Y Satya Poorna Chandra Rao vs BANK OF INDIA on 7 April 2026

O R D E R

1. This Interlocutory Application is filed by the Petitioners praying to condone the delay of 137 days in filing the present Review Application No.1 of 2023 in TSA No.12 of 2022.

2. This case is taken up for hearing by this Tribunal in obedience to the orders of the Hon’ble High Court of Madras dated 22.10.2025 in W.P. Nos.38778, 38784, 38790 of 2025, wherein the Hon’ble High Court has ordered as follows: - “The Debts Recovery Tribunal No.2, Chennai, shall decide the petitioner’s application on merits, one way or the other.” Averments in the application

3. The Petitioners filed SA No.137 of 202o before DRT-II Chennai challenging the Possession Notice issued by the Respondent with respect to the properties of the petitioners. The said SA was dismissed by the Ld. DRT-II Chennai by order dated 30.08.2022 without hearing the petitioners, more so when the case was not listed in the cause list uploaded on 29.08.2022, but seemed to have been listed before the Tribunal in the revised cause list on 30.08.2022. Therefore, there was no representation on behalf of the petitioners, when the order was passed by the Ld. DRT-II, Chennai dismissing the SA on merits.

4. The petitioners had filed an application before the Tribunal on 09.09.2022 to recall the order dated 30.08.2022 and the same came to be dismissed by the Tribunal on 20.01.2023 with liberty to the petitioners to either seek review or appeal, as the case may be, and the petitioners has filed Review Application before this Tribunal numbered as RA No.1 of 2023 and is pending adjudication before this Tribunal.

5. The Review Application has been filed beyond the limitation period and there was a delay of 137 days in filing the Review Application before this Tribunal. The said delay of 137 days is to be excluded in computing the period of limitation as contemplated under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, since the petitioners had approached this Tribunal by way of Recall Application Dy. No.1639/2022 instead of Review Application. Counter by 1st Respondent

6. The present application is nothing but a sheer abuse of process of law and deserves to be dismissed at its threshold. The petitioners / review applicants have filed the present application concealing the material facts of the case to their own convenience and brought the concise facts of the case.

7. In the case of “Standard Chartered Bank Vs. MSTC Ltd., - Civil Appeal No.521 of 2020” the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the Tribunals cannot condone the delay in filing Review Application. Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the judgment of “International Asset Reconstruction Company of India Ltd., Vs. The Official Liquidator of Aldrich Pharmaceuticals Ltd., and Others – 2017 (16) SCC 137” had held a similar view.

8. Further, Section 14 of the Limitation Act is not applicable in the present application. Section 14 stipulates that while calculating the limitation period to any suit the time period of prosecution in court without jurisdiction is to be excluded where the proceedings relate to the same issue and is prosecuted in good faith.

9. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in “Consolidated Engineering Enterprises Vs. Principal Secretary, Irrigation Department & Ors. – (2008) 7 SCC 169” while elaborating on the principles laid down in “Madhavrao Naryanrao Patwardha Vs. Ramkrishnagovind Bhanu and Ors. – (1959) SCR 564” has given the conditions which must be satisfied for applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act.

10. The IA Dy No.1639 of 2022 to recall the final order dated 30.08.2022 was filed before a competent forum and hence does not satisfy the mandatory condition for applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act. Hence the application is liable to be dismissed.

11. The petitioners had failed to provide any just and reasonable cause for not filing the Review Application within the period of limitation and has failed to make out any case for condonation of delay in filing the Review Application.

12. The 1st Respondent is already sustaining losses since they are unable to recover their lawful dues. The loan sanctioned to borrowers is a huge sum and delay cause to the recovery proceedings initiated by the 1st Respondent would cause substantial loss to the 1st Respondent, its stake holders and public at large. The present application is frivolous and devoid of merits and is liable to be dismissed. Point for consideration

13. After hearing the Ld. Counsel for the Petitioners and the 1st Respondent and after perusing the materials available on record the only point that arises for consideration is: - “Whether petitioners delay of 137 days in filing the Review Application can be condoned?” Answers to the point for consideration

14. The Ld. Counsel for the Petitioners / Review Applicants submits that the SA No.137 of 2020 was dismissed by this Tribunal vide order dated 30.08.2022 without hearing the applicants therein and the matter was not even listed on 30.08.2022 and the same was added thereafter in the supplementary list. It is submitted that the counsel could not be present due to ill health and there was no representation. Hence the petitioners filed IA Dy No.1639 of 2022 to recall the order dated 30.08.2022 passed in the SA No.137/2020. It is also submitted that the Tribunal by its order dated 20.1.2023 had dismissed the said IA as not maintainable with a liberty to explore such remedies like review or appeal as advised. It is further submitted that the petitioners immediately thereafter filed RA No.1 of 2023. Therefore as the petitioners were processing the case before the forum under a bonafide impression that orders will be recalled, the said period is liable to be excluded as per Section 14 of the Limitation Act while computing the delay in filing the Review Application and also submitted that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in “Sesh Nath Singh and Another Vs. Baidyabati Sheoraphuli Co-operative Bank Limited and Another – (2021) 7 SCC 313 has clearly held that Section 14 of the Limitation Act is applicable to the DRTs. Ld. Counsel submitted thus the delay of 137 days in filing the Review Application has to be condoned.

15. The Ld. Counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent would contend that the contentions of the Petitioners are false and the delay cannot be condoned. The Ld. Counsel would contend that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the judgment of Sesh Nath Singh (supra) was dealing with a case under IBC and the same is not applicable to DRT. Ld. Counsel would also contend that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in “International

Asset Reconstruction Company of India Ltd., Vs. The Official Liquidator of Aldrich Pharmaceuticals Ltd., and others in Civil Appeal No.16962 of 2017” has clearly held that “Section 24 of the RDB Act, therefore, manifestly makes the provisions of the Limitation Act applicable only to such an original “application” made under Section 19 only. The definition of an “application” under Rule 2(c) cannot be extended to read it in conjuction with Section 2(b) of the Act extending the meaning thereof beyond what the Act provides for and the make Section 24 of the RDB Act applicable to an appeal under Section 30(1) of the Act. Any such interpretation shall be completely contrary to the legislative intend, extending the Rules beyond the Act provides for and limits.” Therefore, it is clear that the limitation act is not applicable in the present case.

16. Ld. Counsel also submits that even otherwise the final order in SA No.137 of 2020 was passed on merits on 30.8.2023 and the Recall Application was filed on 9.9.2023, the recall application was dismissed on 20.1.2023, whereas the Review Application was alleged to have been filed on 15.2.2023, whereas the petition is dated 17.2.2023 and the affidavit is sworn on 23.02.2023. Ld. Counsel would contend that it is not known as to how the affidavit sworn on 23.02.2023 could be filed with a petition dated 15.2.2023 and with Dy No. dated 15.2.2023. Even if the period can be excluded under Section 14 it can be only for the period from 9.9.2023 to 20.1.2023 and even if that is excluded the application is filed beyond the period of thirty days. The Ld. Counsel thus contended that the present application for condoning the delay of 137 days in filing the Review Application is liable to be dismissed.

17. The Petitioners have sought to explain the delay primarily on the ground that they were prosecuting the recall application bona fide and that the period spent therein deserves exclusion. On the other hand, the Respondent has raised serious objections not only to the sufficiency of cause shown but also to the very applicability of the provisions of the Limitation Act in the present proceedings.

18. At this stage, this Tribunal is of the considered view that the issue of limitation, including the applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act and the question whether sufficient cause has been shown, is closely intertwined with the merits and maintainability of the Review Application itself.

19. The contentions raised by both sides involve mixed questions of law and facts, including whether the Petitioners were bona fide prosecuting the earlier proceedings, whether the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act can be extended in the present proceedings before this Tribunal, whether the delay, if any, stands properly explained, and whether the Review Application itself is maintainable in law.

20. This Tribunal is of the opinion that a detailed examination of these aspects would be more appropriate at the stage of final adjudication of the Review Application, where all issues can be comprehensively considered together.

21. In view of the above, instead of deciding the question of condonation of delay at this interlocutory stage, this Tribunal deems it fit to defer the consideration of the delay application and take it up along with the Review Application.

22. Accordingly, the following:

ORDER

(a) The question of condonation of delay of 137 days in filing the Review Application is kept open. The same shall be considered at the time of final hearing and disposal of the Review Application.

(b) Both parties are at liberty to advance their arguments on limitation as well as on merits at the time of final hearing.

(SHARANG DHAR UPADHYAY) PRESIDING OFFICER DRT-II, CHENNAI

(Dictated to PS, who typed in the system directly, corrected, signed and pronounced by me in Open Court, on this 7th day of April, 2026)