CRMMO/733/2026 on 15 October 2026

2026:HHC:45693 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA CrMMO No. 733 of 2026 Reserved on: 06.10.2026 Date of Decision: 15.10.2026

Harbans Singh & another

…. Petitioner

Versus

State of H.P. & others

…. Respondents

Coram

Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Petitioners : Mr Peeyush Verma, Senior Advocate, with Mr Anuj Bali, Advocate. For the Respondents. : Mr Jitender Sharma, Additional Advocate General, for respondents No.1 to 3.

Ms Saroj Kumari, Advocate, for respondents No. 4 and 5.

Rakesh Kainthla, Judge

The petitioners have filed the present petition for quashing of FIR No. 12 of 2026, dated 27.02.2026, registered at

Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

Police Station Jubbal, District Shimla for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 109, 115, and 125 read with Section 3(5) of Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023 and Section 25 of the Arms Act and consequential proceedings arising out of it based on a compromise between the parties.

2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that the informant Krishan Lal made a complaint to the police that his son Ankit had gone to Rohru on 23.02.2026, in his private vehicle bearing registration No. HP-10C-0804. The informant called Ankit in the evening, and Ankit replied that he would stay with his friend at Rohru. The informant received a call on 24.02.2026, at about 02:00 a.m., that Ankit and his friend Diwakar had picked a quarrel with Pradeep Singh and his family members in village Raika. They had run away after the incident and left the vehicle on the spot. The informant, his wife and family members went to the village where Ankit and Diwakar were present. Ankit revealed that he and Diwakar had visited Pradeep’s house to settle an earlier dispute. A quarrel started between the parties, and Pradeep’s father took out a gun to threaten Ankit and Diwakar. They ran away. Ankit fell and sustained an injury to his foot. The matter was compromised on the spot. Ankit was taken to Civil Hospital, Jubbal, where the doctor advised an X-ray. The medical officer found the pellets in the foot after the X-ray and referred Ankit to IGMC. Ankit revealed that somebody had fired when he was running away, and he might have suffered a gunshot wound to his foot. The police registered the FIR and investigated the matter. The police seized the gun used during the incident. The police recorded the statements of the witnesses and found that petitioner Harbans Singh had shot at Ankit and his friend to scare them away. As per the report of analysis, the gun was found in working order. The pellets recovered from the wound could have been fired from the gun. The nature of the injury was also stated to be grievous, which could have been caused by a gunshot. The police filed the charge sheet before the court after the investigation.

3. Being aggrieved by the filing of the charge sheet before the Court, the petitioners have filed the present petition asserting that the parties have compromised the matter, and the informant and victim do not want to proceed further with the matter after the compromise. Hence, it has been prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR and the consequential proceedings arising out of it be quashed based on the compromise between the parties.

4. The statements of the victim Ankit and informant Krishan Lal were recorded on 21.08.2026, in which they stated that they had entered into a compromise with the petitioners voluntarily without any influence and they had no objection to quashing the FIR based on a compromise between the parties.

5. I have heard Mr Peeyush Verma, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Mr Anuj Bali, Advocate, for the petitioners, Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General, for respondents No. 1 to 3 and Ms Saroj Kumari, Advocate, for respondents No. 4 and 5.

6. Mr Peeyush Verma, learned Senior Advocate, for the petitioners, submitted that the parties have reconciled the matter. The incident occurred because Ankit and his friend had visited the petitioner's house in the middle of the night. Petitioner Harbans fired a shot to save himself after hearing the commotion. He had no intention to cause hurt to any person. The ingredients of commission of offence punishable under Section 109 of BNS are not satisfied. No fruitful purpose would be served by continuing with the proceedings. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR and consequential proceedings arising out of it be quashed.

7. Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent/State submitted that the petitioner Harbans had fired a gunshot at Ankit, which had caused hurt to him. The allegations in the FIR prima facie satisfy the requirement of Section 109 of BNS. The offence is heinous, which cannot be quashed based on a compromise between the parties. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

8. Ms Saroj Kumari, learned counsel for the respondents no. 4 and 5, submitted that the matter has been compromised between the parties and she had no objection to quashing the FIR based on a compromise between the parties.

9. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

10. The FIR has been registered for the commission of offences punishable under Section 109 of BNS (corresponding to Section 307 of the IPC) and Section 25 of the Arms Act. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Gian Singh v. State of

Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303: 2012 SCC OnLine SC 769 that the jurisdiction to quash the proceedings under Section 482 based on the compromise is different from the jurisdiction of compounding under Section 320 of CrPC. It was observed: “57. Quashing of offence or criminal proceedings on the ground of settlement between an offender and victim is not the same thing as compounding of the offence. They are different and not interchangeable. Strictly speaking, the power of compounding offences given to a court under Section 320 is materially different from the quashing of criminal proceedings by the High Court in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. In compounding of offences, the power of a criminal court is circumscribed by the provisions contained in Section 320. The court is guided solely and squarely thereby. On the other hand, the formation of opinion by the High Court for quashing a criminal offence, criminal proceeding or criminal complaint is guided by the material on record as to whether the ends of justice would justify such exercise of power. However, the ultimate consequence may be acquittal or dismissal of the indictment.

58. Where the High Court quashes a criminal proceeding having regard to the fact that the dispute between the offender and the victim has been settled although the offences are not compoundable, it does so as, in its opinion, continuation of criminal proceedings will be an exercise in futility and justice in the case demands that the dispute between the parties is put to an end and peace is restored; securing the ends of justice being the ultimate guiding factor. No doubt, crimes are acts which have harmful effects on the public and consist of wrongdoing that seriously endangers and threatens the well-being of society, and it is not safe to leave the crime-doer only because he and the victim have settled the dispute amicably or the victim has been paid compensation, yet certain crimes have been made compoundable in law, with or without the permission of the court. In respect of serious offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc., or other offences of mental depravity under IPC or offences of moral turpitude under special statutes, like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, the settlement between the offender and the victim can have no legal sanction at all. However, certain offences which overwhelmingly and predominantly bear civil flavour having arisen out of a civil, mercantile, commercial, financial, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony, particularly relating to dowry, etc. or the family dispute, where the wrong is basically to the victim and the offender and the victim have settled all disputes between them amicably, irrespective of the fact that such offences have not been made compoundable, the High Court may within the framework of its inherent power, quash the criminal proceeding or criminal complaint or FIR if it is satisfied that on the face of such settlement, there is hardly any likelihood of the offender being convicted and by not quashing the criminal proceedings, justice shall be casualty and ends of justice shall be defeated. The above list is illustrative and not exhaustive. Each case will depend on its own facts, and no hard-and-fast category can be prescribed.

59. B.S. Joshi [(2003) 4 SCC 675: 2003 SCC (Cri) 848], Nikhil Merchant [(2008) 9 SCC 677 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 858], Manoj Sharma [(2008) 16 SCC 1 : (2010) 4 SCC (Cri) 145] and Shiji [(2011) 10 SCC 705 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 101] do illustrate the principle that the High Court may quash criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent power under Section 482 of the Code and Section 320 does not limit or affect the powers of the High Court under Section 482. Can it be said that by quashing criminal proceedings in B.S. Joshi [(2003) 4 SCC 675: 2003 SCC (Cri) 848], Nikhil Merchant [(2008) 9 SCC 677 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri)

858], Manoj Sharma [(2008) 16 SCC 1 : (2010) 4 SCC (Cri) 145] and Shiji [(2011) 10 SCC 705 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 101] this Court has compounded the non-compoundable offences indirectly? We do not think so. There does exist a distinction between compounding an offence under Section 320 and quashing a criminal case by the High Court in the exercise of inherent power under Section 482. The two powers are distinct and different, although the ultimate consequence may be the same, viz., acquittal of the accused or dismissal of the indictment.

60. We find no incongruity in the above principle of law and the decisions of this Court in Simrikhia [(1990) 2 SCC 437: 1990 SCC (Cri) 327], Dharampal [(1993) 1 SCC 435: 1993 SCC (Cri) 333: 1993 Cri LJ 1049], Arun Shankar Shukla [(1999) 6 SCC 146: 1999 SCC (Cri) 1076: AIR 1999 SC 2554], Ishwar Singh [(2008) 15 SCC 667 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1153], Rumi Dhar [(2009) 6 SCC 364 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1074] and Ashok Sadarangani [(2012) 11 SCC 321]. The principle propounded in Simrikhia [(1990) 2 SCC 437: 1990 SCC (Cri) 327] that the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court cannot be invoked to override an express bar provided in law is now well settled. In Dharampal [(1993) 1 SCC 435: 1993 SCC (Cri) 333: 1993 Cri LJ 1049], the Court observed the same thing: that the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code cannot be utilised for exercising powers which are expressly barred by the Code. A similar statement of law is made in Arun Shankar Shukla [(1999) 6 SCC 146: 1999 SCC (Cri) 1076: AIR 1999 SC 2554]. In Ishwar Singh [(2008) 15 SCC 667: (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1153], the accused was alleged to have committed an offence punishable under Section 307 IPC, and with reference to Section 320 of the Code, it was held that the offence punishable under Section 307 IPC was not compoundable and there was an express bar in Section 320 that no offence shall be compounded if it is not compoundable under the Code. In Rumi Dhar [(2009) 6 SCC 364 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1074] although the accused had paid the entire due amount as per the settlement with the bank in the matter of recovery before the Debts Recovery

Tribunal, the accused was being proceeded with for the commission of the offences under Sections

B/420/467/468/471 IPC along with the bank officers who were being prosecuted under Section 13(2) read with 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The Court refused to quash the charge against the accused by holding that the Court would not quash a case involving a crime against society when a prima facie case has been made out against the accused for framing the charge. Ashok Sadarangani [(2012) 11 SCC 321] was again a case where the accused persons were charged of having committed the offences under Sections 120-B, 465, 467, 468 and 471 IPC and the allegations were that the accused secured the credit facilities by submitting forged property documents as collaterals and utilised such facilities in a dishonest and fraudulent manner by opening letters of credit in respect of foreign supplies of goods, without actually bringing any goods but inducing the bank to negotiate the letters of credit in favour of foreign suppliers and also by misusing the cash-credit facility. The Court was alive to the reference made in one of the present matters and also the decisions in B.S. Joshi [(2003) 4 SCC 675: 2003 SCC (Cri) 848], Nikhil Merchant [(2008) 9 SCC 677 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 858] and Manoj Sharma [(2008) 16 SCC 1 : (2010) 4 SCC (Cri) 145] and it was held that B.S. Joshi [(2003) 4 SCC 675: 2003 SCC (Cri) 848] and Nikhil Merchant [(2008) 9 SCC 677 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 858] dealt with different factual situation as the dispute involved had overtures of a civil dispute but the case under consideration in Ashok Sadarangani [(2012) 11 SCC 321] was more on the criminal intent than on a civil aspect. The decision in Ashok Sadarangani [(2012) 11 SCC 321] supports the view that criminal matters involving overtures of a civil dispute stand on a different footing.

61. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding, FIR or complaint in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation, but it has to be exercised in accordance with the guideline engrafted in such power, viz., (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or FIR may be exercised where the offender and the victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case, and no category can be prescribed. However, before the exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc., cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or the victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and the offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, etc., cannot provide a basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominantly civil flavour stand on a different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from a commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, the High Court may quash the criminal proceedings if, in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and the victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of the criminal case would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice, and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or whether continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of the process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and the wrongdoer and whether, to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that the criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.

11. It was held in State of M.P. v. Laxmi Narayan, (2019) 5 SCC 688: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 320 that the offences punishable under the Arms Act fall within the definition of serious offences and cannot be quashed based on the compromise. It was observed: “15. Considering the law on the point and the other decisions of this Court on the point, referred to hereinabove, it is observed and held as under:

15.1. That the power conferred under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings for the non-compoundable offences under Section 320 of the Code can be exercised, having overwhelmingly and predominantly a civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationships or family disputes and when the parties have resolved the entire dispute amongst themselves; 15.2. Such power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society.

15.3. Similarly, such power is not to be exercised for offences under special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, which are not to be quashed merely on the basis of a compromise between the victim and the offender; 15.4. Offences under Section 307 IPC and the Arms Act, etc. would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be treated as crimes against society and not against the individual alone, and therefore, the criminal proceedings for the offence under Section 307 IPC and/or the Arms Act, etc. which have a serious impact on the society cannot be quashed in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Code, on the ground that the parties have resolved their entire dispute amongst themselves. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine whether the incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or if the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which, if proved, would lead to framing the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of the injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delicate parts of the body, the nature of weapons used, etc. However, such an exercise by the High Court would be permissible only after the evidence is collected after investigation, the chargesheet is filed/the charge is framed and/or during the trial. Such exercise is not permissible when the matter is still under investigation. Therefore, the ultimate conclusion in paras 29.6 and 29.7 of the decision of this Court in Narinder Singh [Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 6 SCC 466:

(2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 54] should be read harmoniously and to be read as a whole and in the circumstances stated hereinabove; 15.5. While exercising the power under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings in respect of non-compoundable offences, which are private and do not have a serious impact on society, on the ground that there is a settlement/compromise between the victim and the offender, the High Court is required to consider the antecedents of the accused; the conduct of the accused, namely, whether the accused was absconding and why he was absconding, how he had managed with the complainant to enter into a compromise, etc.” (Emphasis supplied)

12. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Naushey Ali v. State of U.P., (2025) 4 SCC 78 that an offence punishable under Section 307 of IPC is a heinous offence and cannot be quashed based on the compromise; however, mere mention of Section 307 of IPC is not sufficient to prevent the Court from exercising its inherent jurisdiction. It was observed at page 85:

20. Will the mere mention of Section 307IPC in the criminal proceedings force the court to adopt a hands-off approach when parties come forward with a settlement? In that event, what should be the duty of the court, and what are the tests to be applied to decide in which cases settlements would be accepted and in which cases they would not be?

21. In State of M.P. v. Laxmi Narayan [State of M.P. v. Laxmi Narayan, (2019) 5 SCC 688 : (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 706], after discussing the ratio in Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab [Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 6 SCC 466 : (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 54] and other judgments, this Court held : (Laxmi Narayan case [State of M.P. v. Laxmi Narayan, (2019) 5 SCC 688 : (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 706], SCC pp. 704-705, para 15) “15. Considering the law on the point and the other decisions of this Court on the point, referred to hereinabove, it is observed and held as under:

15.1. That the power conferred under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings for the non- compoundable offences under Section 320 of the Code can be exercised, having overwhelmingly and predominantly a civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationships or family disputes and when the parties have resolved the entire dispute amongst themselves; 15.2. Such power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society.

15.3. Similarly, such power is not to be exercised for offences under the special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act, or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of a compromise between the victim and the offender; 15.4. Offences under Section 307 IPC and the Arms Act, etc. would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be treated as crimes against society and not against the individual alone, and therefore, the criminal proceedings for the offence under Section 307IPC and/or the Arms Act, etc., which have a serious impact on the society cannot be quashed in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Code, on the ground that the parties have resolved their entire dispute amongst themselves. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307IPC in the

FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine whether the incorporation of Section 307IPC is for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which, if proved, would lead to framing the charge under Section 307IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delicate parts of the body, the nature of weapons used, etc. However, such an exercise by the High Court would be permissible only after the evidence is collected after investigation and the charge-sheet is filed/charge is framed and/or during the trial. Such exercise is not permissible when the matter is still under investigation. Therefore, the ultimate conclusion in paras 29.6 and 29.7 of the decision of this Court in Narinder Singh [Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 6 SCC 466: (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 54] should be read harmoniously and to be read as a whole and in the circumstances stated hereinabove; 15.5 [Ed. Para 15.5 corrected vide Official Corrigendum No. F.3/Ed.B.J./22/2019 dated 3-4-2019. While exercising the power under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings in respect of non- compoundable offences, which are private and do not have a serious impact on society, on the ground that there is a settlement/compromise between the victim and the offender, the High Court is required to consider the antecedents of the accused; the conduct of the accused, namely, whether the accused was absconding and why he was absconding, how he had managed with the complainant to enter into a compromise, etc.” (emphasis supplied)

22. Before we apply this judgment to the facts, it will be worthwhile to recall the observations of Sikri, J. in Narinder Singh [Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 6 SCC 466: (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 54]: (SCC p. 481, para 26) “26. Having said so, we would hasten to add that though it is a serious offence as the accused person(s) attempted to take the life of another person/victim, at the same time the court cannot be oblivious to hard realities that many times whenever there is a quarrel between the parties leading to physical commotion and sustaining of injury by either or both the parties, there is a tendency to give it a slant of an offence under Section 307IPC as well.” (emphasis supplied)

23. Coming back to Laxmi Narayan [State of M.P. v. Laxmi Narayan, (2019) 5 SCC 688: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 706], this Court has held that mere mention of Section 307IPC in the FIR or the charge-sheet should not be the basis for adopting a hands-off approach. It has further held that it would be open for the court to examine as to whether the incorporation of Section 307IPC is there for the sake of it or whether there is evidence to back it. It has been held that the courts may go by the nature of injuries sustained, as to whether the injuries are inflicted on the vital/delicate parts of the body and the nature of the weapon used. It has also been clarified that such an exercise would be permissible after investigation and filing of a charge- sheet/framing of charges or during the trial. (See para 15.4 of Laxmi Narayan [State of M.P. v. Laxmi Narayan, (2019) 5 SCC 688: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 706].)

13. In the present case, the contents of the FIR show that Ankit and Diwakar were running away after the petitioner Harbans had fired at them. It was submitted that petitioner Harbans had shot in exercise of the right of private defence. This cannot be accepted. Ankit and Diwakar were running away, and Harbans could have any apprehension of any injury to himself or his family members; hence, the act of firing at the persons who were running away cannot, prima facie, constitute an act of private defence.

14. It was submitted that no injury to the vital part was caused and the offence punishable under Section 109 of IPC is not made out. This submission will not help the petitioner. Section 109 of the BNS corresponds to Section 307 of the IPC. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held in Surender Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 191, that grievousness of the injury or the possibility of injury which could have led to death is not a necessary ingredient to attract Section 307 of the IPC. It was observed:

7. We are of the opinion that the grievousness of the injuries or the possibility of injury which could have led to death is not a necessary ingredient to attract Section 307. Section 307 reads thus: — ‘S. 307 Whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge, and under such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and if hurt is caused to any person by such act, the offender shall be liable either to imprisonment for life, or to such punishment as is hereinbefore mentioned.’

8. It has two limbs, insofar as the punishment is concerned, but only one regarding the culpability. The culpability being found if there is commission of any act with such intention or knowledge that the act could result in death, making the perpetrator guilty of murder. As regards punishment, the accused shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to 10 years and shall also be liable to a fine, which is the first limb. The second limb provides that if such act, caused with intention or knowledge, results in hurt to any person, then the offender shall be liable either to imprisonment for life or to such punishment as provided in the first limb. Hurt, grievous or simple, is not a precondition to attract Section 307, but if there is hurt, be it simple or grievous, and the act causing such hurt is with the intention or knowledge that such act could have caused death, making the perpetrator guilty of murder, then a graver punishment is provided.

9. In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Kashiram(2009) 4 SCC 26 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 40, this Court held that to justify the conviction under Section 307, it would be sufficient if there is intent coupled with some overt act in execution thereof. It is not essential that there should be a bodily injury capable of causing death or even an injury in the nature of simple hurt. Relying on a number of decisions, it was held that the intention to kill or knowledge that death will occur is a question of fact depending on a given case to find culpability under Section 307. The mere fact that the injury inflicted was simple or minor will not by itself rule out the application of Section 307, since the determining question is the intention or knowledge.

10. Chimanbhai Jagabhai Patel v. State of Gujarat(2009) 11 SCC 273 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1323 found the ingredients under Section 307 to be; (i) the overt act of the accused,

(ii) the intention or knowledge; to cause a bodily injury, which he knew would likely cause death, or such bodily injury which in the ordinary course of nature would lead to death, or that act is so imminently dangerous that in all probability death would be occasioned and (iii) that the accused had no excuse for incurring the risk of causing such death or injury. Pasupuleti Siva Ramakrishna Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh(2014) 5 SCC 369; (2014) 2 SCC (Cri) 584 differentiated the punishments, as we found in the first and second limbs. One, the intention alone leads to a punishment of 10 years, and if it is accompanied by hurt, then it extends to life imprisonment. State of M.P. v. Saleem alias Chamaru(2005) 5 SCC 554: 2005 SCC (Cri) 1329 categorically held that to sustain a conviction under Section 307, there is no necessity for a bodily injury capable of causing death. A simple injury caused would not, as a corollary, mean absence of intention to cause death, which intention or knowledge has to be discerned from the circumstances surrounding the crime. State of Madhya Pradesh v. Kanha alias Omprakash (2019) 3 SCC 605 : (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 247 and Jage Ram v. State of Haryana(2015) 11 SCC 366: (2015) 4 SCC (Cri) 425 held that the absence of a fatal injury would not dislodge Section 307, but the nature or gravity of the injury and the nature of the weapon used could lead to an inference of intent and knowledge.

15. In the present case, a gun was used to shoot Ankit and, had the death been caused, the petitioner Harbans would have been guilty of murder because shooting at a person can only show an intention to kill that person. Hence, the submission that no prima facie case is made out for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 109 of BNS cannot be accepted.

16. Thus, the nature of offences is such that the matter cannot be reconciled between the parties and it is impermissible to quash the FIR based on a compromise between the parties as per the binding precedents of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India.

17. In view of the above, the present petition fails, and it is dismissed.

18. The observations made hereinabove are regarding the disposal of this petition and will have no bearing whatsoever on the merits of the case.

( Rakesh Kainthla ) 15th October, 2026

Judge

(Ravinder)