CMPMO/144/2026 on 16 October 2026

1. CMPMO No. 269 of 2025 Surinder Dogra

…Petitioner Versus Suman Sharma and others …Respondents …………………………………………………………………………….

2. CMPMO No. 273 of 2025 Kimti Lal (deceased) through LRs …Petitioners Versus Suman Sharma and others …Respondents …………………………………………………………………………….

3. CMPMO No. 144 of 2026 Suman Sharma and others

…Petitioners Versus Surinder Dogra …Respondent …………………………………………………………………………….

4. CMPMO No. 145 of 2026 Suman Sharma and others

…Petitioner Versus

2 2026:HHC:45839 Kimti Lal (deceased) through LRs …Respondents

Coram

The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Virender Singh, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 CMPMOs No. 269 & 273 of 2025 For the petitioner(s) : Mr. Mohit Jaitak, Advocate (through VC) and Mr. Nipun Thakur, Advocate. For the respondent(s) : Mr. R.K. Gautam, Senior Advocate, with Mr. Jai Ram Sharma, Advocate. …………………………………………………………………………… CMPMOs No.

&

of 2026

For the petitioner(s) : Mr. R.K. Gautam, Senior Advocate, with Mr. Jai Ram Sharma, Advocate. For the respondent(s) : Mr. Mohit Jaitak, Advocate (through VC) and Mr. Nipun Thakur, Advocate. Virender Singh, Judge. The above-titled four CMPMOs are being decided by this common order, as, they are inter-connected and involve common question of law and facts.

2. CMPMOs No. 273 of 2025 and 145 of 2026 have been filed by the parties to the lis against the order, 1 Whether Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

3 2026:HHC:45839 dated 16th May, 2025, passed by the learned Appellate Authority under the Rent Control Act, Una, District Una, in Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 289/25, in Rent Appeal, titled as Kimti Lal versus Suman Sharma and others, whereby the learned Appellate Authority has partly allowed the application, filed under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as ‘CPC’) and fixed the use and occupation charges of the tenanted premises as 7500/- per month. ₹

3. CMPMOs 269 of 2025 and 144 of 2026 have been filed by the parties to the lis against the order, dated 16th May, 2025, passed by the learned Appellate Authority under the Rent Control Act, Una, District Una, in Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 287/25, in Rent Appeal, titled as Surinder Dogra versus Suman Sharma and others, whereby the learned Appellate Authority has allowed the application, filed under Section 151 of the CPC, fixing the use and occupation charges of the tenanted premises as 7500/- per month. ₹

4. For the sake of brevity, the above titled petitions have been filed in two appeals, which have been preferred

4 2026:HHC:45839 by the tenants against their eviction order from the tenanted premises.

5. The tenants have assailed the impugned orders, passed by the learned Appellate Authority, to the extent whereby the use and occupation charges have been fixed as 7500/- per month, on the ground, that the said use ₹ and occupation charges are on the higher side, whereas, the landlords have assailed the said orders, on the ground that the use and occupation charges, fixed as 7500/-, ₹ are on the lower side.

6. Perusal of the record shows that during the pendency of the appeals before the learned Appellate Authority, the landlords have filed the applications under Section 151 of the CPC, for issuance of the direction to the tenants to deposit the use and occupation charges @ 30,000/- per month, as according to them, after the eviction orders have been passed by the learned Rent Controller, Una, in their applications, for eviction against the tenants, on 9th February, 2024, the relationship of landlord and tenant comes to an end and the person in unauthorized possession, is liable to pay the use and

5 2026:HHC:45839 occupation charges, which have been prayed to be fixed, keeping in view the commercial potentiality of the rented premises, by pleading that the rented premises is situated in the main market. In support of the applications, affidavits have been filed by the landlords.

7. The prayer, as made in the applications, has been contested by the tenants, by alleging that the averments, as made in the applications, are not factually correct and as such, a prayer has been made to dismiss the applications.

8. Those applications have been decided by the learned Appellate Authority, vide orders, dated 16th May, 2025, by fixing the use and occupation charges as 7500/- per month, from the date of eviction, i.e. 9 ₹ th February, 2024.

9. It is not in dispute that after the eviction order, till the actual delivery of the possession to the landlords, the tenant is required to pay mesne profit/use and occupation charges.

10. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Atma Ram Properties (P) Ltd. versus Federal Motors (P) Ltd.,

6 2026:HHC:45839 reported in (2005) 1 Supreme Court Cases 705, has elaborately discussed the concept of substantial loss to the party applying for stay of the execution while dealing with the provisions of Order 41 Rule 5 of the CPC. Relevant paras 9 to 11 of the judgment, are reproduced, as under: “9. Dispossession, during the pendency of an appeal of a party in possession, is generally considered to be 'substantial loss' to the party applying for stay of execution within the meaning of clause (a) of sub-rule (3) of Rule 5 of Order 41 of the Code. Clause (c) of the same provision mandates security for the due performance of the decree or order as may ultimately be passed being furnished by the applicant for stay as a condition precedent to the grant of order of stay. However, this is not the only condition which the appellate Court can impose. The power to grant stay is discretionary and flows from the jurisdiction conferred on an appellate Court which is equitable in nature. To secure an order of stay merely by preferring an appeal is not the statutory right conferred on the appellant. So also, an appellate Court is not ordained to grant an order of stay merely because an appeal has been preferred and an application for an order of stay has been made. Therefore, an applicant for order of stay must do equity for seeking equity. Depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case an appellate Court, while passing an order of stay, may put the parties on such terms the enforcement whereof would satisfy the demand for justice of the party found successful at the end of the appeal. In South Eastern Coalfields Ltd. Vs. State of M.P. & Ors., (2003) 8 SCC 648, this Court while dealing with interim orders granted in favour of any party to litigation for the purpose of extending protection to it, effective during the pendency of the

7 2026:HHC:45839 proceedings, has held that such interim orders, passed at an interim stage, stand reversed in the event of the final decision going against the party successful in securing interim orders in its favour; and the successful party at the end would be justified in demanding compensation and being placed in the same situation in which it would have been if the interim order would not have been passed against it. The successful party can demand (a) the delivery to it of benefit earned by the opposite party under the interim order of the High Court, or (b) compensation for what it has lost, and to grant such relief is the inherent jurisdiction of the Court. In our opinion, while granting an order of stay under Order 41 Rule 5 of the CPC, the appellate court does have jurisdiction to put the party seeking stay order on such terms as would reasonably compensate the party successful at the end of the appeal in so far as those proceedings are concerned. Thus, for example, though a decree for payment of money is not ordinarily stayed by the appellate Court, yet, if it exercises its jurisdiction to grant stay in an exceptional case it may direct the appellant to make payment of the decretal amount with interest as a condition precedent to the grant of stay, though the decree under appeal does not make provision for payment of interest by the judgment-debtor to the decree-holder. Robust commonsense, common knowledge of human affairs and events gained by judicial experience and judicially noticeable facts, over and above the material available on record - all these provide useful inputs as relevant facts for exercise of discretion while passing an order and formulating the terms to put the parties on. After all, in the words of Chief Justice Chandrachud, speaking for the Constitution Bench in Olga Tellis and Ors. Vs. Bombay Municipal Corporation and Ors. (1985) 3 SCC 545 (SCC p. 574, para 35) "Common sense which is a cluster of life's experiences, is often more

8 2026:HHC:45839 dependable than the rival facts presented by warring litigants".

10. Shri Ranjit Kumar, the learned senior counsel for the respondent, submitted that during the pendency of the appeal the tenant- appellant cannot be directed to pay any amount over and above the amount of contractual rent unless and until the decree or order of eviction has achieved a finality because, in view of the protection of rent control legislation enjoyed by the tenant, he shall continue to remain a tenant and would not become a person in unlawful possession of the property until the decree has achieved a finality from the highest forum upto which the litigation is pursued. Reliance was placed on the decision of this Court in Smt. Chander Kali Bai & Ors. Vs. Shri Jagdish Singh Thakur & Anr., (1977) 4 SCC 402, followed in Vashu Deo Vs. Balkishan, (2002) 2 SCC 50. This submission raises the following two issues:- (i) in respect of premises enjoying the protection of rent control legislation, when does the tenancy terminate; and (ii) upto what point of time the tenant is liable to pay rent at the contractual rate and when does he become liable to pay compensation for use and occupation of the tenancy premises unbound by the contractual rate of rent to the landlord?

11. Under the general law, and in cases where the tenancy is governed only by the provisions of Transfer of Property Act, 1882, once the tenancy comes to an end by determination of lease under Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act, the right of the tenant to continue in possession of the premises comes to an end and for any period thereafter, for which he continues to occupy the premises, he becomes liable to pay damages for use and occupation at the rate at which the landlord could have let out the premises on being vacated by the tenant.” (self emphasis supplied)

9 2026:HHC:45839

11. It is also not in dispute, in the present cases, that Una is a fast growing commercial hub of the State and considering the rate of rent, as discussed by the learned Appellate Authority, in para 19 of the impugned orders, the use and occupation charges are liable to be enhanced, as, according to the lease agreement, dated 17.09.2014/ 09.12.2023, shop No. 1156 was rented out to M/s AERO Club @ 66,700/- from 01.06.2020 to 31.12.2020 and @ 76,705/-, after 01.01.2021, the area of which has been mentioned as 155.50 sq. meters.

12. Although, the above rent agreements are not determinative factors, but, it will give an idea of the commercial potentiality of the rented premises, in this case. As such, the ends of justice would be met, in case, the use and occupation charges of the rented premises, from the date of eviction till the actual delivery of possession, are fixed @ 15,000/- per month.

13. The tenants are directed to deposit the arrears within three months from today and to deposit the use and occupation charges on or before 7th day of every month.

10 2026:HHC:45839

14. With these observations, the petitions are disposed of and the impugned orders are modified, accordingly.

15. Pending applications, if any, are also disposed of.

( Virender Singh ) Judge October 16, 2026 ( rajni )