CRMPM/1932/2026 on 15 October 2026

IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MP(M) No. 1932 of 2026 Reserved on: 12.10.2026 Date of Decision: 15.10.2026

Rahul Thakur

…. Petitioner

Versus

State of HP

…. Respondent

Coram

Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Petitioner

: Mr Vishal Singh Thakur,

Advocate. For the Respondent/State : Mr Ajit Sharma, Deputy

Advocate General.

Rakesh Kainthla, Judge

The petitioner has filed the present petition seeking regular bail in FIR No. 74 of 2026, dated 10.06.2026, registered at Police Station Sadar, District Shimla, H.P., for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 21 and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act (NDPS Act).

2. It has been asserted that the police received secret information on 10.06.2026 at about 04:10 p.m. that Rahul Thakur

Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

was transporting heroin in his vehicle bearing registration No. HP86-8555. The information was reduced to writing and was sent to the Superior Officer. The police joined Karan Verma and Rohit Gill, and went to the spot where the vehicle was parked. The police searched the vehicle in the presence of independent witnesses and recovered 6.95 grams of heroin. The police registered the FIR and arrested the petitioner. The quantity of heroin stated to have been recovered by the police falls within the intermediate quantity, and rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act do not apply to the present case. The petitioner has been in custody since 11.06.2026. The police have completed the investigation, and no fruitful purpose would be served by detaining the petitioner in custody. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail.

3. The petition is opposed by filing a status report asserting that the police received secret information on 10.06.2026 at about 04:10 p.m. that Rahul Thakur (the present petitioner) was selling heroin from his vehicle bearing registration number HP-86-8555. A huge quantity of heroin could be recovered by searching the vehicle. The information was credible, and any delay in procuring the warrant would have led to the destruction of the heroin. Hence, the information was reduced to writing and was sent to the Supervisory Officer. The police went to the spot indicated in the information and joined Karan Verma and Rohit Gill on the way. The police found the vehicle bearing registration No. HP-86-8555 parked on a link road. The driver identified himself as Rahul Thakur, the present petitioner. The police searched the vehicle in the presence of the petitioner and independent witnesses. The police found the documents of the vehicle, currency notes of ₹23,000/- and 6.95 grams of heroin. The police seized the articles and arrested the petitioner. The heroin was sent to the FSL, and as per the result of the analysis, it was confirmed to be diacetylmorphine. The petitioner made a disclosure statement and led the police to a room where Harpreet Singh alias Harry was found. Harpreet Singh made a disclosure statement which led to the recovery of 308.510 grams of Heroin and currency notes worth ₹61,900/-. The police arrested Harpreet and seized the heroin. This substance was also found to be heroin. FIR No. 18 of 2024, dated 15.03.2024 and FIR No. 116 of 2024, dated 06.07.2024 are registered against the petitioner. The result of the analysis from the FSL regarding the mobile phone conversation/chat is awaited. Hence, the status report.

4. I have heard Mr Vishal Thakur, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent/State.

5. Mr Vishal Thakur, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and he was falsely implicated. As per the prosecution, an intermediate quantity of heroin was recovered, and rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act do not apply to the present case. The police have completed the investigation, and no fruitful purpose would be served by detaining the petitioner in custody. The petitioner would abide by the terms and conditions that the Court may impose. Hence it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail.

6. Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent/State, submitted that the petitioner had made a disclosure statement leading to the arrest of the co-accused Harpreet. The police recovered a commercial quantity of heroin from the possession of Harpreet. The petitioner has criminal antecedents, and he would indulge in the commission of a similar crime in case of his release on bail. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

7. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

8. The parameters for granting bail were considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pinki v. State of U.P., (2025) 7 SCC 314: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 781, wherein it was observed at page 380:-

(i) Broad principles for the grant of bail

56. In Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P., (1978) 1 SCC 240: 1978 SCC (Cri) 115, Krishna Iyer, J., while elaborating on the content of Article 21 of the Constitution of India in the context of personal liberty of a person under trial, has laid down the key factors that should be considered while granting bail, which are extracted as under: (SCC p. 244, paras 7-9) “7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the vital factor, and the nature of the evidence is also pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be liable, if convicted or a conviction is confirmed, also bears upon the issue.

8. Another relevant factor is whether the course of justice would be thwarted by him who seeks the benignant jurisdiction of the Court to be freed for the time being. [Patrick Devlin, “The Criminal Prosecution in England”

(Oxford University Press, London 1960) p. 75 — Modern Law Review, Vol. 81, Jan. 1968, p. 54.]

9. Thus, the legal principles and practice validate the Court considering the likelihood of the applicant interfering with witnesses for the prosecution or otherwise polluting the process of justice. It is not only traditional but rational, in this context, to enquire into the antecedents of a man who is applying for bail to find whether he has a bad record, particularly a record which suggests that he is likely to commit serious offences while on bail. In regard to habituals, it is part of criminological history that a thoughtless bail order has enabled the bailee to exploit the opportunity to inflict further crimes on the members of society. Bail discretion, on the basis of evidence about the criminal record of a defendant, is therefore not an exercise in irrelevance.” (emphasis supplied)

57. In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4 SCC 280: 2001 SCC (Cri) 674, this Court highlighted various aspects that the courts should keep in mind while dealing with an application seeking bail. The same may be extracted as follows: (SCC pp. 284-85, para 8) “8. The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the basis of well-settled principles, having regard to the circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner. While granting bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the character, behaviour, means and standing of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public or State and similar other considerations. It has also to be kept in mind that for the purposes of granting the bail the legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds for believing” instead of “the evidence” which means the court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it (sic itself) as to whether there is a genuine case against the accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of the charge.” (emphasis supplied)

58. This Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh, (2002) 3 SCC 598: 2002 SCC (Cri) 688, speaking through Banerjee, J., emphasised that a court exercising discretion in matters of bail has to undertake the same judiciously. In highlighting that bail should not be granted as a matter of course, bereft of cogent reasoning, this Court observed as follows: (SCC p. 602, para 3) “3. Grant of bail, though being a discretionary order, calls for exercise of such a discretion in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course. An order for bail bereft of any cogent reason cannot be sustained. Needless to record, however, that the grant of bail is dependent upon the contextual facts of the matter being dealt with by the court and facts do always vary from case to case. While the placement of the accused in society, though it may be considered by itself, cannot be a guiding factor in the matter of grant of bail, and the same should always be coupled with other circumstances warranting the grant of bail. The nature of the offence is one of the basic considerations for the grant of bail — the more heinous is the crime, the greater is the chance of rejection of the bail, though, however, dependent on the factual matrix of the matter.” (emphasis supplied)

59. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977, this Court held that although it is established that a court considering a bail application cannot undertake a detailed examination of evidence and an elaborate discussion on the merits of the case, yet the court is required to indicate the prima facie reasons justifying the grant of bail.

60. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765, this Court observed that where a High Court has granted bail mechanically, the said order would suffer from the vice of non-application of mind, rendering it illegal. This Court held as under with

regard to the circumstances under which an order granting bail may be set aside. In doing so, the factors which ought to have guided the Court's decision to grant bail have also been detailed as under: (SCC p. 499, para 9) “9. … It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere with an order passed by the High Court granting or rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is equally incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while considering an application for bail are:

(i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence;

(ii) nature and gravity of the accusation;

(iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction;

(iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released on bail;

(v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused;

(vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated;

(vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being influenced; and

(viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail.” (emphasis supplied) xx

62. One of the judgments of this Court on the aspect of application of mind and requirement of judicious exercise of discretion in arriving at an order granting bail to the accused is Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170, wherein a three-Judge Bench of this Court, while setting aside an unreasoned and casual order (Pappu Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2856 and Pappu Singh v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2857) of the High Court granting bail to the accused, observed as follows: (Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170]), SCC p. 511, para 35) “35. While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of an individual is an invaluable right, at the same time, while considering an application for bail, courts cannot lose sight of the serious nature of the accusations against an accused and the facts that have a bearing in the case, particularly when the accusations may not be false, frivolous or vexatious in nature but are supported by adequate material brought on record to enable a court to arrive at a prima facie conclusion. While considering an application for the grant of bail, a prima facie conclusion must be supported by reasons and must be arrived at after having regard to the vital facts of the case brought on record. Due consideration must be given to facts suggestive of the nature of crime, the criminal antecedents of the accused, if any, and the nature of punishment that would follow a conviction vis-à-vis the offence(s) alleged against an accused.” (emphasis supplied)

9. The present petition has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

10. The status report shows that the police found the petitioner present in the vehicle bearing registration no. HP-86- 8555. The police searched the vehicle and recovered 6.95 grams of heroin. The petitioner also made a disclosure statement, which led to the arrest of the co-accused, Harpeet Singh, from whom 308.510 grams of heroin was recovered. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mehboob Ali v. State of Rajasthan, (2016) 14 SCC 640: (2016) 4 SCC (Cri) 412: 2015 SCC OnLine SC 1043, that the information given by the accused, leading to the discovery of another accused from whom forged currency notes were recovered, is admissible under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act. It was observed at page 646: - “15. It is apparent that on the basis of the information furnished by accused Mehboob Ali and Firoz, and other accused, Anju Ali was arrested. The fact that Anju Ali was dealing with forged currency notes was not known to the police. The statements of both the accused have led to the discovery of the fact and arrest of the co-accused, which was not known to the police. They identified him, and ultimately, the statements have led to unearthing the racket of the use of fake currency notes. Thus, the information furnished by the aforesaid accused persons vide information memos is clearly admissible, which has led to the identification and arrest of accused Anju Ali, and as already stated, possession of Anju Ali's fake currency notes had been recovered. As per information furnished by the accused Mehboob and Firoz vide memos Exts. P-41 and P-42, the fact has been discovered by the police as to the involvement of the accused Anju Ali, which was not within the knowledge of the police. The police were not aware of the accused Anju Ali, as well as the fact that he was dealing with fake currency notes, which were recovered from him. Thus, the statement of the aforesaid accused Mehboob and Firoz is clearly saved by Section 27 of the Evidence Act. The embargo put by Section 27 of the Evidence Act was clearly lifted in the instant case. The statement of the accused persons has led to the discovery of facts proving the complicity of the other accused persons, and the entire chain of circumstances clearly makes out that the accused acted in conspiracy, as found by the trial court as well as the High Court. xxxxxxx

20. Considering the aforesaid dicta, it is apparent that there was a discovery of a fact as per the statement of Mehmood Ali and Mohd. Firoz. The co-accused was nabbed on the basis of an identification made by the accused Mehboob and Firoz. That he was dealing with fake currency notes came to the knowledge of the police through them. Recovery of forged currency notes was also made from Anju Ali. Thus, the aforesaid accused had knowledge about co-accused Anju Ali, who was nabbed at their instance and based on their identification. These facts were not to the knowledge of the police; hence the statements of the accused persons leading to the discovery of the fact are clearly admissible as per the provisions contained in Section 27 of the Evidence Act, which carves out an exception to the general provisions about inadmissibility of confession made under police custody contained in Sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act.”

11. Therefore, prima facie, there is sufficient material to connect the petitioner to the commission of the crime.

12. The status report mentions that two FIRs have been registered against the petitioner. The petitioner filed a copy of the order passed by learned Special Judge-II, Solan District, Solon, in F.I.R. No. 116 of 2024 in which the petitioner was acquitted. Thus, F.I.R. No. 18 of 2024, dated 15.03.2024, is still pending against the petitioner, which shows that the petitioner has criminal antecedents. This Court dealt with the relevance of criminal antecedents while granting bail in Champa vs. State of H.P.: 2025:HHC:28899 and held that the criminal antecedents would disentitle an accused from the concession of bail. This judgment was unsuccessfully assailed before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in SLP(Criminal) 19120 of 2025 titled Champa Devi vs State of H.P., decided on 27.11.2025. Therefore, the relevance of criminal antecedents cannot be ignored.

13. The registration of the FIR for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 21 of the NDPS Act, prima facie, supports the submission of the State that the petitioner would indulge in the commission of a similar offence in case of his release on bail; hence, the petitioner cannot be released on bail at this stage.

14. In view of the above, the present petition fails and is dismissed.

15. The observation made hereinbefore shall remain confined to the disposal of the instant petition and will have no bearing whatsoever on the merits of the case.

(Rakesh Kainthla) 15th October, 2026

Judge

(Ravinder)