MR SIDDARTH SONNAD vs CANARA BANK (SYNDICATE BANK) on 29 August 2025

**ORDER**

IA 3379/2022 has been filed on 26.12.2022 under S.5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 r/w S.24 of the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 (as amended from time to time) – for short 'the Act' - by the petitioner praying to condone the delay of 115 days in filing the aforesaid Review Application (RA) No.1/2023. The petitioner is none other than the 4^th defendant/4^th certificate debtor in OA 1050/2020.

Tripoli Kar

2. The case set out by the petitioner/4^th defendant/4^th certificate debtor in IA No.3379/2022 through his the notary attested affidavit accompanying the IA in brief is as follows:- This petitioner came to know about the final order dated 02.08.2022 passed in OA 1050/2020 during the first week of November only and the review application is filed within thirty days from the date of knowledge.

3. The 1^st respondent/applicant bank/certificate holder filed statement of objection on 05.11.2024 contending as follows:- The application is barred by limitation. There is a delay of more than 700 days. The petitioner/4^th defendant/4^th certificate debtor was duly served with summons in the OA. On the above contentions, the 1^st respondent/applicant bank/certificate holder prayed for dismissal of the application with costs.

4. Respondents 2 to 4/defendants 1 to 3/certificate debtors 1 to 3 were duly served with notice but they never appeared nor were they represented in the proceedings and thus remained absent.

5. The only point arises for consideration is as to whether the petitioner/4^th defendant/4^th certificate debtor is entitled to the relief prayed for?

6. At the outset, this Tribunal expresses its displeasure over the conduct on either side in prosecuting and defending the case. RA No.1/2023 was filed on 26.12.2022 along with IA 3379/2022 for condonation of delay. The 1^st respondent/applicant bank/certificate holder entered appearance through its officer in the proceedings on 13.04.2023 and through counsel by filing vakalath on 11.08.2023. However, Ld counsel for the 1^st respondent/applicant bank/certificate holder obtained adjournments from 11.08.2023 for filing a statement of objection to IA 3379/2022 and eventually the same was filed only on 05.11.2024. Thus, both sides could aid in protracting and prolonging an interlocutory proceeding for the last more than thirty two months.

7. At the outset, it may be pointed out by the Tribunal that the pleadings put forth by the petitioner/4^th defendant/4^th certificate debtor running into six pages in IA

3379/2022 and 25 pages in RA 1/2023 is not at all proper. The necessity of pleadings has to be understood realistically. The pleadings are not specific and precise. The facts of the case must be pleaded with specificity, particularity and precision. The insistence of pleadings is not to repeat the words of the statute and to cite the Judgements. In these circumstances, the laborious attempt made by the petitioner/4^th defendant/4^th certificate debtor to assail the final order dated 02.08.2022 and the prayer to condone the delay in an application to set aside the same on the grounds envisaged in the RA/IA cannot be accepted by this Tribunal. The Tribunal is under no obligation to entertain such pleas.

8. The Hon'ble High Court of Kerala in Mohammed Mamdouh Matwally Ghali v Kerala Automobiles Ltd [reported in 2011 (3) KLT 159] has held that insistence of the law on pleadings is not to repeat the words of statute and the necessity of pleadings has to be understood realistically. The relevant portion reads as below:- *"Forms we may have buried but they still rule us from the grave'. The necessity of pleadings has to be understood realistically. Proper pleadings are necessary not as a matter of ritual or as a fetish. The law of pleadings has its foundation on the principles of natural justice that the adversary must be notified of the precise nature of the challenge raised and given the opportunity to make his defence. The insistence of the law on pleadings is not to repeat the words of the statute. Notwithstanding the fact that a specific plea that the award is in conflict with the public policy of India is not raised in the petition filed under S.34, a total and holistic reading of the petition must eloquently convey that the challenge raised is on that ground also. In these circumstances, the laborious attempt made to assail the findings of the District Court on the ground that the findings are not supported by pleadings cannot be accepted."*

9. Also, the relief sought for in the RA is to set aside the ex-parte final order passed against him in OA 1050/2020 and to restore the same. But, seeking such relief, the petitioner/4^th defendant/4^th certificate debtor has filed an application under R.5A of the Debts Recovery Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1993 (as amended from time to time), which is envisaged for review of an order on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record only. The petitioner/4^th defendant/4^th certificate debtor has not pointed out any such error apparent on the face of the records crept in the final order dated 02.08.2022. But his grievance is to set aside the same on the ground of non-receipt of summons, which falls under S.22(2)(g) of the Act r/w O.9 R.13 of the Code of Civil DRAFT

Procedure, 1908. Therefore, the provisions quoted in the application and the title of the application itself is wrong.

10. Apart from the above, the address of the petitioner/4^th defendant is shown at two different places and respondents 2 to 4/defendants 1 to 3/certificate debtors 1 to 3 at four different places. It is not possible to understand as to how a person can reside physically at more than one place at the same time. Summons/notices cannot be issued to a party expecting to reside physically at more than one place simultaneously. This would cause delay in communication and non-service also. The petitioner/4^th defendant has not shown the correct address for communication for the aforesaid parties in his application. The 1^st respondent is shown as the authorised officer of the Canara Bank whereas the authorised officer has nothing to do with an application filed under S.19(1) of the Act before this Tribunal.

11. The Point:- Notwithstanding to the impenetrable obscurity and opacity in the pleadings drafted, this Tribunal would like to adjudicate the matter on its merits as could be inferred from the pleadings.

12. The 1^st respondent/applicant bank/certificate holder filed OA 1050/2020 on 04.09.2020 under S.19(1) of the Act for recovery of the sum of ₹1,54,61,000/- due under term loan account No.04488320000031, the sum of ₹2,13,69,970/- due under term loan account No.04488320000020 and the sum of ₹2,66,77,000/- due under term loan account No.04488320000049, totalling to the sum of ₹6,35,07,968/- with interest thereon @12.25% per annum with half yearly rests from the defendants 1 to 4 jointly and severally and by sale of A schedule hypothecated movables and B schedule mortgaged immovable properties.

13. The said OA was allowed as prayed for with interest and costs as per the final order dated 02.08.2022. Pursuant thereto, a recovery certificate bearing

No.430/2022 was issued on 15.03.2024 to the Recovery Officer for recovery of the certificate debt.

14. The petitioner/4^th defendant/4^th certificate debtor on 26.12.2022 filed RA No.1/2023 to set aside the aforesaid final order as against him and he has come up with this petition to condone the delay of 115 days in filing the same. According to the petitioner/4^th defendant/4^th certificate debtor, he came to know about the final order dated 02.08.2022 passed in OA 1050/2020 during the first week of November only and the review application is filed within thirty days from the date of knowledge. But the exact date of knowledge has not been divulged by him in the pleadings. Per contra, according to the 1^st respondent/applicant bank/certificate holder, the summons was duly served upon the petitioner/4^th defendant/4^th certificate debtor and he has not shown any sufficient reason for the delay in filing the application and there are no merits in the petition.

15. A perusal of the OA records shows that summons in this case was sent to the petitioner/4^th defendant/4^th certificate debtor by registered post on 25.09.2020 and he was duly served with such summons on 26.09.2020, as could be inferred from the postal acknowledgement card signed by him for having received the same and produced by the 1^st respondent/applicant bank/certificate holder in the OA proceedings. But he never appeared nor was he represented in the proceedings and thus he was declared ex-parte in the proceedings on 04.05.2022. Resultantly, the impugned final order was passed against him on 02.08.2022.

16. S.24 r/w S.2(b) of the Act says that the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963, shall, as far as may be, apply to an OA filed under S.19(1) of the Act. Needless to say, the instant application is governed by Art.123 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which reads as follows:- ✓

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<table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>Article</th> <th>Description of suit</th> <th>Period of limitation</th> <th>Time from which period begins to run</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>123</td> <td>To set aside a decree passed ex-parte or to re-hear an appeal decree or heard ex-parte.</td> <td>Thirty days</td> <td>The date of the decree or where the summons or notice was not duly served, when the applicant had knowledge of the decree.</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>

17. A careful reading of Art.123 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would clearly show that when summons is duly served on defendant, the period of limitation for filing an application for setting aside a decree passed ex-parte will begin to run not from the date of knowledge of the decree but from the date of the decree itself. Irrefragably, the petitioner/4^th defendant/4^th certificate debtor was duly served with summons in the OA as shown above. The ex-parte final order was passed against him only on 02.08.2022. Therefore, RA No.1/2023 ought to have been filed on or before 01.09.2022. But he filed the above application beyond such period i.e., only on 26.12.2022. Thus, there is a delay of 116 days in filing such application.

18. S.22(2)(g) of the Act r/w O.9 R.13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 provides for setting aside an ex-parte final order against a defendant, which provides for two reasons, namely (i) summons was not duly served and (ii) sufficient cause preventing the defendant from appearing when the suit was called on for hearing. Undisputedly, the petitioner/4^th defendant/4^th certificate debtor was duly served with summons in the OA by registered post on 26.09.2020. In the above circumstances, his contention to the tune that he was not aware of the final order dated 02.08.2022 passed in OA 1050/2020 and the said fact came to his knowledge only during the first week of November 2022 is only an outright lie, which belies his contention. Thus, the reasons shown by the petitioner/4^th defendant/4^th certificate debtor are only vague and he raised such contentions for the sake of the application only. He has not shown any sufficient and valid reason for his non-appearance in the proceedings. In the above circumstances, the contention raised by the petitioner/4^th defendant/4^th certificate debtor to the effect that he was not aware of the OA proceedings and could be aware of such proceedings only during the first week of

November 2022 cannot be believed even for a moment, which is only an outright lie. He was aware of the OA proceedings but he chose to abstain from the proceedings and he awoke from his slumber when he knew that his property is going to be sold in execution proceedings. If he wilfully abstained from the proceedings, it is at his risk and responsibility only. One cannot take advantage of one's own default.

19. This Tribunal is required to weigh the explanations offered by the petitioner/4^th defendant/4^th certificate debtor and the acceptability of the same. The delay in this case reflects the inactivity and the inaction on the part of the petitioner/4^th defendant/4^th certificate debtor. The law does not permit one to sleep and to seek one's relief as and when one desires. The failure on the part of the petitioner/4^th defendant/4^th certificate debtor in not showing due diligence in filing the Review Application (miscued title only) at the right time and the delay taken in filing the same can only be construed, in the absence of any valid explanation, as gross negligence and lack of bonafides on his part. If ex-parte final orders are set aside on flimsy grounds like these, there would be no finality to the applications filed before this Tribunal, which would adversely affect the avowed object of the Act. Thus, IA 3379/2022 is devoid of any merit and thus is liable to be dismissed.

20. The petitioner/4^th defendant/4^th certificate debtor in RA has submitted that the 1^st respondent/applicant bank/certificate holder has suppressed material facts before this Tribunal and he is not liable for the amounts claimed as due under the OA. According to him, he is having a good case on merits to contest the OA. But he has no reason as to why he did not file a written statement in the case despite receiving summons, if he had merits of the case. Notwithstanding the above legal position, this Tribunal is inclined to condone the delay of 116 days in filing RA No.1/2023 and to afford an opportunity to the petitioner/4^th defendant/4^th certificate debtor to prove his case and bonafides, but not lightly. In the above facts and circumstances of the case, it may not be inappropriate if the Tribunal directs him to deposit a sum of ₹200 lakhs (Rupees two hundred lakhs only), of which the sum of ₹100 lakhs on or before 15.09.2025 and the balance sum of ₹100 lakhs on or before 15.10.2025, by way of DD/RTGS/online transmission before the 1^st respondent/applicant bank/certificate holder. If the petitioner/4^th defendant/4^th certificate debtor deposits the aforesaid amounts on or before the respective dates, the 1^st respondent/applicant bank/certificate holder shall keep such amounts in a fixed deposit in the name of the Recovery Officer with auto renewal for six months. The 1^st respondent/applicant bank/certificate holder shall not disburse, close or transact with the same until further orders from this Tribunal.

21. In the result, IA 3379/2022 is allowed, subject to the strict compliance of the aforesaid condition, failing which the IA shall stand dismissed for non-compliance. For reporting compliance by either side, adjourned to 18.09.2025. No costs.

*[Dictated to my P.A. transcribed by him, corrected and pronounced by me in the open Tribunal on this the 29^th day of August, 2025]*

[ IMTIAZ ALI ] PRESIDING OFFICER

Tribunal Page

IN THE DEBTS RECOVERY TRIBUNAL - 1, KARNATAKA AT BANGALORE

PRESENT: SRI IMTIAZ ALI PRESIDING OFFICER

Dated the 29^th day of August, 2025

**INTERLOCUTORY APPLICATION NO.3379 OF 2022**

**IN REVIEW APPLICATION No.1/2023 IN ORIGINAL APPLICATION NO.1050 OF 2020**

Between

Siddarth Sonnad, S/o Sharanabasappa sonnad,

Bangalore, Karnataka – 560054. ..Petitioner/4^th defendant/ 4^th certificate debtor

And

The authorised officer, Canara Bank, (erstwhile Syndicate Bank), Basaveshwara Road, Bangalore, Karnataka – 560002

and three others.

.... Respondents/applicant bank and defendants 1 to 3

**ORDER**

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