Himachal Pradesh High Court
CMPMO/270/2026 on 16 October 2026
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH SHIMLA
CMPMO No. 270/2026
Reserved on: 05.10.2026
Decided on: 16.10.2026
Kishan Dass @ Kishan Singh
….Petitioner
Versus
Kanta Devi & ors.
…Respondents ________________________________________________________________
Coram:
The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Romesh Verma, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 For the Petitioner: Mr. Jagdish Thakur, Advocate.
For the Respondents: Mr. N. K. Thakur, Sr. Advocate with Mr. Divya Raj Singh, Advocate, for respondent Nos. 1 & 2.
Romesh Verma, Judge
The instant petition arises out of the order, dated 13.05.2026, as passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge, Court No.1, Amb, District Una, whereby the objections, as filed by the petitioner/ J.D. to the execution petition, came to be dismissed.
The facts, as emerge in the present case, are that the present respondent Nos. 1 and 2/claimants, namely Kanta Devi and Hem Lata along with Shamsher Singh, filed a petition under Sections 4 and 4A of the Employees' Compensation Act, 1923, in 1Whether reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
the court of the Commissioner under Employees' Compensation Act, Court No. 1, Amb, District Una, on 27.02.2013 seeking therein compensation to the tune of Rs.15 lakh on account of death of Krishan Chand, son of Shri Gyan Chand, resident of village Haroti, Tehsil Amb, District Una. As per the case, as set up by the claimants, husband of Kanta Devi and father of Shamsher Singh and Hemlata, namely late Shri Krishan Chand, was working as a Driver in the vehicle bearing registration No. HP-01U-0283, belonging to present respondent No.3, namely, Sonia, wife of Kishan Dass. It was averred that on 23.10.2012, while the deceased was discharging his duties towards respondent No.3 on the aforesaid vehicle, he met with an accident with an unidentified vehicle near Pekhu Bela, Tehsil and District Una, and he died on the spot. Therefore, the claimants sought compensation amount to the tune of Rs. 15 lakh on account of death of Krishan Chand.
The said petition was resisted by respondent No.3/J.D. Smt. Sonia, and as per the case as set up by her, she never employed the deceased, late Shri Krishan Chand, as a Driver in her vehicle bearing registration No. HP 01U-0283. All the averments, as made in the petition, were specifically denied and disputed.
The learned Commissioner below vide its judgment dated 04.12.2023, allowed the petition, holding present respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and Shamsher Singh entitled for grant of compensation to the tune of Rs. 9,18,540/- along with simple interest at the rate of 12% per annum w.e.f. 23.10.2012 till realization from present respondent No. 3.
It has been admitted by the learned counsel for the parties that the said judgment has attained finality as respondent No. 3, Smt. Sonia, has not assailed the said judgment before the superior court.
After passing of the judgment, dated 04.12.2023, present respondent Nos. 1 and 2 on 07.08.2024 filed the execution petition for the recovery of the compensation amount as per the judgment as passed by the learned Commissioner below, by attaching and selling the properties belonging to respondent No.3, particulars whereof have been given in para 10 of the execution petition. In the execution petition, apart from respondent No.3, Sonia, wife of Kishan Dass, Sonia Transport Firm, being managed by its partner and proprietor Kishan Dass, alias Kishan Singh was arrayed as respondent No. 2.
The J.Ds (petitioner and respondent No.3) filed objections to the execution petition by raising preliminary objections with respect to the maintainability, mis-joinder, cause of action, etc. It was specifically stated that the execution petition is not maintainable in its present form. In preliminary objection No. 2, it was stated that the J.D. No. 2 was not the party in the original claim petition against whom the decree holders have filed the execution petition, hence the same is liable to be rejected on this sole ground. It was further stated that though it is admitted that Kishan Dass is the husband of Sonia, however, it was denied that he is the managing partner of the transport firm. It has been contended that there is no firm as alleged by the decree holders in the execution petition. It was denied that any transport firm is jointly owned by its partners Sonia and Kishan Dass, alias Kishan Singh. It has been stated that decree holders have filed the execution petition impleading therein the present petitioner as JD No. 2 by concocting a story in order to grab the money from the husband of the J.D. No.1 Sonia.
The learned executing Court vide its impugned order dated 13.05.2026 dismissed the objections, as filed by the J.Ds, and thereafter the matter was listed for seeking report qua attachment and sale of the properties of the J.Ds. as detailed in the execution petition.
Feeling dissatisfied, the present petitioner/J.D. No.2, Kishan Dass, alias Kishan Singh, has instituted the present petition invoking provisions of Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
Mr. Jagdish Thakur, learned counsel for the petitioner/J.D. No.2 has submitted that the impugned order, as passed by the learned executing Court, is erroneous and liable to be quashed and set aside. He has urged that the judgment, dated 04.12.2023, as passed by the learned Commissioner below categorically shows that the same was passed against his wife, Smt. Sonia, and the petitioner, who was not party in those proceedings, has wrongly been arrayed as party respondent in the execution petition in order to avail undue and unfair advantage, therefore, the execution petition which was filed by the decree holders against him is not maintainable. He would submit that after accepting the present petition, the execution petition as filed against him deserves to be rejected.
On the other hand, Mr. N. K. Thakur, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Mr. Divya Raj Singh, Advocate, for respondent Nos. 1 and 2, has defended the impugned order. He has contended that the impugned order is legal, valid and sustainable and it does not call for any interference by this Court. He has further submitted that the judgment, dated 04.12.2023 has attained finality, therefore, the compensation amount, as assessed by the learned Commissioner below, is liable to be paid to the decree holders. He has further submitted that the instant petition being devoid of any merit deserves to be rejected.
I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the material available on record.
In the present case, respondent Nos. 1 and 2/claimants including Shamsher Singh, had filed a petition under Sections 4 and 4A of the Employees' Compensation Act, 1923, in the court of Commissioner under Employees' Compensation Act, Court No. 1, Amb, District Una, on 27.02.2013 seeking therein compensation to the tune of Rs.15 lakh on account of death of Krishan Chand, son of Shri Gyan Chand. As per the case as set up by claimants, late Shri Krishan Chand, was working as a driver in the vehicle bearing registration No. HP-01U-0283, belonging to respondent No.3, namely, Sonia, wife of Kishan Dass. It was averred that on 23.10.2012, while the deceased was discharging his duties towards Smt. Sonia on the aforesaid vehicle, he met with an accident with an unidentified vehicle near Pekhu Bela, Tehsil and District Una, and he died on the spot. The learned Commissioner below vide its judgment dated 04.12.2023, allowed the petition and respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and Shamsher Singh were held entitled for grant of compensation to the tune of
Rs. 9,18,540/- along with simple interest at the rate of 12% per annum w.e.f. 23.10.2012 till realization from present respondent No. 3.
It has been contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that since the judgment, dated 04.12.2023, has been passed against Smt. Sonia, who admittedly is wife of the present petitioner, but since he was not the party respondent in those proceedings, therefore, in the execution petition he could not have been added as a party respondent. He has submitted that the learned trial court has adopted very unique method by dismissing the objections, despite the fact that in the preliminary objections to the execution petition, it has been specifically averred that in the main proceedings the petitioner was not party, therefore, the execution petition is bad on account of mis- joinder of the parties, and the same is liable to be rejected.
The learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon judgment, as passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vasudev Dhanjibhai Modi vs. Rajabhai Abdul Rehman, 1970 (1) SCC 670, wherein it has been held that the executing court cannot go behind the decree. The relevant extract of the said judgment reads as follows:- “6. A Court executing a decree cannot go behind the decree: between the parties or their representatives it must take the decree according to its tenor, and cannot entertain any objection that the decree was incorrect in law or on facts. Until it is set aside by an appropriate proceeding in appeal or revision, a decree even if it be erroneous is still binding between the parties.”
To the similar extent, the learned counsel for the petitioner has relied on the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Brakewel Automotive Components (India) Private Limited vs. P.R. Selvam Alagappan, (2017) 5 Supreme Court Cases 371, wherein it has been reiterated that the executing court can neither travel behind the decree nor sit in appeal over the same or pass any order jeopardizing the rights of the parties thereunder. Exercise of power under Section 47 of the CPC is microscopic and lies in a very narrow inspection hole, and an executing court can allow objection to the executability of the decree if it finds that the same is void ab initio and is a nullity, apart from the ground that it is not capable of execution under the law, either because the same was passed in ignorance of such provision of law or the law was promulgated making a decree un-executable after its passing. The Hon’ble Apex court has held as follows:- “21. As it is, Section 47 of the Code mandates determination by an executing court, questions arising between the parties or their representatives relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree and does not contemplate any adjudication beyond the same. A
decree of court of law being sacrosanct in nature, the execution thereof ought not to be thwarted on mere asking and on untenable and purported grounds having no bearing on the validity or the executability thereof.
22. Judicial precedents to the effect that the purview of scrutiny under Section 47 of the Code qua a decree is limited to objections to its executability on the ground of jurisdictional infirmity or voidness are plethoric . This Court, amongst others in Vasudev Dhanjibhai Modi vs. Rajabhai Abdul Rehman and others 1971 (1) SCR 66 in essence enunciated that only a decree which is a nullity can be the subject matter of objection under Section 47 of the Code and not one which is erroneous either in law or on facts. The following extract from this decision seems apt: “6. A Court executing a decree cannot go behind the decree between the parties or their representatives; it must take the decree according to its tenor, and cannot entertain any objection that the decree was incorrect in law or on facts. Until it is set aside by an appropriate proceeding in appeal or revision, a decree even if it be erroneous is still binding between the parties.
7. When a decree which is a nullity, for instance, where it is passed without bringing the legal representatives on the record of a person who was dead at the date of the decree, or against a ruling prince without a certificate, is sought to be executed an objection in that behalf may be raised in a proceeding for execution. Again, when the decree is made by a Court which has no inherent jurisdiction to make it, objection as to its validity may be raised in an execution proceeding if the objection appears on the face of the record: where the objection as to the jurisdiction of the Court to pass the decree does not appear on the face of the record and requires examination of the questions raised and decided at the trial or which could have been but have not been raised, the executing Court will have no jurisdiction to entertain an objection as to the validity of the decree even on the ground of absence of jurisdiction.”
23. Though this view has echoed time out of number in similar pronouncements of this Court, in Dhurandhar Prasad Singh vs. Jai Prakash University and others, AIR 2001 SC 2552, while dwelling on the scope of Section 47 of the Code, it was ruled that the powers of the court thereunder are quite different and much narrower than those in appeal/revision or review. It was reiterated that the exercise of power under Section 47 of the Code is microscopic and lies in a very narrow inspection hole and an executing court can allow objection to the executabilty of the decree if it is found that the same is void ab initio and is a nullity, apart from the ground that it is not capable of execution under the law, either because the same was passed in ignorance of such provision of law or the law was promulgated making a decree inexecutable after its passing. None of the above eventualities as recognised in law for rendering a decree inexecutable, exists in the case in hand. For obvious reasons, we do not wish to burden this adjudication by multiplying the decisions favouring the same view”.
The learned senior counsel for respondent Nos. 1 and 2 has submitted that the aforesaid principle of law, as relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, is not disputed. He has drawn attention of the Court to the statement of Smt. Sonia, respondent No. 3 in the present proceedings and tried to project that as a matter of fact, the original owner of the truck was the present petitioner, and since the parties are husband and wife, therefore, in all eventualities the compensation amount can be recovered either from them. He has also drawn the attention of this court to the statement where respondent No.3 has admitted that the truck driver was engaged by her husband. In such statement, it has been admitted that the present petitioner, husband of Sonia, used to maintain finance and expenses of the truck in question.
The sum and substance of the submission of the learned senior counsel for respondents No. 1 and 2 is that it is the present petitioner who is the owner of the vehicle in question , therefore, in all eventualities, the execution, as filed against Smt. Sonia and the present petitioner is very much maintainable, and there is no error or infirmity in the impugned order.
This Court is in agreement with the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the basic principle of law that court cannot go behind the decree has not been taken into consideration by the learned executing court while passing the impugned order. The learned executing court has also not taken into consideration the entire material placed on record, including the statements of the respective parties.
The basic question before this Court, as raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner, is whether the decree which has been passed against Smt. Sonia can be executed against the present petitioner.
The learned counsel for the petitioner, while vehemently relying upon the decisions (supra) of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, has contended that the objections which have been filed by the JDs/present petitioner, deserve to be allowed. The contention, as raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner, goes to the root of the case/execution petition, thus, in the considered opinion of this Court, the learned executing Court is required to deal with the case in hand after taking into consideration the legal principles as laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court. Therefore, on this sole ground, the impugned order is liable to be quashed and set aside.
In view of aforesaid discussion, the instant petition is allowed and the impugned order, dated 13.05.2026, as passed by the learned executing Court, is quashed and set aside with a direction to the learned executing Court to decide the objections, as filed by the J.Ds to the execution petition, afresh by affording an opportunity to the respective parties in accordance with law and on the basis of the exposition of law as laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.
Parties to appear before the Executing Court on 06.11.2026 either themselves or through their learned counsel.
Before parting, it is made clear that any observation made here-in-above shall not be taken as an expression of opinion on the merits of the main case and the same shall be adjudicated upon uninfluenced by any observations made here- in-above, which are only for the purpose of the instant petition.
(Romesh Verma) 16th October, 2026
Judge (pankaj)