CRMPM/1986/2026 on 16 October 2026

IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA CrMP(M) No. 1986 of 2026 Reserved on: 14.10.2026. Decided on: 16.10.2026 Ajit Kumar Rai …. Petitioner Versus State of H.P.

…. Respondent

Coram

Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No For the Petitioner : M/s Himanshu Sharma and Prashant Sharma, Advocates. For the Respondent/State : Mr Jitender Sharma, Additional Advocate General. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioner has filed the present petition seeking regular bail in FIR No. 271 of 2024, dated 03.11.2024, registered for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 103(1) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023 at Police Station Baddi, District Solan, H.P.

Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

2. It has been asserted that the prosecution case is based upon a totally absurd, baseless and imaginary story. There is nothing on record to show that the petitioner is connected to the commission of the crime. As per the prosecution, the informant Subhod Kumar and Babu Ram (since deceased) were working in ACE Builder. They were residing in separate rooms. The informant went for his work while the deceased Babu Ram remained in his room on 29.10.2024. The informant subsequently found that Ajit Kumar, the present petitioner, had visited the room of Babu Ram and assaulted him. The informant went to the room of Babu Ram and found him lying in an unconscious state. The informant went to the work on the next day. However, Babu Ram remained in his room. The informant went to Babu Ram's room in the evening, and he was crying in pain. Babu Ram revealed that Ajit had given him beatings with kicks to his stomach, due to which he had acute pain. Babu Ram was taken to Baddi Bazaar. He requested that he should be sent to Lachhman’s house at Ludhiana for further treatment. The informant took Babu Ram in a bus to Ludhiana. The informant tried to wake Babu Ram up at Ludhiana, but Babu Ram had died. The matter was reported to the police and the police registered the FIR. The allegations against the petitioner are false. No recovery was effected from the petitioner. Ramu Rai (PW1) and Devender Kumar (PW2) have not supported the prosecution case. The statement made by the informant before the police is weak and legally inadmissible. There is no corroborating material to support the statement. The police have completed the investigation and filed the charge sheet before the Court. No fruitful purpose would be served by detaining the petitioner in custody. The petitioner would abide by the terms and conditions that the Court may impose. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail.

3. The petition is opposed by filing a status report asserting that the petitioner had given beatings to Babu Ram (since deceased) on 29.10.2024 at 7:00 p.m. The informant went to the room of Babu Ram and asked him what had happened. Babu Ram was unconscious and did not reveal anything. The informant again went to the room of Babu Ram on 30.10.2024, and saw that Babu Ram was holding his stomach with his hands and was crying. He revealed that the petitioner had visited Babu Ram’s room at 7:00 p.m. on the previous evening and quarrelled with him for not going to work. The petitioner kicked Babu Ram’s stomach. Babu Ram requested the informant to take him to Ludhiana to the house of his relative for treatment. The informant took him to Ludhiana in a bus on 31.10.2024. Babu Ram died on the way. The matter was reported to the police. The police registered the F.I.R. As per the report of the Medical Officer, the deceased died due to septic peritonitis consequent upon rupture of the intestine caused by blunt force trauma. All injuries were ante mortem in nature and sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. The injuries were possible by kicking a person in the abdomen. The deceased was not suffering from any previous disease or injuries. The charge sheet has been filed before the Court, and the prosecution has cited 37 witnesses, out of whom the statements of 9 witnesses have been recorded. Four witnesses have been given up, and the matter is listed for the remaining prosecution witnesses with effect from 11 to 19.01.2027. Hence, the status report.

4. I have heard M/s Himanshu Sharma and Prashant Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State.

5. Mr Himanshu Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that PW1 and PW2 have not supported the prosecution version. The statement of the informant could not be recorded as the summons issued to him has not been returned. The prosecution case has become weak after PW1 and PW2 have recanted their previous testimonies. The petitioner is the sole earner of the family, and his family members are suffering in his absence. The investigation has been completed, and the charge sheet has been filed before the Court. No fruitful purpose would be served by detaining the petitioner in custody. The petitioner would abide by the terms and conditions that the Court may impose. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail.

6. Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State, submitted that the petitioner had earlier filed a bail petition which was dismissed by this Court. A subsequent bail petition lies only when there is a change in the circumstances. The petitioner has not shown any change in the circumstances and is not entitled to bail. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

7. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

8. It is undisputed that the petitioner had earlier filed a bail petition which was registered as Cr. M.P. (M) No. 1302 of 2025 and was dismissed on 04.07.2025. It was rightly submitted on behalf of the State that a subsequent bail petition lies only when there is a change in the circumstances. It was held in State of Maharashtra. Captain Buddhikota Subha Rao (1989) Suppl. 2 SCC 605, that once a bail application has been dismissed, a subsequent bail application can only be considered if there is a change of circumstances. It was observed: “Once that application was rejected, there was no question of granting a similar prayer. That is virtually overruling the earlier decision without there being a change in the fact situation. And when we speak of change, we mean a substantial one, which has a direct impact on the earlier decision and not merely cosmetic changes, which are of little or no consequence. 'Between the two orders, there was a gap of only two days, and it is nobody's case that during these two days, drastic changes had taken place necessitating the release of the respondent on bail. Judicial discipline, propriety and comity demanded that the impugned order should not have been passed, reversing all earlier orders, including the one rendered by Puranik, J., only a couple of days before, in the absence of any substantial change in the fact situation. In such cases, it is necessary to act with restraint and circumspection so that the process of the Court is not abused by a litigant and an impression does not gain ground that the litigant has either successfully avoided one judge or selected another to secure an order which had hitherto eluded him.

9. Similarly, it was held in Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan @ Pappu Yadav (2004) 7 SCC 528 that where an earlier bail application has been rejected, the Court has to consider the rejection of the earlier bail application and then consider why the subsequent bail application should be allowed. It was held: “11. In regard to cases where earlier bail applications have been rejected, there is a further onus on the court to consider the subsequent application for grant of bail by noticing the grounds on which earlier bail applications have been rejected and after such consideration, if the court is of the opinion that bail has to be granted then the said court will have to give specific reasons why in spite of such earlier rejection the subsequent bail application should be granted.”

10. A similar view was taken in State of T.N. v. S.A. Raja, (2005) 8 SCC 380, wherein it was observed:

9. When a learned Single Judge of the same court had denied bail to the respondent for certain reasons, and that order was unsuccessfully challenged before the appellate forum, without there being any major change of circumstances, another fresh application should not have been dealt with within a short span of time unless there were valid grounds giving rise to a tenable case for bail. Of course, the principles of res judicata are not applicable to bail applications, but the repeated filing of bail applications without there being any change of circumstances would lead to bad precedents.

11. This position was reiterated in Prasad Shrikant Purohit v. State of Maharashtra (2018) 11 SCC 458, wherein it was observed:

30. Before concluding, we must note that though an accused has a right to make successive applications for the grant of bail, the court entertaining such subsequent bail applications has a duty to consider the reasons and grounds on which the earlier bail applications were rejected. In such cases, the court also has a duty to record the fresh grounds which persuade it to take a view different from the one taken in the earlier applications.

12. It was submitted that two prosecution witnesses have resiled from their testimonies and the prosecution version is doubtful. This submission will not help the petitioner. It was laid down by the Delhi High Court in Dineet v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2025 SCC OnLine Del 8603, that it is impermissible for the bail Court to appreciate the evidence recorded during the trial and grant bail on the ground that the independent witness has not supported the prosecution’s case. It was observed: “17. Addressing Mr Mahajan's submissions, it is pertinent to note that nearly the entirety of the petitioner's case rests upon the assumption that this Court may enter into witness testimonies and evidence to determine contradictions and the hostility of witnesses at the stage of bail.

18. However, it is trite that the same is not within the power of this Court at the stage of bail, as laid down in Satish Jaggi v. State of Chhattisgarh (2007) 11 SCC 195 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 660, paragraphs 11 and 12 of which merit reproduction: “11. On the aforesaid reasoning, the learned Chief Justice thought it fit to grant bail. Mr A.K. Ganguli, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant complainant, Mr Amarendra Sharan, learned ASG appearing on behalf of CBI and Mr Rajiv Dutta, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the State of Chhattisgarh strenuously contended that

having regard to the observations and findings of the learned Chief Justice as recorded above, it clearly shows that the learned Chief Justice, while granting bail to the accused, virtually decided the case on merit, which amounts to acquitting the accused of the criminal charge levelled against him without trial. Per contra, Mr Vivek Tankha, learned Senior Counsel, contended that now the evidence is closed, so there is no question of the accused tampering with the prosecution witnesses or fleeing from justice. He further contended that now the arguments in the case have finally started, and the arguments of the prosecution are over, and only the defence is to give its reply. He, accordingly, contended that the bail granted by the learned Chief Justice need not be disturbed.

12. Normally, if the offence is non-bailable, bail can also be granted if the facts and circumstances so demand. We have already observed that in granting bail in a non-bailable offence, the primary consideration is the gravity and the nature of the offence. A reading of the order of the learned Chief Justice shows that the nature and the gravity of the offence and its impact on the democratic fabric of society were not at all considered. We are more concerned with the observations and findings recorded by the learned Chief Justice on the credibility and the evidential value of the witnesses at the stage of granting bail. By making such observations and findings, the learned Chief Justice has virtually acquitted the accused of all the criminal charges levelled against him even before the trial. The trial is in progress, and if such findings are allowed to stand, it would seriously prejudice the prosecution's case. At the stage of granting bail, the court can only go into the question of the prima facie case established for granting bail. It cannot go into the question of the credibility and reliability of the witnesses put up by the prosecution. The question of credibility and reliability of prosecution witnesses can only be tested during the trial.”

19. By virtue of the aforementioned paragraphs from the Hon'ble Supreme Court's decision in Satish Jaggi, it is evinced that this Court, at the stage of Bail, cannot look into the allegations of PW2 being a witness who has turned hostile, nor apply its mind to alleged contradictions in his statement under Section 161 of the CrPC when compared with his testimony in Court, as the same would amount to appreciation of the evidentiary value of his statement and testimony, and this is an exercise that is only to be conducted during the course of trial.

20. The same has been relied upon by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the judgment of State of Karnataka v. Sri Darshan, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1702, with the following paragraphs of this decision reproduced for ready reference: “20.2.5. Further, such an approach of the High Court is contrary to the judicial precedents of this Court, including Satish Jaggi v. State of Chhattisgarh (supra), Kanwar Singh Meena v. State of Rajasthan4, wherein it was held that courts, while considering bail, should not assess the credibility of witnesses, as this function squarely lies within the domain of the trial Court. Thus, the impugned order of the High Court violates this principle by commenting on the delay in the witness statements and imputing a lack of credibility at this stage” (emphasis supplied) ***** “20.3.6. In the present case, the High Court also proceeded to analyse and discount the credibility of certain prosecution witnesses and forensic material. It observed contradictions in the eyewitness statements concerning the overt acts of the accused (para 26). It expressed doubts about the prosecution's explanation for the delay in recording the statements of CW. 76 and CW. 91 (para 27). It questioned the timing of the doctor's supplementary opinion and weighed its evidentiary worth (para 31). As already pointed out, the credibility or reliability of witnesses is a matter for the trial Court to determine after full-fledged cross-examination. It is a trite law that statements recorded under section 161 Cr. P.C. are not substantive, and their evidentiary value can only be determined after cross-examination during trial. Any opinion rendered at the bail stage risks prejudging the outcome of the trial and must be avoided. Thus, the court's assessment of these aspects amounts to a premature appreciation of the probative value of prosecution evidence.” (emphasis supplied) ***** “24. On a cumulative analysis, it is evident that the order of the High Court suffers from serious legal infirmities. The order fails to record any special or cogent reasons for granting bail in a case involving charges under Sections 302, 120B, and 34 IPC. Instead, it reflects a mechanical exercise of discretion, marked by significant omissions of legally relevant facts. Moreover, the High Court undertook an extensive examination of witness statements at the pre- trial stage, highlighting alleged contradictions and delays - issues that are inherently matters for the trial Court to assess through cross-examination. The trial Court alone is the appropriate forum to evaluate the credibility and reliability of witnesses. Granting bail in such a serious case, without adequate consideration of the nature and gravity of the offence, the accused's role, and the tangible risk of interference with the trial, amounts to a perverse and wholly unwarranted exercise of discretion. The well- founded allegations of witness intimidation, coupled with compelling forensic and circumstantial evidence, further reinforce the necessity for cancellation of bail. Consequently, the liberty granted under the impugned order poses a real and imminent threat to the fair administration of justice and risks derailing the trial process. In light of these circumstances, this Court is satisfied that the present case calls for the exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Section 439(2) Cr. P.C.” (emphasis supplied)

21. Drawing inspiration from the judgment in Darshan, the hostility of a witness cannot be interpreted as an automatic declaration of the prosecution's case as unconvincing, and thereby, in essence, result in the conduct of a mini-trial at the stage of bail and return findings upon the ex facie merit of the accused's innocence/guilt.

13. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in X Vs. State of Rajasthan MANU/SC/1267/2024 that ordinarily, in serious offences, the Trial Court or the High Court should not entertain the bail application of the accused after the commencement of the trial and grant bail because of some discrepancy in the testimony. It was observed: - “14. Ordinarily, in serious offences like rape, murder, dacoity, etc., once the trial commences and the prosecution starts examining its witnesses, the Court, be it the Trial Court or the High Court, should be loath to entertain the bail application of the Accused.

15. Over a period of time, we have noticed two things, i.e., (i) either bail is granted after the charge is framed and just before the victim is to be examined by the prosecution before the trial court, or (ii) bail is granted once the recording of the oral evidence of the victim is complete, by looking into some discrepancies here or there in the deposition and thereby testing the credibility of the victim.

16. We are of the view that the aforesaid is not a correct practice that the Courts below should adopt. Once the trial commences, it should be allowed to reach its conclusion, which may either result in the conviction of the Accused or the acquittal of the Accused. The moment the High Court exercises its discretion in favour of the Accused and orders the release of the Accused on bail by looking into the deposition of the victim, it will have its own impact on the pending trial when it comes to appreciating the oral evidence of the victim. It is only if the trial gets unduly delayed and that, too, for no fault on the part of the Accused, the Court may be justified in ordering his release on bail on the ground that the right of the Accused to have a speedy trial has been infringed.”

14. Similarly, it was held by this Court in Suraj Singh v. State of H.P., 2022 SCC OnLine HP 268 that the Court exercising bail jurisdiction cannot appreciate the contradictions in the evidence. It was observed:

10. Petitioner has placed reliance on the statements of witnesses already recorded by the learned Special Judge, in support of his argument to the effect that, from perusal of these statements, reasonable grounds can be entertained for concluding prima facie innocence of the petitioner. The arguments raised on behalf of the petitioner deserve to be rejected for the reason that this Court, while dealing with the bail application, will not appreciate the evidence being recorded during the trial. Undisputedly, only some of the witnesses out of the entire list of witnesses relied upon by the prosecution have been examined. In these circumstances, it is not prudent to form any opinion as to the innocence or guilt of the petitioner based on such partial evidence.

15. It was submitted that the allegations against the petitioner are false and there is no material to connect the petitioner to the commission of the crime. This submission will also not help the petitioner. The Court had earlier found, while deciding the bail petition filed by the petitioner, that there was sufficient material to prima facie connect the petitioner to the commission of the crime. The findings recorded by the Court cannot be reviewed by this Court while exercising the jurisdiction to grant a subsequent bail petition. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Kajad, (2001) 7 SCC 673; 2001 SCC (Cri) 1520; 2001 SCC OnLine SC 1070, that it is impermissible to review the earlier order of bail in the subsequent bail petition, and the Court can only consider the change in circumstances. It was observed at page 676:

8. It has further to be noted that the factum of the rejection of his earlier bail application bearing Miscellaneous Case No. 2052 of 2000 on 5-6-2000 has not been denied by the respondent. Successive bail applications are indeed permissible under the changed circumstances. But without the change in the circumstances, the second application would be deemed to be seeking a review of the earlier judgment, which is not permissible under criminal law, as has been held by this Court in Hari Singh Mann v. Harbhajan Singh Bajwa [(2001) 1 SCC 169: 2001 SCC (Cri) 113] and various other judgments.

16. It was submitted that the prosecution has not completed the evidence and this violates the petitioner's right to a speedy trial. This submission cannot be accepted. The status report shows that the prosecution has cited 37 witnesses, out of whom the statements of 9 witnesses have been recorded and 4 witnesses have been given up. The matter is now listed with effect from 11 to 19.01.2027 for recording the statements of witnesses. The recording of 9

witnesses and giving up 4 witnesses within 1 year five months does not show any delay in the progress of the trial. Therefore, the petitioner cannot be held entitled to bail on the ground that there is a violation of the petitioner's right to a speedy trial.

17. No other point was urged.

18. In view of the above, the present petition fails and is dismissed.

19. The observations made hereinabove are regarding the disposal of this petition and will have no bearing whatsoever on the merits of the case.

(Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 16th October, 2026 (Nikita)