CANARA BANK vs M/s. ANBHU ROADWAYS (INDIA) PRIVATE LIMITED on 4 May 2026

O R D E R

IA No.1657/2016 & IA No.1658/2016 in Transferred Application No.143 of 2008 filed before the Ld. DRT Madurai and subsequently upon transfer to this Tribunal renumbered as T.A. No.16 of 2021, are respectively petitions seeking impleadment the Petitioner as 2nd Defendant in TA and to raise the order of attachment dated 06.12.2013 passed in I.A.No.505 of 2010 in T.A.No.143 of 2008 by the Ld. DRT, Madurai.

2. An additional common affidavit has since come to be filed in both the IAs on the side of Petitioner/Proposed Party claiming to be a bonafide purchaser of the property got attached in IA No.505/2010, to which the Ld. Counsel for the Respondent/Applicant Bank would seek to treat their counter statement filed already as their response to the petitioner’s additional affidavit as well.

2.1 IA No.1657/2016 filed by the Petitioner/Proposed Party Mr.M. Deivasigamani seeks to implead him as 2nd defendant before Ld. DRT, Madurai in Transferred Application No.143/2008 (subsequently transferred to this Tribunal and renumbered as T.A.No.16/2021) on the premise that he is a bonafide purchaser of the property set out in the registered Sale Deed dated 30.12.2011 bearing Document No.7178/2011 on the file of Joint Sub Registrar II, Namakkal, even prior to the date of its attachment on 16.12.2013 and that of its intimation to the Sub Registrar Office on 27.01.2014. The attached property originally belonged to M/s.K.K.R. Bus Service, a partnership firm having purchased the said property through a registered Sale Deed dated 19.02.2004 which in turn came to be purchased from the said firm by one A. Kavitha through a registered Sale Deed dated 14.06.2010 bearing Document No.3077/2010. The Petitioner having purchased the said property for a proper sale consideration through registered Sale Deed dated 30.12.2011 bearing Document No.7178/2011 from the said A. Kavitha and being in peaceful possession and enjoyment of the same upon having his name mutated in revenue records, needs to be impleaded as 2nd defendant in the TA 16/2021, for seeking raising of attachment ordered in IA No.505/2010 in respect of Plot No.25, New Survey No.61/64 situated at Kondichettipatti Village, Namakkal Taluk and District.

2.2 IA No.1658/2016 filed by the Petitioner /proposed party seeks to raise the attachment order dated 06.12.2013 passed in IA No.505/2010 in TA 143/2008 before Ld. DRT Madurai (which is subsequently transferred to this Tribunal and renumbered as T.A. No.16 of 2021) in respect of Plot No.25, New Survey No.61/64 situated at Kondichettipatti Village, Namakkal Taluk & District, accompanied by an affidavit dated 25.07.2016 and Additional Affidavit dated 13.04.2016 affirming inter-alia that the 1st Respondent/Applicant Bank moved IA No.505/2010 for attachment of 2 items of property out of which the property having an extent of 2400 sq.ft is Plot No.25, New Survey No.61/64 situated at Kondichettipatti Village was ordered to be attached only on 16.12.2013; that the dues of the borrower/2nd Respondent not being a secured debt, the ABJ petition has come to be filed by the 1st Respondent/Applicant Bank stating the 2nd Respondent Company to be the owner of the said property although the same that belonged to M/s.K.K.R Bus Service, a partnership firm through a registered Sale Deed dated 19.02.2004 was sold to A.Kavitha through a registered Sale Deed dated 14.06.2010 from whom the petitioner purchased the same through a registered Sale Deed dated 30.12.2011 Document No.7178/2011 and got the revenue record also mutated in his favour; that the attachment of property got by the 1st Respondent/Applicant Bank after his purchase was known to the petitioner only recently; that the borrower company is not the owner of the petition mentioned property of which the petitioner is a bonafide purchaser and after two years of his such purchase, ABJ petition in respect of his property was got ordered on 06.12.2013 and intimated to Sub-Registrar Office only on 27.01.2014; that in view of the above, the attachment over the petitioner’s property has to be raised also considering the fact that the subject property belonged to M/s.K.K.R Bus Service, a partnership firm which a distinct legal entity, separate from M/s.Anbhu Roadways (India) Pvt. Ltd. which is a Private Limited Company; that as one Mr.K.R. Appu, a partner of M/s.KKR Bus Service is also connected with M/s.Anbhu Roadways (India) Pvt. Ltd. which are separate, independent, different legal entities, the Respondent/Applicant Bank while filing IA No.505/2010 deliberately and knowingly misrepresented before this Tribunal as if the property belonging to M/s.KKR Bus service is the property of the borrower namely M/s.Anbhu Roadways (India) Pvt. Ltd.; that such representation being false to the knowledge of the Respondent/Applicant Bank amounts to deliberate suppression of materials facts and fraud upon this Tribunal with the sole intention of securing an order of Attachment which it was otherwise not entitled to; that the Respondent/Applicant Bank was fully aware of or in any event ought to have known upon due diligence that the property stands in the name of M/s.K.K.R Bus Service which is not the borrower and have no contractual or legal liability towards the bank; that M/s.K.K.R Bus Service is a complete stranger to the loan transaction it not having been a borrower, guarantor, co-applicant and co-obligant who had offered any security by way of a mortgage or charge; that the Respondent/Applicant Bank has intentionally projected the property of a third party as that of the borrower thereby misleading the Tribunal and securing an order of injunction/attachment by fraud; that such suppression is not a mere irregularity but a fundamental defect affecting the very jurisdiction of this Tribunal to pass an order of attachment over the said property; that it is a settled principle of law that any order obtained by suppression of material facts or by playing fraud upon the Tribunal is a nullity and non-est in law and can be set aside at anytime; that the Respondent/Applicant Bank failed to implead the true owner M/s.KKR Bus Service and obtained an order of injunction behind its back; that the petitioner being the subsequent purchaser whose rights are directly affected was also not issued any notice nor afforded any opportunity of hearing in gross violation of the principles of natural justice particularly the Rule of audi alteram partem; that the Respondent/Applicant Bank cannot justify its action merely on ground that Mr.K.R. Appu is connected with both entities; that it is a settled legal position that a partnership firm and a private limited company are distinct legal entities and the property of one cannot be attached for the liabilities of the other in the absence of any legally enforceable charge, guarantee or security interest; that any injunction order passed against Mr.K.R. Appu in his individual capacity or in relation to M/s.Anbhu Roadways (India) Pvt. Ltd. cannot and does not operate as a restraint against the independent property of M/s.KKR Bus Service; that the said K.R. Appu as the partner of M/s.KKR Bus Service has sold the property to one Mrs.Kavitha and thereafter the petitioner purchased the same in the year 2011 for a valuable consideration; that the Respondent/Applicant Bank being a public sector bank and an instrumentality discharging public functions is under a legal obligation to act with utmost transparency, fairness and diligence particularly when seeking to affect immovable property rights; that the Respondent/Applicant Bank after obtaining alleged order of interim injunction/attachment from this Tribunal failed to take necessary steps to give due public notice of the said order including failure to ensure proper reflection of such order in the records of the jurisdictional Sub-Registrar; that the subject property is situated within the territorial limits of Namakkal District whereas the order of injunction was obtained from the Tribunal at Madurai which is situated in different jurisdiction; that it was incumbent upon the Respondent Bank to ensure that the order of injunction is duly communicated and recorded with the concerned Sub-Registrar Office having jurisdiction over the property so as to bind third parties and put prospective purchasers on notice; that the petitioner having acquired valid title through a lawful chain of transactions is a bonafide purchaser for value without notice; that at the time of purchase as there was no lawful disclosure of any valid attachment nor any legally sustainable encumbrance affecting the title of the petitioner, the Respondent/Applicant Bank has no right or authority to attach the said property; and that the Attachment being illegal without jurisdiction, is liable to be set aside.

2.3 The counter statements filed by 1st Respondent/Applicant Bank in both the IAs are on the lines that the petitioner has not any right for claiming his impleadment in the main application and for seeking of raising of attachment since the property morefully described in the petition was initially purchased by Mr.K.R. Appu in his capacity as Managing Partner of M/s.KKR Bus Service by a sale deed registered as Document No.360/2004; that the 1st Respondent/Applicant Bank had on 15.03.2010 filed a petition to attach the petition mentioned

property in which the Tribunal had granted an order of interim injunction on 06.05.2010 restraining the defendants from alienating the petition mentioned property; that the defendant K.R. Appu in gross violation of the injunction order and with a view to defraud the bank executed a sale deed dated 14.06.2010 in favour of his wife Mrs.Kavitha registered as Document No.3077/2010 who in turn had sold the same to the petitioner on 30.12.2011; that the defendant having been set ex-parte on 16.12.2007 the attachment was ordered on 06.12.2013; that the sale effected in favour of Kavitha, W/o. Appu is void on account of injunction passed by this Tribunal restraining the Defendants from alienating the property; that the said Kavitha having not any valid title could not have conveyed petitioned mentioned property; that the sale executed by Mr.K.R. Appu as Managing Partner of M/s.K.K.R Bus Service in favour of his wife Kavitha being a sham and illegal transaction solely created to bypass an order of injunction granted by this Tribunal, the petitioner has no right to claim to be impleaded in the main application; and that the IAs are only to be liable.

3. Heard in extenso the factual and legal submissions made on either side. The Ld. Counsel appearing for the 1st Respondent/Applicant Bank would emphatically contend that this Tribunal having granted and passed an order of injunction on 06.05.2010 restraining the Defendants from alienating or encumbering the property mentioned in ABJ petition in IA No.505/2010, the Managing Director of Defendant Company Mr.K.R. Appu had sold the property to his wife Kavitha on 14.06.2010 by way of sham and nominal sale deed to play a fraud upon this Tribunal and such a sale while an injunction order of the Tribunal is pending is non-est and invalid. To succor strength for his such submission, Ld. Counsel for the 1st Respondent/Applicant Bank placed his reliance on the following judgments:

i. The Supreme Court in its judgment rendered in “Surjit Singh & Ors. Etc. Etc vs Harbans Singh & Ors. Etc. Etc”, reported in 1996 AIR 135 : 1995 SCC (6) 50, held thus :

“4. ……………………..

In sum, it did not make any appreciable difference whether property per se had been alienated or a decree pertaining to that property. In defiance of the restraint order, the alienation/assignment was made. If we were to let it go as such, it would defeat the ends of justice and the prevalent public policy. When the Court intends a particular state of affairs to exist while it is in seisin of a lis, that state of affairs is not only required to be maintained, but it is presumed to exist till the Court orders otherwise. The Court, in these circumstances has the duty, as also the right, to treat the alienation/assignment as having not taken place at all for its purposes. …………………………”.

ii. The Hon’ble High Court of New Delhi in its judgment rendered in “Sonu Bhati & Anr. vs Archana Jain & Ors.”, reported in Indian Kanoon - http://indiankanoon.org/doc/113619926/, held thus : “19. To the same effect are the decisions of the Madras and Calcutta High Courts in Century Flour Mills Ltd. v. S. Suppiah [AIR 1975 Mad 270 : (1975) 2 Mad LJ 54] and Sujit Pal v. Prabir Kumar Sun [AIR 1986 Cal 220 : (1986) 90 CWN 342]. In Century Flour Mills Ltd. [AIR 1975 Mad 270 : (1975) 2 Mad LJ 54] it was held by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court that where an act is done in violation of an order of stay or injunction, it is the duty of the court, as a policy, to set the wrong right and not allow the perpetuation of the wrongdoing. The inherent power of the court, it was held, is not only available in such a case, but it is bound to exercise it to undo the wrong in the interest of justice. That was a case where a meeting was held contrary to an order of injunction. The Court refused to recognise that the holding of the meeting is a legal one. It put back the parties in the same position as they stood immediately prior to the service of the interim order.

22. In view of the above, we find no infirmity with the decision of the learned Single Judge in declaring the sale deeds, in question, as void. Once it is accepted that the sale deeds in question have been executed in violation of the orders passed by the court directing status quo to be maintained regarding title and possession of the suit property, the appellants also would have no locus to challenge any orders, which restore the title and possession of the property as obtaining on the date when the interim orders were passed. The sale deeds having been executed in violation of the orders of the court must be treated as non- existent. Thus, we find no ground to interfere with the impugned order declaring the same to be void.”

iii. The Hon’ble High Court of Mumbai in its judgment rendered in “Keshrimal Jivji Shah And Anr. vs Bank Of Maharashtra And Ors.” reported in Indian Kanoon - http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1031007/ : IV(2004)BC6 : 2004(3)MHLJ893, held thus : “6. It is pertinent to note that for protecting its security, respondent No. 1 bank moved an application for temporary injunction by way of Notice of Motion in the said suit. This Court (R.M. Lodha, J), after hearing respondent Nos. 1 and 2 granted ad-interim order of injunction on 6th March 1998 in terms of prayer Clause (b) which reads as under :-- "(b) that pending the hearing and final disposal of the suit, the Defendant No. 2 be restrained by himself, his servants and agents or otherwise howsoever by an order and injunction of this Hon'ble Court from in any manner disposing of or parting with possession of or alienating or entering or transferring or creating any right, title or interest in the said immovable property described in Exh.E to the plaint and in respect of the hypothecated goods and book debts described in the Deed of Hypothecation being Exh.15 to the plaint and/or from recovering or realising the book debts or any part thereof."

12. Being aggrieved by this order, petitioners have approached this Court invoking its jurisdiction under Article 226 of Constitution of India. The Courts below were of the view that sub-lease in favour of petitioners being in contravention of the order of injunction passed by this Court on 6th March 1998 is void and confers no right, title and interest in favour of petitioners herein. Besides this, the Courts below have observed that petitioners have failed to substantiate their pleas that they are bona fide purchasers for value without notice. This conclusion arrived at by the Courts below is seriously challenged on the ground that it is vitiated by errors apparent on the face of record and is wholly perverse. It is contended that Recovery Officer and D.R.T. had no jurisdiction to declare the transfer in favour of petitioners as void.

27. ………………………………………………………………………………………… …………………………………………………… …………………………………………These observations cannot be applied when it is noticed that during the pendency of an order of injunction, immovable property, which is subject matter of restraint or injunction, is transferred. When this course is admittedly adopted, then there is no choice but to declare the transaction as illegal. There is no question of then deciding the nature and effect of the order of injunction. 28. Mr. Naphade's submissions overlook the effect of an order of injunction. An order issuing interlocutory injunction is issued with a view to preserve and protect status quo during the pendency of the suit or litigation. The true effect of such an order is, therefore, preservation of status quo prevailing as on the date of issuance of the order. Any alteration in the status quo as prevailing and directed to be maintained by the Court of law is not permissible except with leave or sanction of Court. It is well settled that if Courts are not to honour and implement their own orders and encourage party litigants, be they public authorities, to invent methods of their own to short circuit and give a go by to the obligations and liabilities incurred by them under orders of Courts, the rule of law will become casualty in the process - a consequence to be jealously averred by all and at any rate by the highest Courts in the State, (see ).

29. ………………. Therefore, it is clear that the transfer had no legal effect. In view of our conclusion that the transfer was illegal, strictly speaking it is not necessary to go into other aspects and deal with contentions of Shri Naphade. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, answer to question No. 1 is that transfer is illegal and cannot be recognised. Consequently, transferee gets no valid title nor does he acquire any right or interest in the immovable property.”

4. Mr. A.Sanjiv Kumar, Ld. Counsel for the 1st Respondent/Applicant Bank submits that the law is trite that any stay order passed by a Court or Tribunal even without jurisdiction, cannot be defied or disobeyed and rather needs to be looked at with sanctity. This Tribunal’s order dated 06.05.2010 being a restraint order forbearing the defendants from alienating or encumbering the ABJ petition mentioned property, Mr.K.R.Appu ought not to have sold the property and such sale that too to his wife by a sham and nominal sale deed is illegal, invalid and non-est not conferring any title on her to pass a better title to the petitioner herein. Ld. Counsel also submitted that the injunction passed on 06.05.2010 and the attachment order passed on 06.12.2013 in IA No.505/2010 cannot be assailed by the petitioner who is a third party and in any respects the said order cannot be sought to be set aside by the Tribunal which passed the same after considering all facts and circumstances entitling the 1st Respondent/Applicant Bank to such an order. The remedy or legal recourse lies elsewhere by way of an Appeal, that too by the concerned firm or its purchaser Kavitha and not at the instance of the petitioner. Both the IAs filed by the present petitioner who is a purchaser of the property restrained to be sold, lacks locus, competence and any right much less a legal right to either seek his impleadment in the main SA or raising of attachment order made in IA No.505/2010 for the reason of which both the IAs deserve to be dismissed, would be his final submission.

5. Ms.Priyadharshini, Ld. Counsel for the Petitioner submits that the injunction sought for and obtained by the 1st Respondent/Applicant Bank projecting the petition mentioned property to be the property of the sole Defendant Company M/s.Anbhu Roadways (India) Pvt. Ltd. is a fraud played upon this Tribunal and it is a trite law that any act of fraud would vitiate all solemn proceedings. Ld. Counsel submitted that the property of a firm is not the property of a partner and the property of a firm cannot be stretched too far to be held in any event to be a property of a private limited company. What was sold to the petitioner’s vendor is a property of the firm M/s.K.K.R Bus Service and the injunction order obtained was against the property misstated to be that of a private limited company namely M/s.Anbhu Roadways (India) Pvt. Ltd. when the said partnership firm M/s.K.K.R Bus Service was not a guarantor or co-applicant or co-borrower answerable to the OA

claim. The injunction obtained on misrepresentation and misstatement of materials fact and truths does not restrain the firm from dealing with its assets for a valid consideration and the sale made by the said firm to Kavitha and the subsequent sale of Kavitha to petitioner are lawful since neither the injunction order or attachment order has been communicated to the concerned SRO to caution and advise the general public from not dealing with the petition mentioned property. The petitioner being a bonafide purchaser is entitled for protection and for seeking raising of attachment effected over his property by an order of this Tribunal. Ld. Counsel submitted that the true owner M/s.K.K.R Bus Service was not impleaded as a party in IA No.505/2010 for the reason of which the restraint order passed against the said firm would not have any legal effect or adverse impact over the subsequent sale effected either to Kavitha or thereafter to the petitioner. To succor strength to her such submissions, Ld. Counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the following judgments:

i. The Hon’ble High Court of Madras in “Sri Mappillai Vinayakar Cine Complex vs. Commercial Tax Officer”, reported in MANU/TN/0757/2008, readeth thus: “2. The brief facts that are necessary for disposal of the writ petition are set out below: The petitioner is a partnership firm originally constituted in the year 1984 and it is running a cinema theatre under a duly granted licence;

25. Therefore, the impugned proceedings which seek to attach the entire properties of the petitioner-firm including the shares of the partners, who are admittedly not the partners of the assessee-firm, viz., M/s. Sri Mappillai Vinayagar Roller Flour Mills firm is bad in law and hence so far as such partners are concerned the impugned attachment order cannot be sustained and accordingly set aside. Similarly in view of the view taken by this Court in respect of the liability of the partners of the petitioner-firm as far as the liability of the two private limited companies are concerned, the impugned attachment order seeking to enforce the liability of the aforesaid two private limited companies as against the properties of the partners of the petitioner-firm can also not be sustained.”

ii. The Hon’ble High Court of Kerala in its judgment rendered in “Subramanian vs. Padmaja”, reported in (2015) 01 KL CK 0140, held thus: “3. ……………………….In the aforesaid circumstances, we are of the view that to meet the ends of justice, a civil court passing an order of injunction restraining alienation of a specific immovable property, in exercise of the powers under Order XXXIX Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure can certainly direct such orders to be communicated to the Sub Registry concerned with a direction to enter the particulars of the order in Book1.

iii. The Aurangabad Bench of the Hon’ble High Court of Bombay in its judgment rendered in “Umaji Satwaji Shep (Died) by L.Rs. versus Gulam Mohmood Gulam Dastgir (Died) By L.Rs”, reported in 2022 LiveLaw (Bom) 431, held thus: “19. Therefore, considering all these facts, I come to the conclusion that the learned appellate court has wrongly restrained the appellants from alienating the suit properties till decision of appeal only on the basis of certain display board and by ignoring the vital ingredients required for granting equitable relief of temporary injunction. The record clearly shows that Azeemunisa Begum and Sayeda Begum failed to establish prima facie case in their favour for securing the temporary injunction as prayed. Moreover, they have also suppressed the earlier proceedings while fling RCS No.215 of 1994. It is to be noted here that there was no injunction of any kind was running against the present appellants during pendency of the suit. In fact, Azeemunisa Begum and Sayeda Begum despite fling the application for grant of temporary injunction in the suit, did not press the same and requested to the trial court to hear the same alongwith the suit. It is significant to note that the advocate for the present appellants had in fact made statement before the trial court that the appellants would not alienate the suit properties till the decision of the suit. Thus, on dismissal of the suit, the said statement also become useless and it can not be considered as a ground for granting further injunction in favour of Azeemunisa Begum and Sayeda Begum. By considering all these aspects, I certainly fnd that the learned appellate court has defnitely erred in restraining defendant Nos.3 & 4 namely, Umaji and Madhav and their legal representatives, who are the appellants in this appeal from alienating the suit properties and creating third party interest thereon till fnal disposal of the appeal. As such, the impugned order is liable to be quashed and set aside.”

6. A mindful reading of the affidavit filed by Sr. Manager of 1st Respondent/Applicant Bank in IA No.505/2010 makes it explicit that the affiant of said bank had affirmed inter-alia that the discreet inquiry made by it brought to light that the Respondent Company therein is owning the properties which are described in Schedule-A; that the said bank reliably understood about the said Respondent Company’s attempts made to preempt and frustrate the steps of the Applicant Bank to realize its dues; and that unless an order of attachment is ordered against the properties, the public sector bank would be made to suffer irreparable loss and hardships. This Tribunal had in its proceedings dated 06.05.2010 and 06.12.2013 ordered as hereunder:

Proceedings dated 06.05.2010 granting injunction:

“Counsel Mr. Parameswaran for A/B present and informed that they have filed IA No.505/10 (ABJ) and the service is awaited. Interim injunction is granted restraining the Respondents from alienating the scheduled petition mentioned property till the disposal of the IA No.505/10. The A/B is directed to send private notice to the Respondents intimating the interim injunction granted in the matter and to file memo of proof of service during the next date of hearing. Call on 07.06.2010 for further proceedings.”

Proceedings dated 06.12.2013 ordering attachment:

“Counsel for the Applicant Bank (Mr.Piramanayagam) present and filed proof of service for sending notice to Defendant in IA No.505/10 (ABJ). Since service completed, the name of Defendant is called in open court and called absent and set ex-parte. Under these circumstance, IA.No.505/10 (ABJ) is taken up for hearing and allowed. Counsel for the Applicant Bank is directed to intimate the attachment orders of the property to the concerned Sub-Registrar’s office. The Sub- Registrar concerned is directed to note the attachment order over the properties. The Registry is directed to send copy of this order to concerned Sub-Registrar office for doing needful. Further the Applicant Bank is directed to inform this order to the said Defendant. For taking steps and for filing PA/OD by the Applicant Bank. Call on 29.01.2014.”

6.1 As could be discerned from the aforestated proceedings, interim injunction was granted restraining the Respondent i.e, M/s.Anbhu Roadways (India) Pvt. Ltd. from alienating the schedule mentioned property till the disposal of IA No.505/2010, granting of interim injunction or stay falling within the incidental/ancillary powers of the Tribunal as held by Hon’ble Apex Court in its judgment rendered in the case of “Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation of India Ltd. vs. Grapco Industries Ltd. & Ors.” reported in AIR 1999 SC 1975 : 1999 (4) SCC 710 and the Full Bench judgment of the Hon’ble High Court of Madras rendered in the case of “Lakshmi Shankar Mills vs. Indian Bank” reported in AIR 2008 Madras 181 : 2008(2) CTC 529 : MANU/TN/0676/2008.

6.2 The sole Defendant in the OA is M/s.Anbhu Roadways (India) Pvt. Ltd., which is a registered Company under Companies Act 1953 being a juristic person separate, distinct and independent from that of its shareholders and directors. The 1st Respondent/Applicant Bank in its counter statement filed in both the IAs would admit the petition mentioned property to be the property of a firm M/s.K.K.R Bus service by a virtue of sale deed Document No.360/2004. While the said property is concededly a property of a partnership firm and the said firm is not a privy or party to the loan transaction of the Defendant Company contracted with the Applicant Bank either as a co-applicant, co-obligant, borrower, guarantor or mortgagor, the said property which cannot be equated as a property of its partners in terms of Section 14 of Partnership Act, could not have been sought to be attached or injuncted by making an application for ABJ in IA No.505/2010.

6.3 The submission of the Ld. Counsel for the 1st Respondent/Applicant Bank made on the lines that an injunction order passed for whatever reasons will enure to their benefit and the sale made by M/s.K.K.R Bus Service by its partner Mr.K.R. Appu who is a Director in the Defendant Company is a sale within the family which requires no protection, did not impress this Tribunal for more than one reasons. The injunction so obtained on 06.05.2010 on the premise that the Defendant Company should be restrained from selling or encumbering its property failing which realization of the fruits of the final order or recovery order so likely to be passed would be frustrated do not stand the edifice on which it came to be granted. The moment the said property turns out to be the property of a totally different entity namely M/s.K.K.R Bus Service - a partnership firm, as the injunction order so obtained fails to satisfy all three tests required for ordering so in the absence of a prime-facie case in favour of the applicant bank; balance of convenience not being in favour of the Applicant Bank; and the Applicant Bank not standing to suffer any prejudice since it is not the Defendant Company which was reliably

learnt to have attempted at sale of its property to defeat or defraud its claim. 6.4 The attachment got subsequently ordered by the Tribunal on 06.12.2013 is also bad in law since it does not stand the test for ordering so in terms of sub-section (13) (A) of Section 19 of RDB Act which readeth thus: “Where, at any stage of the proceedings, [the Tribunal on an application made by the applicant along with particulars of property to be attached and estimated value thereof, or otherwise is satisfied] [Substituted by Act No. 44 of 2016.] that the defendant, with intent to obstruct or delay or frustrate the execution of any order for the recovery of debt that may be passed against him,

(i) is about to dispose of the whole or any part of his property; or

(ii) is about to remove the whole or any part of the property from the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal; or

(iii) is likely to cause any damage or mischief to the property or affect its value by misuse or creating third party interest, the Tribunal may direct the defendant, within a time to be fixed by it, either to furnish security, in such sum as may be specified in the order, to produce and place at the disposal of the Tribunal, when required, the said property or the value of the same, or such portion thereof as may be sufficient to satisfy the certificate for the recovery of debt, or to appear and show cause why he should not furnish security.

6.5 The petitioner claiming and contending to be the bonafide purchaser is entitled to seek raising of attachment in terms of sub- section (16) of section 19 of RDB Act which renders an order of attachment made without complying with the provisions of sub-section

(13) to be void. At the cost of repetition, the Tribunal observes that the 1st Respondent/Applicant Bank would be entitled for ABJ order had the Defendant attempted to sell his property meaning thereby if the property was the property of Defendant Company itself and it was attempting to alienate or encumber it or to cause damage to it or to remove it from the territorial jurisdiction of the Tribunal, such an attachment is to be ordered or not otherwise.

6.6 The Tribunal gave an anxious consideration to the submissions made by the Ld. Counsel for the 1st Respondent/Applicant Bank as to whether the petitioner has no locus to challenge either the injunction or attachment ordered over his property and whether it is M/s.KKR Bus Service, a partnership firm or its purchaser Kavitha could alone challenge the same that too by way of an Appeal, the answer it gets is in the negative since the petitioner who claims to be purchaser without notice of either the attachment order or injunction order is entitled to seek raising of attachment by pointing out to the 1st Respondent/Applicant Bank’s failure to meet out the ingredients for its obtention of an order of attachment in terms of sub-section (13) (A) of Section 19 as it is the petitioner who is the person truly aggrieved and not the M/s.K.K.R Bus Service or Ms.Kavitha who has alienated the property and received its sale consideration.

6.7 The raising of attachment sought for by the petitioner herein under sub-section (16) of Section 19 of RDB Act is akin to seeking such raising of attachment by any person aggrieved under Order 38 Rule 10 of CPC and can be tested applying the same since importing of the equitable principles of CPC is permissible in RDB proceedings as well. This Tribunal respectfully reminded of the judgment of the Full Bench judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court rendered in the case of “Hamda Ammal Vs. Avadiappa Pathar & 3 Ors” reported in (1991) 1 SCC 715, which though is a judgment rendered in the context of Rule 5 and Rule 10 of order 38 CPC and section 64 of CPC, holds it to be very much applicable to the proceedings before the Tribunal under sub- sections (13)(A) & (25) of Section 19 of RDB Act r/w. R.18 of DRT (Procedure) Rules. The Tribunal

6.8 The 1st Respondent/Applicant Bank which admits the attached property to be the partnership firm now in its counter statement filed in the above IA, had misstated and misrepresented to this Tribunal in the affidavit affirmed and filed by it in IA No.505/2010 by stating the said property got injuncted eventually to be a property of the Defendant Company as a consequence of the discreet enquiry so made by it. Such a misstatement made in the affidavit filed along with IA 505/2010 renders and turns out the same to be a false affidavit, certainly disentitling it to the equitable relief of injunction which the 1st Respondent had then secured from this Tribunal on its surmises and conjectures as to the ownership of the said property without making discreet inquiry as falsely affirmed in its affidavit. The Tribunal arrives at such an inevitable conclusion fortified by the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India rendered in the case titled Sciemed Overseas Inc. vs. BOC India Limited and Ors. reported in MANU/SC/0020/2016, wherein it is held thus : “30. In the case of Suo Moto Proceedings Against R. Karuppan, Advocate MANU/SC/0338/2001 : (2001) 5 SCC 289 this Court had observed that the sanctity of affidavits filed by parties has to be preserved and protected and at the same time the filing of irresponsible statements without any regard to accuracy has to be discouraged. It was observed by this Court as follows:

Courts are entrusted with the powers of dispensation and adjudication of justice of the rival claims of the parties besides determining the criminal liability of the offenders for offences committed against the society. The courts are further expected to do justice quickly and impartially not being biased by any extraneous considerations. Justice dispensation system would be wrecked if statutory restrictions are not imposed upon the litigants, who attempt to mislead the court by filing and relying upon false evidence particularly in cases, the adjudication of which is dependent upon the statement of facts. If the result of the proceedings are to be respected, these issues before the courts must be resolved to the extent possible in accordance with the truth. The purity of proceedings of the court cannot be permitted to be sullied by a party on frivolous, vexatious or insufficient grounds or relying upon false evidence inspired by extraneous considerations or revengeful desire to harass or spite his opponent. Sanctity of the affidavits has to be preserved and protected discouraging the filing of irresponsible statements, without any regard to accuracy.

31. Similarly, in Muthu Karuppan v. Parithi Ilamvazhuthi MANU/SC/0418/2011 : (2011) 5 SCC 496 this Court expressed the view that the filing of a false affidavit should be effectively curbed with a strong hand. It is true that the observation was made in the context of contempt of Court proceedings, but the view expressed must be generally endorsed to preserve the purity of judicial proceedings. This is what was said:

Giving false evidence by filing false affidavit is an evil which must be effectively curbed with a strong hand. Prosecution should be ordered when it is considered expedient in the interest of justice to punish the delinquent, but there must be a prima facie case of "deliberate falsehood" on a matter of substance and the court should be satisfied that there is a reasonable foundation for the charge.”

6.9 The Debts Recovery Tribunal – a quasi judicial authority being a special Tribunal established under the RDB Act and held to be an effective part of the justice delivery system as per the weighty observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in its judgment rendered in case titled “Union of India vs. Delhi High Court Bar Association & Ors.” reported in AIR 2002 SUPREME COURT 1479, has a duty to ensure purity of the judicial proceedings before it as also to avoid misuse or abuse of its process and proceedings by any parties upon filing false affidavit or affidavit containing misstatement of facts to secure an unfair advantage or a favourable order causing prejudice to a third party like that of the petitioner herein who had purchased the property which originally belonged to the partnership firm namely M/s. K.K.R Bus Service and not that of a Private Ltd. Company namely M/s. Anbhu Roadways (India) Pvt. Ltd. as falsely misstated in the affidavit by the 1st Respondent Bank for securing the order of injunction at the first instance and attachment over the property eventually. While a party to the lis is free to raise any contentions or grounds available to him under law to seek a relief, it however cannot be stretched to construe permitting such a party to approach this Tribunal or any court of law with falsity, misrepresentation or misstatement of facts. In coming to such a conclusion this Tribunal is fortified in its view by the judgment rendered by the Division Bench of the Hon'ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh in the case titled A.

Anuradha v. Canara Bank, reported in CDJ 2006 APHC 1221. Though the said judgment was rendered in a writ petition filed before it, the observations made by the Hon'ble High Court are very much relevant here and are reproduced hereunder:- "(2) .............. we have not felt persuaded to entertain the writ petition because, (a) the petitioners have not approached the Court with clean hands inasmuch as they have deliberately omitted to place on record copies of notices issued by the respondent Bank under Sections 13(2) and 13(4) of the Act, Order dated 7-4-2005 passed by Debts Recovery Tribunal, Hyderabad dismissing SA No. 77 of 2005. Copy of the order passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate under Section 14 has also not been placed before the Court. It is not the petitioners' case that they do not have knowledge of the notices issued by the respondent Bank under Sections 13(2) and 13(4) of the Act or the order passed by the competent Court under Section 14 of the Act. It is therefore reasonable to presume that they have deliberately omitted to place the relevant documents before the Court. In our view, by withholding the documents, which have direct bearing on the decision of the writ petition, the petitioners have tried to mislead the Court in accepting their innocuous prayer for issuance of a direction to the respondent to entertain their representation ...............

(3) TRUTH was the hallmark of the justice delivery system which operated in the country till the establishment of the court system under British rule. The people used to tell truth and truth only without being influenced by its consequences. In the present day judicial system the truth is perhaps the biggest casualty. Unscrupulous litigants like the petitioners leave no stone unturned to mislead the quasi-judicial and judicial authorities and the courts for material gains. The entire system has become victim of such persons. In order to meet this challenge, the courts have evolved new rules, strategies and techniques. One such rule is that the court will not grant hearing to a person who does not approach it with clean hands. To put it differently, a person who touches the fountain of justice with the tainted hand or who makes an attempt to pollute the course of justice by making false or misleading statements or by suppressing facts must be shown the door at the threshold.” (Emphasis is mine)

6.10 Having found and held that the injunction obtained or the attachment eventually ordered was in respect of the property of the

partnership firm M/s.KKR Bus Service and not that of Defendant Company M/s.Anbhu Roadways (India) Pvt. Ltd., the injunction so obtained on 06.05.2010 and the attachment ordered eventually on 06.12.2013 in IA No.505/2010 is declared to be of no legal consequences and the Tribunal is competent to declare so in its proceedings under sub-section (16) of Section 19 of RDB Act itself as sub-section (25) of the self-same provision read with Rule 18 of the Debts Recovery (Procedure) Rules entitles the Tribunal to pass such other orders to give effect to its orders or to prevent abuse of its orders or to sub-serve the ends of justice. The Hon’ble High Court of Kerala in its judgment rendered in the case titled “Mathai P.T. and Ors. vs. South Indian Bank Ltd. and Ors.” reported in MANU/KE/0616/2015 held thus: " In Ext. P17 order of the DRAT that is impugned in the OP (DRT), the Appellate Tribunal finds that the DRT had no jurisdiction to pass Ext. P14 order inasmuch as the order was passed in excess of the jurisdiction conferred on the Presiding officer under Section 19 of the RDDBFI Act. The appellate tribunal finds that, in an OA filed by the bank, the presiding officer of the DRT was only to determine the debt and then leave it to the recovery officer to recover the money found due, in accordance with Section 25 of the said Act. Counsel for the petitioner would vehemently contend, and in my view rightly so, that the DRT was well within its powers to pass Ext. P14 order permitting a partial redemption of Item 12 property. Section 19(25) of the RDDBFI Act confers powers on the DRT to "make such orders and give such directions as may be necessary or expedient to give effect to its orders or to prevent abuse of its process or to secure the ends of justice". While there are a plethora of judgments that recognise the legal position that the powers of the DRT under the RDDBFI Act are wider than that of the CivilCourt(See: Industrial C. and I. Corporation v. Grapco Industries MANU/SC/0372/1999 : 1999 KHC 794 : 1999 (4) SCC 710 : 1999 (3) KLT SN 91 : 199(2) KLJ NOC 19 : 1999 ISJ (Banking) 567 : AIR 1999 SC 1975; ICICI Bank v. DRA Chennai MANU/TN/4261/2011 : 2012 KHC 2358: AIR 2012 Mad. 111), I note that division bench of the Gujarat High Court in Lalitkumar Jivabhai Thakkar v. SBP MANU/GJ/0419/2009 : 2010 KHC 6542 : AIR 2010 Guj. 4 interpreted the expression "ends of justice" used in Section 19(25) of the RDDBFI Act as meaning: "Not only justice to the parties but also to witnesses and others which may be inconvenienced. Tribunal is empowered to make such orders and give such directions, as may be necessary or expedient to give effect to the orders lawfully passed. Tribunal is also empowered to make such orders and issue such directions so as to secure the ends of justice. Tribunal is also empowered to make such orders and issue such directions so that the process of the tribunal be not abused." In the light of the said interpretation with regard to its powers under the RDDBFI Act, Ext. P14 order of the DRT, that permitted the petitioners to redeem Item 12 property, which was a

Tarwad property of sentimental value to the petitioners, by paying an amount of Rs. 4,90,00,000/- to the respondent bank, based on independent and reliable valuation reports obtained by the DRT, and after taking note of the consent given by the co-mortgagors and the mortgagee bank, cannot be seen as one that the DRT did not have jurisdiction to pass. The findings of the appellate tribunal, to the contrary, are liable to be set aside and I do so."

6.11 The Tribunal which proceeded to grant an order of injunction on the misstatement of the 1st Respondent/Applicant Bank as to the said property being the property of defendant company itself, can certainly raise the order of attachment erroneously got passed by the 1st Respondent/Applicant Bank by indulging in abuse of its process, reminded of a well settled legal maxim “actus curiae neminem gravabit” meaning thereby that an act of Court or Tribunal shall prejudice no one.

The IA No.1658/2016 stands allowed by raising the attachment erroneously ordered in IA No.505/2010 with direction to the Registry to communicate as to this Tribunal’s lifting of the attachment order over the property mentioned in IA No.505/2010 to the concerned SRO to enter in its records and books the effacing of the attachment ordered on 06.12.2013 and entered in its books on 27.01.2014. There is however no order as to costs.

6.12 I.A.No.1657/2016 seeks impleadment of the petitioner/proposed party as 2nd Defendant in the TA. Even a stranger to an attachment proceedings who has a legal right over the property wrongfully attached can seek raising of such an attachment without seeking his impleadment in the main proceedings as a party defendant. The Tribunal proceeds to hold so in terms of O.38 R.10 of CPC r/w. S.19(25) of RDB Act and R.18 of DRT (Procedure) Rules without seeking a formal impleadment in the ABJ petition filed by the 1st Respondent/Applicant Bank.

Ergo, IA No.1657/2016 stands dismissed, however with no order as to the costs. [Dictated to my Steno directly on the computer, corrected and pronounced by me in the open Tribunal on this the 04th day of May, 2026].

[ N SOMASUNDAAR ] PRESIDING OFFICER

IN THE DEBTS RECOVERY

TRIBUNAL, COIMBATORE

PRESENT: SRI N SOMASUNDAAR, B.A.; B.L. PRESIDING OFFICER

Dated the 04th May, 2026

I.A. No.1657 of 2016 AND I.A.No.1658 of 2016 IN T.A. No.16 OF 2021

M. Deivasigamani S/o. Muthusamy Door No.4/72, South Street, Sellipalayam Village, Namakkal, Namakkal District.

……… Petitioner/Proposed Party

Versus

1. The Canara Bank No.32-C, Mohanoor Road, Namakkal.

………… Respondent/Applicant

2. M/s.Anbhu Roadways India Pvt. Ltd. No.200A, Padmavathy Complex, Salem Road, Namakkal, Represented by its Managing Director K.R. Appu.

...............Respondent/Respondent

.

O R D E R