CR.A/42/2015 on 13 October 2026

IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Appeal No. 42 of 2015 Reserved on: 29.9.2026 Date of Decision: 13.10.2026. State of H.P. ...Appellant Versus Ram Nath ...Respondent

Coram

Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Appellant/State : Mr P.K. Nanda, Additional Advocate General. For the respondent : Ms Ayushi, Advocate. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 03.03.2014 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court No. 5, Shimla, (learned Trial Court) vide which the respondent (accused before the learned Trial Court) was acquitted of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337, and 338 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience).

Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police presented a challan before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337, and 338 of the IPC. It was asserted that the informant Ramesh Chand (PW-1), his maternal aunt Phooli Devi (PW-2), and Indira Devi (PW-4) had visited Shimla for medical treatment of Phooli Devi. They got down from a bus at Chhota Shimla on 22.08.1999 at about 11:00 AM. They were walking towards the right side of the road at about 12:40 PM when a truck bearing registration No. HP-12-9191 came from Sanjauli at high speed and hit Phooli Devi towards the wrong side of the road. Phooli Devi’s leg was crushed under the tyres of the truck. The driver identified himself as Ram Nath, the present accused. The accident occurred because of his negligence and the high speed of the truck.

3. The matter was reported to the police. ASI Asha Ram (PW-13) recorded the informant’s statement (Ext.PW-1/A) and sent it to the Police Station, where FIR (Ext.PW-10/A) was registered. ASI Asha Ram investigated the matter. He prepared the site plan (Ext. PW-13/A). Constable Lokender Singh (PW-12) took photographs of the spot (Ext.P-1 to Ext. P-9), whose negatives are Ext. P-10 to Ext. P-18. ASI Asha Ram seized the truck vide memo (Ext. PW-3/A) along with documents. ASI Vidya Sagar (PW-8) conducted the mechanical examination of the truck and found that there was no mechanical defect in it that could have led to the accident. The truck was handed over on sapurdari vide memo (Ext. PW-5/A). Dr Jitender Chauhan (PW-7) medically examined the victim Phooli Devi and found that she had suffered crush injuries. He referred her to a higher institution for further examination and issued the MLC (Ext.PW- 7/A). Dr Ramesh Chauhan (PW-9) treated the victim in the hospital and issued the case summary (Ext.PW-9/A). Statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after the completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court.

4. The learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to charge the accused with the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337, and 338 of the IPC, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed trial.

5. The prosecution examined 13 witnesses to prove its case. Informant Ramesh Chand (PW-1) witnessed the incident.

Phooli Devi (PW-2) is the victim. Ranjit Singh (PW-3) and Baldev Singh (PW-11) witnessed the recoveries. Indira Devi (PW-4) is an eyewitness. Hem Raj (PW-5) was given the truck on sapurdari. Nirmal Singh (PW-6) witnessed the sapurdari. Dr Jitender Chauhan (PW-7) conducted the medical examination. ASI Vidya Sagar (PW-8) conducted the mechanical examination of the truck. Dr Ramesh Chauhan (PW-9) treated the victim. Raghunath (PW-10) recorded the FIR. Constable Lokender Singh (PW-12) took the photographs. ASI Asha Ram (PW-13) investigated the matter.

6. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), admitted that the documents of the truck were seized by the police. He denied that he was driving the truck on the date of the incident. He stated that the driver had run away from the spot and the witnesses deposed falsely against him. He did not produce any evidence in his defence.

7. The learned Trial Court held that the testimonies of the witnesses contradicted each other. The identity of the accused as the driver of the truck was not established. The prosecution had examined the victim and her relatives. The incident had taken place at a public place, but no independent witness was examined. The prosecution had failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt; hence, the learned Trial Court acquitted the accused.

8. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court, the State has filed the present appeal, asserting that the learned Trial Court erred in acquitting the accused. The prosecution’s witnesses corroborated each other. They consistently stated that the accused was driving the truck at the time of the accident and that the accident occurred because of the negligence of the accused. The informant’s testimony was duly corroborated by the statement of the Medical Officer. Hence, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside.

9. I have heard Mr P.K. Nadda, learned Additional Advocate General, for the appellant/State, and Ms Ayushi, learned counsel for the respondent/accused.

10. Mr P.K. Nadda, learned Additional Advocate General for the appellant/State, submitted that the learned Trial Court erred in acquitting the accused. Minor contradictions can occur due to the lapse of time, and failure to reproduce facts identically. The accused should not have been acquitted because of minor contradictions alone. The learned Trial Court had taken an unreasonable view while acquitting the accused. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside.

11. Ms Ayushi, learned counsel for the respondent, submitted that the prosecution witnesses changed the initial version reported to the police, which made their testimonies highly doubtful. The learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view that could have been taken based on the evidence produced before it, and this Court should not interfere with the reasonable view of the learned Trial Court. Therefore, she prayed that the appeal be dismissed.

12. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

13. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sanjay Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1373, that the

Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal only if it is impossible, perverse, wholly unsustainable, or manifestly illegal. It was observed: Scope of interference with an acquittal:

26. At the outset, it is necessary to remind ourselves of the settled principles governing interference with an order of acquittal. An accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty. When a court of competent jurisdiction acquits the accused, the presumption of innocence is not weakened but reinforced. Where such acquittal is affirmed by the High Court, the caution to be exercised by this Court under Article 136 is even greater.

27. In Kali Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh (1973) 2 SCC 808: 1973 SCC (Cri) 1048, this Court explained the golden thread running through criminal jurisprudence in the following words: “25. Another golden thread which runs through the web of the administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. This principle has a special relevance in cases wherein the guilt of the accused is sought to be established by circumstantial evidence. A rule has accordingly been laid down that unless the evidence adduced in the case is consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and is inconsistent with that of his innocence, the Court should refrain from recording a finding of guilt of the accused. It is also an accepted rule that in case the Court entertains reasonable doubt regarding the guilt of the accused, the accused must have the benefit of that doubt. Of course, the doubt regarding the guilt of the accused should be reasonable; it is not the doubt of a mind which is either so vacillating that it is incapable of reaching a firm conclusion or so timid that it is hesitant and afraid to take things to their natural consequences. The rule regarding the benefit of doubt also

does not warrant acquittal of the accused by resort to surmises, conjectures or fanciful considerations. As mentioned by us recently in the case of State of Punjab v. Jagir Singh, a criminal trial is not like a fairy tale wherein one is free to give flight to one's imagination and fantasy. It concerns itself with the question as to whether the accused arraigned at the trial is guilty of the offence with which he is charged. Crime is an event in real life and is the product of the interplay of different human emotions. In arriving at the conclusion about the guilt of the accused charged with the commission of a crime, the Court has to judge the evidence by the yardstick of probabilities, intrinsic worth and the animus of witnesses. Every case in the final analysis would have to depend upon its own facts. Although the benefit of every reasonable doubt should be given to the accused, the Courts should not at the same time reject evidence which is ex facie trustworthy on grounds which are fanciful or in the nature of conjectures.”

28. The decision in Kali Ram (supra) further cautions that wrongful acquittal and wrongful conviction do not stand on the same footing, for conviction of an innocent person causes grave injustice and shakes public confidence in the administration of criminal justice. The rule of benefit of doubt, therefore, is not technical; it is a substantive safeguard flowing from the presumption of innocence.

29. In Ghurey Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2008) 10 SCC 450 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 60, this Court reiterated the limited scope of interference with acquittals. This Court observed: “75. The Trial Court has the advantage of watching the demeanour of the witnesses who have given evidence; therefore, the appellate court should be slow to interfere with the decisions of the Trial Court. An acquittal by the Trial Court should not be interfered with unless it is totally perverse or wholly unsustainable.”

30. The decision in Ghurey Lal (supra) also crystallised certain propositions: first, there is a double presumption of innocence in favour of an acquitted accused; secondly, if two views are possible, the view favourable to the accused must prevail; thirdly, though the appellate court has the power to reappreciate evidence, it should interfere only when the acquittal is manifestly illegal, perverse or results in miscarriage of justice; and fourthly, due weight must be given to the Trial Court's findings, particularly because the trial judge had the advantage of observing the demeanour of witnesses.

31. In Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325, this Court held that though the appellate court has full power to review and reappreciate the evidence, the presumption of innocence is strengthened by an order of acquittal. It was held that when two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal.

32. The same principle was restated in Mrinal Das v. State of Tripura (2011) 9 SCC 479, wherein this Court held that an order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. If two reasonable views are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal.

33. Therefore, the question before us is not whether another view on the evidence is possible. The question is whether the view taken by the Trial Court and affirmed by the High Court is impossible, perverse, wholly unsustainable, or manifestly illegal. Having examined the record, we are unable to hold so.

14. The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

15. The informant had specifically asserted in the complaint (Ext. PW-1/A) that he, the victim, and Indira Devi were walking towards the right side of the road to catch a bus. He changed this version in the Court and stated that all of them were standing on the roadside at the time of the accident. Phooli Devi

(PW-2) also stated that she was standing on the roadside. Indira Devi (PW-4) stated in her cross-examination that they were standing on the roadside. Therefore, the prosecution witnesses have altered the manner of the accident.

16. ASI Asha Ram (PW-13) investigated the matter. He prepared the site plan (Ext. PW-13/A), in which it has been mentioned at Serial No. 4 that the victim's leg was crushed at a distance of 4.5 metres from the right side. However, the blood is shown in the photograph in the middle of the road and not on the extreme right or the left side. Indira Devi (PW-4) admitted that the truck and blood were visible in the middle of the road. She volunteered to say that they were standing on the right side. However, there is no explanation as to how the blood and truck were found in the middle of the road. The photographs and the site plan clearly show that the accident had not occurred in the manner suggested by the prosecution witnesses.

17. Phooli Devi (PW-2) stated that she did not know the name of the driver because she had become unconscious. Indira Devi (PW-4) stated in her cross-examination that she had not seen the accused driving the truck, and his name was disclosed by the police officials. Ramesh Chand stated that he could identify the accused present in Court; however, he has nowhere stated that the accused was driving the truck. He has also not provided any reason as to how he could have identified the accused. Therefore, in these circumstances, the learned Trial Court was justified in holding that the statements of the prosecution witnesses were not sufficient to establish the identity of the accused as the driver of the truck.

18. Indira Devi stated that the accident had occurred because of the high speed of the truck and the negligence of the accused. These statements are not sufficient to convict the accused. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mohanta Lal vs. State of West Bengal, 1968 ACJ 124, that the use of the term ‘high speed’ by a witness amounts to nothing unless it is elicited from the witness what is understood by the term 'high speed'. It was observed: “Further, no attempt was made to find out what this witness understood by high speed. To one man, the speed of even 10 or 20 miles per hour may appear to be high, while to another, even a speed of 25 or 30 miles per hour may appear to be a reasonable speed. On the evidence in this case, therefore, it could not be held that the appellant was driving the bus at a speed which would justify holding that he was driving the bus rashly and negligently. The evidence of the two conductors indicates that he tried to stop the bus by applying the brakes; yet, Gopinath Dey was struck by the bus, though not from the front side of the bus, as he did not fall in front of the bus but fell sideways near the corner of the two roads. It is quite possible that he carelessly tried to run across the road, dashed into the bus and was thrown back by the moving bus, with the result that he received the injuries that resulted in his death.”

19. This position was reiterated in State of Karnataka vs. Satish 1998 (8) SCC 493, wherein it was held: “Merely because the truck was being driven at a "high speed" does not bespeak of either "negligence" or "rashness" by itself. None of the witnesses examined by the prosecution could give any indication, even approximately, as to what they meant by "high speed". "High speed" is a relative term. It was for the prosecution to bring on record material to establish as to what it meant by "high speed" in the facts and circumstances of the case. In a criminal trial, the burden of providing everything essential to the establishment of the charge against an accused always rests on the prosecution, and there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused until the contrary is proved. Criminality is not to be presumed, subject, of course, to some statutory exceptions. There is no such statutory exception pleaded in the present case. In the absence of any material on the record, no presumption of "rashness" or "negligence" could be drawn by invoking the maxim "res ipsa loquitur.”

20. This Court also held in State of H.P. Vs. Madan Lal, 2003 Latest H.L.J. (2) 925 that speed alone is not a criterion for judging rashness or negligence. It was observed: - “It may be pointed out that speed alone is not a criterion to decide rashness or negligence on the part of a driver. The deciding factor, however, is the situation in which the accident occurs.”

21. This position was reiterated in State of H.P. Vs. Parmodh Singh 2008 Latest HLJ (2) 1360 wherein it was held: - “Thus, negligent or rash driving of the vehicle has to be proved by the prosecution during the trial, which cannot be automatically presumed even on the basis of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Mere driving of a vehicle at a high speed or slow speed does not lead to an inference that negligent or rash driving had caused the accident resulting in injuries to the complainant. In fact, speed is no criterion to establish the fact of rash and negligent driving of a vehicle. It is only a rash and negligent act as its ingredients, which the prosecution has failed to prove in the instant case.”

22. Thus, the accused cannot be held liable because witnesses stated that he was driving the vehicle at high speed without any further evidence that the accused was in breach of his duty to take care.

23. Ramesh Chand (PW-1), Phooli Devi (PW-2), and Indira Devi (PW-4) stated that the accident had occurred because of the negligence of the accused. These statements will not help the prosecution. A witness can only depose about the facts that had occurred in his presence, and he is not permitted to draw inferences from the facts. The inferences have to be drawn by the Jury or the Judge when he is sitting without a Jury. It was laid

down by Goddard LJ in Hollington v. Hawthorn 1943 KB 507 that a witness cannot depose about negligence. It was observed at 595: “It frequently happens that a bystander has a full and complete view of an accident. It is beyond question that while he may inform the court of everything he saw, he may not express any opinion on whether either or both of the parties were negligent. The reason commonly assigned is that this is the precise question the court has to decide, but in truth, it is because his opinion is not relevant. Any fact that he can prove is relevant, but his opinion is not.”

24. Similar is the judgment in State of H.P. vs. Niti Raj 2009 Cr.L.J. 1922 (HP), where it was held: “It is not necessary for a witness to say that the driver of an offending vehicle was driving the vehicle rashly. The issue whether the vehicle was being driven in a rash and negligent manner is a conclusion to be drawn based on evidence led before the Court.”

25. Therefore, no advantage can be derived from the statements that the accident had occurred because of the negligence of the accused.

26. The Medical Officer proved that the victim had sustained injuries. This evidence will not help the prosecution because it has to be established that the injuries were caused by the negligence of the accused. There is no satisfactory evidence regarding negligence, and the learned Trial Court was justified in recording the acquittal.

27. No other point was urged.

28. In view of the above, the present appeal fails, and it is dismissed. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, also stand disposed of.

29. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) the respondent/accused is directed to furnish bail bonds in the sum of ₹25,000/- with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court within four weeks, which shall be effective for six months with stipulation that in the event of Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment, or on grant of the leave, the respondent/accused on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

30. Records be returned to the learned Trial Court forthwith, along with a copy of the judgment. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 13th October, 2026 (Chander)