CITY UNION BANK LIMITED vs MRS RAJALAKSHMI JAWAHAR on 14 May 2026

O R D E R

1. This Miscellaneous Application (for short - ‘MA’) has been filed by the Applicant bank under Section 19(25) read with Section 19(5) (i) of the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act,1993 to strike off the Reply Statement filed by the Respondents/Defendants in the Original Application on the ground of limitation.

2.1 That the deponent of the Affidavit filed in support of the application has averred inter-alia that the Respondents/Defendants entered appearance in the above OA proceedings through their Ld. Counsel on 08.03.2022 and repeatedly sought adjournments for filing of their reply statements on 23.05.2022, 11.08.2022, 31.10.2022, 14.11.2022, 15.12.2022, 15.02.2023, 09.05.2023 and 30.05.2023 and did finally file their Reply statement on 09.06.2023; their Reply statement has not been filed within the period of limitation due to which it ought not to have been taken on file; and that the Reply Statement ought to have been filed within a period of 30 days from the date of service of summons as mandated under Section 19(5)(i) of the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 and in the event of the Respondents/Defendants failing to file the reply statement within the said period of 30 days, the Presiding Officer may, in exceptional cases and in special circumstances to be recorded in writing, extend the said period by such further period not exceeding 15 days.

2.2 That the Respondents/Defendants having not filed their Reply Statement as mandated under section 19 (5) (i) of the Act which are mandatory in nature and not directory it is not open to the Respondents/Defendants to seek extension of time for filing of their Reply Statement at any stage after expiry of the period provided therefor under section 19 (5) (i); and that unless the Reply statement filed beyond the period of limitation prescribed under the Act is rejected and ordered to be struck off, the Petitioner / Applicant bank shall suffer irreparable loss and hardships. 3.1 That the Respondents/Defendants have filed a counter affidavit stating inter-alia that the above Original Application was filed in the year 2019; that the summons was served on the Respondents only in the year 2002 and they entered appearance through their Ld. Counsel on 08.03.2002; that these Respondents thereafter sought time for filing Reply Statement during the hearings and the same was granted by this Tribunal; that on 09.06.2023 these Respondents filed their Reply Statement; that in the meantime the Petitioner/Applicant filed their Proof Affidavit and thereafter, these Respondents filed their Counter Proof Affidavit and final arguments was heard and this Tribunal passed a final order on 02.05.2024. 3.2 That aggrieved over the above final order passed by this Tribunal these Respondents/Defendants filed a Civil Revision Petition before the Hon’ble High Court of Madras in C.R.P.No.2514 of 2024 in which it initially granted interim stay of the operation of the order passed by this Tribunal in the above O.A. and finally on 29.07.2025 allowed the Civil Revision Petition remanding the matter back to this Tribunal for fresh consideration as the earlier final order passed by this Tribunal is a non-speaking order without any findings; that as a matter of fact the counsel appearing for the Applicant Bank in the above CRP had conceded before the Hon’ble High Court that this Tribunal’s order is a non-speaking order and the same does not decide the issue raised before it on the basis of various defences raised by these Defendants; and that the Petitioner/Applicant Bank did not raise any issue before the Hon’ble High Court with regard to the filing of the Reply Statement beyond the period fixed under section 19 (5) (i). 3.3 That the Petitioner/Applicant having argued the matter on the earlier occasion without raising any objections for the Reply Statement filed by these Respondents/Defendants beyond the period fixed under S.19 (5) (i) and final order having come to be passed taking into account all the pleadings, filing of the present petition to reject the Reply Statement filed by these Respondents/Defendants citing S.19 (5) (i) is purely an after-thought and the same is hit by the doctrine of estoppel; that when these Respondents/Defendants requested time to file Reply Statement on various dates the same was granted by this Tribunal as the Petitioner/Applicant on none of the above occasions raised this issue before it nor they filed their Proof Affidavit before this Tribunal stating that the time for filing Reply Statement was over in terms of Section 19 (5) (i) of the Act and requested the Tribunal to proceed further with the case and pass final orders; that the Petitioner/Applicant waited till filing of Reply Statement and thereafter only they filed their proof affidavit to which the counter proof affidavit was filed by these Defendants based on which only the final order was passed; and that it is not now open to the Petitioner/Applicant to claim that the Reply Statement was filed beyond the timeline fixed under Section 19 (5) (i) of the Act and the same has to be struck off at this belated stage. 3.4 That these Respondents even before commencement of the final arguments on 04.03.2024 at the earlier occasion on 02.03.2024 itself filed petition to cross examine the witness in Dairy No.1044 of 2024; that after the Hon’ble High Court remanded back the matter the case was listed for hearing on 23.01.2026 after which the petition to cross- examine the official witness was numbered as I.A.No.310 of 2026; and that the Petitioner/Applicant in order to come out of the clutches had chosen a short cut method and filed the present petition to strike off the Reply Statement which is not maintainable at this belated stage and is not permissible in law.

4.1 Mr.C. Srivatsan, Ld. Counsel for the Petitioner/Applicant Bank would submit that the matter stood remanded back to this Tribunal for consideration afresh and in accordance with law meaning thereby that the Petitioner is entitled to urge / make all submissions it would be entitled to on facts and in law. Pointing out to S.19(5)(i) of RDB Act that confers powers on the Presiding Officer to grant / extend time for filing of Written Statement only for a maximum period of 15 days in exceptional and special circumstances to be recorded in writing over and above the 30 days period made available to the Defendant(s) to file his/her/their Written Statement, Ld. Counsel emphatically contended that the Written Statement filed beyond the maximum period of 45 days are liable to be struck off as the receipt of such pleadings beyond the strict timelines stipulated in the said provision would not be a pleadings which could be looked into for any purposes. Ld. Counsel submitted that since the written statement came to be filed beyond the maximum period of 45 days, the respondent bank only urges to consider it to be time barred and non- filing of such a Written Statement within the period of 30 days or 45 days is a question of law which the Petitioner could urge at any point of time before the OA is taken for final consideration and decided on merits. 4.2 To succor strength for his such submissions, the Ld. Counsel for Petitioner/Applicant bank would rely on the following legal precedents:

i. The judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India rendered in the case titled “SCG Contracts (India) Pvt. Ltd Vs. K.S.Chamankar Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. and others” reported in (2019) 12 SCC 210 : MANU/SC/0227/2019 reading thus:

“4. On 24.09.2018, another learned Single Judge took up this application and held that the 05.12.2017 order being final, even though the provisions of law may provide otherwise, the Defendant No. 1's written statement which was filed on 15.12.2017 should be taken on record. The Petitioner has filed a Special Leave Petition against the aforesaid two orders.

5. …………………….

6. As against this, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondents has argued, basing himself on the decisions in Bhanu Kumar Jain v. Archana Kumar and Anr. MANU/SC/1079/2004 : (2005) 1 SCC 787 and Shaikh Salim Haji Abdul Khayumsab v. Kumar and Ors. MANU/SC/2518/2005 : (2006) 1 SCC 46 that the vital difference between res judicata in a subsequent suit and res judicata in two different stages of the same proceeding must be kept in view. He stated that as the 05.12.2017 order had attained finality and could only now be challenged after the decree in the Suit is passed, clearly, the order of 24.09.2018 is correct. He also stated that by now the order dated 05.12.2017 had been acted upon and a wrongful act of the Court therefore, cannot prejudice him. He also argued citing the judgment of R.K. Roja v. U.S. Rayudu and Anr. MANU/SC/0751/2016 : (2016) 14 SCC 275 that as an Order VII Rule 11 application had been filed and that had to be answered before trial of the Suit could commence, it was clear that a written statement could not be filed. He then relied upon Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure which preserves the inherent power of the court, more particularly, that of a Court of record-the High Court, and can be invoked in cases like the present where grossly unjust consequences would otherwise ensue.

7. ……….…………………………………

8. The Commercial Courts, Commercial Division and Commercial Appellate Division of High Courts Act, 2015 came into force on 23.10.2015 bringing in their wake certain amendments to the Code of Civil Procedure. In Order V, Rule 1, Sub-rule (1), for the second proviso, the following proviso was substituted:

Provided further that where the Defendant fails to file the written statement within the said period of thirty days, he shall be allowed to file the written statement on such other days, as may be specified by the Court, for reasons to be recorded in writing and on payment of such costs as the court deems fit, but which shall not be later than one hundred twenty days from the date of service of summons and on expiry of one hundred and twenty days from the date of service of summons, the Defendant shall forfeit the right to file

the written statement and the court shall not allow the written statement to be taken on record.

Equally, in Order VIII Rule 1, a new proviso was substituted as follows:

Provided that where the Defendant fails to file the written statement within the said period of thirty days, he shall be allowed to file the written statement on such other day, as may be specified by the court, for reasons to be recorded in writing and on payment of such costs as the Court deems fit, but which shall not be later than one hundred and twenty days from the date of service of summons and on expiry of one hundred and twenty days from the date of service of summons, the Defendant shall forfeit the right to file the written statement and the court shall not allow the written statement to be taken on record.

This was re-emphasized by re-inserting yet another proviso in Order VIII Rule 10 Code of Civil Procedure, which reads as under:

10. Procedure when party fails to present written statement called for by Court.- Where any party from whom a written statement is required Under Rule 1 or Rule 9 fails to present the same within the time permitted or fixed by the Court, as the case may be, the Court shall pronounce judgment against him, or make such order in relation to the suit as it thinks fit and on pronouncement of such judgment a decree shall be drawn up.

Provided further that no Court shall make an order to extend the time provided Under Rule 1 of this Order for filing of the written statement.

A perusal of these provisions would show that ordinarily a written statement is to be filed within a period of 30 days. However, grace period of a further 90 days is granted which the Court may employ for reasons to be recorded in writing and payment of such costs as it deems fit to allow such written statement to come on record. What is of great importance is the fact that beyond 120 days from the date of service of summons, the Defendant shall forfeit the right to file the written statement and the Court shall not allow the written statement to be taken on record. This is further buttressed by the proviso in Order VIII Rule 10 also adding that the Court has no further power to extend the time beyond this period of 120 days.”

15. Learned Counsel appearing for the Respondents then argued that it cannot be assumed that the learned Single Judge did not know about these amendments when he passed the first impugned order dated 05.12.2017. We do not wish to enter upon this speculative arena. He then argued that since this judgment permitted him to file the written statement beyond 120 days, it was an act of the Court which should prejudice no man. This doctrine cannot be used when the res is not yet judicata. The 05.12.2017 order is res sub judice inasmuch as its correctness has been challenged before us.

The aforesaid para applies on all force to the facts of the present case, as even assuming that the 05.12.2017 order is final, res judicata cannot stand in the way of an erroneous interpretation of a statutory prohibition. The present is one such case. Therefore, the second order must also be set aside.

16. Learned Counsel for the Respondents then strongly relied upon the inherent powers of the Court to state that, in any case, a procedural provision such as contained in the amendment, which may lead to unjust consequences can always, in the facts of a given case, be ignored where such unjust consequences follow, as in the facts of the present case. We are again of the view that this argument has also no legs to stand on, given the judgment of this Court in Manohar Lal Chopra v. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal, MANU/SC/0056/1961 : [1962] Suppl 1 SCR 450. In this judgment, the Court held:

The suit at Indore which had been instituted later, could be stayed in view of Section 10 of the Code. The provisions of that Section are clear, definite and mandatory. A Court in which a subsequent suit has been filed is prohibited from proceeding with the trial of that suit in certain specified circumstances. When there is a special provision in the Code of Civil Procedure for dealing with the contingencies of two such suits being instituted, recourse to the inherent powers Under Section 151 is not justified.... (at page 470)

Clearly, the clear, definite and mandatory provisions of Order V read with Order VIII Rule 1 and 10 cannot be circumvented by recourse to the inherent power Under Section 151 to do the opposite of what is stated therein.

17. ……………….

18. Factually speaking, this is not correct as a Special Leave Petition from the said order has been filed. Even otherwise, this Court in Canara Bank v. N.G. Subbaraya Setty and Anr. (supra) has held (page 3414):

(ii) An issue of law which arises between the same parties in a subsequent suit or proceeding is not res judicata if, by an erroneous decision given on a statutory prohibition in the former suit or proceeding, the statutory prohibition is not given effect to. This is despite the fact that the matter in issue between the parties may be the same as that directly and substantially in issue in the previous suit or proceeding. This is for the reason that in such cases, the rights of the parties are not the only matter for consideration (as is the case of an erroneous interpretation of a statute inter parties), as the public policy contained in the statutory prohibition cannot be set at naught. This is for the same reason as that contained in matters which pertain to issues of law that raise jurisdictional questions. We have seen how, in Natraj Studios (MANU/SC/0477/1981 : AIR 1981 SC 537) (supra), it is the public policy of the statutory prohibition contained in Section 28 of the Bombay Rent Act that has to be given effect to. Likewise, the public policy contained in other statutory prohibitions, which need not necessarily go to jurisdiction of a Court, must equally be given effect to, as otherwise special principles of law are fastened upon parties when special considerations relating to public policy mandate that this cannot be done. The aforesaid para applies on all fours to the facts of the present case, as even assuming that the 05.12.2017 order is final, res judicata cannot stand in the way of an erroneous interpretation of a statutory prohibition. The present is one such case. Therefore, the second order must also be set aside.

19. The appeal is allowed, with the consequence that the written statement of Defendant No. 1 must be taken off the record.”

ii. The judgement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India rendered in the case titled “M/s.TATA Chemicals Ltd., Vs. Commissioner of Customs (Preventive)” reported in

SCC

: MANU/SC/0617/2015, reading thus: “17. …………………………… ………………………………. In law equally the Tribunal ought to have realized that there can be no estoppel against law. If the law requires that something be done in a particular manner, it must be done in that manner, and if not done in that manner has no existence in the eye of law at all. The Customs Authorities are not absolved from following the law depending upon the acts of a particular Assessee. Something that is illegal cannot convert itself into something legal by the act of a third person.”

iii. The judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India rendered in the case titled “Union of India (UOI) and Ors. vs. Mohanlal Likumal Punjabi and Ors.” reported in

SCC

: MANU/SC/0137/2004 reading thus: “9. In Uptron (India) Ltd. v. Shammi Bhan and Anr. MANU/SC/0258/1998 : [1998]1SCR719 , it was held that a case decided on the basis of wrong concession of a counsel has no precedent value. That apart, the applicability of the statute or otherwise to a given situation or the question of statutory liability of a person/institution under any provision of law would invariably depend upon the scope and meaning of the provisions concerned and has got to be adjudged not on any concession made. Any such concession would have no acceptability or relevance while determined rights and liabilities incurred or acquired in view of the axiomatic principle, without exception, that there can be no estoppel against statute.”

iv. The judgment of the Division Bench of Hon’ble High Court of Madras rendered in the case titled “South Indian Mint and Aromatic Products Ltd., and Others vs. IDBI Bank Ltd ” reported in Indian Kanoon - http://indiankanoon.org/doc/74770527/ reading thus :

“11. ……………………………………..we are not inclined to accept the said contention, for the reason that what is envisaged in sub-Section 8 of Section 19 of the Act, is that any right or claim in respect of the cause of action, accruing to the defendants against the applicants, either before or after the filing of the application, but before the defendants had delivered his defence or before the time limited for delivering his defence has expired, should be the subject matter of set off, or counter claim, as the case may be and sub-Section 8 of Section 19 of the Act, does not state that it can be done at any time, say for instance, in the instant case, just three days before the matter was posted for orders. The time limit for delivering defence, filing of counter claim or set off is prescribed, in sub-Section 5 (i) of Section 19 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1996.

12. Sub-Section 5 (i) of Section 19 of the said Act, deals with set off under sub-Section

(6) or a counter claim under sub-Section (8), if any, and such written statement has to be filed by the defendant, with original documents or true copies thereof with the leave of the Tribunal.

13. As per the proviso to Section 19 (5) of the Act, where the defendant fails to file the written statement within the said period of thirty days, the Presiding Officer, may in exceptional cases and in special circumstances to be recorded in writing, extend the said period by such further period not exceeding fifteen days to file the written statement of his defence.

14. Thus, from the reading of Section 19 (5) of the Act, the Tribunal, can in exceptional cases alone can extend the time for filing written statement/set off/counter claim, not exceeding fifteen days to file the written statement, along with set off/counter claim. Further, if the Tribunal, desired to exercise its jurisdiction in terms of proviso to Section 19 (5) of the Act, exceptional and special circumstances, have to be recorded in writing. In the case on hand, OA has been filed on 19/7/2016. No sooner, service of summons is 15 completed, written statement ought to have been filed within 30 days.

15. Yet another factor to be taken note of is that prior to 4/11/2016, sub-Section 5 of Section 19 of the Act, stood as hereunder:- Provided where the defendant fails to file the written statement within the said period of 30 days, the Presiding Officer may, in exceptional cases and in special circumstances, to be recorded in writing, allowed not more than two extensions to the defendants to file the written statement. Sub-Section 5 of Section 19 of the Act has been substituted by Act 44 of 2016, with effect from 4/11/2016. The amended sub-Section 5 extracted supra, has enabled the defendants to file their claim to set of under sub-Section 6 or a counter claim under sub-Section 8 if any along with the written statement, within 30 days from the date of service of summons for any exceptional cases, we extended not exceeding 15 days, to file the written statement of his defence.

16. In the case on hand, both the Debt Recovery Tribunal I, Chennai as well as the appellate forum, have considered the facts, statutory provisions, and passed a well considered order, dismissing I.A.No.660 of 2017, seeking leave to file a counter claim at the belated stage, i.e., just three days, before the matter stood for orders. When the statute prescribes an outer time limit for filing written statement/set of/claim, as the case may be, the same has to be given effect in letter and spirit. It is not open to the defendants to seek, leave to file a counter claim, at any stage, by extending the period, provided therefor, in sub-Section 5 of Section 19 of the Act.”

v. The judgment of the Division Bench of Hon’ble High Court of Delhi rendered in the case titled “Anita Garg and Ors. vs. State Bank of India” reported in MANU/DE/1942/2021 reading thus:

“31. Though, Section 19(5)(i) does not, in terms, provide for the forfeiture of the right to file the written statement, if it is not filed within the stipulated time, or the extended time that could and may be granted, in our view, the consequence would be the same, as the written statement filed beyond the stipulated time, or extended time which could legally be granted for that purpose, cannot be brought on record. The intention of the Parliament can be gathered not only from the Statement of Objects and Reasons set out hereinabove, but also from the outer limit of time, for which extension may, in a deserving case - by following the guideline laid down in the Section, be granted. The proceedings before the DRT are also proceedings arising out of commercial dealings and the disputes are commercial disputes. It would not stand to reason, that while the Parliament sought to enforce strict timelines for expeditious disposals of commercial disputes by enacting the Commercial Courts Act, it did not do so in respect of disputes of the same kind, decided by the Debt Recovery Tribunals. The only reason for not incorporating the forfeiture clause in Section 19 is, that the existing provision contained in Section 19 leads to the same conclusion.”

vi. The judgment of the Division Bench of Hon’ble High Court of Madhya Pradesh rendered in the case titled “M/s. Crest Steel and Power Pvt. Ltd. and others vs. Punjab National Bank and others” reported in AIR ONLINE

MP

: Indian Kanoon - http://indiankanoon.org/doc/98172136/ : MANU/MP/0823/2018 “18- Therefore, the question which is pending for consideration is as to when the period of thirty days is to commence for filing of written statement in a complaint filed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, but in respect of the Act in question, sub-section (4) of Section 19 mandates that the defendant is required show cause within thirty days from the service of summons as to why relief should not be granted whereas sub-section

(5) of Section 19 of the Act contemplates that defendant shall file written statement within thirty days. The proviso contemplates additional fifteen days for filing written statement but in exceptional cases and in special circumstances. Therefore, the Act has specified the period from which the time of thirty days will commence. Since the Act is a complete Code in respect of substantive rights and the procedure, therefore, the principle laid down in Kailash's case (supra) would not be applicable wherein CPC is made applicable to the trial of an election petition under the Representation of People Act. The Court held as under:- "33. As stated earlier, Order 8 Rule 1 is a provision contained in the CPC and hence belongs to the domain of procedural law. Another feature noticeable in the language of Order 8 Rule 1 is that although it appoints a time within which the written statement has to be presented and also restricts the power of the Court by employing language couched in a negative way that the extension of time appointed for filing the M/S Crest Steel And Power Private ... vs Punjab National Bank on 10 May, 2018 Indian Kanoon - http://indiankanoon.org/doc/98172136/ 11 written statement was not to be later than 90 days from the date of service of summons yet it does not in itself provide for penal consequences to follow if the time schedule, as laid down, is not observed. From these two features certain consequences follow." 19- Therefore, not only there was earlier Larger Bench judgment in Dr. J.J.

Merchant's case (supra), but later Three Judges Bench while considering somewhat similar provisions contained in the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, held that the time fixed for filing written statement cannot be extended. Therefore, in view of the order passed by the Supreme Court in Hilli I (supra), the period of thirty days is mandatory keeping in view the object of the Act for expeditious disposal of the claim of the secured creditors. The intention for expeditious disposal is implicit, when sub-section (24) of Section 19 mandates the Tribunal to conclude the proceedings within two hearings. 20- Therefore, keeping in view the object and purpose of the statute, we find that written statement was required to be filed within thirty days, which could in exceptional cases or in special circumstances be extended by the Tribunal by another fifteen days. In the present case, the petitioners' were informed by show-cause notice that they have to file their written statement within thirty days. The claim of the Bank is for recovery of over Rs.1400 Crores. Therefore, the provisions of the Act have to be assigned the meaning which is keeping in view the objective of the Act rather than to frustrate the object.”

19- Therefore, not only there was earlier Larger Bench judgment in Dr. J.J. Merchant's case (supra), but later Three Judges Bench while considering somewhat similar provisions contained in the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, held that the time fixed for filing written statement cannot be extended. Therefore, in view of the order passed by the Supreme Court in Hilli I (supra), the period of thirty days is mandatory keeping in view the object of the Act for expeditious disposal of the claim of the secured creditors. The intention for expeditious disposal is implicit, when sub-section (24) of Section 19 mandates the Tribunal to conclude the proceedings within two hearings.

20- Therefore, keeping in view the object and purpose of the statute, we find that written statement was required to be filed within thirty days, which could in exceptional cases or in special circumstances be extended by the Tribunal by another fifteen days. In the present case, the petitioners' were informed by show-cause notice that they have to file their written statement within thirty days. The claim of the Bank is for recovery of over Rs.1400 Crores. Therefore, the provisions of the Act have to be assigned the meaning which is keeping in view the objective of the Act rather than to frustrate the object.”

vii. The judgment of the Hon’ble High Court of Karnataka rendered in the case titled “State of Karnataka vs. Eastern Medicals” reported in 1992 (2) KARLJ 164 : MANU/KA/0187/1993, reading thus:

31. It is not possible to agree with the views expressed in the aforesaid Decisions. No amount of waiver or silence or acquiescence will make the suit maintainable, nor it will confer jurisdiction upon the Court to entertain the suit; because no suit against the Government or against the public officer attracting Section 80 of the C.P.C. can be instituted and maintained without serving a notice and until the expiration of two months next after the notice in writing has been delivered to or left at the office. It is a pre-requisite for service of notice as contemplated under Section 80 C.P.C. Service of notice is a pre-requisite for instituting and maintaining a suit. In fact in GANGAPPA GURUPADAPPA GUGWAD v. RACHAWWA AND ORS., MANU/SC/0351/1970 : [1971]2SCR691 , it

has been held that in such a case plaint has to be rejected. The following passage from the said Decision may usefully be referred to:

"No doubt it would be open to a Court not to decide all the issues which may arise on the pleadings before it if it finds that the plaint on the face of it is barred by any law. If for instance the plaintiff's cause of action is against a Government and the plaint does not show that notice under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure claiming relief was served in terms of the said Section it would be the duty of the Court to reject the plaint recording an order to that effect with reasons for the order. In such a case the Court should not embark upon a trial of all the issues involved and such rejection would not preclude the plaintiff from presenting a fresh plaint in respect of the same cause of action".

viii. The judgment of the Hon’ble High Court of Kerala rendered in the case titled “Vineesh Vs. State of Kerala” reported in Indian Kanoon

- http://indiankanoon.org/doc/63057716/ reading held thus: “12. To persist with an error is not virtuous; correcting it is a duty of judicial integrity. The strength of a Judge lies not in the claim of infallibility, but in the courage to admit error and the humility to correct it when conscience and law reveal a truer course. Therefore, when a Single Judge renders a judgment without recognising a binding precedent and relevant statutory provisions, the same Judge is justified in subsequently differing from that earlier view. For these reasons, I am persuaded by my judicial conscience to differ from my earlier view in Mohammed Noufal (supra).”

ix. The judgment of the Hon’ble Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal of Kolkata rendered in the case titled “State Bank of India and Ors. vs. Umang Kejiriwal and Ors.” reported in MANU/DK/0019/2024, reading thus:

“29. Reliance is also placed upon Section 19(25) of the Act along with Rule 18 of the DRT (Procedure) Rules. It is submitted that Tribunal has power to issue direction which may be necessary to give effect to its order or to prevent abuse of the process of law. Further, it is submitted that Section 19(25) of the Act renders inherent power to the Tribunal to pass any order in the interest of justice. Both the provisions of the Act would not apply in the facts of the present case when there is a specific provision in the Act to the effect that a particular period is prescribed for filing written statement and no exceptional powers are provided to the Tribunal for extending the period, then Tribunal cannot extend the prescribed period by invoking the provision of Section 19(25) of the Act or Rule 18 of the DRT (Procedure) Rules.

30. Accordingly, I am of the view that Tribunal has no jurisdiction to extend the 30 days period prescribed and in exceptional cases 15 days more to file the written statement in O.A. proceeding filed under the Act. I am also of the view that learned Tribunal has erred in passing the impugned order.”

5.1 Mr.Jayesh B Dolia, Ld. Sr. Counsel for the Respondents/Defendants would submit that the petitioner/Applicant Bank having delayed in causing of summons in a OA pertaining to the year 2019 could not be allowed to canvas for the proposition that the Written Statement filed beyond the maximum period of 45 days provided in section 19 (5) (i) are to be rejected or struck off from the file as the Petitioner/Applicant Bank is estopped in raising such a plea after allowing this Tribunal to pass a final order based on the pleadings and requiring the Hon’ble High Court of Madras to remand back the matter for fresh consideration for the reason of this Tribunal not considering all the defences raised during the course of arguments. It was urged to consider that the summons were served only during February, 2022 and the Respondents/Defendants entered appearance on 08.03.2022. Therefore, in the absence of any proof by the bank to prove that the summons were served by the Ld. Registrar upon the defendants along with the copy of application and paper book under registered post in terms of R.11 it cannot be treated that the Defendants are duly served with summons as per law to reckon the period of 30 days for filing of Written Statement from the date of service of summons. Between 24.04.2019 to 14.01.2022

the case was not taken by DRT and in the hearings held on 08.03.2022, 11.08.2022, 31.10.2022 and 14.11.2022 there was no representation on behalf of the Applicant Bank. It was pointed out that the Tribunal had on 30.05.2023 granted time to them to file Written Statement and posted the matter on 09.06.2023 by which time the Written Statement came to be filed which cannot be sought to be undone after 3 years. 5.2 The Ld. Sr. Counsel for the Respondents/Defendants submitted that the issue as regards limitation prescribed under section 19 (5) (i) was never raised by the Petitioner/Applicant on any occasion when this Tribunal granted time for filing Written Statement and the same came to be received by the Tribunal. The Petitioner/Applicant Bank has not preferred Civil Revision Petition as against this Tribunal’s receiving of Written Statement beyond the time prescribed under section 19 (5) (i) of the Act and not raised the issue of the Revision Petitioners’ filing of Written Statement beyond the period of limitation before the Hon’ble High Court in C.R.P. No.2514/2024 to render its findings on the said legal issue. Ld. Senior Counsel concluded his submissions stating that the Petitioner/Applicant cannot seek to reject the Written Statement at this distance of time when the Hon’ble High Court has remanded the matter for consideration afresh of the entire case and defences raised in the OA by observing in its order thus:

“4. Concededly, the order impugned is apparently non-speaking and does not decide the issue raised before it on the basis of various defences raised by the Petitioners”.

5. “A perusal of the above clearly shows that the Tribunal has not applied its mind and by a complete non-speaking order, original application filed by the bank has been allowed”.

6. “Since the respondent has conceded to the aforesaid position, this petition stands allowed. The Order passed by the Tribunal is set aside and the case is remanded for consideration afresh and in accordance with law”

5.3. To succor strength for his such submissions, Ld. Sr. Counsel for the Respondents/Defendants would rely on the following legal precedents : i. The judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India rendered in the case titled “M/s.Anvita Auto Tech Works Pvt. Ltd. vs. Aroush Motors & another” reported in 2025 INSC 1202, reading thus: “2. The present controversy can be encapsulated in words of the Hon’ble Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer: “Procedural law is not to be a tyrant but a servant, not an obstruction but an aid to justice. It is the handmaid of justice and not its mistress”

3. The object of the procedural rules is to advance the cause of justice and not to thwart it and when the rigid adherence to technicalities of procedure causes injustice, courts have to come to the rescue by adopting a liberal approach. The courts cannot countenance a situation Reason: where substantial justice is sacrificed at the altar of procedural rigidity. Where substantial justice is at stake, technicalities must give way to ensure that the litigant is afforded sufficient opportunity to defend. The present controversy must be tested on the said principle.

11. The said IA came to be Rejected by order dated 22.03.2022 by the Trial Court and consequently, the Written Statement also came to be rejected. The Defendant No. 1 challenged the order of dismissal of IA by way of Commercial Appeal bearing No. 189 of 2021. Meanwhile, the Written Statement on behalf of Defendant No. 2 was also taken as Nil. The suit progressed subsequently to the stage of recording plaintiff’s evidence and on 30.07.2022, 10.08.2022 and on 19.08.2022 the examination-in-chief of PW1 was recorded and cross-examination of the defendant was taken as Nil by the Trial Court on the ground that defendant had failed to file their Written Statement within Stipulated time and the matter was posted for defendant’s evidence.

23. This Court while issuing notice in the present special leave petition on 18.05.2025 was of the view that the only issue that arises for consideration is: “Whether the High Court was correct in observing that on account of non-filing of written statement by the defendant, his right to cross-examination is taken away?”

26. The law regarding the mandatory filing of Written Statement in a commercial dispute within the statutory period is clearly envisaged under Proviso to sub-rule (1) of Rule 1 of Order VIII Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) and Second Proviso to Sub-rule (1) of Rule 1 of Order V CPC as amended by the Special Amendment under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015. The said provisions impose an absolute embargo upon the courts to accept the written statement after the expiry of one hundred twenty

(120) days. For easy reference, the aforesaid bare provision of Proviso to sub- rule

(1) of Rule 1 of Order VIII CPC is extracted herewith: “1. Written Statement. —The defendant shall, within thirty days from the date of service of summons on him, present a Written Statement of his defence:

Provided that where the defendant fails to file written statement within the said period of thirty days, he shall be allowed to file the written statement on such other day, as may be specified by the court, for reasons to be recorded in writing and on payment of such costs as the court deems fit, but which shall not be later than one hundred twenty days from the date of service of summons and on expiry of one hundred twenty days from the date of service of summons, the defendant shall forfeit the right to file the written statement and the court shall not allow the written statement to be taken on record.”

27. The mandatory nature of statutory period in filing WS in a commercial dispute stood fortified by the decision of this court in SCG Contracts (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. K.S. Chamankar Infrastructure Private Limited and Ors. (2019) 12 SCC 210 wherein this court held that timeline of 120 days’ fixed by the statute is not directory but rather mandatory, therefore, commercial courts cannot condone the delay beyond 120 days in filing the WS. On this very aspect the appeal could have been dismissed nevertheless, there is something more vital to the present issue which this court cannot lose sight of.

28. The meticulous scrutiny of the chronological chart as mentioned supra shows that the limitation period for filing the WS commenced on 17.07.2021 and ended on 14.11.2021. Both these dates fell at a time when our nation was in garb of global pandemic of COVID-19 which affected the lives of millions of people around the world as well our judicial systems. This court was conscious of the fact as to the difficulty faced by the litigants in approaching the courts physically and was of the view that the said pandemic should not become the reason to vandalise the rights of the litigants due to expiry of period of limitation who could have approached the court well within the time had it not been for the pandemic. Hence this court In Re: Cognizance for Extension of Limitation (2022) 3 SCC 117 in Suo Moto Writ Petition (C) No. 3 of 2020 by exercise of its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India passed series of orders to exclude the period commencing from 15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022 for the purpose of computing the limitation period under any general or special laws in respect of all judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings. For the purpose of reference, the relevant portion of the order is extracted below:

“……. I. The order dated 23.03.2020 is restored and in continuation of the subsequent orders dated 08.03.2021, 27.04.2021 and 23.09.2021, it is directed that the period from 15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022 shall stand excluded for the purposes of limitation as may be prescribed under any general or special laws in respect of all judicial or quasi judicial proceedings.

II. Consequently, the balance period of limitation remaining as on 03.10.2021, if any, shall become available with effect from 01.03.2022.

III. In cases where the limitation would have expired during the period between 15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022, notwithstanding the actual balance period of limitation remaining, all persons shall have a limitation period of 90 days from 01.03.2022. In the event the actual balance period of limitation remaining, with effect from 01.03.2022 is greater than 90 days, that longer period shall apply. ……

29. This court in Aditya Khaitan & Ors. v. IL & FS Financial Services Limited 2023 INSC 867 had encountered a similar situation wherein the High Court had disallowed the appellant to file the Written Statement in a commercial dispute on the premise that the same was beyond the mandatory statutory period of 120 days. This Court while relying upon the orders passed In Re: Cognizance for Extension of Limitation (Supra) allowed the appeal and directed the Written statement to be taken on record. Further this court in Babasaheb Raosaheb Kobarne & Anr. v. Pyrotek India Private Limited & Ors. 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1315 and Prakash Corporates v. Dee Vee Projects Limited (2022) 5 SCC 112 had allowed the appellant to file its written statement notwithstanding the fact that it was filed beyond the period of 120 days in the light of the COVID-19 pandemic wherein the period of limitation was extended as stated supra.

30. Relegating back to the facts of the instant case, the statutory period of 120 days commenced from date of service of summons on 17.07.2021 and as per section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, the date of service had to be excluded therefore, from 18.07.2021, the 120 days’ period commenced and it ended on 14.11.2021. In the light of aforesaid discussion, it can be very well said that both the dates fell within the sweep of period between 15.02.2020 to 28.02.2022. In fact, during this period itself, to be precise on 24.11.2021 itself defendant No.1 had filed I.A. No.5 seeking enlargement of time to file written submission and subsequently on 07.01.2022 had filed IA No.VI/ 6A seeking permission to file written submission enclosing the written submission also. Therefore, the High Court ought to have excluded the aforesaid period for the purpose of filing the written statement and ought to have permitted the defendant No.1 to file written statement on record and contest the suit on merits rather than dismissing the appeal.

31. There is another consideration why the present appeal deserves to be allowed. The perusal of the records particularly, the order sheet of the trial court dated 19.08.2022 (Annexure P-17) clearly reveal that after the examination-in-chief of PW1 was closed, the cross-examination of Defendant no. 1 was taken as “Nil” on the ground that defendant had failed to file their written statement within stipulated time. The said reason is absolutely perverse and is contrary to the right of defence available to the defendant. The purpose of cross-examination is to elicit the truth from the witness and impeach its credibility. When the WS was not allowed to be taken on record, the denial of the right to cross- examine cannot be taken away by leaving the defendant in lurch and this has acted as final nail in the coffin to defendant’s right of defence. This court not long back in Ranjit Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2024 INSC 724 had held that even when the defendant has not filed the Written statement, his right to cross-examine the plaintiff witnesses is not foreclosed. The relevant portion of the decision for easy reference is extracted herewith: “5…….At this stage, we must clarify the legal position. Even if a defendant does not file a written statement and the suit is ordered to proceed ex-parte against him, the limited defence available to the defendant is not foreclosed. A defendant can always cross-examine the witnesses examined by the plaintiff to prove the falsity of the plaintiff’s case. A defendant can always urge, based on the plaint and the evidence of the plaintiff, that the suit was barred by a statute such as the law of limitation…..”

32. Thus, in the light of the aforesaid discussion, we are of the considered view that the present appeal deserves to be allowed and accordingly, the same stands Allowed. Consequently, the impugned judgment dated 20.05.2025 in Commercial Appeal No. 19 of 2023 and consequently the judgment and decree passed in commercial suit No.372/2021 by the Addl. City Civil and Sessions Judge (Exclusive Commercial Court) dated 15.11.2022 quo defendant No.1 (Appellant herein) is set aside and the matter is remanded back to the trial court to dispose of the same after allowing the appellant herein to file the Written Statement subject to payment of cost to the tune of Rs. 1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh Only) and to permit the appellant to exercise his right of cross-examination of plaintiff’s witnesses. The trial court is requested to dispose of the present commercial suit expeditiously and preferably within a period of Six (6) months from today.”

ii. The judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India rendered in the case titled “State of Punjab Vs. Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar & others” reported in MANU/SC/1476/2011 : (2011) 14 SCC 770, reading thus: “II. DOCTRINE of WAIVER:

21. In Manak Lal (Supra), this Court held that alleged bias of a Judge/official/Tribunal does not render the proceedings invalid if it is shown that the objection in that regard and particularly against the presence of the said official in question, had not been taken by the party even though the party knew about the circumstances giving rise to the allegations about the alleged bias and was aware of its right to challenge the presence of such official.

The Court further observed that waiver cannot always and in every case be inferred merely from the failure of the party to take the objection. 'Waiver can be inferred only if and after it is shown that the party knew about the relevant facts and was aware of his right to take the objection in question.

Thus, in a given case if a party knows the material facts and is conscious of his legal rights in that matter, but fails to take the plea of bias at the earlier stage of the proceedings, it creates an effective bar of waiver against him. In such facts and circumstances, it would be clear that the party

wanted to take a chance to secure a favourable order from the official/court and when he found that he was confronted with an unfavourable order, he adopted the device of raising the issue of bias. The issue of bias must be raised by the party at the earliest.

(See: M/s. Pannalal Binjraj and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. MANU/SC/0122/1956 : AIR 1957 SC 397; and Justice P.D. Dinakaran (Supra))

22. In M/s. Power Control Appliances and Ors. v. Sumeet Machines Pvt. Ltd. MANU/SC/0646/1994 : (1994) 2 SCC 448 this Court held as under:

Acquiescence is sitting by, when another is invading the rights. It is a course of conduct inconsistent with the claim... It implies positive acts; not merely silence or inaction such as involved in laches... The acquiescence must be such as to lead to the inference of a licence sufficient to create a new right in the Defendant....

Inaction in every case does not lead to an inference of implied consent or acquiescence as has been held by this Court in P. John Chandy and Company (P) Ltd. v. John P. Thomas MANU/SC/0382/2002 : AIR 2002 SC 2057. Thus, the Court has to examine the facts and circumstances in an individual case.

23. Waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a right. It involves conscious abandonment of an existing legal right, advantage, benefit, claim or privilege, which except for such a waiver, a party could have enjoyed. In fact, it is an agreement not to assert a right. There can be no waiver unless the person who is said to have waived, is fully informed as to his rights and with full knowledge about the same, he intentionally abandons them. (Vide: Dawsons Bank Ltd. v. Nippon Menkwa Kabushihi Kaish MANU/PR/0024/1935 : AIR

PC 79; Basheshar Nath v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Delhi and Rajasthan and Anr. MANU/SC/0064/1958 : AIR 1959 SC 149; Mademsetty Satyanarayana v. G. Yelloji Rao and Ors. MANU/SC/0310/1964 : AIR 1965 SC 1405; Associated Hotels of India Ltd. v. S.B. Sardar Ranjit Singh MANU/SC/0333/1967 : AIR 1968 SC 933; Jaswantsingh Mathurasingh and Anr. v. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation and Ors. MANU/SC/0469/1991 : (1992) Supp 1 SCC 5; M/s. Sikkim Subba Associates v. State of Sikkim MANU/SC/0313/2001 : AIR 2001 SC 2062; and Krishna Bahadur v. Purna Theatre and Ors. MANU/SC/0667/2004 : AIR 2004 SC 4282).

24. This Court in Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Dr. Hakimwadi Tenants' Association and Ors. MANU/SC/0538/1987 : AIR 1988 SC 233 considered the issue of waiver/acquiescence by the non- parties to the proceedings and held:

In order to constitute waiver, there must be voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a right. The essence of a waiver is an estoppel and where there is no estoppel, there is no waiver. Estoppel and waiver are questions of conduct and must necessarily be determined on the facts of each case....

There is no question of estoppel, waiver or abandonment. There is no specific plea of waiver, acquiescence or estoppel, much less a plea of abandonment of right. That apart, the question of waiver really does not arise in the case. Admittedly, the tenants were not parties to the earlier proceedings. There is, therefore, no question of waiver of rights, by Respondents 4-7 nor would this disentitle the tenants from maintaining the writ petition.”

6.1 Before proceeding to discuss, deliberate and decide on the legal issue since raised in the present MA, it becomes imperative to go through the records of proceedings ever since the service of summons on the defendants in the above OA which is filed to recover Rs.11,41,78,900.00 from Defendants 1 & 2 jointly and severally and out of sale of the OA schedule mentioned mortgage properties.

6.2 On a conspectus of the proceeding sheets of the present OA, it is learnt that pursuant to the ordering of summons to the defendants on 24.04.2019 by the Tribunal through the Registry and Applicant Bank for their appearance on 09.07.2019, the summons stood served on Respondents / Defendants 1 & 2 as could be discerned from the served postal acknowledgments of respondent 1 & 2 bearing the date i.e. 27/6/2019 filed into the Registry by the Applicant Bank. On the said date of hearing i.e. 09.07.2019 itself, the respondents/defendants 1 & 2 entered appearance through Ld. Counsel by filing their vakalat. A memo dated 21.10.2019 is seen filed vide Diary No.9950/2019 by the applicant bank evidencing service of OA Paper book on the Ld. Counsel for defendants on 19.10.2019. The matter stood reposted from time to time between

09.7.2019 and 14.9.2021 as pointed out by the Ld. Sr. Counsel for Respondents, may be for the reason of COVID –19 pandemic that supervened then between 15.3.2020 and 28.02.2022 as came to be judicially recognized by Hon’ble Apex Court in Suo Moto Writ Petition (C) No.3/2020 for exclusion of period of limitation in relation to any legal proceedings. On the next date of hearing i.e. 08.3.2022 the entering of appearance of Adv. Mr. Panchapakesan for defendants came to be noted by the Ld. Registrar, on which date there was no representation for either parties. On 11.8.2022, 31.10.2022 and 14.11.2022 there were representation on the side of defendants through their Ld. Counsel requesting every time for a short time for filing of written statement. As written statement was not filed by 14.11.2022, Ld. Registrar posted the matter before the Bench on 15.12.2022 observing about non filing of written statement despite his granting of sufficient time. The Ld. Counsel for defendants pleaded for further time to file written statement in the hearings dated 15.12.2022, 09.5.2023 & 30.5.2023 and the then Ld. Presiding Officer had granted the time sought for in the first three hearings upon observing in the proceeding dated 09.5.2023 about the applicant bank approaching the Hon’ble High Court of Madras in W.P. Nos.25986 25990, 25993 and 25995 of 2023 in which the Hon’ble High Court had upon observing as to the pendency of the said cases since 2019 required these cases to be disposed of by the Tribunal. 6.3 That on 30.5.2023, my predecessor in office had considered the prayer made by the defendants in the present case and extended the period of filing of written statement till 09.06.2023 by way of offering one last and final opportunity for filing it upon observing further that or otherwise the chance would stand closed. The observation of Hon’ble High Court of Madras about the pendency of these matters since 2019 and the need for disposal of the matter as early as possible was yet again observed in the proceedings dated 30.05.2023. The Written Statement is stated to have been filed on 09.06.2023 within the time extended and granted by then Ld. Presiding officer of this Tribunal. 6.4 The contention raised by Ld. Sr. Counsel for respondents as regards non service of summons and OA book on the defendants as per Rule 11 of the DRT (Procedure) Rules for reckoning the period of 30 days for filing of Written Statement from date of service of such summons did not find favour with the Tribunal as the defendants entered appearance through their Ld. Counsel Mr. Panchapakesan by filing vakalat on 09.7.2019. i.e., the date of the 1st posting itself pursuant to service of summons on them as early on 27.6.2019. The acknowledgment cards available on record, vakalat filed by respondents as early on 09.07.2019 and the applicant’s memo dated

21.10.2019 rebels against rather falsifies the allegation of respondents as to they having been served with summons only in February 2022. The defendants 1 & 2 who had been appearing through their Ld. Counsel on 11.8.2022 had been only seeking time for filing written statement on all the subsequent hearings on 31.10.2022, 14.11.2022, 15.12.2022, 09.05.2023 & 30.05.2023 of which the last three hearings were before the Ld. Presiding officer of this Tribunal seeking time for filing written statement without having any complaints, grievance or the need to represent and record in its proceedings as regards non service of OA book on them for reasons obvious. 6.5 Going by the proceedings of the above six hearings, it is too late in the day to urge that they were precluded from filing of the written statement ever since their entering of appearance before this Tribunal on 09.7.2019 in view of non service of summons by the Registrar along with OA book as per Rule 11. The Tribunal is reminded of judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court rendered in the case titled ‘Sunil Poddar and Ors. Vs. Union Bank of India’, reported in MANU/SC/0322/2008 which is an enunciation of law on the point that defendant who otherwise has gained knowledge about the OA proceedings could not seek to set aside ex-parte order passed against him on the context of non-service of summons.

6.6 Palpably the Ld. Counsel for the defendants were seeking short time for filing written statement in every proceedings before Ld. Registrar or the Ld. Presiding Officer without any whisper or murmur as regards non service of OA book as per Rule 11 which is discernible from the proceedings available on record and the proceeding dated 30.5.2023 in which the reason attributed for non filing of written statement was to the effect of the need for carrying out the verification of reply statement and uploading of it in E-DRT. In all the hearings before this Tribunal, the Ld. Counsel for applicant had submitted about the requirement of defendants to file written statement and the time for filing so came to be sought for and obtained by Ld. Counsel for the defendants alone for the reason of their receipt of OA book. The fact remains that the Ld. Presiding Officer of this Tribunal had then granted time for filing of Written Statement in the proceedings dated 15.12.2022, 09.05.2023 & 30.05.2023 for a period spread over five and half months apart from the time granted by Ld. Registrar to the defendants on 11.8.2022, 31.10.2022 & 14.11.2022 after service of the OA book to them as early on 19.10.2019. The defendants in the given case ought to have filed the Written Statement as per S.19 (5) (i) of RDB Act and Rule 11 of Debts Recovery Tribunal (Procedure) Rules by 18.11.2019 and not beyond.

6.7 As pointed by the Ld. Sr. Counsel for the respondents, the written statement has been received on file by the Tribunal on 09.06.2023 whereupon the bank filed proof affidavit and the respondents/defendants filed counter proof affidavit. The Tribunal cannot give it a miss that written statement of the defendants 1 & 2 has come to be filed after 300 days from their seeking of time for filing written statement on 11.8.2022 notwithstanding their entering of appearance in the OA proceedings on 09.7.2019 and receiving OA Book on 19.10.2019.

6.8. Axiomatically, the insertion of the proviso to clause (i) of sub section (5) of Section 19 with effect from 04.11.2016 is to the effect of entitling the Defendant(s) to file a written statement beyond 30 days from service of summons provided this Tribunal grants additional time not exceeding 15 days for the reasons to be recorded in writing, should an exceptional and/or special circumstance be made out for granting of such extension. At the cost of repetition it is reiterated that the Respondents/Defendants who had received the OA Book as early on 19.10.2019 and appeared through their Ld. Counsel in six effective hearings between 11.08.2022 and 30.05.2023 after the COVID pandemic period and the expiry of time excluded for the purpose of limitation pursuant to the order of Hon’ble Apex Court passed in Suo Moto Writ Petition (C) No.3/2020, had filed Written

Statement on 09.06.2023 with a delay of around 1298 days from 19.11.2019 in negation of statutory timelines provided in S.19 (5) (i). 6.9 The Tribunal deems it just and expedient to produce the relevant provision of RDB Act and DRT (Procedure) Rules as hereunder: “19. [Application to the Tribunal. [Substituted by Act 1 of 2000, Section 9, for Section 19 (w.r.e.f. 17.1.2000).]

5. (i) the defendant shall within a period of thirty days from the date of service of summons, present a written statement of his defence including claim for set-off under sub- section (6) or a counter-claim under sub-section (8), if any, and such written statement shall be accompanied with original documents or true copies thereof with the leave of the Tribunal, relied on by the defendant in his defence:

Provided that where the defendant fails to file the written statement within the said period of thirty days, the Presiding Officer may, in exceptional cases and in special circumstances to be recorded in writing, extend the said period by such further period not exceeding fifteen days to file the written statement of his defence; 19(8) A defendant in an application may, in addition to his right of pleading a set-off under sub-section (6), set up, by way of counter-claim against the claim of the applicant, any right or claim in respect of a cause of action accruing to the defendant against the applicant either before or after the filing of the application but before the defendant has delivered his defence or before the time limited for delivering his defence has expired, whether such counter-claim is in the nature of a claim for damages or not.

19 (9) A counter-claim under sub-section (8) shall have the same effect as a cross-suit so as to enable the Tribunal to pass a final order on the same application, both on the original claim and on the counter-claim.

19 (10) The applicant shall be at liberty to file a written statement in answer to the counter- claim of the defendant within such period [as may be prescribed] [Substituted by Act No. 44 of 2016.].

19(10-A) Every application under sub-section (3) or written statement of defendant under sub-section (5) or claim of set-off under sub-section (6) or a counter-claim under sub- section (8) by the defendant, or written statement by the applicant in reply to the counter- claim, under sub-section (10) or any other pleading whatsoever, shall be supported by an affidavit sworn in by the applicant or defendant verifying all the facts and pleadings, the statements pleading documents and other documentary evidence annexed to the application or written statement or reply to set-off or counter-claim, as the case may be:

Provided that if there is any evidence of witnesses to be led by any party, the affidavits of such witnesses shall be filed simultaneously by the party with the application or written statement or replies filed under sub-section (10A).”

The Debts Recovery Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1993

“11. Endorsing copy of application to the defendant. – A copy of the application and paper-book shall be served on each of the defendants as soon as they are filed, by the Registrar by registered post.

12. Filing of written statement and other documents by the defendant and by the applicant as a reply to the written statement.–

(1) The defendant may, within a period of thirty days from the date of service of summons, file two complete sets of written statement including claim for set-off or counter claim, if any, along with documents in a paper book form.

(2) A copy of the written statement filed under sub-rule (1) shall be served to the applicant.

(3) If the defendant fails to file the written statement of his defence, including claim for set-off or counter claim under sub-rule (1), if any, within the period of thirty days, the Presiding Officer may in exceptional cases and special circumstances to be recorded in writing, extend the period, by such further period not exceeding fifteen days.

(4) If the defendant have filed their claim for set-off or counter claim, the applicant shall file reply statement in answer to the claim for set-off or counter claim within a period of thirty days of filing of such claims.

(5) If the applicant fails to file his reply within the period of thirty days, the Presiding Officer may, in exceptional cases and special circumstances, to be recorded in writing, extend the period, by such further period not exceeding fifteen days.

(6) The written statement of the defendant including claim for set-off or counter claim or any other pleading whatsoever by the defendant or the applicant, as the case may be, shall be supported by an affidavit sworn in by the defendant or the applicant or the witnesses, verifying all the facts and pleadings and other documents annexed and the affidavits of witnesses to be led by defendant or the applicant shall be filed simultaneously with the written statement of the defendant or the reply of the applicant.

(7) If the defendant or the applicant as the case may be, fails to file the reply as specified above, the Tribunal may proceed forthwith to pass an order on the application as it thinks fit.” 6.10 Going by the foregoing provisions, the 30 days time limit for filing written statement with an inhibition to the Presiding Officer to extend the period beyond 15 days is a provision brought into the statute book with an avowed object of recovering/realizing public funds expeditiously by stipulating strict timeline for filing of pleadings and evidence. It is needless to say that the expression “not exceeding fifteen days” makes such timelines mandatory, which is to be granted by Presiding Officer only for special or exceptional circumstances to be recorded in writing and not routinely or as a matter of right. The Tribunal could see similar provisions in section 38(3)(a) of Consumer Protection Act 2019 which mandates filing of written version within 45 days and second proviso to sub-rule (1) of Order V Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (as stood amended by the Commercial Courts, Commercial Division and Commercial Appellate Division of High Courts Act 2015) which stood amended w.r.e.f. 23.10.2015 providing for 30 days time limit for filing of Written Statement and a grace period of 90 days as may be provided by the Court for reasons to be recorded in writing with a time ceiling of 120 days in all for filing of written statement.

6.11 The Tribunal is of the definitive view and opinion that such time ceiling given under RDB Act cannot be given a go-by either by the Presiding Officer or the Applicant and Defendant(s) which would render the legislative intendment of inserting the said provision otiose, nugatory or redundant. The Tribunal’s such view is fortified by the Division Bench judgment of

Hon’ble High Court of Madras rendered in M/s. South Indian Mint & Aeromatic Products Ltd. which elucidates and declares the law on the lines that when the statute prescribes an outer time-limit for filing Written Statement/Set off/ Counter Claim as the case may be, the same has to be given effect in letter and spirit and it would not be open to the defendants to seek leave to file a Counter Claim at any stage by extending the period provided therefore in sub Section (5) of Section 19 of the Act. The Division Bench of Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in Anita Garg & others, the Division of Bench of Hon’ble High Court of Madhya Pradesh in M/s. Crest Steel & Power Private Ltd. and the Hon’ble Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, Kolkata in Umang Kejiriwal and another had held that the time period provided for filing written statement in Section 19 (5) (i) is mandatory which cannot be extended. The Tribunal is also reminded of yet another judgment of the Division Bench of the Hon’ble High Court of Punjab and Haryana rendered in the case titled “Kaur Sain Spinners Limited and Ors. Vs. Debts Recovery Tribunal-III and Ors.”, reported in MANU/PH/1304/2021 wherein it is held thus :

27. Thus, keeping in view the object and purpose of the statute, we find that written statement was required to be filed within 30 days from the date of receipt of summons which could in exceptions cases or in special circumstances be extended by the Tribunal by another 15 days. Since, claim of the Bank is for recovery of an amount of ' 49.44.65,248/-, therefore, the provisions of the 1993 Act have to be assigned the meaning which is keeping in view the objective of the Act rather than to frustrate the object. So, we are of the considered view that the petitioners have lost their right to file written statement, having failed to do so within 30 days. Besides, from the material The Registrar placed on the file, it is further evidently crystal clear that apart from being defaulter of the respondent - bank, the petitioners had taken loans from other banks also, to the tune of more than Rs.240 crores and it would certainly lead to draw an irresistible and unerring conclusion that the petitioners intended to usurp the public money.

28. …………………………

29. …………………………

30. To determine the impact of above authority cited by the petitioner, we would like have to determine the scope of The Civil Procedure Code. The Civil Procedure Code is a general law and will not affect local or special laws which are already in force. In case of any conflict with local or special laws, the local or special law will prevail over the Civil Procedure Code. In case, if the local or special law is silent about any particular issue, then the Civil Procedure Code will apply. Accordingly in this case. Section 19(5) of the 1993 Act specifically provides for the filing of written statement within 30 days and only in exceptional and special circumstances time period can exceed 15 days to file the written statement Therefore, Tribunal was not bound by procedure laid down by Civil Procedure Code but shall be guided by principles of natural justice and subject to other provisions of this Act and Rules. Tribunal shall have powers to regulate its own procedure.”

6.12 The legal position regarding the time period for filing Written Statement being as afore, the Tribunal is now required to delve at and decide whether its act of granting time for filing of written statement by defendants could be now undone - it being reminded of well settled legal maxim “Actus curiae neminem gravabit” meaning thereby that an act of Court or Tribunal shall prejudice no man. It is also required to decide whether the conduct of either the applicant or defendants in not raising the issue of period of limitation prescribed under the proviso to 19 (5)(i) and Rule 12 (3) for filing of Written Statement by the defendant(s) before this Tribunal at the relevant time or before Hon’ble High Court of Madras in CRP.No.2492/2024 amounts to waiver, estoppel, abandonment or acquiescence on their part from raising it before this Tribunal after the matter was remanded back for consideration afresh and in accordance with law. It is no doubt true that the OA stood remanded back for consideration afresh by this Tribunal but in accordance with law. Even if we are to hold that the conduct of the applicant bank or its Ld. Counsel in not raising the issue of statutory time-lines for receiving written statement at relevant time is to be held as a concession on their part, it is trite law that such concession would not confer jurisdictional power or authority to this Tribunal to extend time beyond statutory timelines and it is well settled principle of law that there can be no estoppels against a statue. 6.13 The judgment of Apex Court in SGC Contracts (India) Pvt. Ltd. relied on the side of petitioner / applicant bank renders the answer to the anxious consideration as to whether the reception of written statement by this Tribunal vide its proceedings dated 09.6.2023 would operate as resjudicata in now arriving at a different decision in the matter of reception of such pleadings on the side of defendants by way of written statement. The Hon’ble Apex Court in para 4 of said judgment had observed about a similar factual situation in that case where another Ld. Single Judge took up the application on 24.9.2018 and held that the 05.12.2017 order regarding filing of written statement is final even though the provision of the law may provide otherwise. First defendant’s written statement which was filed on 15.12.2017 should be taken on record was his further observation therein. The petitioner having filed the SLP against the afore said two orders dated 05.12.2017 and 24.9.2018, the Hon’ble Apex Court in para 18 of the said order upon observing and holding that even assuming that 05.12.2017 order is final, res judicata cannot stand in the way of an erroneous interpretation of statutory provision and proceeded to hold that the said case being one such case the 2nd order dated 24.9.2018 passed by another Ld. Single Judge must also be set aside. The said judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court though came to be rendered with regard to the mandatory time period provided under Order 5 Rule 1 (1) read with order 8 Rule 1 and 10 CPC as amended for suits relating to commercial disputes is applicable with equal force to the present case under RDB Act for reasons alluded infra and elsewhere in this order. 6.14 The time period provided in proviso to Section 19 (5) (i) of RDB Act being “not exceeding 15 days” which the Presiding Officer of this Tribunal could extend beyond 30 days from the date of service of summons and OA book, renders the said timelines mandatory not conferring powers, authority, jurisdiction or discretion to the Presiding Officer to grant extension of time beyond 15 days more so in view of Rule 12(7) postulating that the Tribunal may proceed forthwith to pass an order on the application of the defendant or the applicant fails to file their reply within the specified time. The said statutory timelines had gone unnoticed by the Tribunal on 09.6.2023 when reply statement came to be received or when time for filing written statement came to be extended by it or its Ld. Registrar between 11.8.2022 & 30.5.2023 on six occasions.

6.15 The Apex Court’s said judgment in SGC Contracts (India) Pvt. Ltd. also answers the query and worry of this Tribunal as to whether its act of striking off the reply statement filed beyond the statutory maximum period of 45 days would not be an act of the Tribunal causing harm to the defendants 1 & 2 who came to be granted extension of time in filing of reply statement on seven occasions. The said Court had in para 15 of said order opined that the doctrine ‘an act of Court should prejudice no man’ in having permitted the defendant therein to file the written statement beyond 120 days cannot be used when the res is not yet judicata. The said Court further held that case that 05.12.2017 order is res subjudice in as much as its correctness has been challenged before it. Ld. Counsel for the applicant bank relied on the said judgment and rightly pointed out that the Division Bench of Hon’ble High Court of Madras having remanded back the OA to this Tribunal vide its order dated 29.07.2025 in CRP.No.2514/2024 for consideration afresh and in accordance with law, the earlier order by my predecessor- in- office to the effect of receiving their written statement would not operate as res judicata in the matter of deciding the present MA seeking to strikeoff from its file the written statement of the respondents/defendants which has been received without considering the statutory prohibition under Section 19 (5) (i) of RDB Act. 6.16 The Tribunal is further disposed to think that once the Hon’ble High Court remanded back the matter for consideration afresh and in accordance with law, it is not rendered powerless to interpret the statutory provisions in the right perspective and proceeds to decide as to whether or not the written statement filed with an inordinate and inexplicable delay of more than 1298 days from when the defendants’ ought to have filed the same from their receipt of OA Book on 19.10.2019 could be struck off from its file. The judgment of Apex court in M/s.Anvita Auto Tech works Pvt. Ltd. relied by Ld. Sr. Counsel for defendants though is also a judgment rendered in the matter of filing of written statment beyond 120 days with a similar IA filed by the plaintiff seeking to strike out the defense filed beyond the mandatory period wherein the Lordships had permitted the appellant to file written statement by remanding back the matter to Trial Court imposing a cost of Rs.1,00,000/- and permitting the appellant to exercise his right of cross examination of plaintiff witness in commercial suit, the said judgment is distinguishable from the one relied by the petitioner/applicant bank of Hon’ble Apex Court in SCG Contracts (India) Pvt. Ltd., since the limitation period in M/s.Anvita Auto Tech Works Pvt. Ltd. for filing written statement commenced on 17.7.2021 and ended on 14.11.2021 when the nation was in garb of global pandemic of COVID 19 and the Apex Court In Re: Cognizance for extension of limitation in Suo Moto Writ Petition (C) No.3/2022 by exercise of its extraordinary powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India passed series of orders to exclude the period commencing from 15.3.2020 till 28.2.2022 for purpose of computing the limitation period under any general or special laws in respect of all judicial or quasi judicial proceedings. That was not the case in the above OA.

6.17. What more persuades this Tribunal to take a different view from that of my predecessor –in- office in the matter of extending the time period and receiving on file the written statement is the onus and the responsibility which it has got as a creature of statute to interpret the statutory provisions in its right perspective and not to erroneously interpret or overlook the statutory prohibition contained in Section 19 (5) (i). Its doing so has the sanction of law as fortified by the judgment of Hon’ble High Court of Kerala in Vineesh vs. State of Kerala wherein it elucidates the law that when a Single Judge renders a judgment without recognizing a binding precedent and relevant statutory provisions, the same Judge is justified in subsequently differing from that earlier view. The said Court further held that the strength of a Judge lies not in the claim of infallibility but in the courage to admit the error and the humility to correct it when conscience and law reveal a truer course. The said judgment propels this Tribunal to hold that the reception of written statement by then Ld. Presiding Officer in negation of the statutory inhibition contained in Section 19 (5) (i) to receive written statement beyond 15 days over and above 30 days from date of service of summons and OA

book is to be undone by striking off the written statement filed on 09.06.2023. 6.18 For the foregoing reasons, the MA stands allowed striking off the Written Statement from the file of the above OA. No order as to costs. [Dictated to my Steno directly on the computer, corrected and pronounced by me in the open Tribunal on this the 14 thday of May, 2026].

[ N SOMASUNDAAR ] PRESIDING OFFICER

IN THE DEBTS RECOVERY

TRIBUNAL, COIMBATORE

PRESENT: SRI N SOMASUNDAAR, B.A.; B.L. PRESIDING OFFICER

Dated the 14th day of May, 2026

M.A.No.23 of 2026 in OA No.252 of 2019

Between

M/s City Union Bank Limited Rep by its Assistant General Manager Mr.G.Vishwanathan, 27-30, Sarojini Street, Ram Nagar, Coimbatore – 641 009. ..… Petitioner/applicant

And

Mr. G. Jawahar S/o.V.P. Gopal, 141/71, T.V. Samy Road, R.S.Puram, Coimbatore – 641002. & another.

….. Respondents/Defendants

O R D E R