Debts Recovery Tribunals and Appellate Tribunals

Ms U Udhayakumari vs BANK OF BARODA on 29 July 2026

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IN THE DEBTS RECOVERY TRIBUNAL – II AT CHENNAI

Dated this 29th day of July, 2026

PRESENT: SHRI SHARANG DHAR UPADHYAY

Presiding Officer

MA No.94 of 2025 in TA No.683 of 2022

1.

Udhayakumari

D/o Ulaganathan

242, No.242, First Street,

Keelarungunam Natham

Nellikuppam, Panruti Taluk

Cuddalore

2.

Gopu alias Raghuram

S/o Govindarajan

No.169, 1st Street, Natham

Nellikuppam, Panruti Taluk

Cuddalore – 607 105

…Petitioners / Defendants

Versus

Bank of Baroda

Anguchettypalayam Branch

No.116/3, Salem Main Road

Anguchettypalayam

Panruti Taluk – 607 110

…Respondent / Applicant

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ORDER

1. This Application is filed by the Petitioners / Defendants seeking to condone the delay of 654 days in filing application to set aside ex-parte order dated 30.11.2023 passed by this Tribunal in TA No.683 of 2022.

2. It is stated in the application that the above OA is filed by the respondent bank for recovery of a sum of Rs.26,40,152.18p along with further interest. It is also stated that the respondent bank had originally sanctioned a home loan of Rs.15,30,000/- to the petitioners on

03.10.2013 and having availed the same the petitioners executed various loan and security documents, the contents of which are not explained to them and many of which were unfilled at the time of signing. It is further stated that the 1st Petitioner hand over the title documents of her property to the bank. It is stated that the respondent bank has been charging exorbitant interest and penal charges, which are not part of the original agreement. It is also stated that the petitioners were regular in repayments and was conducting the loan account as per the terms of sanction and there were regular credit to the loan account. It is stated that the petitioners have not created any mortgage in favour of the bank but had only deposited the title deeds pertaining to the schedule mntioned property, which, by itself does not constitute a valid mortgage under Section 58 of the Transfer of Property Act and mere deposit of title deeds does not empower the respondent to proceed under the said provisions. It is further stated that though the summons were received, due to ill health, the petitioners could not appear before the Tribunal and were also not aware of the pendency and progress of the proceedings in the OA. It is also stated that the petitioner did not receive any further communication from the bank or its counsel and they came to know of the ex-parte order only upon receipt of a notice from the Recovery Officer regarding the DRC, therefore, the present MA is being filed to set aside the ex-parte order dated 30.11.2023. It is stated that the delay is neither willful nor wanton but has occurred only due to the aforesaid bonafide circumstances. It is also stated that the petitioner have a valid and substantial defense to contest the OA. It is stated that the final order was passed only ex- parte and no irreparable prejudice would be caused to the respondent if the present MA is allowed, on the other hand, unless the delay is condoned, the petitioners will be put to great loss and hardship.

3. The respondent is represented by Ld. Counsel. But no counter is filed.

4. Heard the Ld. Counsels appearing on behalf of both the parties. Point for Consideration

5. Having heard the Ld. Counsels for both sides and after perusing the records the only point that arises for consideration is: - “Whether the petitioners have made out sufficient cause for condonation of the delay of 654 days in filing the application to set aside the ex parte final order dated 30.11.2023 passed in TA No.683 of 2022?” Answer to the Point for Consideration

6. The delay sought to be condoned is 654 days, which is inordinate. The sole explanation offered by the petitioners is that they were unable to appear before the Tribunal due to ill health and were unaware of the subsequent proceedings until they received notice from the Recovery Officer. However, except making bald averments, the petitioners have not produced any medical records, prescriptions, hospital documents or any other contemporaneous evidence to substantiate the plea of illness.

The affidavit is also silent as to the nature of the illness, the period during which they were allegedly incapacitated, and how such illness prevented them from approaching the Tribunal within the prescribed period.

7. It is an admitted fact that the petitioners had received summons in the original proceedings. Having been aware of the pendency of the matter, they were expected to exercise due diligence in defending the proceedings. Mere assertion that they did not receive further communication from the bank or its counsel cannot constitute a sufficient cause for remaining absent for such a prolonged period.

8. Further, the present application has been filed only after the Recovery Officer initiated recovery proceedings pursuant to the Recovery Certificate. This circumstance indicates that the application has been filed only to stall the recovery proceedings and protract the litigation rather than to bona fide prosecute the matter.

9. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala, (1997) 7 SCC 556, held that the law of limitation has to be applied with all its rigour and courts cannot condone delay on equitable grounds in the absence of sufficient cause. In Balwant Singh (Dead) v. Jagdish Singh & Ors., (2010) 8 SCC 685, it was held that negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be treated as sufficient cause. Likewise, in Basawaraj & Anr. v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, (2013) 14

SCC 81, the Apex Court reiterated that unless a party establishes a cause beyond its control preventing it from approaching the Court within time, delay cannot be condoned. Further, in Postmaster General v. Living Media India Ltd., (2012) 3 SCC 563, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that condonation of delay is an exception and cannot be claimed as a matter of right.

10. Applying the above settled principles to the facts of the present case, this Tribunal finds that the petitioners have failed to establish sufficient cause for condonation of the inordinate delay of 654 days. The explanation offered is vague, unsupported by documentary evidence, and does not satisfactorily explain the entire period of delay. Consequently, the petitioners are not entitled to the discretionary relief sought. Accordingly, the point for consideration is answered against the petitioners.

11. In the result, the following:

ORDER

MA No. 94 of 2025 is dismissed. Consequently, the unnumbered MA Dy No.1753 of 2025 also stands dismissed. No order as to costs. Sd/- (SHARANG DHAR UPADHYAY) PRESIDING OFFICER DRT-II CHENNAI (Dictated to PS, who typed in the system directly, corrected, signed and pronounced by me in Open Court, on this 29th day of July, 2026)

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