M S S B VALVES INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED vs CANARA BANK on 29 August 2025

**ORDER**

The petitioner filed Interlocutory Application (IA) 2077/2024 on 21.09.2024 under S.5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 r/w S.24 of the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 (as amended from time to time) – for short 'the RDB Act' - praying to condone Taped by Prag the delay of 2828 days in filing the Review Application No.8/2024 filed on 22.08.2024 seeking to review the final order dated 12.02.2014 passed in Securitisation Application (SA) 227/2013 filed on 16.04.2013 under S.17(1) of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 as amended from time to time – hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'. The petitioner is none other than the applicant in the SA.

2. The case set out in the notary attested affidavit accompanying the IA in brief is as follows:- Taking into consideration of the covid-19 period of relaxation from 15.03.2020 to 28.02.2022 and the time spent before the Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka in WP No.13267/2024, there is a delay of 2828 days in filing RA 8/2024. The order dated 12.02.2014 was passed on misleading and suppression of the facts and that too in the absence of the counsel on record.

3. The 1^st respondent/defendant filed a statement objection on 10.06.2025 contending as follows:- There is no satisfactory explanation as to what prevented the petitioner/applicant from approaching the Tribunal within the stipulated time period. No sufficient case has been shown for condonation of delay. On the above contentions, the 1^st respondent/defendant prayed for dismissal of the application with costs.

4. The 2^nd respondent/auction purchaser was duly served with summons. But it never appeared nor was it represented in the proceedings and thus it remained absent.

5. Though the 1^st respondent/applicant filed a memo on 25.10.2024 undertaking to file vakalath, no vakalath has been filed in this case.

6. The only point arises for consideration is as to whether the petitioner/applicant is entitled to the relief prayed for?

7. The Point:- R.5A of the Debts Recovery Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1993 (as amended from time to time) – for short 'the DRT Rules' - deals with review of Typed by: Karp an order passed by the Tribunal on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the records, and it reads as below:- *"(1) Any party considering itself aggrieved by an order made by the Tribunal on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record desires to obtain a review of the order made against him, may apply for a review of the order to the Tribunal which had made the order.*

*(2) No application for review shall be made after the expiry of a period of thirty days from the date of the order and no such application shall be entertained unless it is accompanied by an affidavit verifying the application.*

*(3) Where it appears to the Tribunal that there is no sufficient ground for a review, it shall reject the application but where the Tribunal is of opinion that the application for review should be granted, shall grant the same.*

*PROVIDED that no such application shall be granted without previous notice to the opposite party to enable him to appear and to be heard in support of the order, a review of which is applied for."*

8. The proviso to sub-rule (3) of R.5A of the DRT Rules says that no review application shall be granted without previous notice to the opposite party to enable him to appear and to be heard. It may be noted that the words used therein is 'opposite party' and not respondents or defendants making it mandatory that the notice in the proceedings in a review application should be issued to the opposite party only. The use of the term 'opposite party' instead of any other term by the rule makers in R.5A of the DRT Rules is consciously made and with great significance only. It means that the notice in the proceedings in a review application shall be issued to the parties who were active and who have contested the original proceedings only. It may be noted that the 2^nd respondent/auction purchaser was not a party to SA 227/2013. In the above circumstances, notice to the 2^nd respondent/auction purchaser is not necessary and proper.

9. The review petitioner/applicant, who is none other than the borrower to a financial assistance of ₹100 lakhs availed from the 1^st respondent/defendant bank, filed SA 227/2013 on 10.04.2013 under S.17(1) of the Act praying to set aside the possession notice dated 22.03.2013 issued by the authorised officer of the 1^st respondent/defendant under S.13(4) of the Act in respect of the schedule immovable property taking symbolic possession of the same. The said SA was dismissed for non-prosecution as per the final order dated 12.02.2014.

Typed By: Kapi

10. Going by R.5A of the DRT Rules r/w S.17(7) of the Act, the impugned final order passed by the Tribunal on 12.02.2014 is liable to be reviewed on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record. Even taking to the larger extent, O.47 R.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 provides for review of a Judgement on the grounds, namely:- (i) discovery of new and important matter of evidence which after the exercise of due diligence, was not within the knowledge of the applicant or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order was made, or (ii) some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record; or (iii) for any other sufficient reason (which has been interpreted to be analogous to the other reasons specified above). As per sub-rule (2) of R.5A of the DRT Rules (as it stood amended vide GSR 1047 (E) dated 03.11.2016 and made effective from 04.11.2016) no application for review shall be made after the expiry of a period of thirty days from the date of the order. Prior to the amendment the period of limitation was sixty days, which is applicable to the instant application. The aforesaid sub-rule is couched in a negative language implying a mandatory character of limitation. The use of the word 'shall' makes it further obligatory. As per the stricture laid down under sub-rule (2) of R.5A of the DRT Rules, an application challenging the impugned final order dated 12.02.2014 ought to have been filed before this Tribunal on or before 14.04.2014 but the same was happened to be filed only on 22.08.2024 with a delay of 3783 days.

11. The review petitioner/applicant in paragraph 4 of the RA under the head 'limitation' stated that the application has been filed with a delay of 2828 days. The averments read as follows:- *"The petitioner declares that the impugned order passed by this Hon'ble Tribunal was dated 12.02.2014, this review petition as per latest amendment should have been filed within 30 days from the date of order. However, the amendment came into effect only in the year 2016. Therefore, if this aspect is taken into consideration, the petitioners are entitled for availing the exemption/limitation period of 60 days as the order is passed way back in the year 2014, much before amendment. However, there is a delay of 2828 days and an application under S.5 and under S.14 of the Limitation Act, to condone the delay of 2828 taking into consideration the exemption period of 30 days and covid-19 period relaxation period of 915 days (15.03.2020 to 28.02.2022) and time spent before the Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka in WP No.13267/2024 which was filed on 14.05.2024 and disposed on 12.07.2024, i.e 30 days (grace period) +*

Typed by: Raj

915 days (covid period) + 56 days (spent in High Court) = 1001 days, deducted from total number of days 3829 days = 2828 days delay.

*The respondent bank subsequent to initiating the measures under SARFAESI Act, 2002 and selling the schedule property, have filed an application under S.19 of the RDB Act, 1993, under the pretext of recovery of balance outstanding amount before this Hon'ble Tribunal, in OA No.1665/2014, which is pending adjudication, where they have mentioned that the account is classified as NPA and have issued the demand notice dated 16.01.2013, took possession of the mortgaged property and subsequently sold to 2^nd respondent herein for a sum of ₹112 lakhs. Therefore, the applicant herein has also filed a contempt petition before this Hon'ble Tribunal and if this application is allowed, then, question of delay does not arise in the instant case, as the said order is passed on misleading and suppression of this facts, that too, in the absence of the counsel on record, on 12.02.2014."*

12. On scrutiny, the scrutiny hand of the Registry vide remarks dated 30.08.2024 noted a few defects including limitation. The Registry vide order dated 02.09.2024 granted time up to 09.09.2024 for curing the defects, which was further extended up to 03.10.2024. In the meantime, the petitioner/applicant filed IA 2077/2024 on 21.09.2024 praying to condone the delay of 2828 days in filing RA 8/2024. The defects were cured as per the remarks of the scrutiny hand dated 24.09.2024. However, despite the defect of limitation, the Registrar vide order dated 24.09.2024 ordered to register the RA and placed the matter before the Tribunal for hearing on 25.09.2024. The order reads as below:- *"Register as RA. Place the case before the Hon'ble Presiding Officer for hearing on 25.09.2024"*

13. When the matter came up before the Tribunal for the first time on 25.09.2024, Ld counsel for the petitioner/applicant was present. Both sides were represented by counsel when the case was taken up on 25.10.2024. However, both sides went astray on contesting the case on merits but did not bring IA 2077/2024 to the notice of this Tribunal during the entire proceedings. Both sides were heard on 10.06.2025 and on perusal of the records for passing of the final order only this Tribunal came across with IA 2077/2024 and thus an order is being passed in IA 2077/2024.

14. Time and again it was brought to the notice of the Registry in umpteen occasions in a large number of decisions in the past that mere filing of an IA would not cure the defect of limitation and the Registry shall not register a main application until and unless a favourable order is passed by the Tribunal in the IA for condonation of Tribal by Kapa

delay. Had it been taken into consideration for strict compliance and obedience, there was no need for the Registry to register the main application and place the same for hearing on 25.09.2024 before the Tribunal vide order dated 24.09.2024. The Registry of this Tribunal shall be guided by the rule of procedure in stricto sensu. No application filed along with a petition to condone the delay in filing the same shall be registered without the special leave of the Tribunal. A memo filed by either side citing urgency is not a bar for the same. The Interlocutory Application filed praying for condonation of delay shall alone be placed before the Tribunal for consideration. The Registry is directed to take a note of the above observations without fail for future guidance while scrutinising the applications and while deciding all questions arising out of the scrutiny of them before they are registered.

15. According to the petitioner/applicant, as per the affidavit accompanying the IA, it has sought for exemption of the period from 15.03.2020 to 28.02.2022 while computing the period of limitation in respect of the instant RA, which ought to have been filed before this Tribunal on or before 14.04.2014.

16. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in *In Re : Cognizance for Extension of Limitation [reported in 2022 (1) KLT 315 (SC)]* taking into consideration the impact of the surge of covid viruses on public health and the adversities faced by the litigants directed that the period from 15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022 shall stand excluded for the purpose of limitation as may be prescribed under any general or special laws in respect of all judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and that in cases where the limitation would have expired during the period between 15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022, notwithstanding the actual balance period of imitation remaining, all person shall have a limitation period of 90 days from 01.03.2022. It may be noted that what exempted and extended by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid *In Re* Judgement is 'the period of limitation' and not the period of condonation of delay.

Tribal Ho Kaga

17. The Hon'ble Supreme Court while distinguishing the aforesaid point, in Sagufa Ahmed & Ors v Upper Assam Plywood Products Pvt Ltd & Ors [reported in 2020 (5) KHC 89 :ILR 2020 (4) Ker.1 : 2020 (4) KLJ 584 : 2021 (2) SCC 317 : 2020 (11) SCALE 216 : MANU/SC/0697/2020] has held that what was extended by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid Judgement supra was only the period of limitation and not the period up to which delay can be condoned in exercise of discretion conferred by the statute. The relevant portion reads as below:- *"But we do not think that the appellants can take refuge under the above order. What was extended by the above order of this Court was only 'the period of limitation' and not the period up to which delay can be condoned in exercise of discretion conferred by the statute. The above order passed by this Court was intended to benefit vigilant litigants who were prevented due to the pandemic and the lockdown from initiating proceedings within the period of limitation prescribed by general or special law. It is needless to point out that the law of limitation finds its root in two latin maxims, one of which is Vigilantibus Non Dormientibus Jura Subveniunt which means that the law will assist only those who are vigilant about their rights and not those who sleep over them."*

18. It was also held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in DDA v Tejpal [reported in (2024) 7 SCC 433] that the benefit of cognizance for extension of limitation In re case can be availed by the applicants only in a case where the period of limitation expired between 15.03.2020 and 28.02.2022, and the relevant portion reads thus:- *"Sagufa Ahmed construed that the orders passed in Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, In re were intended to benefit vigilant litigants who were prevented due to the pandemic and the lockdown, from initiating proceedings within the period of limitation prescribed by general or special law. We respectfully agree with the view taken in Sagufa Ahmed. Consequently, the benefit of Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, In re can be availed by the applicants only in a case where the period of limitation expired between 15.03.2020 and 28.02.2022."*

19. In the above facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the law enunciated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the petitioner/applicant is not entitled to the benefit of the Judgement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in In Re : Cognizance for Extension of Limitation [reported in 2022 (1) KLT 315 (SC)] for condonation of the original period of limitation as the period of limitation had already been expired on 14.04.2014 and not during the period between 15.03.2020 and 28.02.2022. Therefore, the delay of 3783 days in presenting the impugned RA 8/2024 will not come within the outer limit within which this Tribunal can condone as directed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court Typed by Krip in the decision *In Re supra*. In the above circumstances, it is idle for the petitioner/applicant to rely on such Judgement.

20. Yet another reason for exemption sought for by the petitioner/applicant is that the time spent before the Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka in WP No.13267/2024 may be exempted. It may be noted that the petitioner/applicant aggrieved by the impugned final order passed on 12.02.2014 in SA 227/2013 by this Tribunal filed Writ Petition No.13267/2024 on 14.05.2024 before the Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru. The Hon'ble High Court disposed of the same as per the order dated 12.07.2024 reserving liberty in favour of the petitioner to take recourse to such remedies as available in law. The relevant portion reads as below:- *"3. Though several contentions have been urged by both sides in support of their respective claims, having regard to the long inordinate and unexplained delay and latches of more than 10 years from the date of impugned order, which was passed on 12.02.2014 by the Debt Recovery Tribunal – I, Bengaluru and also the availability of equally efficacious and alternative remedy by way of appeal before the DRAT, Chennai under S.18 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (for short, the SARFAESI Act') without expressing any opinion on the merits/demerits of the rival contentions, I deem it just and appropriate to dispose of this petition reserving liberty in favour of the petitioner to take recourse to such remedies as available in law, including filing an appropriate appeal before the appropriate Court/Forum/Tribunal subject to all just exceptions. In the event, the petitioner takes recourse to such remedies as available in law as stated supra, the respondents would be entitled to contest the said proceedings and all defences available to the respondents including maintainability, limitation, etc are kept open.*

*4. Subject to the aforesaid observations and directions, the petition stands disposed of."*

21. The petitioner/applicant relies on the liberty granted by the Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka in the aforesaid order dated 12.07.2024 in WP No.13267/2024 while computing the inordinate delay of 3783 days in filing RA 8/2024 before this Tribunal. The Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka while granting liberty in favour of the petitioner/applicant to take recourse to such remedies as available in law, including filing an appropriate appeal before the appropriate Court/Forum/Tribunal, subject to all just exceptions, have observed and directed that the respondents would be entitled to contest the said proceedings and all defences available to the respondents including maintainability, limitation, etc are kept open. The Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka disposed of the aforesaid Writ Petition having regard to the long, inordinate and Typed by Kshit unexplained delay and latches of more than ten years from the date of the impugned order dated 12.02.2014. No exemption or liberty in respect of limitation was granted by the Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka to the petitioner/applicant to take recourse as available in law while approaching the appropriate Court/Forum/Tribunal but the question of limitation was kept open to adjudicate upon. Therefore, it is idle for the petitioner/applicant to rely on the liberty granted by the Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka while computing the period of limitation in respect of RA 8/2024.

22. It also appears to be the case of the petitioner/applicant that the time spent during the pendency of WP No.13267/2024 before the Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka shall be exempted under S.14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 while computing the period of limitation under sub-rule (2) of R.5A of the DRT Rules in respect of RA 8/2024. It may be noted that Writ Petition No.13267/2024 was filed before the Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru only on 14.05.2024 whereas the period of limitation in respect of RA 8/2024 had already been expired on 14.04.2014.

23. Going by the language of S.14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the time spent by the plaintiff in a court without jurisdiction is excluded from the period of limitation for any suit or application. This means that if a plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence in another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or of appeal or revision against the defendant, and such proceeding is prosecuted in good faith in a court, which from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of like nature, is unable to entertain it, then the time spent in such proceeding shall be excluded from the period of limitation for any suit or application. Therefore, it is clear that the time spent during the wrong court is intended to be excluded under S.14 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The petitioner/applicant filed Writ Petition No.13267/2024 before the Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore on 14.05.2024. The benefit of S.14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 puts the petitioner/applicant in the same position as it was in the abortive proceedings started. But Typed by Kapi

it does not enable it to get a benefit beyond what is contemplated thereunder. Going by the language of S.14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the time spent by the plaintiff in a court without jurisdiction is excluded from the period of limitation for any suit or application. This means that if a plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or of appeal or revision against the defendant, and such proceeding is prosecuted in good faith in a court, which from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of like nature, is unable to entertain it, then the time spent in such proceeding shall be excluded from the period of limitation for any suit or application. Therefore, it is crystal clear that only the time spent during the wrong court is intended to be excluded under S.14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and not the period before or after that. Writ Petition No.13267/2024 was filed only on 14.05.2024, after a lapse of 3683 days from the date of cause of action has arisen, whereas the period of limitation stipulated under sub-rule (2) of R.5A of the DRT Rules is only 60 days (as it stood then) from the date of cause of action, which means that the period of limitation stipulated under sub-rule (2) of R.5A of the DRT Rules had already been run out when the petitioner/applicant filed Writ Petition No.13267/2024 before the Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka. RA 8/2024 was filed before this Tribunal only on 22.08.2024, i.e with a delay of 41 days from the date of the order dated 12.07.2024 and with a delay of 3783 days from the date of original cause of action. Therefore, even if the entire period (from 14.05.2024 to 12.07.2024) during which the proceedings were actually pending before the Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka is excluded, the present application is still barred by limitation for 3724 days. Therefore, it appears to be that the petitioner/applicant has prayed for exclusion of not only the period during which the proceedings were actually pending before the Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka but also the period lapsed by it before and after filing the Writ Petition, which in the opinion of this Tribunal would not come under the scope and purview of S.14 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Hence, the Traced by Krip benefit of principles contained under S.14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 cannot apply to the facts of this case.

24. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in M.P Steel Corp'n v CCE [reported in (2015) 7 SCC 58] has held that the period prior to the initiation of any abortive proceeding cannot be excluded for the simple reason that S.14 does not enable a litigant to get a benefit beyond what is contemplated by it i.e to put the litigant in the same position as if the abortive proceeding had never taken place, and it reads so:- *"However, the period prior to the initiation of any abortive proceeding cannot be excluded for the simple reason that Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 does not enable a litigant to get a benefit beyond what is contemplated by the section – that is to put the litigant in the same position as if the abortive proceeding had never taken place.*

*Tirumareddi Rajarao v State of AP, 1964 SCC On Line AP 167 : AIR 1965 AP 388, overruled*

*Therefore, in a case where the limitation period for the original proceeding is six months and assuming that the plaintiff/applicant filed such a proceeding on the ninetieth day i.e. After three months are over, but the said proceeding turns out to be abortive after it has gone through a chequered career in the appeal courts and the same plaintiff/applicant now files a fresh proceeding before a court of first instance having the necessary jurisdiction, then so long as the said proceeding is filed within the remaining three month period, Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 will apply to exclude the entire time taken starting from the ninety-first day till the final appeal is ultimately dismissed. This example also goes to show that the expression 'the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding' needs to be construed in a manner which advances the object sought to be achieved, thereby advancing the case of justice."*

25. When a direct and efficacious statutory remedy is available under the DRT Rules before this statutory forum created by law for any person aggrieved by any of the order passed by this Tribunal, the petitioner/applicant cannot catch at a straw by way of Writ Petition resorted to by it, as an alternative remedy ignoring the direct statutory dispensation, as an umbrella for the inordinate delay caused by it in approaching this Tribunal for seeking its relief. The remedy under sub-rule (2) of R.5A of the DRT Rules was available to the petitioner/applicant had it been really aggrieved. If it is not used properly at the right time it is its folly only. There is no pleading in the RA or the petition as to why the efficacious and direct statutory remedy under the DRT Rules was not availed of and the compelling reasons for bypassing the same. The right to sue accrues within sixty days (as it stood then) from the date on which the final order had been passed by this Tribunal only. In the above circumstances, no reliance can be placed upon the Tried by Kuj claim made by the petitioner/applicant that it complied with the liberty granted by the Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka and, therefore, the present application is filed within the period of limitation as prescribed under the DRT Rules. The Act is a special law enacted for enforcement of security interest over the secured asset for recovery of secured debt from the secured debtors without the assistance of Tribunal or Court. No leniency in the form of condonation of delay is shown thereunder for an aggrieved person. Therefore, the claim as advanced by the petitioner/applicant is rejected. Though the petitioner/applicant contended that the final order dated 12.02.2014 was passed on misleading and suppression of the facts and that too in the absence of the counsel on record, no valid reason has been furnished by it for its non-representation on the impugned dates in the proceedings in SA 227/2013 before this Tribunal. In the above circumstances, all reasons shown by the petitioner/applicant for the inordinate delay occurred in filing RA 8/2024 aggrieved by the impugned final order dated 12.02.2014 are only lame excuses and are not sustainable in the eye of law. The language of the provision is very clear. In view of the time limit expressly provided in clear language, the question of date of knowledge or condonation of delay does not arise therein. It is essential for a party to have knowledge of the action to take a remedial measure within the time limit prescribed under the statute. The petitioner/applicant has also not furnished any plausible explanation as to why it could not present the review application on or before 14.04.2014. It may be noted that wherever the time of limitation applies, it is the sole responsibility and duty of the petitioner/applicant to ensure that the filing is carried out well before the period of limitation. No exemption from the limitation can be availed on the ground of fraud or misrepresentation played by the opposite side whereas no such offence has been proved before this Tribunal. No such concession is given under the Act. Therefore, the petitioner/applicant cannot rely on the lame excuses as furnished in the petition for its laches, lapses and the inordinate delay occurred in presenting RA 8/2024 on or before Typed by Kuj

14.04.2014 before this Tribunal. In the above circumstances, the lame excuses put forward by the petitioner/applicant are only made for the purpose of the application and no reliance can be made on such averments. Admittedly, what prayed for is barred by limitation and the petitioner/applicant has no lawful reason and plausible explanation as to why the inordinate delay occurred.

26. As stated above, the relief sought for in the instant RA 8/2024 to set aside the impugned final order dated 12.02.2014 is barred by limitation. Therefore, the claim of the petitioner/applicant made out in paragraph 4 of the RA under the head 'limitation' to the effect that the same has been filed with a delay of 2828 days only cannot be accepted by this Tribunal.

27. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in *P K Ramachandran v State of Kerala [reported in (1997) 7 SCC 556 : AIR 1998 SC 2276]* has held that the law of limitation has to be applied with all its rigour when the Statute so prescribes, and it reads thus:- *"Law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes and the courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds."*

28. It may be noted that the only provision available for condonation of delay is that under S.5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. It may be noted that by virtue of S.24 of the RDB Act, the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 are, as far as may be, made applicable to an application made to a Tribunal. The word 'application' as per S.2(b) of the RDB Act takes in an application made to a Tribunal under S.19 of the RDB Act only. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in *Mardia Chemicals Ltd. v. Union of India [reported in (2004) 4 SCC 311]* has categorically held that the proceedings under S.17 of the Act is not an appellate proceeding, but rather an initial action which is brought before a forum prescribed under the Act, and is like a suit under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Relying on the decision in *Mardia Chemicals'* case (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court in *Transcore v. Union of India & Anr [reported in (2008) 1 SCC 125]* has held that the Debts Recovery Tribunal acts in an original jurisdiction under S.17 of the Act. Pursuant Typed by Kavya thereto, the words 'right to appeal' in the marginal heading of S.17(1) of the Act was substituted by the word 'Application' with effect from 01.09.2016 vide SO 2831 (E) dated 01.09.2016. All the more, the proviso to S.17(1) of the Act indicates that the Debts Recovery Tribunal under S.17(1) of the Act exercises original jurisdiction. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ganesan v Commissioner, Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Board [reported in 2019 (2) KLT 925 (SC)] has held that the Limitation Act 1963 will not apply to appeals or applications before the Tribunals, unless expressly provided. Therefore, it may be noted that the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to an application filed under S.17(1) of the Act. Moreover, vide order dated 12.07.2023 in Miscellaneous Application IR No.1011/2019 in Securitisation Application IR No.3708/2018 this Tribunal categorically held that the Debts Recovery Tribunal has no power to condone the delay in filing application under S.17 (1) of the Act, which has become absolute and final. Therefore, looking at any angle, the delay of 3783 days in filing RA 8/2024 praying to review the final order dated 12.02.2014 passed in SA 227/2013 cannot be condoned by this Tribunal.

29. The Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka in Kailasam P v The Karnataka Bank Limited [reported in MANU/KA/0620/2025 : 2025 KHC 7606 (DB)] has held that it is the policy of the Parliament that one who wants to have redressal has to knock at the doors of DRT within 45 days and thereafter those doors should permanently stand closed. The relevant portion reads as below:-

*"A perusal of the above provision leaves no manner of doubt that no provision is made by the Parliament for condonation of delay in approaching the DRT against orders of the kind, whatever be the cause therefor and howsoever justifiable it may sound. Unless power to condone delay is legislatively granted expressly or by inference, a Tribunal of the kind cannot condone delay. It hardly needs to be stated that the Tribunals unlike conventional courts do not have inherent power. Added, a Tribunal is not a court and therefore 1963 Act is not applicable, subject to all just exceptions. It is the policy of Parliament that one who wants to have redressal has to knock at the doors of DRT within 45 days and thereafter those doors should permanently stand closed. In other words, law does not come to the aid of those who are sleepy and tardy. Further, no challenge is laid to the provisions of S.17 on the ground that it does not provide for condonation of delay."*

30. The petitioner/applicant in the application has prayed for condonation of delay of 2828 days only whereas actually there is a delay of 3783 days in presentation of Typed by Ragu

RA 8/2024 before this Tribunal. From the above, it is clear that the petitioner/applicant has no idea about the period of limitation in an application to be filed under sub-rule (2) of R.5A of the DRT Rules in respect of review of final order passed in an application filed under S.17(1) of the Act before the Tribunal.

31. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in DDA v Tejpal [reported in (2024) 7 SCC 433] has held that a party who is insensible to the value of civil remedies, and who does not assert his claim with promptitude is denied the ability to enforce even an otherwise rightful claim and that every suit or appeal made after the period of limitation ought to be dismissed, notwithstanding whether such ground had been raised by the opposite side, and it reads thus:- *"Since the issue in this batch of appeals concerns the condonation of delay, it would be worthwhile to briefly allude to the law of limitation. The Limitation Act, 1963 is a statute of repose founded on considerations of public policy and expediency. The dominant objective underlying the law of limitation is that the title to property, and matters of rights in general, cannot be kept in a state of constant uncertainty, doubt or suspense. Public interest requires that finality should be put to litigation. The Limitation Act, thus, prescribes the specific points of time from which the period of limitation begins to run for the institution of actions. On expiry of such period, no action can be initiated save and except where the court condones the delay for a sufficient cause. A party who is insensible to the value of civil remedies, and who does not assert his claim with promptitude is denied the ability to enforce even an otherwise rightful claim. This position is reflected in the Latin maxim, vigilantibus et non dormientibus jura subveniunt i.e the law aids the vigilant and not those who sleep on their rights.*

*The Bombay High Court in Kumudini Ramdas Sah v K M Mody aptly exposit the philosophical pillars supporting the concept of limitation: (i) the word of prosecution ought not to be hanging over an individual for an indeterminate period; (ii) those who have been lethargic in safeguarding their interests should not expect the law to come their rescue; and (iii) a defendant ought not to suffer for lost evidence owing to the passage of time.*

*S.3 of the Limitation Act reflects this philosophy. Every suit or appeal made after the period of limitation ought to be dismissed, notwithstanding whether such ground had been raised by the opposite side. However, this does not imply that the Limitation Act destroys the right itself. Instead, it only extinguishes the ability to enforce the right, without either creating or destroying the underlying cause of action or entitlement itself."*

32. This Tribunal is required to weigh the explanations offered by the petitioner/applicant and the acceptability of the same. The delay in this case reflects the inactivity and the inaction on the part of the petitioner/applicant. The law does not permit one to sleep and to seek one's relief as and when one desires. When parties claiming to be aggrieved by the final order passed by this Tribunal in an application filed under S.17(1) of the Act and desires to obtain a review of the same and approach this Tribunal at their own leisure and pleasure, this Tribunal within the four corners of the Act and the Typed by: Kavy

Rules made thereunder is under legal obligation rather dutiful to scrutinise as to whether the grievance at a belated stage could be considered or not. The law does not permit a really aggrieved person to sleep and approach a legal forum as he desires. If he does so it is at his risk and responsibility only. In the instant case, the petitioner/applicant has approached this Tribunal with an inordinate delay of 3783 days, which cannot be appreciated bearing in mind the avowed object of the Act. Indolent persons cannot expect any indulgence and interference from any court of law or Tribunal. The failure on the part of the petitioner/applicant in not showing due diligence in filing the RA at the right time and the delay taken in filing the same can only be construed, in the absence of any valid explanation, as gross negligence and lack of bonafides on its part. In the above facts and circumstances of the case, the delay of 3783 days in filing of RA 8/2024 cannot be condoned by this Tribunal as the same has been filed well beyond the period of limitation as prescribed under sub-rule (2) of R.5A of the DRT Rules (as it stood then). Therefore, looking at any angle, the delay of 3783 days in filing of RA No.8/2024 cannot be condoned in any way.

33. In the above facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the discussion as above, the delay of 3783 days in presenting RA No.8/2024 cannot be condoned and thus the same cannot be entertained by this Tribunal. IA 2077/2024 is liable to be dismissed. Suffice it to say that RA 8/2024 fails and thus is liable to be dismissed as not maintainable before this Tribunal for barred by limitation.

34. In the result, IA 2077/2024 and consequently RA 8/2024 are dismissed. All pending IAs stand closed. No costs.

*[Dictated to my PA directly on the computer, corrected and pronounced by me in the open Tribunal on this the 29^th day of August, 2025]*

[ IMTIAZ ALI ] PRESIDING OFFICER

Typed by Kaja

IN THE DEBTS RECOVERY TRIBUNAL - 1, KARNATAKA AT BANGALORE

PRESENT: SRI IMTIAZ ALI PRESIDING OFFICER

Dated the 29^th day of August, 2025

**INTERLOCUTORY APPLICATION NO. 2077/2024** **IN** **REVIEW APPLICATION NO.8/2024** **IN** **SECURITISATION APPLICATION NO.227 OF 2013**

Between

M/s S B Valves (India) Private Limited, 120B, 2^nd Phase, Tarihal Industrial Estate, Tarihal, Hubli, Dharwad, Karnataka – 580026, represented by its Managing Director, Basavaraj N Saarangi, S/o late Narayanappa Sarangi. ....Petitioner/applicant

And

The Canara Bank, Traffic Island Branch, Court Circle, Hubli, Dharwad, Karnataka – 580029 and another. ....respondents/defendant and auction purchaser.

**ORDER**

29.8.25