M/s Yuvaraj Power Projects Ltd vs Vistra ITCL India Ltd on 22 April 2026

**ORDER**

Heard the Ld. Counsel of the applicant. No one appeared on behalf of OP/Respondent FI.

In the above MA the applicant has prayed to condone the delay of 478 days in filing the Review Application.

The Ld. Counsel of the applicant submitted that OA 760/2016 is disposed of by this Tribunal vide order dt. 09.11.2023. Order of OA 760/2016 came in the knowledge of applicant on 07.06.2024 when the applicant received a notice sent by the Ld. Recovery Officer of DRT, Visakhapatnam. Applicant knowing about the order went in to depression as he had no role in obtaining the loan from the Applicant Bank. Applicant appeared before Ld. Recovery Officer on 07.06.2024 to prove his bonafide. After regaining his mental balance applicant consulted two different advocates in July 2024. Both of them advised to file a Review Application. The applicant instructed his advocate at Visakhapatnam to file Review Application. The delay is unintentional and not willful. Prima-facie case is in favour of the applicant.

The applicant has filed present MA on 02.4.2025. Applicant has also filed written arguments. As per MA Applicant could not be brought the notice of this Tribunal that loan was availed 4 years prior to the joining of the Review Applicant//Defendant No.6 as an Additional Director in the company. Applicant was never a signatory to the loan agreement. Defendant No.6 never held any share of the Company. The role of the applicant was only to advise the company on the execution of the project. Applicant has not received any remuneration or any perks etc from the company. Bank carried out detail investigation and found that Defendant No. 6 has no role at the time of sanctioning of loan.

The counsel of the applicant has filed copy of Judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court of India passed in Civil Appeal No. SLP © No. 12787 of 2025 in case titled ***Malleeswari Vs. K. Suguna and Another 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1927*** has held as follows:

*The power of review is different from appellate power and is subject to the following limitations to maintain the finality of judicial decisions:*

**15.1** *The review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 of CPC.*

**15.2** *Review is not to be confused with appellate powers, which may enable an appellate court to correct all manner of errors committed by the subordinate court.*

**15.3** *In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 of CPC, it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be reheard and corrected. A review petition, it must be remembered, has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be an appeal in disguise.*

**15.4** *The power of review can be exercised for the correction of a mistake, but not to substitute a view. Such powers can be exercised within the limits specified in the statute governing the exercise of power.*

**15.5** *The review court does not sit in appeal over its own order. A rehearing of the matter is impermissible. It constitutes an exception to the general rule that once a judgment is signed or pronounced, it should not be altered. Hence, it is invoked only to prevent a miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors.*

The Ld. Counsel of the applicant also referred the Judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court of India passed in Civil Appeal No. 8435-8436 of 2024 in this case ***Mool Chandra v. Union of India, (2025) 1 SCC 625*** have held as follows:

**20.** *Be that as it may. On account of liberty having been granted to the appellant to pursue his remedy in accordance with law, yet another OA No. 2066 of 2020 along with an application for condonation of delay came to be filed. The delay was not condoned by the Tribunal on the ground that it was filed more than one year after the impugned order came to be passed. No litigant stands to benefit in approaching the courts belatedly. It is not the length of delay that would be required to be considered while examining the plea for condonation of delay, it is the cause for delay which has been propounded will have to be examined. If the cause for delay would fall within the four corners of "sufficient cause", irrespective of the length of delay same deserves to be condoned. However, if the cause shown is insufficient, irrespective of the period of delay, same would not be condoned.*

**21.** *In this background when we turn our attention to the facts on hand, it would emerge from the records that the appellant being aggrieved by the dismissal of OA No. 2066 of 2020 on the ground of delay had approached the Delhi High Court challenging the same. The High Court on the ground of penalty imposed being a minor penalty, refused to entertain the writ petition or in other words confirmed the order impugned before the Tribunal on merits.*

**22.** *This Court in Commr. v. Labour Commr. [Commr. v. Labour Commr., (2009) 3 SCC 525 : (2009) 1 SCC (Civ) 876] has taken a view that while deciding an application for condonation of delay the High Court ought not to have gone into the merits of the case. It has been further held : (SCC p. 526, para 5)*

*"5. While deciding an application for condonation of delay, it is well settled that the High Court ought not to have gone into the merits of the case and would have only seen whether sufficient cause had been shown by the appellant for condoning the delay in filing the appeal before it. We ourselves have also examined the application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act before the High Court and, in our opinion, the delay of 178 days has been properly explained by the appellant. That being the position, we set aside the impugned order of the High Court. Consequently, the appeal filed before the High Court is restored to its original file. The High Court is requested to decide the appeal on merit in accordance with law after giving hearing to the parties and after passing a reasoned order."*

**23.** *If negligence can be attributed to the appellant, then necessarily the delay which has not been condoned by the Tribunal and affirmed by the High Court deserves to be accepted. However, if no fault can be laid at the doors of the appellant and cause shown is sufficient then we are of the considered view that both the Tribunal and the High Court were in error in not adopting a liberal approach or justice-oriented approach to condone the delay. This Court in Municipal Council, Ahmednagar v. Shah Hyder Beig [Municipal Council, Ahmednagar v. Shah Hyder Beig, (2000) 2 SCC 48] has held : (SCC p. 51, para 6)*

*"6. Incidentally this point of delay and laches was also raised before the High Court and on this score the High Court relying upon the decision in Abhyankar case [N.L. Abhyankar v. Union of India, 1994 SCC OnLine Bom 574 : (1995) 1 Mah LJ 503] observed that it is not an inflexible rule that whenever there is delay, the Court must and necessarily refuse to entertain the petition filed after a period of three years or more which is the normal period of limitation for filing a suit. The Bombay High Court in Abhyankar case [N.L. Abhyankar v. Union of India, 1994 SCC OnLine Bom 574 : (1995) 1 Mah LJ 503] stated that the question is one of discretion to be followed in the facts and circumstances of each case and further stated : (SCC OnLine Bom para 22)*

*'22. ... The real test for sound exercise of discretion by the High Court in this regard is not the physical running of time as such but the test is whether by reason of delay, there is such negligence on the part of the petitioner, so as to infer that he has given up his claim or whether before the petitioner has moved the writ court, the rights of the third parties have come into being which should not be allowed to be disturbed unless there is reasonable explanation for the delay.' "*

**24.** Applying the aforesaid principles which we are in complete agreement to the facts on hand and test the same it would not detain us for too long to set aside the impugned orders [Mool Chandra v. Union of India, 2023 SCC OnLine Del 8673] · [Mool Chandra v. Union of India, 2023 SCC OnLine Del 8674] , inasmuch as the delay of 425 days in filing fresh OA No. 2066 of 2020 has been succinctly explained by the appellant before the Tribunal, namely, it has been contended that there was no intimation of withdrawal of the earlier OA by his counsel and the order of withdrawal dated 10-8-2018 [Mool Chandra v. Union of India, 2018 SCC OnLine CAT 28651] does not reflect that such withdrawal was based on any memo duly signed by the appellant. Further, the High Court has proceeded to confirm the order of the Tribunal on the footing that penalty imposed on the appellant is only a minor penalty, namely, withholding of one increment without cumulative effect, by completely ignoring the fact that in the earlier round of litigation it had been clearly held that punishment of dismissal imposed on the appellant was totally disproportionate to the alleged act.

I also perused the record of OA 760/2016, ON 31.08.2016. Ld. Counsels P.V. Ramakrishna and Shri R.S.Murthy appeared on behalf of D6 and D3. After perusal of the order dt. 28.02.2017 it reveals that D3, D5, D6 and D7 did not file written statement and case was pending for written statement of D3, D5, D6 and D7. On 10.07.2017 D6 filed adoption memo of D3 written statement.

After that this OA was pending for evidence and other pending IAs disposal. OA amended out and again this Tribunal granted time for additional written statement. At last right to file additional written statement is forfeited. On 08.05.2019 D3 and D6 reported ready for Defendant's Evidence. Hence record was placed before Ld. Registrar. After evidence OA 760/2016 was posted for arguments and since 30.05.2019 this OA was pending for long time for arguments. At last on 09.11.2023 final order was passed in this case, D6 has contested the OA 760/2016. He may file appeal against the order of this Tribunal but applicant has not filed any appeal in this case within time.

After scanning the facts of MA 42/2025 I find that applicant has not explained the delay of 478 days in filing the Review Application. The reasons given by the applicant is not realizable.

On the basis of above discussion MA 42/2025 is hereby dismissed.

(Dictated to Steno, transcribed by her, corrected and pronounced by me in the open court on this 22^nd day of April, 2026)

PRESIDING OFFICER DEBTS RECOVERY TRIBUNAL VISAKHAPATNAM