Date of the Order necessary 17/07/202 6 Ld. Counsel Mr. Ashok Kumar Dhandhania, Mr. Jayabrata Basu Roy, Mr. Nimish Mishra, Mr. Hareram Singh and Ms. Sabiha Sultana appeared for NDN Applicant. Ld. Counsel Mr. Debasish Chakraborty appeared for Respondent ARC. Delay condonation petition was heard on 15/07/2026. Ld. Counsel for Applicants submitted that there is 84 days delay in filing application diary no. 664/2025 for setting aside the ex-parte judgement passed by this Tribunal on 19/02/2025. It was submitted by Ld. Counsel for NDN Applicant that the cause of action is taken from the receipt of copy of judgement and there is only 20 days delay. Ld. Counsel for Respondent ARC on the contrary submitted that in OA/120/2018, notice has been served to Defendants. After receiving notice from Tribunal, Defendants did not appear intentionally for which ex-parte judgement was passed. It was submitted by Ld. Counsel for Respondent ARC that Defendants in OA have no sufficient cause for setting aside ex-parte judgement or for condonation of delay. He submitted

Sne Date of the Order necessary that delay is more than 4 years and 111 days. Ld. Counsel for NDN Applicant has relied judgement of Supreme Court in Shivamma vs. Karnataka Housing Borad and Ors. paras 121, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139 and 141 it is held that: “121. This Court in Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy, (2013) 12 SCC 649, after examining a plethora of decisions on what is meant by "sufficient cause", summarized its principles as under:- "21. From the aforesaid authoritles the principles that can broadly be culled out are:

21.1. (1) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented. non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice.

21.2. (ii) The terms "sufficient cause" should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-situation.

21.3. (iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis 21.4. (iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of.

21.5. (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact.

21.6. (vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should

Sne Date of the Order necessary not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice.

21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play.

21.8. (viii) There is a distinction between Inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation.

21.9. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach.

21.10. (x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation.

21.11. (xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of ilmitation.

21.12. (xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinised and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception.

21.13. (xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude.

22. To the aforesaid principles we may add some more guidelines

Sne Date of the Order necessary taking note of the present day scenario. They are:

22.1. (a) An application for condonation of delay should be drafted with careful concern and not in a haphazard manner harbouring the notion that the courts are required to condone delay on the bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is seminal to justice dispensation system.

22.2. (b) An application for condonation of delay should not be dealt with in a routine manner on the base of individual philosophy which is basically subjective.

22.3. (c) Though no precise formula can be laid down regard being had to the concept of judicial discretion, yet a conscious effort for achieving consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory system should be made as that is the ultimate institutional motto.

22.4. (d) The Increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non-serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a nonchalant manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters.

135. In construing "sufficient cause" it must be borne in mind that rules of procedure are handmaids of justice. Procedural rigidity should not become an instrument of injustice. In the context of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, this balance assumes special significance. Courts have repeatedly underscored that while limitation provisions are founded on sound principles of finality and certainty, their application cannot be divorced from the overarching objective of ensuring that litigants are not shut out from the doors of justice merely on account of technicalities.

136. When technical considerations of limitation conflict with the imperative of substantial justice, the latter should ordinarily prevail. Rules of limitation are not designed to destroy the rights of parties but to prevent inordinate delay in seeking remedies. Thus, the interpretation of "sufficient

Sne Date of the Order necessary cause" must be liberal and purposive, aimed at advancing the cause of justice rather than defeating it. This is why the courts, while construing applications for condonation of delay, emphasize the bona fides of the applicant over the sheer arithmetical length of the delay.

137. Where strict adherence to these rules results in injustice, the Court is duty-bound to apply a liberal interpretation of "sufficient no cause" so as to balance technical requirements with the demands of justice. A litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late, and therefore, a pragmatic and justice-oriented approach must inform the judicial discretion under Section

5. This decision continues to be the most frequently cited authority for the proposition that the judiciary should incline towards justice rather than technicality. Therefore, when courts interpret "sufficient cause," they are expected to exercise discretion in a manner that fosters justice, fairness, and equity, keeping in mind the realities of litigation.

138. When a Court of Law deals with an application to condone the delay filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, such application will have to be generally viewed in a liberal and lenient way to do substantial justice between the parties. Section 5 of the Limitation Act must be liberally construed and applied so as to advance substantial justice. It is undoubtedly true that a justice oriented approach is necessary while deciding application under Section 5 of Limitation. However, it cannot be said that in every case delay must necessarily be condoned. It is a condition precedent for Section 5 of the Limitation Act that there must be a sufficient reason for condoning the delay.

139. However, while substantial justice must be advanced, the law of limitation is equally binding, and "sufficient cause" must be shown in substance, not in empty form. This ensures that the balance between justice and certainty is not skewed in favour of unmerited litigants.

Sne Date of the Order necessary

140. However, at the same time, the courts must be mindful that strong case on merits is no ground for condonation of delay. When an application for condonation of delay is placed before the court, the inquiry is confined to whether "sufficient cause" has been demonstrated for not filing the appeal or proceeding within the prescribed period of limitation. The merits of the underlying case are wholly extraneous to this inquiry. If courts were to look into the merits of the matter at this stage, it would blur the boundaries between preliminary procedural questions and substantive adjudication, thereby conflating two distinct stages of judicial scrutiny. The purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not to determine whether the claim is legally or factually strong, but only whether the applicant had a reasonable justification for the delay.

141. Test of "sufficient cause" cannot be substituted by an examination of the merits of the case. Condonation of delay is a matter of discretion based on explanation for the delay, not on the prospects of success in the case. If merits are considered, a litigant with a stronger case may be favoured with condonation despite negligence, while a weaker case may be rejected even if sufficient cause is made out. This would lead to an inequitable and inconsistent application of the law, undermining the uniform standard that the doctrine of limitation is designed to maintain.” Ld. Counsel for Applicant has also relied judgement of Hon’ble High Court of Bombay in Shaikh Ibrahim Janmohammad vs. Tekchand Alias Ravindra Fakirchand Rathod wherein para 2 and 3 it is held that: “2. Sub-clause (3) of Rule 3A of Order 41 of the Code as insereted by Act No. 104 of 1976 reads as follows:

Sne Date of the Order necessary "Where an application has been made under sub-rule (1), the Court shall not make an order for the stay of execution of the decree against which the appeal is proposed to be filed so long as the Court does opt, after hearing under rule 11, decide to hear the appeal."

3. In view of the amended provisions of Order 41 of the Civil Procedure, Code an application for condonation of delay in filling an appeal has to be decided before admitting the appeal and issuing notice to the Court below under R. 13 of O. 41 of the Civil Procedure Code. Sub-clause (3) of R. 3A of O. 41 reproduced above provides that an order for stay of execution of decree shall not be made as long as the Court does not after hearing under r. 11 decide to hear the appeal. The Civil Procedure Code has to be interpreted so as to advance the cause of justice. In case a decree is allowed to be executed before deciding the application for condonation of delay and also before hearing under r. 11 C.P.C. the judgment-debtor would be put to a great loss and inconvenience in case later on the Court condones the dealy and also admits the appeal on hearing under R. 11. This Rule was considered by the Gujarat High Court in (Naran Annappa Shethi v. Jayantilal Chunilal Shah) 1986 Guj. L.R. 206 and after exhaustive discussion held that the rule was not mandatory and despite the word "shall" the provision made in sub-cl. (3) of R. 3A was only directory. I fully agree, with the reasoning given in that judgment and on the same reasoning I find that the rule is not mandatory.” He has also relied judgement of Hon’ble High Court of Calcutta in Sri Rani Satiji Mandir and Ors. vs. Shyam Sundar Jhunjhunwala wherein para 13 it is held that: “13. We concur with the observations made by Justice Nag referred to above. Irrespective of the provisions of S. 151 of the C.P.C. we however can

Sne Date of the Order necessary grant limited stay and R. 3A will not stand as a bar in view of the fact that Order 41, Rule 3A of the C.P.C. cannot apply in case of an order by virtue of O. 43, R. 2 which enjoins application of the Rules of Order 41 in the matters of procedure and that also "so far as may be." Ld. Counsel for Applicant submits for stay of recovery proceeding as per judgement of Hon’ble High Court of Calcutta in Sri Rani Satiji Mandir and Ors. vs. Shyam Sundar Jhunjhunwala but the order of limited stay by Hon’ble High Court of Calcutta is on the facts of the said case which can not universally apply for stay of recovery proceeding. Ld. Counsel for Respondent ARC has drawn attention to affidavit of service of notice on Defendants in OA and they did not appear during trial of OA. It is pleaded by NDN Applicant in delay condonation petition that there is delay of 84 days due to time taken for obtaining certified copies. He has not pleaded when he obtained certified copies. However in the copy of ex-parte judgement in OA/120/2018, there is noting 707 with date 21/04/2025. So the judgement was sent to parties vide letter no. 707 on 21/04/2025. Misc Application has been filed on 13/06/2025. Application for setting aside ex-parte judgement has to be filed within 30 days. There is delay of about 45 days.

Sne Date of the Order necessary Therefore delay of 45 days can be condoned but the Applicants who were Defendants in OA did appear for several years during trial of OA. Applicants are not entitled for stay of receovery proceeding which will be decided at the time of hearing of Misc. Application. Hence it is ordered as follows:  Delay condonation petition is allowed.  Registry is directed to register diary no. 664 of 2025 as MA and issue notice to all parties.  Applicants are directed to appear before Ld. Registrar of this Tribunal on 24/07/2026 for registration of diary as MA and issuance of notice to parties. At the time of hearing of MA, stay on recovery proceeding will be considered on merit. (Ambuja Mohan Das) Presiding Officer