MS MADHAV ENTERPRISE vs PIRAMAL CAPITAL AND HOUSING LIMITED on 23 March 2026

**ORDER**

1. 1. Arguments of Ld. Counsels for both the parties on the Application for Condonation of Delay being M.A. No.58/2025 moved by Applicant for condoning delay of 627 days in filing above Securitization Application have been heard.

2. 2. It is the case of the Applicant that the Applicant is neither a borrower nor a guarantor and has no connection whatsoever with the financial assistance extended by the Respondent FI to its borrower – M/s Surya Automotive. The Applicant had participated in E-Auction sale conducted by Respondent No.1 in which Respondent No.1, acting in collusion with Respondent No.2, fraudulently declared Respondent No.2 – Mr. Kushalbhai Pragjibhai Radadiya as successful auction purchaser. Being aggrieved by the said measure 2M.A. 58/2025

taken by Respondent No.1, the Applicant filed Special Civil Suit No.25/2023 before Civil Court Ankaleshwar on 8.11.2023, which was disposed of by the said Court vide order dated 09.07.2024.

1. 3. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order passed by Civil Court, the Applicant preferred First Appeal No.3460/2024 before Hon'ble High Court of Gujarat on 12.08.2024. The Hon'ble High Court of Gujarat disposed of the said First Appeal vide order dated 05.05.2025 granting liberty to the Applicant to approach this Tribunal. The Applicant has further stated that the Sale Notice was issued by the Respondent No.1 FI on 28.09.2023 and sale of the property in question was conducted on 31.10.2023. Therefore, the SA was required to be filed by the Applicant on or before 12.11.2023 i.e. within 45 days from the date of Sale Notice. However, in view of the order passed by the Hon'ble High Court of Gujarat, the Applicant has come before this Tribunal for redressal of its grievances by means of Securitization Application. As such there is no delay in filing the accompanying Securitization Application.

2. 4. Though Respondent No.1 FI has not filed any reply to the present application for Condonation of Delay, Ld. Counsel Mr. Mohit Gupta appearing for Respondent No.1 vehemently opposed to the contentions raised by the Applicant. He submitted that the entire process of sale of the secured asset has been concluded and therefore the Applicant is not going to be benefitted by challenging the measures of Respondent No.1 FI. He has further submitted that the delay is absolutely unexplained and the Applicant has not given sufficient or genuine reasons for condoning a huge delay of 627 days. Accordingly, he prayed for dismissal of the present application.

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1. 5. Having heard Ld. Counsels for both the parties, I disposed of the present application for Condonation of Delay by this order.

2. 6. Ld. Counsel for the Applicant relied on the judgment of **Hon'ble High Court of Gujarat dated 28.06.2024 passed in LPA No.224/2020 in the case of Aditya Birla Finance Ltd. V/s Mangalesh Champaklal Gandhi & Ors.** and submitted that this Tribunal has general power to condone the delay so as to invoke its jurisdiction beyond that period of 45 days prescribed u/s 17(1) of SARFAESI Act as provided u/s 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. He further submitted that time spent by the Applicant in proceeding before Civil Court as well as Hon'ble High Court under a bona fide belief and impression, is required to be excluded while computing period of limitation as provided u/s 14 of Limitation Act.

3. 7. With regard to the applicability of Section 5 of Limitation Act to this Tribunal, it would be worthwhile to refer to the law laid down by Hon'ble High Court of Gujarat in **Aditya Birla Finance Ltd.** (Supra). It has been held in para 52 and 53 of the said judgment as under:

*"52. With the above discussion, the contention made by the petitioner (therein) in the Corporation Bank (supra), that Section 5 of the Limitation Act would apply only to the Court and not to the Tribunal or any proceedings before the authority other than the Tribunal, has been turned down by the Division Bench. It was held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act would also apply to the statutory authority under the Special law when it is not expressly barred or prohibited.*

*53. We do not find any justification to form contradictory opinion to the said reasoning of the Division Bench with regard to the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act by reading*

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*of Section 29(2), which applies to the proceedings before any Tribunal or any authority under Special law or in local law".*

1. 8. In view of the aforesaid observations of the Hon'ble High Court of Gujarat, it is a settled position of law that this Tribunal has discretion to entertain Application u/s 17(1) of SARFAESI Act beyond the period of 45 days as provisions of Section 5 of Limitation Act would apply and such discretion has to be exercised taking into consideration the facts and circumstances on the aspect of sufficient cause to condone the delay or not.

2. 9. Considering the fact that Sale Notice was issued by Respondent No.1 FI on 28.09.2023 and sale of the property in question was conducted on 31.10.2023, the SA was required to be filed by the Applicant on or before 12.11.2023 i.e. within 45 days from the date of Sale Notice. However, excluding the period spent by the Applicant before Civil Court, Ankaleshwar in Special Civil Suit No.25/2023 and before Hon'ble High Court of Gujarat in First Appeal No.3460/2024, the Applicant was expected to file Securitization Application before this Tribunal u/s 17(1) of SARFAESI Act within 45 days from order dated 05.05.2025 passed by Hon'ble High Court of Gujarat, disposing of First Appeal No.3460/2024 i.e. on or before 19.06.2025. The Applicant has filed the present MA before this Tribunal on 01.08.2025 for Condonation of Delay in filing Securitization Application. Thus, there is a delay of 42 days on the part of the Applicant in approaching this Tribunal after disposal of his First Appeal No.3460/2024 by Hon'ble High Court of Gujarat on 05.05.2025. The Applicant has not explained the said delay of 42 days in his application for Condonation of Delay.

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10. In the above circumstances, it is required to be noted that the SARFAESI Act and Recovery measures taken by the Bank under the said Act are intended to be expeditious and time-bound. Ld. Counsel for the Applicant has vehemently argued that the Applicant has a good meritorious case in its favour and it is likely to succeed in the SA. However, this Tribunal is not in a position to accept the said argument as the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India and other DRATs / High Courts have settled the legal position on the question of condoning delay in filing the SA u/s 17 of SARFAESI Act and have held from time to time that merits alone cannot justify the Condonation of Delay. Therefore, this Tribunal is of the opinion that the strong merits alone are legally irrelevant for condoning delay of 42 days in filing SA. It may be further observed that merits can supplement, but cannot replace the legally acceptable explanation for delay. It needs to be taken in mind that in this case this Tribunal does not find any reason to hold that the case of Applicant is based on strong merit.

11. This Tribunal is supported in its aforesaid view by the observations of Hon'ble High Court of Gujarat made in the case of **Gitaben Manharlal Pujara vs. Haresh Bipinchandra Pathak & Anr. 1999(1) GCD 16 (Guj)**. It has been held therein as under:

*"The appeal has to be presented by the aggrieved party within the prescribed period of limitation and in case where it is not presented within limitation, it shall be accompanied by an application supported by affidavit setting forth the facts on which the appellant relies to satisfy the Court that he/she/it had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within prescribed period of the limitation, so the satisfaction of the Court on the facts set forth in the application supported by the affidavit that the appellant had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal in the*

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prescribed period of limitation is sine qua non for condonation of delay which has been caused in filing of the appeal Delay caused in filing of appeal cannot be condoned more so when there is long delay of 576 days merely on sympathies or on consideration of economic constraints and financial difficulties of the applicant-appellant or merely on asking or desire. In the absence of specific, definite and clear facts pleaded in application and supported by the affidavit by which the applicant was prevented from filing of the appeal within the prescribed period of limitation and how he/she/it has overcome to constraints and conditions it is difficult for the Court to accept the case of the applicant-appellant for condonation of delay caused in preferring the appeal. While considering application of the applicant-appellant for condonation of delay caused in preferring the appeal the Court has to keep in mind also that by not preferring the appeal by the aggrieved party in limitation a valuable right is accrued to the opposite party. more so when delay is of considerable long period. Each day delay cause in preferring appeal may not be required to be explained. But where on the facts set forth in the application supported by the affidavit the Court is satisfied that the applicant-appellant had no cause much less sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within prescribed period of limitation it may not condone the delay caused in preferring the appeal. The explanation for the delay must be reasonable or satisfactory. Before condoning the delay caused in preferring the appeal the Court, has to record its satisfaction that the explanation for delay furnished by the litigant is either reasonable or satisfactory."

1. 12. It is pertinent to note that the only reason for delay of 42 days has been assigned by the Applicant is that it was bona fide pursuing legal remedies before other forums and therefore it was unable to file SA within the prescribed time limit. In light of the aforesaid conduct of the Applicant, it becomes clear that it is not vigilant about its rights and not acting promptly. In this context, legal maxim "**vigilanti bus et non dormienti bus jura subveniunt**", which means that the law will assist only those who are vigilant about their rights and not those who sleep over them, would be applicable. In the present case, since the Applicant has approached this Tribunal after a long period and 7M.A. 58/2025

has not offered any sufficient cause or explanation for sleeping over its rights, the delay remains unexplained and hence, this Tribunal is not inclined to exercise its discretion u/s 5 of Limitation Act in favour of the Applicant.

1. 13. In these facts and circumstances, allowing the Condonation of Delay application of Applicant does not appear to be legally justified.

2. 14. In considered view of this Tribunal, in this case the justification and reasons given to condone the delay in filing the SA do not appear to be satisfactorily and legally justified. Accordingly, this Delay Condonation application deserves to be rejected on merit. Hence, the following order is passed:

ORDER

- ➤ Delay Condonation Application being M.A. No.58 of 2025 for delay in filing SA is hereby rejected.

File be consigned to record.

**(PANKAJ KUMAR UPADHYAY)** **PRESIDING OFFICER** **DRT-II, AHMEDABAD**

\*ykb\*