Madras High Court

CRL A/210/2019 of R.RAMANI Vs STATE BY on 16 October 2026

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE OF MADRAS

Reserved on : 08.09.2026

Pronounced on :16.10.2026

CORAM:

THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE M.NIRMAL KUMAR

CRL.A.No.210 of 2019

R.Ramani

... Appellant / Accused

Vs.

State by

The Inspector of Police,

Vigilance & Anti-Corruption,

SIC-I, Chennai – 600 028

Crime No.1/AC/2008

... Respondent / Complainant

PRAYER: Criminal Appeal is filed under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure r/w. Section 27 of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, praying to set aside the conviction and sentence passed against the Appellant / Accused on 27.03.2019 in Spl.Case No.4/2009

by the learned Special Judge-Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chengalpattu.

For Appellant

:

Mr.Abdul Basith

For Respondent

:

Mr.S.Udayakumar

Government Advocate (crl.side)

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JUDGMENT

The Appellant, sole accused in Spl.Case No.4 of 2009, was convicted by Judgment, dated 23.07.2019, by the learned Special Judge-Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chengalpattu. She was sentenced to undergo two years Simple Imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs.4,000/-, in default, to undergo Simple Imprisonment for six months, for the offence under Section 7 of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter “the PC Act”). She was further convicted and sentenced to undergo two years Simple Imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs.4000/-, in default to undergo two months Simple Imprisonment, for the offence under Section 13(1)(d) r/w 13(2) of the PC Act, the sentences being ordered to run concurrently. Aggrieved by the said conviction and sentence, the present Criminal Appeal has been preferred by the appellant.

2. The case of the prosecution, in brief, is as follows:-

i. The Appellant, R.Ramani, worked as Sub Registrar, Sub Registrar Office, Tambaram (Chennai South Registration District), Kanchipuram District, from 09.08.2007 onwards and was a public servant within the meaning of Section 2(c) of the PC Act.

ii. P.W.3 / G.Shanmugaraj purchased a house site from 'Sai Builders'. P.W.2 / M.Sri Ram, Manager of Sai Builders, acting on behalf of its Managing Director, P.W.4 / Mani Shankar. P.W.2 approached the appellant for registration of the sale deed. It is alleged that the appellant demanded Rs.2,000/- as gratification other than legal remuneration for registering the document, and directed that the amount be paid at his office at Tambaram at 17.00 hours on 16.06.2008, the day on which the document was to be registered. Unwilling to pay, P.W.2, lodged a written complaint at 11.45 hours on 16.06.2008 before P.W.12 / Inspector of Police, Vigilance and Anti- Corruption, SIC-I, Chennai and P.W.13 is the Deputy Superintendent of Police, on which Crime No.1/AC/2008 registered under Section 7 of the PC Act. A pre-trap demonstration of the Phenolphthalein Test was conducted and the proceedings were recorded.

iii. A trap laid. Two currency notes of Rs.1,000/- denomination, produced by the complainant, were smeared with phenolphthalein powder and entrusted to him under mahazar, and an official witness sent along with him to watch the proceedings. At about 17.00 hours, in the Sub Registrar Office, Tambaram, the complainant met the appellant and handed over the money. According to the prosecution, the appellant reiterated his earlier demand and accepted the amount in the presence of the official witness. On the pre-arranged signal, the trap party entered the room. The phenolphthalein test on the fingers of both hands of the appellant is stated to have been positive and the tainted notes recovered from the drawer of his office table under seizure mahazar, after their numbers were tallied with those recorded in the mahazar. The appellant then arrested.

3. On completion of investigation, and after sanction for prosecution accorded by the Inspector General of Registration, Chennai, under Section 19(1)(c) of the PC Act, by proceedings dated 16.04.2009 (Ex.P1), final report filed and taken on file as Spl.Case No.4 of 2009. Charges under Section 7 and Section 13(1)(d) r/w 13(2) of the PC Act framed.

4. During trial, on the side of the prosecution, PW.1 to PW.13 were examined and Ex.P.1 to P16 and M.Os.1 to 3 were marked. The defence examined DW1 and D.W.2 and marked documents, including Ex.B1 / Sale Deed No.4956 of 2008 and Ex.B2 / letter sent under RTI Act and its enclosures. When questioned under Section 313 Cr.P.C., the appellant denied the incriminating circumstances. On the above evidence, the trial Court convicted and sentenced the Appellant, as stated above.

5. Mr.Abdul Basith, learned counsel for the appellant, submitted that the demand, the foundational fact, has not been proved. PW2, the complainant, nowhere mention any amount in his deposition on the alleged demand or on the handing over of the money. The learned Special Judge supplied the deficiency by reading the words “2000 rupees” into the testimony of PW2, which do not occur in the deposition. The testimony of PW2, PW3, PW4, PW5 and PW12 is contradictory on the aspect of acceptance. While PW3 and PW2 pleaded ignorance of the registration of Document No.4957 of 2008, PW6, PW12 and PW13 admitted it, which lends credence to the explanation of the appellant under Section 313 Cr.P.C. The defence of motive and of a trap was not considered at all. PW4, the vendor, had a grudge on account of the stamp duty and fees he had to pay, and his subsequent sale of the same property to a third party shows that the complaint, lodged through his manager, was engineered to fix the appellant.

6. The learned counsel further submitted that there were serious violations of the Vigilance and Anti-Corruption Manual. Rule 47 was breached as the statement of the accused was not recorded immediately after arrest, depriving of an opportunity to explain, and Rule 53 was breached as PW13, the Deputy Superintendent of Police, who organised and piloted the trap, also investigated the case. All the officials present at the time of the alleged demand and acceptance were not examined. The trial court does not assign any reasons for rejecting the pleas of the defence or the decisions relied upon by the appellant, and is therefore vitiated.

7. Mr.S.Udayakumar, learned Government Advocate (Crl. Side), appearing for the respondent, supported the judgment of the trial

Court. He submitted that the complainant, supported by the official witness, spoken to the demand and acceptance. The tainted money was recovered from the drawer of the appellant and the phenolphthalein test was positive. Once acceptance was proved, the presumption under Section 20 of the PC Act arose and was not rebutted. The defence was an afterthought and that the alleged lapses in following the Vigilance Manual are, at best, irregularities which do not vitiate the trial. He prayed that the appeal be dismissed.

8. Heard both sides and perused the materials on record, including the judgment of the trial Court, the depositions of the witnesses and the documents marked during trial.

9. The points that arise for consideration are: (i) whether the prosecution has proved, beyond reasonable doubt, a demand of illegal gratification by the appellant; (ii) whether the voluntary acceptance of the tainted money by the appellant, as gratification, has been proved so as to attract the presumption under Section 20 of the PC Act; (iii) whether the explanation of the appellant is probable and has created a reasonable doubt in the case of the prosecution; and (iv) whether the conviction and sentence are liable to be set aside.

10. This being the statutory appeal against a conviction, this Court is duty-bound to re-appreciate the entire evidence and to arrive at its own conclusions on facts and law. The presumption of innocence of the accused is reinforced, and not weakened, by the judgment of conviction only to the extent that the findings are supported by legal evidence. Where a finding of guilt is founded on a misreading of the evidence or on the omission to consider a material plea of the defence, the appellate Court is bound to interfere.

11. The offence under Section 7 of the PC Act (as it stood at the time of the occurrence in June 2008) requires proof that the public servant accepted or obtained, or agreed to accept or attempted to obtain, gratification other than legal remuneration as a motive or reward for doing an official act. The offence under Section 13(1)(d) requires proof that the public servant obtained a valuable thing or pecuniary advantage by corrupt or illegal means or by abusing his position. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has consistently held that proof of demand of illegal gratification is the sine qua non for both offences, and that mere possession or recovery of currency notes from the accused, without proof of demand, is not sufficient to convict. The Constitution Bench in Neeraj Dutta v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) (2023) 4 SCC 731 has clarified that, in the absence of direct evidence because the complainant turns hostile or is unavailable, demand may be established by other evidence, including circumstantial evidence. That decision does not dispense with proof of demand; it only widens the manner in which it may be proved. The demand must still be established by cogent and legally admissible evidence, and the Court cannot presume it.

12. The statutory presumption under Section 20 of the PC Act is available only after the prosecution proves that the accused accepted or obtained gratification. It is, by the very language of Section 20(1), confined to offences under Section 7, Section 11 and Section 13(1)(a) and (b) of the PC Act, and does not extend to Section 13(1)(d). Where the demand itself is not proved, the acceptance of money cannot be characterised as acceptance of gratification, and the presumption is not triggered at all. It is trite that a Court can base a conviction only on the evidence actually adduced before it. Evidence, as defined in Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, consists of the statements which the Court permits or requires the witnesses to make before it. A Judge is not entitled to improve upon the statement of a witness, however confident he may be that the witness meant to say what he supplies, and certainly not to cure a deficiency in the prosecution evidence on the very ingredient on which the whole case turns. The trial Court has done precisely that, and the finding of demand thereby stands vitiated. The prosecution has not pointed to any other direct or circumstantial evidence which, independent of the interpolation, establishes the demand. The official witness could, at best, speak to what he saw and heard at the time of the handing over, and the prosecution case itself is that the alleged demand preceded the trap, having been made earlier when the document was presented for registration. The recitals in Ex.P1, and the allegations in the complaint, are not substantive evidence. The learned Special

Judge has also not dealt with the specific plea of the defence the judgment merely records the conclusion without reasons. A judgment of conviction under a penal statute, particularly one in which the entire case turns on the credibility and content of the testimony of a single witness, must disclose the process of reasoning by which the Court has found each ingredient proved. In its absence, the findings cannot be sustained. Accordingly, demand of illegal gratification has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.

13. The learned Government Advocate relied heavily on the positive phenolphthalein test and the recovery of the tainted notes from the drawer of the appellant. These are, however, only circumstances relating to the acceptance and possession of the money. Recovery by itself is not proof of guilt where the demand is not established. The money may be found with or in the possession of an accused for several reasons. The offence is complete only if it was received as illegal gratification, which requires proof of a demand or, at least, of a voluntary acceptance with knowledge that it is a bribe. In the absence of demand, the prosecution has not proved that the money was accepted as a motive or reward, and the presumption under Section 20 of the PC Act, which can be invoked only after acceptance as gratification is established, cannot be drawn. Even otherwise, as noted above, Section 20 has no application to the charge under Section 13(1)(d).

14. The evidence on acceptance is also not free from doubt. The learned counsel for the appellant has pointed to the inconsistencies in the evidence of PW2, PW3, PW4, PW5 and PW12 on how the money was received and kept, and on the registration of the next document. PW2 and PW3 professed ignorance of the registration of document No.4957 of 2008, whereas PW6, PW12 and PW13 admitted that this document was registered by the appellant immediately after the subject document presented. The “A” Register records the registration of 35 documents on that day, with the subject document as the 34th, and PW12 and PW13 have conceded this. That the appellant was occupied with the registration of the next document at the very time at which the money is said to have been handed over is thus established by the prosecution’s own witnesses. These circumstances give weight to the explanation of the appellant under Section 313 Cr.P.C. that the money was placed in his drawer while he was engaged in registering that document, and they cast doubt on the prosecution version of demand and conscious and voluntary acceptance of bribe.

15. The Court must also consider the plea that the complaint was a device to implicate the appellant. It is settled that an accused is not required to prove his defence beyond reasonable doubt, as the prosecution must prove its case; it is sufficient for the appellant to show, on a preponderance of probabilities, that the explanation offered is reasonable and probable, and that is enough to rebut any presumption in law and to create a doubt in the prosecution case. The appellant’s explanation is supported by materials on record and is inherently probable.

16. The above case revolves around the evidence of P.W.2 / Complainant / Decoy; P.W.3 accompanying witness; P.W.4 / employee of P.W.2 and vendor to the property in documents Ex.P4 and P.W.5, the purchaser of the property. P.W.2's evidence is that on 16.06.2008, he met the appellant at about 10.30 a.m., and shown the document, Ex.P4 to confirm prioir to registration. At that time it is projected that appellant demanded a bribe amount of Rs.2000/-. Thereafter, P.W.2 said to have informed about the demand of bribe to his employer P.W.4. PW.4 said to have advised PW2 to lodge a complaint. Hence, P.W.2 approached PW12, respondent, lodged a complaint and the case was registered at about 11.45 Hrs. Thereafter, two official witnesses namely PW3 and one Ravikumar from TNEB were called to be witness for the trap. Ex.P.3 is the entrustment mahazar, which concluded at about 14.15 hours. It is admitted by PW3, accompanying witness and P.W.12, Trap Laying Officer that PW2 not signed in the entrustment mahazar. Hence, the drawing of entrustment mahazar and date and time is highly doubtful. PW13, the Investigation Officer admits that statement of PW2 recorded by PW12 not submitted to the Court. Further, entrustment mahazar / Ex.P3 reached Court only on 14.08.2009, after an inordinate and unexplained delay and no explanation whatsoever.

17. Further, P.W.2 stated that his employer P.W.4 came to the Vigilance Office and that both P.W.2 and P.W.4 left the Vigilance office in their vehicle and reached the Sub Registrar Office. P.W3, PW12 and Trap Team officials came into two vehicles separately and thereafter, PW2, PW3, PW4 and PW5 went and met the appellant. PW4's evidence is that PW2 called him through mobile and asked him to come to the Registration Office. PW4 and PW5 Registration Office 10 minutes latter, PW2 and PW3 came to the Sub Registrar Office. Thus, there is material contradiction in the evidence of PW2 with regard to presence of PW4 and PW5. Added to it, it is seen in the recovery mahazar, Ex.P9, there is no mention about the presence of PW4 and PW5 at the time of demand and handing over the bribe amount.

18. PW4 is a realtor running a firm under the name of “Sai Builders” engaged in layout development, plotting, construction for over 15 years, frequently executing sale deed at the Sub Registrar Office. The appellant joined as Sub Registrar, Thambaram on 10.08.2007, which is confirmed by PW2 and PW13. It could be seen that PW4 developed the layouts in the name of “Sai Ayush Rameshaa” and he executed sale deed for plot No.1-C in faovur of PW5. Prior to this, PW4 submitted 24 sale deeds for the same layout, undervaluing the plots at Rs.262/- sqft. Doubting the valuation, the appellant, kept the document pending P317/2007, referred the documents to the District Registrar for enquiry and correct valuation who conducted enquiry, found the adjacent plots in the same survey number, developed in the name of “Cousic Avenue” and its valuation is Rs.500/- sqft. Hence, I.G of Registration confirms the objection raised by the appellant, refixed the value of the property from Rs.262/-sqft to Rs.500/-sqft. Hence, PW4 suffered an additional expenditure of Rs.7,68,850/= and causing a loss. Hence, there was animosity developed against the appellant. Further, the appellant insisted that the documents should presented by the vendor and the buyer or by her power of attorney and not by anyone. Hence, he objected P.W.2 presenting the documents for 'Sai Builders'.

19. PW4 and PW13 admit no power of attorney produced to present the documents for registration. Further, the appellant was following online registration and time slot which caused difficulty to PW4. Hence, PW4 set up PW5 and projected as though a sale deed is executed for Plot No.1C and there was a demand of bribe amount. It is seen in Ex.P4, it is recorded that sale consideration of Rs.7,37,500/- was paid in cash. But, PW5, the purchaser confirms that he paid sale consideration by cheque and through bank. He further reconfirms that he and his wife mobilized the amount and paid the sale consideration through bank. Further, he reconfirms that the purchase of sale property and his bank transactions have all declared in his Income Tax Return. But, PW12, the Investigation Officer fails to confirm how the sale consideration paid. PW2 and

PW4 admit that in their office there is separate Accounts Department, which maintains the Accounts for receipt of sale consideration and thereafter documents prepared, submitted for registration. In this case, no evidence collected to show for receipt of sale consideration whether by cash or through bank.

20. Added to it, it is to be seen that Plot No.1C, sale deed was executed by PW4 to PW5 in the year 2014 for Rs.85,00,000/- to Reva Phonix Engineers and Consultancy India Private Limited Managing Director, Manikandan. The said document marked as Ex.D1. Under Ex.D1, the land value was apportioned at Rs.29,50,000/- and the building structure value at Rs.55,50,506/-. Thus, the foundational fact that the appellant demanded bribe amount of Rs.2000/- for accepting Ex.P4 gets demolished and it is clear that PW5 is only a name lender. Though PW4 executed Ex.D1 in 2008 again executed another sale deed for the same property in the year 2014. Thus, Ex.P4 is only a created document and PW5 is the name lender. Thus, once the foundational fact collapses, the entire facts falls to the ground. Further, PW2's evidence is clear that he gone along with PW4. But the evidence of PW3 is that PW2 and PW3, and official witness Rajkumar alone, went with PW12 / Trap Laying Officer to the appellant's office. Hence, presence of decoy, accompanying witness and other witnesses to the Trap are highly doubtful in the manner projected by the prosecution.

21. Further, in this case, the specific defence of the appellant is that the appellant was busy on that day, totally 35 documents presented for registration and Ex.P4 is the 34th document after admitting Ex.P4 the appellant was enquiring the registration of 35th document in Doc.No.4957, which is recorded in “A” Register, Ex.P11 and P12. PW7 is the Joint Sub Registrar; PW8 Assistant; PW9 Office Assistant and PW11 Junior Assistant all confirm the same. Further it is admitted by the witnesses that it was a busy day at about 5.00 p.m., there were about 30 persons who were in the office in connection with Registration work and the appellant was busy with registration of document No.35. At that time, taking advantage of the situation, MO1, trap amount, dropped in the drawer of the appellant, thereafter PW12 came there, forced the appellant to handle the amount dropped in the drawer, thereafter, projected that phenolphthalein test positive. The appellant gave explanation in his 313 questioning and through cross-examination of the witnesses, but the trial Court failed to consider his explanation. Further, added to it, the appellant examined two official witnesses DW1 and DW2 and he marked 2 documents not considered by the trial Court. A cumulative analysis of the evidence unequivocally demonstrates that PW4 harboured a strong motive to falsely implicate the appellant due to objection raised by appellant over property valuation and procedural compliance. PW4, the President of Builders Association compelled to pay additional amount, for refixed value at the instance of the appellant and appellant insisting to adhere to slot for

presentation of the document caused lot of inconvenience developed a gruse and animosity. Hence, PW4 through his employee PW2 and name lender PW5 foisted a false case.

22. PW12 failed to properly perform his duties and not produced any material evidence to establish that the appellant was with doubtful integrity . On the contrary, the evidence shows that the document was presented and accepted, and that it was forwarded to the concerned staff for taking an additional photograph, scanning the document, and recording fingerprints. All these procedures completed without delay. Further, P.W.3's presence is highly doubtful, PW3 admit he had not signed any of the documents except the recovery mahazar marked as Ex.P9. The other documents, namely Exs.P4 to P8, seized from the appellant’s office. None signed by PW3. It is also to be noted that, following the trap, search in the residence of appellant conducted on the same day between 9:15 p.m. and 9:45 p.m., and NIL report submitted , as evidenced by Ex.P10.

23. Learned counsel for the appellant also relied on certain lapses in the conduct of the trap. Rule 47 of the Vigilance and Anti- Corruption Manual requires that the explanation of the accused be recorded immediately after the arrest; PW12 did not do so, and the appellant was thereby denied the first opportunity to explain how the money came to be in his drawer and that this omission is a serious lapse. Similarly, PW7 has deposed that PW13, the Deputy

Superintendent of Police, after organising and piloting the trap, handed over the charge of the appellant to him on 16.06.2008 at SRO Tambaram, and PW.13 then conducted the investigation. The combination of the roles of the trap officer and the investigating officer is contrary to Rule 53 of the Manual and to the Circular No.28680/VAC-4-90 dated 18.09.1990 and 04.06.1991. Further, though seven to eight officials were present in the office at the time of the alleged demand and acceptance, none of them cited and examined as a witness. The shadow witnesses, who accompany the complainant on the instructions of the trap officer, cannot be treated as independent witnesses. I do not find it necessary to decide whether each of the above lapses, individually, would vitiate the trial, as the appeal can be disposed of on the failure of the prosecution to prove demand. But the Court cannot ignore these circumstances. The trap officer’s dual role, the omission to record the explanation of the appellant at the earliest, and the failure to examine independent witnesses who were available, are circumstances which, together with the infirmities discussed above, weaken the reliability of the prosecution case and enhance the doubt in the mind of the Court.

24. To sum up, the prosecution has failed to prove, by legally admissible evidence, the demand of illegal gratification by the appellant. The finding of the trial Court on demand was reached by reading into the deposition of PW2 an amount which the witness had not stated. Acceptance is not established as gratification, and the presumption under Section 20 of the PC Act is not available. The probable defence of the appellant, and the material lapses in the conduct of the trap, were left unanswered by the trial Court. Hence, the conviction cannot be sustained, and the appellant is acquitted from all charges.

25. In the result, this Criminal Appeal is allowed. The conviction and sentence passed in Spl.Case No.4/2009 by the learned Special Judge-cum-Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chengalpattu, vide Judgment dated 27.03.2019 are set aside. The Bail bond, if any, executed by the appellant shall stand cancelled. The fine amount, if any, paid shall be refunded to the appellant. 16.10.2026 Index : Yes/No Internet : Yes / No mpk

To

1. Special Judge-Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chengalpattu.

2. The Inspector of Police, Vigilance & Anti-Corruption, SIC-I, Chennai – 600 028

3. Public Prosecutor, High Court, Madras

M.NIRMAL KUMAR, J. mpk Pre-Delivery Judgment made in CRL.A.No.210 of 2019 16.10.2026

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