CRL A/334/2016 of K.PATTUSAMY Vs THE INSPECTOR OF POLICE on 16 October 2026

COMMON JUDGMENT

These two criminal appeals arise out of the same judgment dated 21.04.2016 passed by the learned Special Judge / Chief Judicial Magistrate, Cuddalore District, Cuddalore, in Spl.C.No.15 of 2010. By that judgment the accused was acquitted of the charge under Section

7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 ("the Act") under Section 248(1) Cr.P.C., but was convicted under Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Act under Section 248(2) Cr.P.C., and sentenced to undergo one year Rigorous Imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/-, in default to undergo two months Rigorous Imprisonment.

2. Crl.A.No.334 of 2016 is preferred by the accused against the conviction and sentence. Crl.A.No.743 of 2016 is preferred by the State against the acquittal under Section 7 of the Act. Since both appeals challenge the same judgment, they were heard together and are disposed of by this Common Judgment. The parties are referred to in this judgment as they stood before the trial Court, namely, the State as the prosecution and K.Pattusamy as the accused.

3. The accused, who aged about 57 years at the time of trial, died during the pendency of the appeal. On an application, this Court, by order dated 23.11.2021 in Crl.M.P.No.11544 of 2021, permitted the appeal to be continued. The record shows that the accused paid the fine amount and that his sentence was suspended by the trial Court. The conviction carries consequences for the family of the deceased accused, and the appeal against conviction therefore survives for decision on merits.

4. The case of the prosecution is that the accused was working as Assistant Manager (Retail Vending) in the Office of the District

Manager, TASMAC, Cuddalore. TASMAC is a company wholly owned by the Government of Tamil Nadu, and the trial Court held, and it is not disputed before this Court, that the accused was a public servant within Section 2(c) of the Act. The Sanction (Ex.P.1) was issued by P.W.1, the Managing Director, and no argument on sanction was pressed in this appeal.

5. The prosecution case, as set out in the final report, is in two parts.

(a) P.W.2, salesman of Shop No.2477, Gangaikondan, Neyveli, was placed under interim suspension by the District Manager (P.W.4) by proceedings, dated 12.02.2010. To get the suspension revoked and to be re-posted, P.W.2 approached the accused. The accused is alleged to have demanded Rs.3,000/-, as illegal gratification in the first week of March 2010, on 08.03.2010 at about 3.30 p.m. at the office, and over the phone on 11.03.2010, directing P.W.2 to meet him on 12.03.2010 with the money. Unwilling to pay, P.W.2 lodged a complaint (Ex.P.2) on 12.03.2010 with P.W.13, Inspector of Police, who registered the FIR(Ex.P.29), arranged official witnesses (P.W.3 and one Muthamil Selvan), and prepared the entrustment mahazar (Ex.P.3) after smearing six Rs.500/- notes (M.O.1 series) with phenolphthalein powder.

(b) The prosecution further alleges that at about 3.15 p.m. on 12.03.2010, at the gate of the District Manager's office, the accused demanded Rs.500/- each from T. Arjunan (P.W.8, Salesman, Shop No.2483, Mangalampettai) and R. Govindan (P.W.9, Salesman, Shop No.2444, Thirumuttam) for processing their petitions for mutual transfer, and accepted Rs.1,000/- from P.W.9 on behalf of both.

6. According to the prosecution, P.W.2 and P.W.3 waited at the office until about 3.20 p.m., when the accused came out and took them near the First Aid Centre, where P.W.2 handed over tainted money, which the accused received with his right hand, counted with both hands and kept in his right pant pocket. On the pre-arranged signal of P.W.2 scratching his head, the trap party closed in. P.W.2 identified the accused. The accused taken to the chamber of the District Manager (P.W.4), where the phenolphthalein test on both hands and on the pant pocket gave a positive result. P.W.14, the Deputy Superintendent of Police, arrested the accused, and recovered Rs.3,000/- from the right pant pocket, numbers of the notes tallying with Ex.P.3. A further Rs.1,000/- (M.O.4) recovered from the accused. The seizure mahazar (Ex.P.8), observation mahazar (Ex.P.9), rough sketch (Ex.P.10) and search list (Ex.P.11) were prepared. After the investigation, P.W.15 filed the final report.

7. The accused was charged under Section 7 and Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Act. He pleaded not guilty. The prosecution examined P.W.1 to P.W.15, marked Exs.P.1 to P.30 and M.O.1 to M.O.4. No witness or document was examined or marked on the side of the defence. When questioned under Section 313 Cr.P.C. the accused denied the allegations and stated that Rs.3,000/- was a loan earlier taken by P.W.2 from him, and that a false case was foisted on him when repayment was insisted upon.

8. The trial Court held that P.W.2 and P.W.3 were the material witnesses on demand and acceptance. P.W.3 examined in chief but died before cross-examination, which the trial Court recorded. The trial Court held that the demand of Rs.3,000/- by the accused was not proved and, in the absence of demand, it was not safe to convict the accused under Section 7 of the Act. Accordingly, the trial Court acquitted him of that charge.

9. The trial Court, however, found the accused guilty under Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Act on the ground that

(i) the accused admitted before P.W.4, during trap proceedings he had Rs.1,000/- which he collected from P.W.8 and P.W.9; (ii) In and Out register entries spoken to by P.W.7 show that P.W.8 and P.W.9 met the accused regarding mutual transfer, though they turned hostile; (iii) the accused offered no reasonable explanation for Rs.1,000/-; and (iv) though P.W.4 the authority to grant mutual transfer, the application to be routed through the accused, and he abused his office in the absence of power.

10. Mr.C.R.Malarvannan, learned counsel, submitted that the conviction rests on recovery alone. P.W.8 and P.W.9, the only persons who could say that any money paid to the accused, turned hostile and denied giving any money; no complaint ever made by them; and no trap laid in respect of the Rs.1,000/-. The names of P.W.8 and P.W.9 do not appear in the earliest document, the seizure mahazar Ex.P.8, which records that the accused said Rs.1,000/- given by one Balakrishnan and P.W.10 Muthuvel, for mutual transfer; P.W.13 deposed to the same effect, and they were cited only to speak to the no-dues letters, and not to payment of any bribe. The prosecution has thus introduced a new case without explanation. It was further submitted that P.W.4 endorsed on Ex.P.19 that the mutual transfer petition be kept on hold till 31.03.2010, so that there was no occasion for any demand; that the so-called admission before the trap party, while the accused in their custody, is inadmissible in evidence; and that the trial Court, having disbelieved the prosecution case on demand in respect of the main transaction, ought not to have accepted the very same prosecution version for the rest.

11. As against the State's appeal, learned counsel submitted that the view taken by the trial Court on Section 7 is a possible and reasonable view, supported by serious infirmities in the prosecution case, namely: (a) the charge memo against P.W.2 prepared only on 08.03.2010 and signed by P.W.4 on 10.03.2010, so there was no occasion for any demand in the first week of March 2010; (b) the accused had no authority to revoke the suspension or to reinstate P.W.2, which P.W.2 himself admitted in cross-examination, the competent authority being only the District Manager; (c) no call records were produced to prove the demand over the phone; (d) P.W.3 never cross-examined and his evidence cannot be relied upon, and in any event, his version that P.W.2 and he "came out" after handing over is inconsistent with the case that the money handed over on the open road; (e) the visitors' register entry Ex.P.7 admitted by P.W.7 to have been written by him and not by P.W.2, and none of the witnesses identified signatures in it; (f) P.W.6 stated that the accused signed the attendance register and went out at about 1.45 p.m. and thereafter brought back by four or five persons, which is at variance with the prosecution case that he met P.W.2 and P.W.3 at about 1.40 p.m. and came out at 3.20 p.m.; and (g) the place of occurrence in Exs.P.9 and P.10 is the SIPCOT Complex Road South of the District TASMAC office, whereas the witnesses place it near the First Aid Centre.

12. Mr.Leonard Arul Joseph Selvam, learned Additional Public Prosecutor submitted that the demand on the date of trap is proved by P.W.2, corroborated by P.W.3 and the seizure mahazar; that recovery of Rs.3,000/- from the pocket of the accused is not even challenged in cross-examination, and phenolphthalein test positive; that once demand and acceptance are proved the presumption under Section 20 of the Act must be raised, and the accused offered no

probable explanation; that the trial Court gave undue weight to minor discrepancies; and that the accused offered no explanation for Rs.1,000/- recovered from him.

13. The following points that arise for determination before this Court are;

(i) Whether the demand and acceptance of illegal gratification of Rs.3,000/- from P.W.2 are proved beyond reasonable doubt, so as to warrant interference with the acquittal under Section 7 of the Act?

(ii) Whether the prosecution has proved the offence under Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Act in respect of the Rs.1,000/- allegedly obtained from P.W.8 and P.W.9?

(iii) To what relief the parties are entitled?

14. In an appeal against acquittal this Court, as the Statutory appellate Court, has full power to reappreciate the evidence. At the same time, the well-settled principle is that where two views are reasonably possible on the evidence, the view favourable to the accused, which has added support of the presumption of innocence strengthened by the acquittal, should not be disturbed merely because another view is possible. Interference is warranted only where the finding of the trial Court is perverse or the view taken is not a possible view (Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4

SCC 415). Applying the same principle in a trap case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Selvaraj v. State of Karnataka ((2015) 10 SCC

230) restored an acquittal where demand was not proved and held that the High Court ought not to have interfered when the trial Court's view was a possible one. In an appeal against conviction, on the other hand, the Court must examine whether the conviction is supported by legally admissible evidence proving every ingredient of the offence.

15. It is settled law that proof of demand of illegal gratification is the gravamen of the offences under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)(i) and

(ii) of the Act, and that mere recovery of tainted currency, without proof of demand, is not sufficient to convict. The presumption under Section 20 of the Act arises only after the prosecution first proves that the accused accepted or obtained the gratification, and acceptance is, in this context, acceptance of a bribe in pursuance of a demand (B. Jayaraj v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2014) 13 SCC

55) ; The Constitution Bench in Neeraj Dutta v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), (2023) 4 SCC 731, has reiterated that proof of demand and acceptance is indispensable, though in the absence of direct evidence the demand may be inferred from other reliable circumstantial evidence. The question here is whether such reliable evidence exists.

16. P.W.2 spoke of three demands. In the first week of March 2010, on 08.03.2010, and over the phone on 11.03.2010. The records show the following:- (a) The suspension of P.W.2 ordered by the District Manager (P.W.4) on 12.02.2010. According to P.W.5, the charge memo (Ex.P.16) prepared on 08.03.2010 on the direction of P.W.4 and signed by P.W.4 on 10.03.2010. P.W.2 himself deposed that the accused asked him on 08.03.2010 to come and give an explanation. Since the charge memo itself came into existence only on 08.03.2010, there was no pending file or occasion for P.W.2 to approach the accused in the first week of March 2010, and the alleged demand during that period is not probable. The alleged demand on 08.03.2010 is equally doubtful, since the explanation sought to be revoked was itself being called for on that very date.

(b) P.W.2 admitted in cross-examination that power to appoint, suspend or reinstate him is vested only with the District Manager (P.W.4), that he knew the accused had no power to reinstate him, and that the explanation was addressed to P.W.4. The suggestion that a person who has no power over the outcome would demand a bribe for revocation of suspension is, in the setting of this case, difficult to accept. The prosecution relies on the circumstance that the file passed through the accused, but Exs.P.4 and P.12 relate to a charge memo and file concerning one Ramalingam and the original file, and Ex.P.5 is an explanation written by P.W.2 to P.W.4. None of these documents shows any role of the accused in the decision to revoke P.W.2's suspension.

(c) As to the telephonic demand on 11.03.2010, there is no evidence except the oral word of P.W.2. The prosecution has not produced the call detail records of the mobile phones of P.W.2 or of the accused, though it was in a position to do so. As the trial Court noted, the initial demand therefore stands unproved.

17. P.W.3 deposed that, after money handed over, he and P.W.2 "came out", which is consistent with the handing over of the money inside the office, whereas the prosecution case, and the evidence of P.W.2 himself is that the money was handed over in the open on the public road near the First Aid Centre. This statement casts a serious doubt on whether P.W.3 present at the time of alleged transaction at all. He did not sign the visitors' register. P.W.2 claimed to have signed the visitors' register. The relevant entry, Ex.P.7, was admitted by P.W.7, the Chief Security Officer who maintains the register, to have been written by him alone, and no witness identified his signature in Ex.P.7. By contrast, Exs.P.24 and P25 show that on 08.03.2010 PW8 and PW9 met only the District Manager, and that P.W.2 too met only the District Manager on that day. P.W.2, however, deposed as if he has not seen the District Manager at all. These documents contradict the oral version of P.W.2.

18. In Selvaraj v. State of Karnataka, (2015) 10 SCC 230, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while considering a prosecution under the Prevention of Corruption Act, emphasised the necessity of evaluating the prosecution evidence carefully where the complainant, who was material to proving the alleged demand and acceptance of illegal gratification, was unavailable for cross-examination. Applying the principle underlying the said decision to the present case, P.W.3, the shadow witness, was examined in chief but died before he could be subjected to cross-examination, which had been deferred at the instance of the defence with the leave of the Court. Consequently, his testimony remained untested, and the defence was deprived of the opportunity to challenge his version of the alleged demand. Though the absence of cross-examination does not automatically render the examination-in-chief inadmissible, the Court must assess its evidentiary value with particular caution and consider whether the remaining evidence independently and reliably establishes the demand for illegal gratification. If the testimony of the complainant and the other evidence on record do not satisfactorily establish the essential ingredients of the offence beyond reasonable doubt, the untested testimony of P.W.3 cannot, by itself, be treated as sufficient to sustain the conviction. In such circumstances, the accused would be entitled to the benefit of reasonable doubt.

19. P.W.6, the Bar Supervisor, who maintained the attendance register (Ex.P.22), deposed that the accused signed the register and went out at about 1.45 p.m. on 12.03.2010, and that thereafter four or five persons from the Vigilance wing brought him back to the office. The prosecution case, on the other hand, is that the accused came to the office at about 1.40 p.m., asked P.W.2 and P.W.3 to wait near the gate, and came out only at 3.20 p.m. These versions cannot stand together. The observation mahazar (Ex.P.9) and rough sketch (Ex.P.10) place the occurrence on the SIPCOT Complex Road, south of the District TASMAC office after the junction, whereas P.W.2, P.W.3 and P.W.13 deposed it happened near the First Aid Centre.

20. Further, P.W.13 deposed that the accused apprehended near the First Aid Centre, yet phenolphthalein test not conducted at the spot and the accused taken to the chamber of P.W.4, and the phenolphthalein test conducted there. The trial Court noted this as an improbable feature. The complaint was lodged by about 8.00 a.m. on 12.03.2010, and yet the trap team left only at about 11.15 a.m. The prosecution case is that the higher authorities were informed and the FIR was registered only after instructions. P.W.13 admitted that direction to register the case was an oral one. In view of the finding on demand it is not necessary for this Court to decide whether the requirement of Section 17 of the Act has been satisfied, and this Court records no finding on it.

21. The accused denied the demand and, in his Section 313 statement, set up that the Rs.3,000/- was repayment of a loan earlier given by him to P.W.2. The prosecution contended before the trial Court that accused gave no explanation. But the accused is not required to prove his defence beyond reasonable doubt. It is enough that the circumstances render his plea probable, and the burden of proving demand remains throughout on the prosecution. The conspicuous fact that the defence plea was reflected in the very first statement made by the accused when questioned on the spot, namely that he had not demanded any money and that it was given by P.W.2 on his own, was noted by the trial Court itself.

22. Taking all of the above together, there is no reliable and legally acceptable evidence that the accused demanded any sum from P.W.2, either before or on the day of trap. The recovery of tainted money from the pocket of accused, though not seriously disputed, cannot by itself prove the offence, as acceptance without proof of demand does not attract Section 7 of the Act, and the presumption under Section 20 cannot be raised on mere recovery. The conclusion of the trial Court on demand is a reasonable and possible view arrived at on appreciation of the evidence, and it is neither perverse nor against the weight of the evidence. There is no ground to interfere with the acquittal. Point No.(i) is answered against the State.

23. The trial Court convicted the accused only in respect of the Rs.1,000/- (M.O.4) said to have been received from P.W.8 and P.W.9. That conviction cannot be sustained, as P.W.8 (T. Arjunan) and P.W.9 (R. Govindan) declared hostile and did not support the prosecution. Neither of them has said that the accused demanded or received money from them. The trial Court itself noted that they were treated hostile. No complaint lodged by either of them, either before or after the trap. No trap was laid in respect of this amount, and the Rs.1,000/- not entrusted, smeared or tested. The evidence of a hostile witness is not necessarily effaced, but the portion relied on must be found reliable and corroborated. Here, there is nothing in their evidence on which the prosecution can rely. The prosecution has thus not proved by direct evidence that any gratification was demanded from or paid by P.W.8 and P.W.9.

24. The only circumstance relied on by the trial Court to hold that P.W.8 and P.W.9 met the accused was the register entries spoken to by P.W.7 (Exs.P.24 and P.25). However, a perusal of these entries shows that on 08.03.2010 and 10.03.2010, P.W.8 and P.W.9 met only the District Manager, and the entries record nothing about the accused. In any event, proof that two salesmen met the District Manager about a mutual transfer cannot prove that accused demanded or received a bribe from them. The finding of the trial Court at paragraph 68 that the register entries "corroborate" payment is therefore a non sequitur.

25. The trial Court rested the conviction on the statement of the accused before P.W.4 that he had Rs.1,000/-, "collected" from P.W.8 and P.W.9, which P.W.4 deposed to. By then the accused apprehended by the Vigilance party, and the statement was made while he was in the custody of the trap team, in answer to questions put by the Deputy Superintendent of Police. A confession to a police officer, or while in police custody, is not provable against the accused, as per Sections 25 and 26 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, and does not become admissible merely because a third person happened to be present, unless it falls within Section 27. A statement that a sum of money received, being part of an alleged confession of the offence, is not saved by the fact that it was reproduced by a civil witness. Further, the trial Court itself noted that statement of accused not recorded immediately in writing, and it was left unclear what exactly said, which in a trap case, is a serious infirmity.

26. The earliest contemporaneous document, seizure mahazar Ex.P.8 prepared on the date of trap, does not mention by P.W.8 and P.W.9 at all. When questioned about the Rs.1,000/-, accused deposed that it was given by Balakrishnan and Muthuvel for mutual transfer. P.W.13 deposed this in his chief-examination. Balakrishnan and Muthuvel were cited only to speak to the letters regarding no-dues about cash remittance. (Exs.P.17 and P.18). Only Muthuvel was examined (P.W.10) and he did not deposed that he paid any bribe;

Balakrishnan not examined. How P.W.8 and P.W.9 came to be named as the persons who paid Rs.500/- each has not been explained. This is a material improvement in the prosecution case, which goes to the root of the matter. The final report records the very same version as Ex.P.8 in the first place, but proceeds to name P.W.8 and P.W.9 as the givers.

27. P.W.4 deposed that he received mutual transfer petition (Ex.P.19) of T.Arjunan only on 08.03.2010 and endorsed it to be kept on hold till 31.03.2010. In that state of things, the accused could not have processed or forwarded the petition in a way that would favour P.W.8 and P.W.9. P.W.4 is the sole authority to grant transfers, a fact which the trial Court itself recognised in its Judgment.

28. Clause (d) of Section 13(1) of the Act requires proof that the public servant (i) by corrupt or illegal means obtained a valuable thing or pecuniary advantage, or (ii) by abusing his position as a public servant obtained such a thing or advantage, or (iii) while holding office, obtained it for any person without public interest. These clauses presuppose, in a trap case, that there was a demand and that the thing obtained pursuant to it. In the present case there is no finding that the accused did or forbore to do any official act, and no evidence that the accused used his position as Assistant Manager to obtain the money from P.W.8 and P.W.9. The findings of the trial Court fallen into inconsistency: having held that the demand from

P.W.2 is not proved, it relied upon the very same unproved prosecution narrative, and the same set of witnesses and trap team, to hold Rs.1,000/- proved. Moreover, the trial Court directed the amount to be returned to P.W.8 and P.W.9 "at Rs.500/- each", although these witnesses denied having paid anything.

29. The presumption under Section 20 is available only where the prosecution has first proved that the accused accepted or obtained an illegal gratification. Possession of Rs.1,000/- in the pocket, without proof that it was received as a gratification, does not raise the presumption. The trial Court's observation that the accused gave no reasonable explanation for Rs.1,000/- effectively shifted the burden on the accused before the prosecution discharged its own. That is contrary to the settled position of law. The reasoning in Selvaraj's case (cited supra) that recovery alone is insufficient applies with greater force to Rs.1,000/-, which neither entrusted nor the subject of any complaint.

30. For these reasons, the prosecution has not proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused demanded, accepted or obtained the sum of Rs.1,000/- from P.W.8 and P.W.9, or that he did so by corrupt or illegal means or by abuse of his position. The finding of guilt under Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Act is perverse and unsustainable in law. Point No.(ii) is answered in favour of the accused.

31. In the result:

(a) Crl.A.No.334 of 2016 filed by the accused is allowed. The judgment of conviction and sentence, dated 21.04.2016, passed by the learned Special Judge / Chief Judicial Magistrate, Cuddalore District, Cuddalore, in Spl.C.No.15 of 2010, for the offence under Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, is set aside, and the accused is acquitted of the said charge.

(b) Crl.A.No.743 of 2016 filed by the State is dismissed, and the acquittal of the accused for the offence under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, is confirmed.

(c) The fine amount of Rs.1,000/-, if any paid by the accused, shall be refunded to the legal heirs of the deceased accused, on proper application and proof of identity, after the expiry of the appeal period / on production of a certified copy of this judgment.

(d) The bail bond, if any, executed by the accused shall stand cancelled, and the sureties, if any, are discharged.

16.10.2026 Index : Yes / No Internet : Yes / No MPK

To

1. The Special Judge / Chief Judicial Magistrate, Cuddalore

2. The Inspector of Police, Vigilance & Anti-Corruption, Cuddalore, Cuddalore District

3. The Public Prosecutor, High Court, Madras.

M.NIRMAL KUMAR, J. mpk Pre-Delivery Judgment made in CRL.A.Nos.334 & 743 of 2016 16.10.2026