BANK OF BARODA vs M/S MANOJ CHICKEN AND EGG CENTRE on 31 October 2025

1. M/s Manoj Chicken and Egg Centre, represented by its proprietress, Rashmi R K, 51, 2^nd Main, 8^th Cross, Someswhwarangagara, Yelahanka New Town, Bangalore, Karnataka – 560004.

2. Muniraju N, S/o Nanjundappa, 51, 2^nd Main, 8^th Cross, Someswhwarangagara, Yelahanka New Town, Bangalore, Karnataka – 560004.

..... Respondents/applicants

This Interlocutory Application having been heard on 14.08.2025 in the presence of Advocates M/s Vignesh Shetty, Natasha N Murthy and Shubhangini Singh for the petitioner/defendant, and the respondents/applicants being absent, and stood over to this day for consideration, the Tribunal delivered the following:-

IA No.863 of 2024 in RA 5/2024 in SA 595/20232**ORDER**

The petitioner filed Interlocutory Application (IA) 863/2024 on 22.04.2024 under S.5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 r/w S.24 of the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 (as amended from time to time) – for short 'the RDB Act' and S.17(7) of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 as amended from time to time – hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' - praying to condone the delay of twelve days in filing Review Application (RA) No.5/2024. The petitioner is none other than the defendant in SA No.595/2023.

2. The case set out in the notary attested affidavit of the authorised officer of the petitioner/defendant bank accompanying the IA in brief is as follows:- Due to continuous holidays and due to unforeseen events the petitioner/defendant was unable to advise its counsel in preferring a review application in time.

3. The respondents/applicants were duly served with a notice. Though a counsel on 14.06.2024 in the proceedings represented them and undertook to file a vakalath, no vakalath is seen filed as per the records available in the file.

4. The only point arises for consideration is as to whether the review petitioner/defendant is entitled to the relief prayed for?

5. The Point:- The respondents/applicants filed SA 595/2023 on 24.08.2021 under S.17(1) of the Act praying to set aside the possession notice dated 08.07.2021 issued by the petitioner/defendant in respect of the schedule immovable property. The respondents/applicants are none other than the borrowers to a financial assistance in the form of overdraft facility of ₹130 lakhs against mortgage availed in the year 2018 from the petitioner/defendant bank. As the proceedings were hit by S.26D of the Act, SA 595/2023 was allowed as per the final order dated 29.02.2024 setting aside the measures taken under S.13 of the Act (including demand notice) by the petitioner/defendant with liberty to it to invoke the provisions under the Act and the Rules made thereunder for Typed by: Krip enforcement of security interest over the secured asset afresh in accordance with law meticulously.

6. R.5A of the Debts Recovery Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1993 (as amended from time to time) – for short 'the Rules' - deals with review of an order passed by the Tribunal on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the records, and it reads as below:- *"(1) Any party considering itself aggrieved by an order made by the Tribunal on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record desires to obtain a review of the order made against him, may apply for a review of the order to the Tribunal which had made the order.*

*(2) No application for review shall be made after the expiry of a period of thirty days from the date of the order and no such application shall be entertained unless it is accompanied by an affidavit verifying the application.*

*(3) Where it appears to the Tribunal that there is no sufficient ground for a review, it shall reject the application but where the Tribunal is of opinion that the application for review should be granted, shall grant the same.*

*PROVIDED that no such application shall be granted without previous notice to the opposite party to enable him to appear and to be heard in support of the order, a review of which is applied for."*

7. Going by R.5A of the Rules r/w S.17(7) of the Act, the impugned final order passed by the Tribunal on 29.02.2024 is liable to be reviewed on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record. Even taking to the larger extent, O.47 R.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 provides for review of a Judgement on the grounds, namely:- (i) discovery of new and important matter of evidence which after the exercise of due diligence, was not within the knowledge of the applicant or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order was made, or (ii) some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record; or (iii) for any other sufficient reason (which has been interpreted to be analogous to the other reasons specified above). As per sub-rule (2) of R.5A of the Rules (as it stood amended vide GSR 1047 (E) dated 03.11.2016 and made effective from 04.11.2016) no application for review shall be made after the expiry of a period of thirty days from the date of the order. The aforesaid sub-rule is couched in a negative language implying a mandatory character of limitation. The use of the word 'shall' make it further obligatory. As per the stricture laid down under Typed By: Kunal sub-rule (2) of R.5A of the Rules, an application challenging the impugned final order dated 29.02.2024 ought to have been filed before this Tribunal on or before 30.03.2024 but the same was happened to be filed only on 22.04.2024 with a delay of 23 days.

8. The review petitioner/defendant in paragraph 4 of the RA under the head 'limitation' stated that the application has not been filed within the period of limitation and hence a separate application has been filed for condonation of delay. The averments read as follows:- *"The appellant/applicant declares that the impugned order passed by this Hon'ble Tribunal dated 29.02.2024 in SA No.595/2023 is sought for reviewing. This Hon'ble Tribunal passed an order on 29.02.2024, however, the applicant applied for the certified copy on 14.03.2024. However, this Hon'ble Court issued the same on 26.03.2024. Immediately, from the date of receipt of this order the applicant has filed the present application. Hence, it is under limitation. The applicant has placed an interlocutory application for condonation of delay. The certified copy of the order obtained from this Hon'ble Tribunal is produced herewith and marked as Annexure A1."*

9. On scrutiny, the scrutiny hand of the Registry vide remarks dated 25.04.2024 noted a few defects including limitation. It is noted by the scrutiny hand that IA 863/2024 has been filed for condonation of delay. The defects were cured as per the remarks of the scrutiny hand dated 29.04.2024. However, despite the defect of limitation, the Registrar vide order dated 02.05.2024 ordered to register the RA and placed the matter before the Tribunal for hearing on 03.05.2024. The order reads as below:- *"Register as RA. Place the case before the Hon'ble Presiding Officer for hearing on 03.05.2024"*

10. When the matter came up before the Tribunal for the first time on 03.05.2024, Ld counsel for the petitioner/defendant alone was present. Though the respondents/applicants entered appearance through counsel they did not even file vakalah in the proceedings. However, both sides did not bring IA 863/2024 to the notice of this Tribunal during the entire proceedings. The petitioner/defendant was heard on 14.08.2025 and on perusal of the records for passing of the order only this Tribunal came across with IA 863/2024 and thus an order is being passed in IA 863/2024.

11. Time and again it was brought to the notice of the Registry in umpteen occasions in a large number of decisions in the past that mere filing of an IA would not Typed By: Kap cure the defect of limitation and the Registry shall not register a main application until and unless a favourable order is passed by the Tribunal in the IA for condonation of delay. Had it been taken into consideration for strict compliance and obedience, there was no need for the Registry to register the main application and place the same for hearing on 03.05.2024 before the Tribunal vide order dated 02.05.2024. The Registry of this Tribunal shall be guided by the rule of procedure in stricto sensu and not by a memo filed by either side. No application filed along with a petition to condone the delay in filing the same shall be registered without the special leave of the Tribunal. A memo filed by either side citing urgency is not a bar for the same. The Interlocutory Application filed praying for condonation of delay shall alone be placed before the Tribunal for consideration. The Registry is directed to take a note of the above observations without fail for future guidance while scrutinising the applications and while deciding all questions arising out of the scrutiny of them before they are registered.

12. According to the petitioner/defendant, as per the affidavit accompanying the IA, due to continuous holidays and due to unforeseen events, it was unable to advise its counsel in preferring a review application in time. It may be noted that only a vague ground has been raised before this Tribunal for the delay occurred in this case. There is no pleading as to which were the continuous holidays that prevented access to this Tribunal. It is also not explained as to what were the unforeseen events beyond its control causing delay in preferring the review application. Going by the explanation given under the column 'limitation', the time required for obtaining the certified copy of the final order caused the delay in filing the review application. It may be noted that an application for certified copy of the final order dated 29.02.2024 was made before this Tribunal only on 14.03.2024. Admittedly, the same was delivered to it on 26.03.2024. No explanation was given as to why the application could not be filed on or before 30.03.2024, which was a working day for this Tribunal. Admittedly, the SA was allowed on default of the Tribal By Kaya petitioner/defendant in defending the case only. It failed to produce the CERSAI report in respect of the schedule immovable property and produced the same in respect of some other property. The authorised officer of the petitioner/defendant bank did not verify the documents produced before this Tribunal and casually conducted the case. Even after disposal of the case, the petitioner/defendant did not take any diligent step to cure the mistake occurred. It could have filed an application under R.5A Rules without a certified copy on or before the date stipulated under the Rules and defect could have been cured subsequently saving the period of limitation. Therefore, the ground of time spent for obtaining the certified copy of the final order is not sustainable in the eye of law.

13. Admittedly, the petitioner/defendant bank failed to advise its counsel properly at the right time to take steps for it. The delay in filing the review application can be attributed to want of diligence or inaction on the part of the officials of the petitioner/defendant bank only. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Maniben Devraj Shah v Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai [reported in (2012) 5 SCC 157] has held that no premium can be given for total lethargy or utter negligence of State officers/machinery/agency/instrumentality, and condonation of delay caused by such officers cannot be allowed as a matter of course by accepting plea that dismissal on ground of limitation will cause injury to public interest. The explanation of continuous holidays and unforeseen events given by the petitioner/defendant for the delay is found to be unsustainable and is only a concocted story to cover up its negligence. This Tribunal is of the view that such kind of lethargy on the part of the officials of the petitioner/defendant bank with so much computerisation having been achieved is no more acceptable. The aforesaid lapses show the casual manner in which the petitioner/defendant bank has approached this Tribunal without showing any cogent or plausible ground for condonation of delay.

Typed by: Kapi

14. It may be pointed out that the approach of the petitioner/defendant bank in this case is doubtful as the authorised officer in this case is absolutely careless to his duty and nurturing a lackadaisical attitude to the responsibility in defending the case. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Noor Mohammed v Jethanand [reported in 2013 (1) KLT SN 113 (C.No.96) SC : (2013) 5 SCC 202] has observed as follows:- *"The virtues of adjudication cannot be allowed to be paralysed by adjournments and non-demonstration of due diligence to deal with the matter. One cannot be oblivious to the feeling necessities of the time. No one can afford to sit in an ivory tower. Neither a Judge nor a lawyer can ignore 'the total push and pressure of the cosmos'. It is devastating to expect infinite patience. Change of attitude is the warrant and command of the day. Getting an adjournment is neither an art nor science. It has never been appreciated by the courts. All who are involved in the justice dispensation system, which includes the Judges, the lawyers, the judicial officers who work in courts, the law officers of the State, the Registry and the litigants, have to show dedicated diligence so that a controversy is put to rest. Shifting the blame is not the cure. Acceptance of responsibility and dealing with it like a captain in the frontier is the necessity of the time. It is worthy to state that diligence brings satisfaction. There has to be strong resolve in the mind to carry out the responsibility with devotion. A time has come when all concerned are required to abandon idleness and arouse oneself and see to it that the syndrome of delay does not erode the concept of dispensation of expeditious justice which is the constitutional command. Sagacious acceptance of the deviation and necessitous steps taken for the redressal of the same would be a bright lamp which would gradually become a laser beam. This is the expectation of the collective, and the said expectation has to become a reality. Expectations are not to remain at the stage of hope. They have to be metamorphosed to actuality. Long back, Francis Bacon, in his aphoristic style, had said, "Hope is good breakfast, but it is bad supper". We say no more on this score."*

15. Such an attitude cannot be appreciated by this Tribunal as the mistake in defending the case committed by the authorised officer of the petitioner/defendant bank only. If such an attitude is permitted, the statutory right of the petitioner/defendant bank under the Act will become an eyewash and it may not be possible for the petitioner/defendant bank to realise the secured debt. At any rate, the Tribunal also is of the opinion to say no more on this score and to deal with the matter in merits of the case.

16. After coming to know about the impugned final order passed on 29.02.2024, the petitioner/defendant applied for the certified copy of the same on 14.03.2024 and the same was obtained on 26.03.2024 and accordingly steps were taken for filing RA before this Tribunal. It has no case as to why it got delayed up to 14.03.2024 for applying the certified copy of the final order dated 29.02.2024. It has also not furnished any plausible explanation as to why it could not present the review application on or before 30.03.2024 despite obtaining the certified copy on 26.03.2024. It Typed By: Raj may be noted that wherever the time of limitation applies, it is the sole responsibility and duty of the petitioner/defendant to ensure that the filing is carried out well before the period of limitation. No exemption from the limitation can be availed on the ground of delay in obtaining certified copy of the final order dated 29.02.2024 from the office of the Tribunal. No such concession is given under the Act. Therefore, the petitioner/defendant cannot rely on the delay in obtaining the certified copy of the final order dated 29.02.2024 for its laches, lapses and the delay occurred in presenting RA 5/2024 on or before 30.03.2024 before this Tribunal. In the above circumstances, the lame excuses put forward by the petitioner/defendant are only made for the purpose of the application only and no reliance can be made on such averments. Admittedly, what prayed for is barred by limitation and the petitioner/defendant has no lawful reason and plausible explanation as to why the delay occurred.

17. It may be noted that the only provision available for condonation of delay is that under S.5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. It may be noted that by virtue of S.24 of the RDB Act, the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 are, as far as may be, made applicable to an application made to a Tribunal. The word 'application' as per S.2(b) of the RDB Act takes in an application made to a Tribunal under S.19 of the RDB Act only. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in *Mardia Chemicals Ltd. v. Union of India [reported in (2004) 4 SCC 311]* has categorically held that the proceedings under S.17 of the Act is not an appellate proceeding, but rather an initial action which is brought before a forum prescribed under the Act, and is like a suit under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Relying on the decision in *Mardia Chemicals'* case (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court in *Transcore v. Union of India & Anr [reported in (2008) 1 SCC 125]* has held that the Debts Recovery Tribunal acts in an original jurisdiction under S.17 of the Act. Pursuant thereto, the words 'right to appeal' in the marginal heading of S.17(1) of the Act was substituted by the word 'Application' with effect from 01.09.2016 vide SO 2831 (E)

Typed by Kapi dated 01.09.2016. All the more, the proviso to S.17(1) of the Act indicates that the Debts Recovery Tribunal under S.17(1) of the Act exercises original jurisdiction. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ganesan v Commissioner, Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Board [reported in 2019 (2) KLT 925 (SC)] has held that the Limitation Act 1963 will not apply to appeals or applications before the Tribunals, unless expressly provided. Therefore, it may be noted that the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to an application filed under S.17(1) of the Act. Moreover, vide order dated 12.07.2023 in Miscellaneous Application IR No.1011/2019 in Securitisation Application IR No.3708/2018 this Tribunal categorically held that the Debts Recovery Tribunal has no power to condone the delay in filing application under S.17 (1) of the Act, which has become absolute and final. Therefore, looking at any angle, the delay of 23 days in filing RA 5/2024 praying to review the final order dated 29.02.2024 passed in SA 595/2023 cannot be condoned by this Tribunal.

18. This Tribunal is required to weigh the explanations offered by the petitioner/defendant and the acceptability of the same. The delay in this case reflects the inactivity and the inaction on the part of the petitioner/defendant. The law does not permit one to sleep and to seek one's relief as and when one desires. When parties claiming to be aggrieved by the final order passed by this Tribunal in an application filed under S.17(1) of the Act and desires to obtain a review of the same and approach this Tribunal at their own leisure and pleasure, this Tribunal within the four corners of the Act and the Rules made thereunder is under legal obligation rather dutiful to scrutinise as to whether the grievance at a belated stage could be considered or not. The law does not permit a really aggrieved person to sleep and approach a legal forum as he desires. If he does so it is at his risk and responsibility only. In the instant case, the petitioner/defendant has approached this Tribunal with a delay of 23 days, which cannot be appreciated bearing in mind the avowed object of the Act. Indolent persons cannot expect Tipton H. Raj any indulgence and interference from any court of law or Tribunal. The failure on the part of the petitioner/defendant in not showing due diligence in filing the RA at the right time and the delay taken in filing the same can only be construed, in the absence of any valid explanation, as gross negligence and lack of bonafides on its part. In the above facts and circumstances of the case, the delay of 23 days in filing of RA 5/2024 cannot be condoned by this Tribunal as the same has been filed well beyond the period of limitation as prescribed under sub-rule (2) of R.5A of the Rules. Therefore, looking at any angle, the delay of 23 days in filing of RA No.5/2024 cannot be condoned in any way.

19. In the above facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the discussion as above, the delay of 23 days in presenting RA No.5/2024 cannot be condoned and thus the same cannot be entertained by this Tribunal. IA 863/2024 is liable to be dismissed. Suffice it to say that RA 5/2024 fails and thus is liable to be dismissed as not maintainable before this Tribunal for barred by limitation.

20. In the result, IA 863/2024 and consequently RA 5/2024 are dismissed. All pending IAs stand closed. No costs.

*[Dictated to my P.A directly on the computer, corrected and pronounced by me in the open Tribunal on this the 31^st day of October, 2025]*

[ IMTIAZ ALI ] PRESIDING OFFICER

Typed by: Kazi

IN THE DEBTS RECOVERY TRIBUNAL - 1, KARNATAKA AT BANGALORE

PRESENT: SRI IMTIAZ ALI PRESIDING OFFICER

Dated the 31^st day of October, 2025

**INTERLOCUTORY APPLICATION NO.863 of 2024** **IN** **REVIEW APPLICATION NO.5/2024** **IN** **SECURITISATION APPLICATION NO.595 OF 2023**

Between

Bank of Baroda, R C Road, Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Race Course Road, Bangalore, Karnataka – 560001. ....Petitioner/Defendant

And

M/s Manoj Chicken and Egg Centre, represented by its proprietress, Rashmi R K, 51, 2^nd Main, 8^th Cross, Someswhwarangagara, Yelahanka New Town, Bangalore, Karnataka – 560004 and another. .... Respondents/Defendants

**ORDER**

31.10.25