MS ASSOCIATE LUMBERS PVT LTD vs Union Bank Of India on 31 December 2025

ORDER

The petitioner filed Review Application (RA) 1/2022 on 30.05.2022 under R.5A of the Debts Recovery Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1993 (as amended from time to time) – for short 'the Rules' praying to set aside the final order dated 29.10.2021 passed by this Tribunal in OA 1136/2017. The petitioners are none other than defendants 1 to 3 and 6 in the OA.

2. The case set out in the RA in brief is as follows:- The 1^st petitioner/1^st defendant company, represented by its Directors, petitioners 2 and 3/defendants 2 and 3, availed on 06.02.2004 a cash credit facility of ₹23 crores (which was enhanced from time to time to ₹60 crores) from the respondent/applicant bank. But the 4^th petitioner/6^th defendant has no privity of contract with the respondent/applicant bank and has not signed any loan security document in its favour. The petitioners/defendants 1 to 3 and 6 were unaware of the OA proceedings as no summons was served upon them. They were aware of the proceedings only recently. The impugned order passed is an error in law and not based on facts. The Tribunal while passing the order did not appreciate the evidence adduced by the respondent/applicant bank in order to determine whether the facts pleaded by it stands proved. Therefore, the reasoning based on the assumption that the petitioners/defendants 1 to 3 and 6 admitted its case is not in accordance with law. The amounts claimed as due under the statement of account have not been corroborated with evidence. The schedule immovable property had already been sold pending the OA proceedings by the respondent/applicant bank invoking the provisions under the SARFAESI Act, which fact was not brought to the notice of the Tribunal. The interest and the penal interest granted under the impugned order is in violation of the terms and conditions in the sanction letters. On the above grounds, the petitioners/defendants 1 to 3

Typed by: Rupa

and 6 prayed for setting aside the final order dated 29.10.2021 passed by this Tribunal in OA No.1136/2017.

3. The respondent/applicant bank filed a statement objection on 20.03.2023 contending as follows:- The impugned final order was passed on 29.10.2021. Therefore, the review application filed on 30.05.2022 is barred by limitation. This Tribunal has no jurisdiction and power to condone the delay. The 4^th applicant/the 6^th defendant was a guarantor to the loan availed by the 1^st petitioner/1^st defendant and she executed a guarantee agreement in favour of the respondent/applicant bank. On the above contentions, the respondent/applicant bank prayed for dismissal of the RA with costs.

4. The only point arises for consideration is as to whether the petitioners/defendants 1 to 3 and 6 are entitled to the relief prayed for?

5. The Point:- R.5A of the Rules deals with review of an order passed by the Tribunal on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the records, and it reads as below:- *"(1) Any party considering itself aggrieved by an order made by the Tribunal on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record desires to obtain a review of the order made against him, may apply for a review of the order to the Tribunal which had made the order.*

*(2) No application for review shall be made after the expiry of a period of thirty days from the date of the order and no such application shall be entertained unless it is accompanied by an affidavit verifying the application.*

*(3) Where it appears to the Tribunal that there is no sufficient ground for a review, it shall reject the application but where the Tribunal is of opinion that the application for review should be granted, shall grant the same.*

*PROVIDED that no such application shall be granted without previous notice to the opposite party to enable him to appear and to be heard in support of the order, a review of which is applied for."*

6. The respondent/applicant bank on 18.07.2017 filed OA 1136/2017 before this Tribunal under S.19(1) of the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 (as amended from time to time) - for short 'the Act' - for recovery of the sum of ₹72,13,73,175.35 due under cash credit account No.CC/01/050006 with interest thereon @14.75% (inclusive of penal interest @2%) per annum with monthly rests from the defendants (including petitioners/defendants 1 to 3 and 6) and by sale of A to C schedule Typed by Rupa

properties. The OA was allowed as prayed for with interest and costs as per the final order dated 29.10.2021. Pursuant thereto a recovery certificate bearing No.16/2022 was issued on 28.03.2022 to the Recovery Officer for recovery of the certificate debt.

7. The respondent/applicant bank has taken a primary contention that the review application filed on 30.05.2022 challenging the final order dated 29.10.2021 is barred by limitation and this Tribunal has no jurisdiction and authority to condone such delay and hence the review application is not maintainable before this Tribunal.

8. Going by R.5A of the Rules, the impugned final order passed by the Tribunal on 29.10.2021 is liable to be reviewed on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record. Even taking to the larger extent, O.47 R.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 provides for review of a Judgement on the grounds, namely:- (i) discovery of new and important matter of evidence which after the exercise of due diligence, was not within the knowledge of the applicant or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order was made, or (ii) some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record; or (iii) for any other sufficient reason (which has been interpreted to be analogous to the other reasons specified above). As per sub-rule (2) of R.5A of the Rules (as it stood amended vide GSR 1047 (E) dated 03.11.2016 and made effective from 04.11.2016) no application for review shall be made after the expiry of a period of thirty days from the date of the order. The aforesaid sub-rule is couched in a negative language implying a mandatory character of limitation. The use of the word 'shall' makes it further obligatory. As per the stricture laid down under sub-rule (2) of R.5A of the Rules, an application challenging the impugned final order dated 29.10.2021 ought to have been filed before this Tribunal on or before 29.11.2021 but the same was happened to be filed only on 30.05.2022 with a delay of 183 days.

9. No separate IA has been filed by the petitioners/defendants 1 to 3 and 6 for condonation of delay of 183 days in presenting RA 1/2022. The review Typed by Karp

petitioners/defendants 1 to 3 and 6 in paragraph 4 of the RA under the head 'limitation' stated that the application has been filed within the period of limitation. The averments read as follows:- *"The order of the Hon'ble Tribunal against which the present review application lies was passed on 29.10.2021. The Hon'ble Supreme Court vide its orders passed on 10.01.2022 in Suo Motu Writ Petition (C) No.3/2020 has suspended the operation of limitation during the period between 15.03.2022 to 28.02.2022 in the light of the covid-19 pandemic. As under the said order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court a further period of 90 days has been provided from 01.03.2022 by way of an extension on the period of limitation. Thus, in view of the same, the present petition is being filed on 30.05.2022 and is, therefore, within limitation."*

10. On scrutiny, the scrutiny hand of the Registry vide remarks dated 07.06.2022 noted a few defects including that of limitation. The Registrar vide order dated 22.06.2022 granted time up to 06.07.2022 for curing the defects, which was further extended up to 25.08.2022. In the meantime, the petitioners/defendants 1 to 3 and 6 filed a memo on 18.08.2022 answering the defects noted by the Registry. The relevant portion in respect of limitation reads thus:- *"Delay application to be filed:- The order of this Hon'ble Tribunal against which the present review application lies was passed on 29.10.2021, The Hon'ble Supreme Court vide its orders passed on 10.01.2022 in Suo Motu Writ Petition (C) No.3/2020 has suspended the operation of limitation during the period between 15.03.2022 to 28.02.2022 in the light of the covid-19 pandemic. As under the said order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, a further period of 90 days has been provided from 01.03.2022 by way of an extension on the period of limitation. The present application was filed on 30.05.2022 being within the period of 90 days stipulated under the order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The application is, therefore, within limitation."*

11. The defects were cured as per the remarks dated 25.08.2022 of the scrutiny hand. The Registrar vide order dated 25.08.2022 ordered to register the RA and placed the matter before the Tribunal for hearing on 13.10.2022. The order reads as below:- *"Register as RA. Place the case before the Hon'ble Presiding Officer for hearing on 13.10.2022"*

12. Notwithstanding to the merits of the reasons proposed by the petitioners/defendants 1 to 3 and 6, this Tribunal is not inclined to accept the contention of the respondent/applicant bank in respect of limitation in view of S.24 of the Act by which the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 has been made applicable to an application filed under S.19(1) of the Act before this Tribunal and especially in view of the guidelines and Typed by: Anup

directions issued by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in *In Re : Cognizance for Extension of Limitation [reported in 2022 (1) KLT 315 (SC)]*. The period of limitation to present the instant RA had expired during the period referred to by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision. Therefore, the benefit of the aforesaid decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court is applicable to the facts of this case.

13. In the above circumstances, notwithstanding to the merits of the case proposed by the petitioners/defendants 1 to 3 and 6, this Tribunal is looking into the directions issued by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in *In Re : Cognizance for Extension of Limitation [reported in 2022 (1) KLT 315 (SC)]* taking into consideration the impact of the surge of covid viruses on public health and the adversities faced by the litigants wherein it is directed that the period from 15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022 shall stand excluded for the purpose of limitation as may be prescribed under any general or special laws in respect of all judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and that in cases where the limitation would have expired during the period between 15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022, notwithstanding the actual balance period of imitation remaining, all person shall have a limitation period of 90 days from 01.03.2022, and the relevant portion reads as below:- *"Taking into consideration the arguments advanced by counsel and the impact of the surge of the virus on public health and adversities faced by litigants in the prevailing conditions, we deem it appropriate to dispose of the MA No.21 of 2022 with the following directions: The order dated 23.03.2020 is restored and in continuation of the subsequent orders dated 08.03.2021, 27.04.2021 and 23.09.2021, it is directed that the period from 15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022 shall stand excluded for the purposes of limitation as may be prescribed under any general or special laws in respect of all judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings. Consequently, the balance period of limitation remaining as on 03.10.2021, if any, shall become available with effect from 01.03.2022. In cases where the limitation would have expired during the period between 15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022, notwithstanding the actual balance period of limitation remaining, all persons shall have a limitation period of 90 days from 01.03.2022. In the event the actual balance period of limitation remaining, with effect from 01.03.2022 is greater than 90 days, that longer period shall apply. It is further clarified that the period from 15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022 shall also stand excluded in computing the periods prescribed under Ss.23(4) and 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, S.12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 and provisos (b) and (c) of S.138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and any other laws, which prescribe period(s) of limitation for instituting proceedings, outer limits (within which the court or tribunal can condone delay) and termination of proceedings."*

14. In view of the above direction issued by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the petitioners/defendants 1 to 3 and 6 were entitled to present an application under R.5A of Typed by Rupa

the Rules aggrieved by the final order dated 29.10.2021 passed by this Tribunal in OA 1136/2017 on or before 30.05.2022 as the limitation (stipulated date of '29.11.2021') had expired during the period between 15.03.2020 and 28.02.2022. However, they presented the same on 30.05.2022, within the time as prescribed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. In the above circumstances, notwithstanding to the merits of the grounds urged by the petitioners/defendants 1 to 3 and 6 in the application, the delay of 183 days in presenting RA 1/2022 comes within the outer limit within which this Tribunal can condone as directed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the decision supra. In the above circumstances, RA 1/2022 filed on 30.05.2022 by the petitioners/defendants 1 to 3 and 6 challenging the final order dated 29.10.2021 passed by this Tribunal in OA 1136/2017 is not barred by limitation but well maintainable before this Tribunal and this Tribunal has jurisdiction to entertain the same.

15. Admittedly, the 1^st petitioner/1^st defendant company, represented by its Directors, petitioners 2 and 3/defendants 2 and 3, availed on 06.02.2004 a cash credit facility of ₹23 crores (which was enhanced from time to time to ₹60 crores) from the respondent/applicant bank as referred to in the OA. But, according to them, the 4^th petitioner/6^th defendant has no privity of contract with the respondent/applicant bank and has not signed any loan security document in its favour and, therefore, the final order dated 29.10.2021 making her also liable for the amounts claimed as due under the OA is wrong. It appears to be their case that the view of this Tribunal in fixing liability on the 4^th petitioner/6^th defendant is wrong. It is also contended by the petitioners/defendants 1 to 3 and 6 that the impugned order passed is an error in law and not based on facts, that the Tribunal while passing the order did not appreciate the evidence adduced by the respondent/applicant bank in order to determine whether the facts pleaded by it stands proved and, therefore, the reasoning based on the assumption that the petitioners/defendants 1 to 3 and 6 admitted its case is not in accordance with law. It is further Typed by: Kapi

contended that the amounts claimed as due under the statement of account have not been corroborated with evidence.

16. It may be noted that no error apparent on the face of the records could be pointed out by the petitioners/defendants 1 to 3 and 6. If the view taken by the Tribunal is wrong based on the facts alleged by the respondent/applicant bank, the remedy of the petitioners/defendants 1 to 3 and 6 lies elsewhere and an application under R.5A of the Rules for review of the aforesaid final order is not the appropriate remedy. The final order passed by this Tribunal, even if it is erroneous, cannot be altered or modified on review of the same. The Tribunal has become functus officio in respect of OA 1136/2017.

17. Assailing the final order dated 29.10.2021, it is also contended by the petitioners/defendants 1 to 3 and 6 that they were unaware of the OA proceedings as no summons was served upon them and they were aware of the proceedings only recently.

18. A perusal of the OA records shows that summons in the OA were sent to the petitioners/defendants 1 to 3 and 6 by registered post on 25.01.2018, which were not returned. A repeated attempt of summons was made on them by registered post on 14.01.2019 by which the 2^nd and the 4^th petitioners/defendants 2 and 6 were duly served and for others were returned un-claimed. Again, a repeated attempt for service of summons was made on them by registered post on 06.09.2019 wherein petitioners 1 and 2/defendants 1 and 2 were duly served. Similar summons sent to the 3^rd applicant/3^rd defendant was returned un-served with the postal endorsement 'unclaimed'. In the above circumstances, petitioners 1, 2 and 4/defendants 1, 2 and 6 were duly served with summons in the OA at different occasions. But they remained absent and they were not represented in the proceedings and thus they were declared ex-parte in the proceedings on 12.10.2021. Resultantly, the impugned order dated 29.10.2021 came to be passed in OA 1136/2017 as against them. In the above facts and circumstances of the case, the Tried No. 1001

contention raised by the petitioners/defendants 1 to 3 and 6 to the effect that they were unaware of the OA proceedings as no summons was served upon them is absolutely false. If they chose to remain absent in the proceedings in spite of due service of summons on them, it is at their risk and sole responsibility only. Though they contended that they were aware of the proceedings only recently, the exact time of date of knowledge is not divulged by them. Though they contended that they have good case on merits of the case, no valid reason has been furnished by them for not filing a written statement in the OA proceedings despite duly served with a summons.

19. The petitioners/defendants 1 to 3 and 6 have also contended that the schedule immovable property had already been sold pending the OA proceedings by the respondent/applicant bank invoking the provisions under the SARFAESI Act, which fact was not brought to the notice of the Tribunal. The respondent/applicant bank in the statement of objection has submitted that it filed a memo of calculation after adjusting all the amounts realised by it during the pendency of the OA. A perusal of the proceedings in execution of the recovery certificate bearing No.16/2022 shows that the respondent/applicant bank filed an affidavit on 15.05.2024 before the Recovery Officer stating that pending the OA proceedings, A schedule immovable property was sold by it for a sum of ₹70 lakhs. The petitioners/defendants 1 to 3 and 6 already entered appearance through counsel in the execution proceedings. Therefore, it is for them to raise it before the Recovery Officer for appropriation of the sale proceeds of A schedule immovable property as on the date of sale in terms of the recovery certificate issued.

20. Yet another contention raised by the petitioners/defendants 1 to 3 and 6 is that the interest and the penal interest granted under the impugned order is in violation of the terms and conditions in the sanction letters. Such contention ought to have been raised in the trial proceedings only. Having abstained from the trial proceedings, the petitioners/defendants 1 to 3 and 6 cannot raise any objection in respect of interest Typed by: Raj

charged by the respondent/applicant bank and allowed by this Tribunal. The doctrine of estoppel applies.

21. The pleadings in the review petition and the arguments advanced by the Ld counsel were entirely on merits of the case. According to the review petitioners/defendants 1 to 3 and 6, the final order dated 29.10.2021 is hit by the error apparent on the face of the records but they could not point out any such error. It appears to be their case that the view and the final decision taken by this Tribunal in the said final order is wrong and erroneous. A review is not in disguise of an appeal. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi [reported in AIR 1966 SC 153] has observed that jurisdiction under O.47 R.1 of the Code cannot be exercised for an erroneous decision to be 'reheard and corrected' and held that a review petition has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be 'an appeal in disguise'. The decision reads thus:- "9. Under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC a judgement may be open to review inter-alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be 'reheard and corrected'. A review petition, it must be remembered has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be 'an appeal in disguise'."

22. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shanti Conductors Private Limited v Assam State Electricity Board and Others [reported in (2020) 2 SCC 677] has held that the scope of review is limited and under the guise of review, petitioner cannot be permitted to re-agitate and re-argue questions, which have already been addressed to and decided and that an error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of record justifying the court to exercise its power of review, and it reads thus: –

"The scope of review is limited and under the guise of review, the petitioner cannot be permitted to re-agitate and reargue the questions, which have already been addressed and decided. The scope of review has been reiterated by this Court from time to time."

23. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Subramanian Swamy v State of T.N [reported in (2014) 5 SCC 75] has held that an order sought to be reviewed must suffer Typed by: Akg

from error apparent on face of order and that in the absence of such error apparent, even an erroneous judgement/order cannot be a ground for review and finality of judgement order cannot be disturbed.

24. Going by the memorandum of facts accompanying the review petition, there is not even a whisper therein stating that there was an apparent error/mistake on the face of records in the impugned final order dated 29.10.2021. No such mistake apparent from the records in the eye of law was pointed out by the review petitioners/defendants 1 to 3 and 6 in the said memorandum of facts of the review petition. The only ground available as per R.5A of the Rules for review is on account of any mistake or error apparent from the record. It is trite law that only those mistakes or errors which are apparent from the face of record could be reviewed. No valid reason was asserted by the review petitioners/defendants 1 to 3 and 6 on account of which the final order dated 29.10.2021 could be warranted for review. This Tribunal does not see and the review petitioners/defendants 1 to 3 and 6 could not point out any error/mistake apparent on the face of the records necessitating review of the impugned final order dated 29.10.2021 passed by the Tribunal.

25. In the above circumstances, this review petition is found to be devoid of any merit and not sustainable and thus is liable to be dismissed. The review petitioners/defendants 1 to 3 and 6 have no case that they have filed any appeal against the impugned final order dated 29.10.2021 and thus the same has become absolute and final. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in *Haridas Das v. Usha Rani Banik (SMT) and others [reported in (2006) 4 SCC 78]* has held that where the remedy of appeal is available, the power of review should be exercised by the court with greatest circumspection. In the above circumstances, this Tribunal does not find any reason or ground to interfere in the matter.

26. No error or mistake apparent on the face of the records could be pointed out by the review petitioners/defendants 1 to 3 and 6 but according to them, the order Typed by: Kapi

passed is without proper adjudication of the matter in dispute and is in gross violation of the legal provisions of the Act and as such, the final order is illegal.

27. There are two types of erroneous decisions. They are:- (i) erroneous decisions in view of the error committed in appreciating the true facts of the case and applying the law relating thereto, which cannot be rectified by invoking the power under review; and (ii) decision erroneous in view of the error apparent on the face of the records, which can be cured and rectified invoking the power under review. All the contentions raised by the review petitioners/defendants 1 to 3 and 6 were on the ground that the view taken by the Tribunal on the facts and circumstances of the case was erroneous and thus is unsustainable. It is trite law that improper or erroneous appreciation of the facts and circumstances of the case cannot be a ground for review for the purpose of setting aside a final order and re-adjudication of the case, for which the remedy lies elsewhere. The error, if any, committed by the Tribunal in properly understanding the facts and circumstances of the case is not a ground for invoking the limited power under review.

28. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Govt. of A.P [reported in AIR 1964 SC 1372] has distinguished an erroneous decision and a decision which could be characterised as vitiated by 'error apparent' and held that a review by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected but lies only for patent error. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Aribam Tuleswar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma [reported in AIR 1979 SC 1047] has held that there are definite limits to the exercise of power of review and that power of review cannot be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. The Hon'ble High Court of Kerala in Kerala State Electricity Board v Sulabha Marketing (P) Ltd [reported in 2018 (1) KLT 765] has held that it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be 'reheard and corrected' and that a review petition has a limited purpose and cannot be Typed by Raa

allowed to be 'an appeal in disguise'. The Hon'ble High Court of Kerala in Pramod Kumar Savita v Union of India [2019 (3) KLT SN 18 (C.No.24)] has held that an erroneous appreciation of pleadings or wrong assumption of contentions cannot be a ground for review and that when grounds raised in review petitions are grounds that ought to be raised in an appeal, it can be said that review petitions are nothing but an appeal in disguise.

29. In such circumstances, the aforesaid facts and grounds brought on record through the memorandum of review petition by the review petitioners/defendants 1 to 3 and 6 cannot be a legitimate basis for setting aside the impugned final order dated 29.10.2021 and re-adjudication of the matter in dispute. Suffice it to say that the relief prayed for which goes to the root of appreciation of the merits of the case is beyond the scope of R.5A of the Rules before this Tribunal for which the proper remedy for the aggrieved party is to approach the appropriate authority. It implies that this Rule cannot be pressed into service without proving any error apparent on the face of the records to seek for a review. The powers under R.5A of the Rules are neither to be equated with the power of appeal nor can this Tribunal be clothed with such power under the guise of appeal as one cannot sit in appeal of oneself. There is no sufficient ground for a review.

30. The petitioners/defendants 1 to 3 and 6 filed a memo on 20.03.2024 stating that Bank of Baroda has initiated proceedings under S.95 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – for short 'the Code' - against petitioners 2 to 4/defendants 2, 3 and 6 and praying for stay of the instant proceedings by virtue of the interim order dated 16.02.2024 passed by NCLT, Bengaluru.

31. Bank of Baroda filed three separate Company Petitions before the National Company Law Tribunal, Bengaluru Bench, Bengaluru under S.95 of the Code seeking to initiate insolvency resolution process in respect of petitioners 2 to 4/defendants 2, 3 and 6 (corporate guarantors) for a default of the amount of ₹2,58,60,17,543.61.

Typed by: Kunal

Accordingly, resolution professional has been appointed and the interim moratorium under S.96(1)(a) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 has commenced on the date of filing of the said applications by the Bank of Baroda and will cease to effect on the date of admission. As per the orders of the NCLT, Bengaluru in the proceedings dated 25.11.2025, the cases are adjourned to 05.01.2026 for hearing on RP report. In the above circumstances, the resolution professional has already submitted his report and the application is yet to be admitted as under S.100 of the Code and till then the interim order as against the debtors is in operation. In the instant case, A schedule immovable property had already been sold pending the OA proceedings. The 1^st petitioner/1^st defendant company had created equitable mortgage by deposit of title deeds over B schedule immovable property and hypothecated C schedule movable properties as collateral security for the enhanced cash credit limit of ₹60 crores in favour of the respondent/applicant bank. As per clause (ii) of clause (b) of sub-section (1) of S.96 of the Code, the creditors of the debtor shall not initiate any legal action or proceedings in respect of any debt. However, this interim moratorium is specifically for the corporate guarantors and not for the corporate entity. The interim moratorium under S.96 of the Code is applicable to the corporate guarantors stopping actions against them by any secured creditor for their debts whereas the corporate entity has its own process under Part II of the Code with a separate moratorium. The petitioners/defendants 1 to 3 and 6 have no case that any secured creditor has obtained a moratorium under S.14 of the Code as against the 1^st petitioner/1^st defendant company. In the above circumstances, the interim moratorium obtained by the Bank of Baroda under S.96 of the Code is applicable as against petitioners 2 to 4/defendants 2, 3 and 6 only and there is no bar for the respondent/applicant bank to proceed against B and C schedule properties in execution of the recovery certificate bearing No.16/2022 issued pursuant to the final order dated 29.10.2021 passed by this Tribunal in OA 1136/2017.

Typed by Raj

32. In the above circumstances, this review application is found to be devoid of any merit and not sustainable and thus is liable to be dismissed.

33. In the result, RA No.1/2022 is dismissed. All pending IAs stand closed.

The parties shall suffer their respective costs.

*[Dictated to my PA directly on the computer, corrected and pronounced by me in the open Tribunal on this the 31^st day of December, 2025]*

[ IMTIAZ ALI ] PRESIDING OFFICER

Typed by: Nagi

IN THE DEBTS RECOVERY TRIBUNAL - 1, KARNATAKA AT BANGALORE

PRESENT: SRI IMTIAZ ALI PRESIDING OFFICER

Dated the 31^st day of December, 2025

**REVIEW APPLICATION NO.1/2022 IN ORIGINAL APPLICATION NO.1136 OF 2017**

Between

M/s Associate Lumbers Private Limited, 85-A, Victoria Road, Mustafa Bazaar, Mazagaon, Mumbai – 400010 and three others. ....Petitioners/defendants

And

Union Bank of India, (erstwhile Corporation Bank), Poonja Arcade, 1^st Floor, KS Rao Road, Hampankatta, Mangalore, Karnataka – 575001. .... respondent/applicant bank

**ORDER**

31.12.25