CRL A/366/2016 of S.RAJAGOPAL Vs STATE REP BY on 16 October 2026

JUDGMENT

The accused, Village Administrative Officer, Poongulam Village, tried in Spl.C.C.No.1 of 2003, for offences under Section 7 and Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 ("the Act"). By judgment dated 25.04.2016, the learned Special Judge convicted and sentenced the appellant to undergo 1 year Rigorous Imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs.2,000/-, in default, 3 months' Rigorous Imprisonment, for the offence under Section 7, and 1 year imprisonment and a fine of Rs.3,000/-, in default, 3 months' Rigorous Imprisonment under Section 13(2) r/w 13(1)(d). The sentences were ordered to run concurrently. Challenging the conviction and judgment, the accused has filed this appeal.

2. The case of the prosecution is as follows:-

(i) PW2 owns agricultural land at Tindivanam Kolla Kottai, Poongulam Village, to an extent of 4 Acres. On 04.02.2002, PW2 approached PW6, an official of Primary Co-operative Agricultural and Rural Development Bank, for a dairy loan. PW2 asked to produce his land records and to have the application countersigned by the Village Administrative Officer. According to PW2, he and his cousin PW4 met the accused that day; the accused demanded Rs.500/-, as illegal gratification, for issuing revenue records and reiterated the demand on 08.02.2002 and again on 20.02.2002.

(ii) Not willing to pay the demand made by the accused, on 20.02.2002, PW2 pledged his jewels with PW8 (pawn broker) for Rs.525/-, lodged a complaint (Ex.P2) with the Vigilance and Anti- Corruption (V&AC), on which the FIR (Ex.P21) registered by PW12, the Deputy Superintendent of Police.

(ii) On 21.02.2002 a pre-trap mahazar (Ex.P3) prepared in the presence of PW3 and PW5, official witnesses; five Rs.100 notes were smeared with phenolphthalein powder. The party reached Poongulam at about 1.30 p.m., but accused was away at a meeting at Alangayam. They returned in the evening. PW2 and PW3 entered the office of the accused; On demand, P.W.2 paid the money to the accused and he kept the money in his shirt pocket and that after the records were prepared and handed over, the accused returned Rs.100/-, when PW2 pleaded poverty. On PW2's signal, the police entered. The accused produced four Rs.100 notes; the sodium carbonate test on his fingers and shirt pocket turned pink; the numbers tallied; the records were seized. The Chemical Examiner (PW10, Ex.P20) reported positive. Sanction (Ex.P1) was granted by PW1, the Revenue Divisional Officer.

3. On completion of investigation, and after sanction for prosecution accorded by P.W.1, Revenue Divisional Officer, Tirupattur, to prosecute the Accused, final report filed and taken on file as Spl.Case No.1 of 2003. Charges under Section 7 and Section 13(2) r/w 13(1)(d) of the PC Act framed.

4. During trial, on the side of the prosecution, PW.1 to PW.13 were examined and Ex.P.1 to P23 and M.Os.1 to 8 were marked. When questioned under Section 313 Cr.P.C., the accused admitted receiving the money but said it was collected from PW2 as a Flag Day donation, and that a false case foisted on him. No defence witness was examined.

5. The trial court held that the sanction was valid; that demand, acceptance and recovery were proved by PW2 and corroborated by PW3, PW4 and PW5 and the positive chemical test; that the Flag Day defence was unsupported because Flag Day falls on 7 December and the transaction was in February 2002; that PW3 did not say the accused mentioned any donation; and that "the prosecution proved beyond doubt" the charges.

6. Mr.N.Manoharan, the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that (a) demand, the sine qua non of both offences, is not proved; (b) PW2's evidence is contradictory on whether he paid before or after the work was done; (c) the genesis of the complaint (Ex.P2) is suspicious and its authorship disowned by the person said to have written it; (d) the official witnesses are not reliable and the accounts of persons present at the time of the trap conflict; (e) the return of Rs.100/- is wholly inconsistent with a bribe and the prosecution's version is an afterthought; (f) the plausible Flag Day explanation, spoken to by PW3 and PW7, rejected on a wrong standard; and (g) the accused's statement was not recorded immediately after the trap, as required by Rule 47 of the Vigilance Manual. It is also contended that the sanction was mechanical.

7. Mr.Leonard Arul Joseph Selvam, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor submitted that the evidence of PW2 is consistent and corroborated by other trap witnesses and scientific evidence; that the recovery of tainted currency from the accused and the positive phenolphthalein test raise the presumption under Section 20 of the Act; that the Flag Day plea was an unsupported afterthought; and that the trial court's appreciation of evidence calls for no interference.

8. Heard both sides and perused the materials on record, including the Judgment of the trial Court, the depositions of the witnesses and the documents marked during trial.

9. The Points for determination:

(i) whether the prosecution has proved a demand of illegal gratification by the accused;

(ii) whether the presumption under Section 20 was rightly drawn; and

(iii) whether the conviction can be sustained.

10. To establish an offence under Section 7, and under Section 13(1)(d) r/w 13(2), the prosecution must prove (1) demand of illegal gratification, (2) its acceptance, and (3) recovery. Proof of demand is indispensable. Mere recovery of tainted currency, without proof of demand, is insufficient, and the statutory presumption under Section 20 arises only after the foundational facts of demand and acceptance are proved. The Constitution Bench in Neeraj Dutta Vs. State (Govt.of NCT of Delhi (2023) 4 SCC 731, has clarified that, in the absence of direct evidence because the complainant turns hostile or is unavailable, demand may be establish by other evidence, including circumstantial evidence. The decision does not dispense with proof of demand; it only widens the manner in which it may be proved. The demand must still be established by cogent and legally admissible evidence, and the Court cannot presume it. Further, the Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated that where the initial demand itself doubtful, the chain of demand, acceptance and recovery is broken even if payment and recovery are shown (State of Lokayukta Police v. C.B. Nagaraj, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1175).

11. The alleged demands on 04.02.2002 and 08.02.2002. The only evidence is PW2, with PW4's bare statement that Rs.500/- was demanded. There is no document, no complaint and no contemporaneous act corroborating these earlier demands. The prosecution's own documents undermine them. The requisition for the records, Ex.P5, is dated 20.02.2002. No application existed on 04.02.2002 or 08.02.2002 on which the accused could have been asked to act. Ex.P5 itself bears no signature of the accused, and Ex.P6 to Ex.P10, the extracts and the loan application countersignature, were readied without any application having been received, which suggests Ex.P5 was prepared to corroborate the story of Ex.P2.

12. According to PW2, the demand was first made on 04.02.2002 and he did nothing until 20.02.2002. When questioned during cross-examination why he made no complaint to the superiors during the interrogation, he could give no explanation. He was financially sound, yet pledged jewels only on 20.02.2002, to cast aspersion on the very day he approached the police. The genesis of the complaint is doubtful. PW2 deposed that Ex.P2 was written by PW4 and witnessed by him; PW4, denied writing it. Ex.P2, comparison with Ex.P5 appears to be in PW2's own hand, and the version said to have been written by PW4 was never confirmed and proved. PW2 in chief deposes that he gave Ex.P2 at 6.00 p.m. on 20.02.2002; in cross-examination he deposes it was between 4.00 and 5.00 p.m., and that he introduced to PW3 and PW5 on 20.02.2002 itself. PW3 and PW5 on the other hand state that they did not see PW2 on 20.02.2002; they first met PW2 on the morning of 21.02.2002. The trial court failed to considers these contradictions which goes to the root of the prosecution case create doubt on the complaint the foundation of the trap. PW4 is not a credible witness to take his evidence for corroboration. PW4 disowned the preparation of Ex.P2, not present at the time of the trap, and contradicts PW2 on the bank loan and the request for the revenue extracts. His evidence does not corroborate any demand at the time of the trap.

13. In chief, PW2 evidence is that he brought Rs.500/-, and gave the money, which the accused kept in his shirt pocket, and the accused prepared the documents within half an hour. In cross- examination deposes in contrary that he gave the money only after the accused finished the work, and that he paid because the accused asked. This inconsistency is not a trifling one. If the records already prepared and delivered then there was no reason for a demand to be made, or for payment to be extracted under pressure. When the work completed and the money is paid thereafter, the Court cannot presume that payment was in pursuance of a demand.

14. PW2 states that three other persons were in the VAO's office; PW3 says only Village Assistant, Pannerselvam, alone with the accused; PW5 says four other persons were present. The trap witnesses cannot agree even on who was in the room at the critical moment. Further, PW5, the second official witness,not present when money paid; he came after PW2's signal. The only witness to the transaction apart from PW2 is PW3, who introduced as PW2's relative

and who does not say that the accused demanded money in his presence. Hence, demand doubtful not proved.

15. The prosecution case is that, after PW2 paid Rs.500/-, the accused returned back Rs.100/- to PW2, who pleaded poverty. A public servant, who just taken a bribe after weeks of insistent demand returning one-fifth of it on a plea is, to say the least, unusual. This is consistent with the defence that the accused took a contribution towards a fund and gave back a part of it. No mahazar was prepared for Rs.100/- note allegedly retained by PW2, no hand wash test conducted on PW2 and Rs.100 single note not sent for chemical examination, and no source in the record explains its absence from the trap. The trial court's statement that PW12 "seized" note from the complainant has no support in any exhibit to which my attention has been drawn. This part of the prosecution case appears to be an afterthought to account for the shortfall of Rs.100/- in the recovery. The accused admitted receipt but pleaded, at the first opportunity under Section 313 Cr.P.C. and by way of an application under Section 311 Cr.P.C., that Rs.400/- received was Flag Day collection to be handed over to superiors.

16. The appellant relies on PW7 Village Assistant, who deposed that the VAO and Revenue Inspector used to collect the donation for Flag Day. The circumstance that is most telling is the return of Rs.100/-, which fits the defence far better than the prosecution case.

The presumption under Section 20 was therefore not available. Hence, the foundational fact of demand was not established, and even if it had been available, it stood rebutted by a probable explanation. The trial court rejected the defence for want of "supporting evidence" and on the ground that Flag Day is on 7 December. That approach is erroneous in two aspects. First, it placed on the accused an onus that law does not place on him. He is not required to prove his explanation beyond doubt suffices if it is reasonably probable one, since the prosecution must prove its case and cannot rest on the weakness of the defence. Second, the reasoning that a Flag Day donation could not be collected in February overlooks that collections in Government offices, to meet targets set by the District Administration, commonly continue beyond the date itself; this was a matter on which PW7 spoken and which the prosecution had every opportunity to rebut by cross-examining the accused's successor PW9. Silence of PW3 whether the accused used the words "Flag Day" cannot carry the weight placed on it, in a case where PW3 himself says nothing about any demand being made in his presence.

17. The time-line of the trap is also inconsistent. The trial court omit own summarises and records that PW7 returned from Alangayam at 4.30 p.m. whereas in its discussion it says 5.30 p.m.; PW4 says he picked up the accused and PW7 at about 4.00 p.m.; the prosecution witnesses give the evening return of the trap party variously as 5.00 p.m., 5.15 p.m. and 5.50 p.m. The post-trap mahazar said to have recorded between 6.15 and 9.00 p.m., and the house search extended to 11.15 p.m. These variations might have been immaterial had the demand been proved; in a case in which demand rests solely on a doubtful complainant, they add to the cumulative doubt.

18. PW2 and PW3 were examined by the investigating officer only on the day of the trap, and no further statement recorded. The statement of the accused on the spot, not recorded following Clause 47 of the Vigilance Manual, so that the public servant may give his explanation at the earliest, not recorded. The Manual's provisions are administrative, and their breach alone would not vitiate a trial; but where the defence is that the money was a collection for a fund, denial at the earliest opportunity to explain deprives the accused of valuable corroboration of his plea and weighs in the assessment of doubt.

19. Taken together, the prosecution has not proved a demand of illegal gratification, either before or at the time of the trap, which is sin quo non in a trap case. The only direct evidence of demand is uncorroborated and self-contradictory testimony of PW2, give complaint with delay and contradicts the account of payment are all open to serious doubt. Acceptance and recovery, though not seriously in dispute, do not by themselves establish an offence under Section 7

or Section 13(1)(d) r/w 13(2), and the accused offered an explanation that is probable on the evidence. In such circumstances the conviction cannot be sustained. The trial court proceeded on an incorrect standard, treated the weakness of the defence as a ground to convict, reversed the onus under Section 20, and overlooked the vital contradictions set out above. The benefit of doubt must go to the appellant.

20. In the result:

(a) The Criminal Appeal is allowed.

(b) The judgment of conviction and sentence dated 25.04.2016 passed in Spl.C.C.No.1 of 2003 by the learned Special Judge under the Prevention of Corruption Act / Chief Judicial Magistrate, Vellore, is set aside, and the appellant/accused is acquitted of the charges under Section 7 and Section 13(2) r/w 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

(c) The fine amount, if paid, shall be refunded to the appellant.

(d) The bail bond, if any, executed by the appellant shall stand cancelled. .10.2026 Index : Yes/No Internet : Yes / No mpk

To:

1. The Special Judge under the Prevention of Corruption Act / Chief Judicial Magistrate, Vellore.

2. The Inspector of Police, Vigilance & Anti-Corruption, Vellore.

3. The Public Prosecutor, High Court, Madras.

M.NIRMAL KUMAR, J. mpk Pre-Delivery Judgment made in CRL.A.No.366 of 2016 16.10.2026