CRL A/453/2020 of M.AYYANAR Vs THE STATE REPRESENTED BY on 16 October 2026

JUDGMENT

This appeal is directed against the judgment dated 14.10.2020 in Spl.C.No.6/2018, by which the learned Special Judge, Special Court for Prevention of Corruption Act Cases, Villupuram, found the appellant guilty of offences under Section 7 and Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 ('the Act'). He was sentenced to three years' rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs.5,000/-, in default, six months' simple imprisonment on each count, the sentences were ordered to run concurrently.

2. The case of the prosecution is as follows:-

i. The accused was a Village Assistant of Vadatharam Village, holding additional charge of Thiruvampattu Village, Gingee Taluk, and is a public servant under Section 2(c) of the Act. The defacto complainant (PW2), V. Shanmugam, whose father Veerasamy was a member of the Chief Minister's Uzhavar Pathukappu Thittam, applied through his mother Parvathi for funeral assistance of Rs.12,500/- in August 2016.

ii. According to the prosecution, the accused demanded and received Rs.2,000/- at the time of the application. On 26.12.2016 at about 11.00 hrs, he is said to have come to PW2's house, told Parvathi in PW2's absence that the cheque was ready and demanded a further Rs.2,000/-. PW2, who learnt of this on 30.12.2016, telephoned the accused that morning, expressed his inability to pay, and the demand was reduced to Rs.1,800/-. PW2 lodged a complaint (Ex.P2) on 13.01.2017. A preliminary enquiry was held, the conversation of 18.01.2017 allegedly recorded in audio and video, the FIR (Ex.P9) was registered on 19.01.2017 in Crime No.2/AC/2017.

iii. On 20.01.2017 a trap was laid. PW2, accompanied by PW3 (shadow witness), said to have handed over phenolphthalein-smeared notes of Rs.1,800/- (M.O.1). On 20.01.2017, in between 11.40 hrs and 12.00 hrs, when the defacto complainant accompanied by the official witness, went to meet the accused at the office of the VAO, Thiruvampattu Village and requested the appellant who was in front of the VAO's seat, regarding the funeral expenses of his father. The accused reiterated his demand of Rs.1800/- and obtained the same as gratification other than legal remuneration as a motive and reward for executing his official function, using his right hand, counted and kept in his shirt pocket. Sodium carbonate tests on both hands and the shirt pocket turned pink; the wash bottles (M.O.2 to M.O.4) were sealed and the shirt is M.O.5. The sanction order (Ex.P1) issued by PW1, the Tahsildar, Gingee. After investigation by PW11, the final report filed, and charges under Sections 7 and 8 (alternatively) and 13(2) r/w 13(1)(d) were framed on 13.08.2018.

3. The prosecution examined PW1 to PW11, marked Exs.P1 to P19 and M.O.1 to M.O.7. The accused questioned under Section 313 Cr.P.C. and denied the incriminating circumstances. He examined no witness.

4. The accused pleaded false implication. His case, put through cross-examination, is that he was only a Village Assistant with no authority over the application; that he completed all that was required of him by forwarding the application with the VAO's recommendation by 11.08.2016; that thereafter the file was pending with the Special Tahsildar for want of funds; that a local politician accompanying PW2 over the delay, abused him by reference to his caste, which led to a threatened complaint under the SC/ST law; and that the present complaint was engineered by that person to forestall it, the money being thrust on him on the trap day.

5. The trial court held: (i) the sanction (Ex.P1) was valid, the omission of PW1 to state in cross-examination that she was satisfied being immaterial; (ii) though the accused was only a Village Assistant with no duty on the application, he 'assumed the work of the VAO' during the vacancy and could not say he had no public duty; (iii) it recorded that the file had been forwarded around 11.08.2016, four months before the alleged demand, and that the investigation was 'not free from flaw' in failing to collect material on the date of allotment of funds, but held that the delay lay with the Special Tahsildar's seniority list and that the beneficiary's bank details were furnished only on the trap day; (iv) there was nothing to contradict PW2's evidence of demand, and PW2 and PW3 proved acceptance, corroborated by recovery; (v) non-examination of Parvathi (LW5) and the discrepancies regarding the typing instrument, arrest memo and the like were minor; (vi) the presumption under Section 20 arose and was not rebutted. It also held that Section 8 was not made out but that the accused was liable under Section 7 on the footing that he held himself out as able to do what he was 'not in a position to do'.

6. Mr.A.Ashwinkumar, learned counsel for the appellant submitted, in substance, that the finding is perverse and rests on assumption. Ex.P1 is vitiated by non-application of mind: PW1 admitted in cross-examination that she had not read the Section 161 Cr.P.C. statements, although Ex.P1 recites that she examined them. Demand, the sine qua non of the offence, is not proved. The first alleged demand of Rs.2,000/-, during August 2016 is absent from the complaint, the FIR and the remand report admitted by PW9. The second demand of 26.12.2016 was made to Parvathi alone, who was not examined although she cited as LW5 and her 161 statement recorded. PW2's knowledge of it is hearsay. The telephonic reduction to Rs.1,800/- is unsupported by any call record.

7. The learned counsel further submitted that prosecution's own evidence, the application forwarded with the VAO's recommendation by 11.08.2016 and the file thereafter lay with the Special Tahsildar awaiting funds. The appellant had no role in sanction or disbursement, and no work pending with him. There was no motive or occasion to demand a bribe. The learned counsel in support of his contentions invited the attention of this Court to the decision of this Court in M. Rajendran v. State (2011) 1 MWN (Cr.) 602, and would content that Mere recovery of tainted money, without proving the demand, is insufficient to establish the accused’s guilt. Further relied on the Judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Lokayukta Police v. C.B. Nagaraj (2025 SCC OnLine SC 1175), and would contend that proof of demand for a bribe is essential; mere recovery of tainted money is insufficient to establish guilt under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The Hon'ble Court dismissed the State’s appeal and upheld the acquittal due to the lack of reliable proof of demand.

8. It is his further contention that Rs.2,000/- allegation was an afterthought. The complaint was lodged 17 days after the alleged demand, the FIR six days after the complaint, and the first information reduced to writing was not produced. PW2 deposed that nothing was typed and he signed nothing, contradicting Ex.P2, a typed document. The audio and video CDs (M.O.6, M.O.7) were inadmissible: Ex.P12 carries no particulars of the device, covers only the audio CD, and PW2 and PW8 gave conflicting versions of who extracted the recordings; the police constable who recorded them was not examined. Adding further, the learned counsel submitted that the trap is doubtful: the second seizure witness (Panchacharam)

was not examined; PW3 said the mahazar was typed on a desktop computer with CPU while the trap laying officer said a laptop; the time recorded in Ex.P4 and Form 95 (13.15 to 15.30 hrs) is irreconcilable with PW4's version of the trap team being at the Gingee Taluk Office around 13.30 to 14.00 hrs; the shirt (M.O.5) was never sent for analysis; Ex.P16 was not mentioned in the arrest memo (Ex.P13) or Form 95 (Ex.P15), and the passbook copy bears a photograph and acknowledgement number not found on the copy in Ex.P6. The trial court shifted the burden on the accused for not summoning records under Section 91 Cr.P.C., and for not proving his defence, and convicted him. Hence, the learned counsel prays for acquittal of the appellant / accused.

9. Mr.Leonard Arul Joseph Selvam, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor supported the judgment. He submitted that PW2, the direct witness, deposed the demand and acceptance of Rs.1,800/-, corroborated by PW3 and the trap laying officer (PW9); that the recovery of M.O.1 from the shirt pocket with positive phenolphthalein results (Ex.P17) and the Entrustment (Ex.P3) and observation mahazars (Ex.P14) proved the trap; that PW8 and PW9 also speak to the demand of Rs.2,000/- reduced to Rs.1,800/-; that the audio and video recordings corroborate PW2; that the sanction was valid; and that on proof of demand and acceptance the presumption under Section 20 arose, which the accused failed to rebut. The discrepancies, he urged, are minor and do not affect the core of the prosecution case. Hence, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor, prays for dismissal of the Appeal.

10. I have carefully heard the submissions made by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant and the learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the respondent and gone through the Judgment of the trial Court and the records.

11. The points that arose for consideration before this Court is;

i. Whether the sanction (Ex.P1) is valid.

ii. Whether the prosecution proved demand of illegal gratification beyond reasonable doubt.

iii. Whether voluntary acceptance and recovery, and the presumption under Section 20, can sustain the conviction.

iv. Whether the conviction under Sections 7 and 13(2) r/w 13(1)(d) is sustainable.

12. On perusal of the records it is seen that PW1 (Tahsildar) deposed that she examined the materials and accorded sanction (Ex.P1). In cross-examination she admitted that she did not read Section 161 statements, that PW8 said the recommendation was made by the Village Administrative Assistant, that the application was received by the Special Tahsildar on 03.08.2016, and that the amount was paid only on 24.01.2017. PW2 deposed to the initial

payment of Rs.2,000/-, a later demand reduced to Rs.1,800/-, complaint on 13.01.2017, recording on 18.01.2017, trap and the handing over of money. In cross-examination he said he took no written complaint, that the police wrote it from his oral statement, and that no signature was taken on the handwritten statement. He unaware that the recommendation had already been sent on 11.08.2016. PW3 spoke to trap and the tests, and conceded in cross- examination that he learnt only at the Taluk Office that the accused had already completed the work, and did not notice whether the shirt itself changed colour.

13. PW4 (Record Clerk) admitted that the application bore the Special Tahsildar's seal of receipt dated 03.08.2016, that Village Administration formalities had been completed by then and that the file was pending in that office for orders. PW5 (VAO) spoke to the recommendation and said that he had not entrusted any VAO duties to the accused. PW6 (Revenue Inspector) recommended the grant after her own enquiry, said that the amount is disbursed only by electronic transfer and that the accused had no authority or responsibility to sanction or disburse. PW7 (Special Tahsildar) admitted that the beneficiary's bank details were already in the file dated 11.08.2016, that the accused had no role in transfer of funds, that the delay was due to delay in allotment of funds, and that the amount was sanctioned and transferred only after the arrest. PW10

(Assistant) said that after recommendation the accused had no role except signing the disbursement register at the time of payment. PW8 (DSP) admitted that the assistance had already been sanctioned even before the complaint, that the certificate (Ex.P12) did not give particulars of the mobile phone from which the recordings were downloaded. PW9 (trap laying officer) admitted that the Rs.2,000/- payment is not in the remand report. PW11 (investigating officer) admitted that the payment was made on 24.01.2017, after she took up investigation, and that she knew of no written order assigning VAO duties to the accused.

14. This being a statutory appeal against conviction, this Court is duty bound to re-appreciate the entire evidence. The law on the subject is settled. Proof of demand of illegal gratification is the gravamen of the offence under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii); mere recovery of tainted money, without proof of demand, is insufficient. The Constitution Bench in Neeraj Dutta v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) (2023) 4 SCC 731 held that in the absence of direct evidence, demand and acceptance may be inferred from circumstantial evidence, but the foundational fact of demand must still be proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt, and the presumption under Section 20 arises only thereafter. The accused's burden in rebuttal is only to raise a probable defence on the standard of preponderance of probabilities; the burden of the prosecution never shifts.

15. Ex.P1 recites that PW1 examined FIR, witness statements, the accused's statement, mahazars and the chemical report. Yet PW1 admitted that she did not read Section 161 statements. Sanction is not a formality; the authority must apply its mind independently to the material and the order disclose the fact. I am conscious of Section 19(3) and (4) of the Act, which bar interference merely on account of an error or irregularity in sanction unless a failure of justice has occasioned. As this appeal must in any event succeed on merits, it is unnecessary to rest the decision on this ground alone. I record only that the sanction was granted in circumstances that raise serious doubt as to proper application of mind.

16. The prosecution case on demand has three stages. First demand of Rs.2,000/- in August 2016; the second demand of 26.12.2016 reduced to Rs.1,800/- on 30.12.2016, and the reiteration at the trap. Each is examined. The charge framed by the trial court itself refers demands on 30.12.2016 and 20.01.2017. The alleged payment of Rs.2,000/- in August 2016 finds no place in the complaint, the FIR or the remand report; PW9 conceded as much. PW2's version in chief is also at variance with the prosecution's own narrative, how the amount 'demanded and obtained' on the very day the application was submitted. A payment of that nature, introduced only in the witness box, which is an improvement and cannot be relied upon. The second demand was allegedly made not to PW2, but to his mother, Parvathi, admitted fact is that Parvathi not examined. PW2 learnt of it on 30.12.2016. His evidence on what was said on 26.12.2016 becomes hearsay and inadmissible for the fact of demand. Parvathi was the only person who could speak of it. She was cited as LW5, her Section 161 statement recorded, and her examination dispensed with on 12.02.2020. The trial court held that nothing had been suggested to PW2 impeaching what his mother told him, and that her non-examination caused no dent. That reasoning inverts the burden. It is for the prosecution to prove demand through competent evidence, not for the accused to disprove a hearsay assertion. Where the alleged demand was made in the presence of a particular person who is not examined, the prosecution case on demand cannot be accepted, and an adverse inference under Section 114(g) of the Evidence Act is justified; this is the principle applied in M. Rajendran (supra) and T.K. Ramesh Kumar v. State (2015) 15 SCC 629, both cited by the appellant.

17. The alleged telephone call of 30.12.2016, the only link between the demand to Parvathi and the demand of Rs.1,800/-, is unsupported by call detail records, the number of the accused or any other material, though the investigating agency had ample opportunity to collect them. Nor is there any contemporaneous record of it before the complaint of 13.01.2017. The content of the alleged demand is also inconsistent with the documents. The accused said to have told Parvathi that cheque was ready. But the assistance is disbursed only by electronic transfer. The trial court itself found that there was no communication that the cheque was ready and that no steps were taken to prepare it until the date of trap and the amount was disbursed on 23/24.01.2017, after the arrest. A statement about readiness of a cheque on 26.12.2016 was thus, on the prosecution's own evidence, untrue, which makes it unlikely that a public servant would make it, and hardly consistent with a genuine demand.

18. The evidence of PW4, PW5, PW6, PW7 and PW10, and Ex.P6, establishes that the application received by the Special Tahsildar on 03.08.2016, forwarded to the Revenue Inspector, forwarded to the VAO, sent back with the VAO's recommendation on 11.08.2016, recommended by the Revenue Inspector, and thereafter kept pending with the Special Tahsildar for want of funds. PW7 admitted the bank details were already in file and that the accused had no role in sanction or transfer. The trial court's contrary finding that the passbook copy was furnished to the accused only on the trap date, thus holding up disbursement, is not borne out by the evidence of the very sanctioning officer, and is based on a document (Ex.P16) whose provenance is itself doubtful.

19. The trial court itself recorded that the accused had no duty or authority on the application. The file pending with the Special Tahsildar, and not the accused and that the investigating officer failed to collect material that could have shown a link between funds' allotment and the alleged demand. Having recorded these findings, the trial court could not have held that demand had been proved. The principle is well established. Where the work of the complainant has already left the table of the accused, there is no occasion for demand and the version of the demand is inherently improbable. The distinction drawn by the trial court that the file was kept pending only for want of Government funds, and therefore the accused's work was 'not completed', has no basis: the 'work' of the accused ended with the recommendation on 11.08.2016, and no witness said that anything remained to be done by him other than signing the register at the time of payment, a step that was in any event contingent on the Special Tahsildar's action.

20. The trial court held that because the VAO's post vacant the accused 'usurped office' and discharged the VAO's functions. This conclusion is unsupported by any evidence. PW5 (VAO) said that he had not entrusted any VAO duties to the accused and that the application was only obtained through the accused; PW1 and PW11 spoke only of the accused's status as Village Assistant, and PW11

knew of no written assignment. Even on the prosecution case as framed, the accused assisted the VAO, whose duties had been discharged on 11.08.2016. The complaint was lodged 17 days after the alleged demand of 26.12.2016 and five months after the first alleged payment; the FIR followed six days after the complaint, without explanation; PW2 said the complaint was written by a police officer from his oral statement and that he signed nothing, whereas Ex.P2 is typed and bears his signature; and the first information reduced to writing was not produced. The trial court accepted PW2's later explanation that the statement was typed from oral narration and signed. Delay in itself may not be fatal in a trap case, but where the foundation of demand is already weak, these features add to the doubt and disclose a case developed in stages. The only direct evidence of demand at the trap is the interested testimony of PW2, and PW3, the official witness who accompanied him, who acknowledged learning only afterwards that the accused had already completed the work.

21. The trial court did not rely on MO6 and MO7 in its reasoning, and rightly so. Electronic records are admissible only on a certificate under Section 65B(4) of the Evidence Act, which must identify the record and the device from which it was produced: PW2 says he recorded and downloaded the video; PW8 says he extracted the recordings; the constable who allegedly recorded the audio was not examined. No transcript, voice identification or comparison was

established. The CDs are therefore not proved and cannot corroborate the demand. Individually, they may be explained; collectively they raise a reasonable doubt: (i) the seizure witness Panchacharam, who signed the mahazars, was not examined (Ex.P11) and the trial court did not even consider the adverse inference; (ii) PW3 said the mahazar was typed on a desktop with a CPU, while the trap laying officer said a laptop; (iii) Ex.P4 and Form 95 (Ex.P15) record preparation at the VAO office between 13.15 and 15.30 hrs, but PW4 places the trap team, with the accused, at the Gingee Taluk Office around 13.30 to 14.00 hrs; (iv) the shirt (M.O.5), said to have received the tainted notes, was not sent for analysis; (v) Ex.P16 was marked directly through the trap laying officer, is not mentioned in the arrest memo (Ex.P13), and was not forwarded to the court with Form 95; the passbook copy in Ex.P16 bears an additional photograph and an acknowledgement number that does not appear on the copy in Ex.P6, and PW7 says the acknowledgement was generated only after disbursement on 23/24.01.2017, which points to insertion of the document after the event. The trial court dismissed each of these as minor. A court may overlook a trivial discrepancy, but it cannot ignore a set of discrepancies that, together with the failure to prove demand, strike at the genuineness of the trap.

22. The defence of the accused that he had done his part and that a local politician stood behind the complaint, with whom he had a quarrel over the delay, is at least probable. PW2 denied it, but PW4,

PW5, PW6, PW7 and PW10 establish that the application was in fact delayed for reasons wholly unrelated to the accused, and that the assistance was disbursed the day after his arrest. The trial court discarded the defence as a 'mere plea' because it was not proved by evidence, and because the accused did not summon the allotment records under Section 91 Cr.P.C. That is a misdirection. The accused is not required to prove his defence beyond reasonable doubt, and the prosecution cannot take advantage of its own failure to collect the allotment records, which the trial court itself regarded as a 'flaw' in the investigation, by casting the onus of producing them on the accused. Accordingly, I hold that the prosecution has failed to prove the demand of illegal gratification, either prior to the trap or at the trap, beyond reasonable doubt.

23. The evidence of PW2 and PW3 on handing over, the pink colour of solutions and the recovery of M.O.1 may prove that the money was found with the accused. But proof of recovery, without proof of demand, cannot sustain a conviction under Section 7 or Section 13(1)(d). The tainted money, where the work of the complainant was no longer in the hands of the accused, is as consistent with the version of the accused that it was thrust upon him as with that of the prosecution. Where the circumstances in which the money came into his hands are in doubt, 'acceptance' as a bribe is not made out. The presumption under Section 20 arises only when the prosecution first proves that the accused accepted or obtained gratification as a motive or reward; the primary facts of demand and voluntary acceptance must first be established (Neeraj Dutta, supra). Here demand is not proved, and the presumption does not arise. The trial court, which recorded that the presumption 'is in favour of the prosecution' and that the accused 'failed to explain his case', applied it mechanically. In doing so it wrongly reversed the burden of proof.

24. Having recorded that the charge under Section 8 was not made out, the trial court convicted the accused under Section 7 on a different footing: that he held himself out as able to do what he was 'not in a position to do'. That was not the case framed against the accused, and there is nothing to show that this theory was put to him in the Section 313 examination. The charge was that the accused demanded and accepted money for doing an official function. A conviction on a theory different from the charge, without opportunity to meet it, occasions prejudice. In any event, even on that theory, demand, being the sine qua non, must be proved, which it was not. For the offence under Section 13(1)(d), the prosecution must show that the accused obtained a valuable thing or pecuniary advantage by corrupt or illegal means, by abuse of position, or without public interest. As the demand and the corrupt motive are not proved and as the accused had no official function to perform on the application at the time of alleged trap, the essential ingredients of the offence are not made out. Section 13(2) falls with it.

25. For the foregoing reasons, I am of the considered view that the trial court's findings are perverse, ignore the admissions of the prosecution's own witnesses, apply the burden of proof against the accused and cannot be sustained. The accused is entitled to the benefit of reasonable doubt.

26. In the result:

(i) This Criminal Appeal is allowed.

(ii) The conviction and sentence imposed on the appellant by the judgment dated 14.10.2020 in Spl.C.No.6/2018 on the file of the learned Special Judge for Prevention of Corruption Act Cases, Villupuram, for offences under Section 7 and Section 13(2) r/w 13(1)

(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, are set aside. The appellant is acquitted of all charges.

(iii) The fine amount, if any paid, shall be refunded to the appellant. The bail bonds, if any, executed by the appellant and his sureties shall stand cancelled. 16.10.2026 Index : Yes/No Internet : Yes / No mpk To

1. The Special Judge, Special Court for Prevention of Corruption Act Cases, Villupuram.

2. The Inspector of Police, Vigilance & Anti-Corruption, Villupuram

3. The Public Prosecutor, High Court, Madras.

M.NIRMAL KUMAR, J. mpk Pre-Delivery Judgment made in CRL.A.No.453 of 2020 16.10.2026