MR S N ESWAA KUMAR vs CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA on 27 February 2026

**ORDER**

The petitioner filed Interlocutory Application (IA) 1974/2025 on 11.08.2025 under S.5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 r/w S.24 of the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 (as amended from time to time) – for short 'the RDB Act' and S.17(7) of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 as amended from time to time – hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' - Tripoli & Co.

praying to condone the delay in filing Unregistered Review Application (URA) Dy No.2165/2025. The petitioner is none other than the applicant in SA No.562/2023.

2. The case set out in the notary attested affidavit of the petitioner/applicant accompanying the IA in brief is as follows:- The default in prosecuting the SA arose on account of the then counsel failing to properly communicating the listing dates and status of the case. The petitioner/applicant was under the impression that the matter was diligently pursued. It is only upon engaging the present counsel recently that the applicant was made aware of the precise legal position and was advised that an application for recall and restoration on merits could be pursued before this Tribunal. The applicant is a lay person not well versed with the legal proceedings and acted in good faith based on the assurance of the previous counsel. Unless the matter is heard and decided on merits, the applicant will suffer irreparable loss.

3. The respondent/defendant filed a statement objection contending as follows:- The application is time barred. The grounds urged by the petitioner/applicant is wholly untenable.

4. R.5A of the Debts Recovery Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1993 (as amended from time to time) – for short 'the Rules' - deals with review of an order passed by the Tribunal on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the records, and it reads as below:- *"(1) Any party considering itself aggrieved by an order made by the Tribunal on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record desires to obtain a review of the order made against him, may apply for a review of the order to the Tribunal which had made the order.*

*(2) No application for review shall be made after the expiry of a period of thirty days from the date of the order and no such application shall be entertained unless it is accompanied by an affidavit verifying the application.*

*(3) Where it appears to the Tribunal that there is no sufficient ground for a review, it shall reject the application but where the Tribunal is of opinion that the application for review should be granted, shall grant the same.*

*PROVIDED that no such application shall be granted without previous notice to the opposite party to enable him to appear and to be heard in support of the order, a review of which is applied for."*

Tribal Re-Kap

5. The only point arises for consideration is as to whether the review petitioner/applicant is entitled to the relief prayed for?

6. The Point:- The review petitioner/applicant, who is none other than the borrower to a financial assistance in the form of overdraft limit of ₹160 lakhs availed on 31.12.2012 (which was further enhanced to ₹335 lakhs on 22.08.2014) from the Central Bank of India, filed SA 562/2023 on 17.11.2023 under S.17(1) of the Act praying to set aside the possession notice dated 19.08.2023 issued by the respondent/defendant under S.13(4) of the Act in respect of the schedule immovable property. The said SA was dismissed as barred by limitation as per the final order dated 30.08.2024.

7. Going by R.5A of the Rules r/w S.17(7) of the Act, the impugned final order passed by the Tribunal on 30.08.2024 is liable to be reviewed on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record. Even taking to the larger extent, O.47 R.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 provides for review of a Judgement on the grounds, namely:- (i) discovery of new and important matter of evidence which after the exercise of due diligence, was not within the knowledge of the applicant or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order was made, or (ii) some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record; or (iii) for any other sufficient reason (which has been interpreted to be analogous to the other reasons specified above). As per sub-rule (2) of R.5A of the Rules (as it stood amended vide GSR 1047 (E) dated 03.11.2016 and made effective from 04.11.2016) no application for review shall be made after the expiry of a period of thirty days from the date of the order. The aforesaid sub-rule is couched in a negative language implying a mandatory character of limitation. The use of the word 'shall' makes it further obligatory. As per the stricture laid down under sub-rule (2) of R.5A of the Rules, an application challenging the impugned final order dated 30.08.2024 ought to have been filed before this Tribunal on or before 30.09.2024 but the same was happened to be filed only on 04.08.2025 with a delay of 308 days.

Tiptal by Nup

8. The review petitioner/applicant in paragraph 4 of the RA under the head 'limitation' stated that the application has been filed within the period of limitation. The averments read as follows:- *"This Miscellaneous Application for recall is filed within a reasonable time and without any undue delay after dismissal of the earlier application."*

9. On scrutiny, the scrutiny hand of the Registry vide remarks dated 05.08.2025 noted a few defects including limitation. The Registry vide order dated 05.08.2025 granted time up to 21.08.2025 for curing the defects. The petitioner/applicant on 08.08.2025 filed a memo requesting to post the case before the Tribunal on 11.08.2025. The memo reads thus:- *"The applicant has filed this MA and it is prayed that the matter may be posted for hearing before this Hon'ble Tribunal on 11.08.2025."*

10. It is noted by the scrutiny hand that IA 1974/2025 has been filed on 11.08.2025 for condonation of delay. The defects were cured as per the remarks of the scrutiny hand dated 12.08.2025. The Registrar vide order dated 12.08.2025 ordered to place IA 1974/2025 for hearing on 13.08.2025. The order reads as below:- *"Memo filed by the applicant. Place the IA in diary stage on the delay for hearing before the Hon'ble Presiding Officer by 13.08.2025."*

11. When the matter came up before the Tribunal for the first time on 13.08.2025, Ld counsel for the petitioner/applicant alone was present. The respondent/defendant filed a statement of objection on 17.10.2025. Both sides were heard on 30.01.2026 and thus an order is being passed in IA 1974/2025.

12. According to the petitioner/applicant, as per the affidavit accompanying the IA, the default in prosecuting the SA arose on account of the then counsel failing to properly communicating the listing dates and status of the case and he was under the impression that the matter was diligently pursued and only upon engaging the present counsel recently that he was made aware of the precise legal position and was advised that an application for recall and restoration on merits could be pursued before this Typed by Rian

Tribunal. It may be noted that the petitioner/applicant came before this Tribunal not only on misconception law but on misconception of facts of the case also. The provision of law quoted in the UMA is with respect to review of the final order only. But the pleadings are made for recalling the final order dismissing the SA for default of the petitioner/applicant. No ground for review of the final order has been furnished in the application. The petitioner/applicant is confused with regard to the relief prayed for and the remedy available to him under law. The fee paid also is for an application filed for setting aside the final order passed dismissing the application for default. It may be noted that SA 562/2023 was dismissed as per the order dated 30.08.2024 passed in IA 2420/2023 for not maintainable as barred by limitation. The SA was dismissed on question of law having heard both sides and not for default of the petitioner/applicant as understood by him. Though the purported default in prosecuting the case has been attributed to the previous counsel who conducted the case, no affidavit from him as to the lapse occurred by him is placed along with the application without which no fault can be found against him. In the above circumstances, the pleadings put forth by the petitioner/applicant cannot be taken into consideration for condonation of delay as his remedy lies elsewhere.

13. It is also stated as a reason for the delay by the petitioner/applicant that he is a lay person not well versed with the legal proceedings and acted in good faith based on the assurance of the previous counsel and unless the matter is heard and decided on merits, he will suffer irreparable loss. It is well settled that ignorance of law is not an excuse for any misfeasance or malfeasance. It is not possible to understand as to how an application which is not even maintainable on question of law can be heard on merits of the case by this Tribunal within the four corners of the Act and the Rules made thereunder. This statement also is made from ignorance of law only. In the above circumstances, the lame excuses put forward by the petitioner/applicant are only made for Typed by Kuj the purpose of the application only and no reliance can be made on such averments. Admittedly, what prayed for is barred by limitation and the petitioner/applicant has no lawful reason and plausible explanation as to why the delay occurred.

14. It may be noted that the only provision available for condonation of delay is that under S.5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. It may be noted that by virtue of S.24 of the RDB Act, the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 are, as far as may be, made applicable to an application made to a Tribunal. The word 'application' as per S.2(b) of the RDB Act takes in an application made to a Tribunal under S.19 of the RDB Act only. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mardia Chemicals Ltd. v. Union of India [reported in (2004) 4 SCC 311] has categorically held that the proceedings under S.17 of the Act is not an appellate proceeding, but rather an initial action which is brought before a forum prescribed under the Act, and is like a suit under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Relying on the decision in *Mardia Chemicals'* case (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Transcore v. Union of India & Anr [reported in (2008) 1 SCC 125] has held that the Debts Recovery Tribunal acts in an original jurisdiction under S.17 of the Act. Pursuant thereto, the words 'right to appeal' in the marginal heading of S.17(1) of the Act was substituted by the word 'Application' with effect from 01.09.2016 vide SO 2831 (E) dated 01.09.2016. All the more, the proviso to S.17(1) of the Act indicates that the Debts Recovery Tribunal under S.17(1) of the Act exercises original jurisdiction. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ganesan v Commissioner, Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Board [reported in 2019 (2) KLT 925 (SC)] has held that the Limitation Act 1963 will not apply to appeals or applications before the Tribunals, unless expressly provided. Therefore, it may be noted that the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to an application filed under S.17(1) of the Act. Moreover, vide order dated 12.07.2023 in Miscellaneous Application IR No.1011/2019 in Securitisation Application IR No.3708/2018 this Tribunal categorically held that the Debts Recovery Trijal to War

Tribunal has no power to condone the delay in filing application under S.17 (1) of the Act, which has become absolute and final. Therefore, looking at any angle, the delay of 308 days in filing URA Dy No.2165/2025 praying to recall the final order dated 30.08.2024 passed in SA 562/2023 cannot be condoned by this Tribunal.

15. This Tribunal is required to weigh the explanations offered by the petitioner/applicant and the acceptability of the same. The delay in this case reflects the inactivity and the inaction on the part of the petitioner/applicant. The law does not permit one to sleep and to seek one's relief as and when one desires. When parties claiming to be aggrieved by the final order passed by this Tribunal in an application filed under S.17(1) of the Act and desires to obtain a review of the same and approach this Tribunal at their own leisure and pleasure, this Tribunal within the four corners of the Act and the Rules made thereunder is under legal obligation rather dutiful to scrutinise as to whether the grievance at a belated stage could be considered or not. The law does not permit a really aggrieved person to sleep and approach a legal forum as he desires. If he does so it is at his risk and responsibility only. In the instant case, the petitioner/applicant has approached this Tribunal with a delay of 308 days, which cannot be appreciated bearing in mind the avowed object of the Act. Indolent persons cannot expect any indulgence and interference from any court of law or Tribunal. The failure on the part of the petitioner/applicant in not showing due diligence in filing the URA at the right time and the delay taken in filing the same can only be construed, in the absence of any valid explanation, as gross negligence and lack of bonafides on his part. In the above facts and circumstances of the case, the delay of 308 days in filing of URA Dy No.2165/2025 cannot be condoned by this Tribunal as the same has been filed well beyond the period of limitation as prescribed under sub-rule (2) of R.5A of the Rules and that too without any requisite application fee. Therefore, looking at any angle, the delay of 308 days in filing of URA Dy No.2165/2025 cannot be condoned in any way.

Typed by: Rani

16. In the above facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the discussion as above, the delay of 308 days in presenting URA Dy No.2165/2025 cannot be condoned and thus the same cannot be entertained by this Tribunal. IA 1974/2025 is liable to be dismissed. Suffice it to say that URA Dy No.2165/2025 fails and thus is liable to be rejected as not maintainable before this Tribunal for barred by limitation.

17. In the result, IA 1974/2025 is dismissed. Consequently URA Dy No.2165/2025 is rejected. All pending IAs stand closed. No costs.

*[Dictated to my PA directly on the computer, typed by him, corrected and pronounced by me in the open Tribunal on this the 27^th day of February, 2026]*

**[ IMTIAZ ALI ]** **PRESIDING OFFICER**

Typed by: Rupa

IN THE DEBTS RECOVERY TRIBUNAL - 1, KARNATAKA AT BANGALORE

PRESENT: SRI IMTIAZ ALI PRESIDING OFFICER

Dated the 27^th day of February, 2026

**INTERLOCUTORY APPLICATION NO.1974 of 2025** **IN** **UNREGISTERED REVIEW APPLICATION** **Dy NO.2165/2025** **IN** **SECURITISATION APPLICATION NO.562 OF 2023**

Between

S N Eswara Kumar, S/o late S Narayana Raju, 17, G2 Lendi Garden Apartment, 5^th Cross, Shanthivana, Sahakarnagar, Bangalore, Karnataka – 560092. ....Petitioner/Applicant

And

The authorised officer, Central Bank of India, BTM Layout, Plot No.8, 100 ft Road, Stage 1 Phase 1, Bangalore, Karnataka – 560068. .... Respondent/Defendant

**ORDER**

27-02-26