CR.A/334/2015 on 13 October 2026

IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Appeal No. 334 of 2015 Reserved on: 28.09.2026 Date of Decision: 13.10.2026. State of H.P. ...Appellant Versus Sanjeev Kumar ...Respondent

Coram

Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No For the Appellant : Mr Pawan Kumar Nadda, Additional Advocate General. For the Respondent : Ms Reeta Hingmang, Advocate. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 28.11.2014 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court No.5, Shimla, District Shimla, H.P. (learned Trial Court) vide which the respondent (accused before the learned Trial Court) was acquitted of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337, 338 and 304A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same

Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience).

2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police presented a challan before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 304A of the IPC. It was asserted that the informant, Monit Verma (PW4), was driving a car bearing registration number HP-03B-0290 on 30.11.2006. His father-in-law Kishan Shyam (PW2) and mother-in-law Krishna Shyam were travelling with him. Krishna Shyam was occupying the front seat, and Kishan Chand (PW2) was occupying the rear seat. The vehicle reached near Mist Chamber, Khallini, at 10:55 a.m. A bus bearing registration No. HP-19B- 6032 came from the opposite side and hit the car on the wrong side of the road. Krishna Shyam sustained injuries to her chest, ribs, head, nose and shoulders. Kishan Shyam and the informant also sustained injuries. Vinod Kumar (PW7) took the injured to the hospital. Krishna Shyam subsequently succumbed to her injuries. The incident occurred because of the negligence of the accused. The matter was reported to the police. The police recorded an entry in the daily diary (Ext.PW18/A). Shakuntla

(PW19) visited the spot. She found that the victim had already been taken to the hospital. She called the photographer, Santosh Kumar (PW9), who took the photographs (Ext.P1 to P7), whose negatives are Ext.P8 to Ext.P14. Shakuntla (PW19) went to the hospital and recorded the informant's statement (Ext.PW4/A) and sent it to the Police Station where FIR (Ext.PW14/A) was registered. Shakuntla filed an application (Ext.PW19/A) for conducting the medical examination of the victims. MLCs (Ext.DW1/A to Ext.DW1/C) were obtained. Shankuntla (PW19) investigated the matter. She prepared the site plan (Ext.PW19/B) and seized the bus bearing registration number HP-19B-6032 vide memo (Ext.PW13/A). Accused Sanjeev Kumar produced his driving license, which was seized vide memo (Ext.PW3/A). HC Joginder Singh (PW10) examined the bus and the Alto car and found that they had no mechanical defect which could have led to the accident. He issued the reports (Ext.PW9/A and Ext.PW9/B). Krishna Shyam succumbed to her injuries. An inquest on the dead body was conducted, and reports (Ext.PW15/A and Ext.PW15/B) were prepared. Dr Piyush Kapila (PW15) conducted the postmortem examination of the deceased and found that the cause of death was due to accidental trauma. He issued the report

(Ext.PW15/C). The statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after the completion of investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court.

3. Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of accusation was put to him for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337, 338 and 304A of the IPC, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.

4. The prosecution examined 19 witnesses to prove its case. Joginder Mohan (PW1), Mahinder Singh (PW3), Salig Ram (PW5), Mast Ram (PW6), HC Anil (PW11) and Jagdish Kumar (PW13) witnessed the recoveries. Krishan Shyam (PW2) was travelling in the Alto car. The informant, Monit Varma (PW4), was driving the Alto car. Vinod Kumar (PW7) carried the injured to the hospital. Susheel Kumar (PW8) is the witness to Sapurdari. HC Santosh Kumar (PW9) took the photographs. HC Joginder Singh (PW10) conducted the mechanical examination of the vehicle. Budh Singh (PW12) proved the entry in the daily diary. Yogesh Dutt (PW14) signed the FIR. Dr Piyush Kapila (PW15)

conducted the postmortem examination of the deceased. Rakesh Negi (PW16) informed the police about the accident. Ashok Verma (PW17) prepared the challan. HC Vijay Singh (PW18) proved the entries in the daily diary. SP Shankuntla (PW19) investigated the matter.

5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.), denied the prosecution case in its entirety. He claimed that he was driving the vehicle slowly and there was no negligence on his part. He admitted that the vehicle bearing registration No. HP-19B-6032 was seized by the police and was released on Sapurdari. He stated that the driver of the Alto car negotiated the curve improperly and the Alto hit the bus at a high speed. He examined Madan Singh Chauhan (DW1) in his defence.

6. Learned Trial Court held that the accused had not disputed that he was driving the bus at the time of the accident. He claimed that the accident had occurred because of the informant’s negligence, who was driving the car at a high speed. The plea taken by the accused was highly probable. The prosecution had only examined the occupants of the car but had not examined any independent witness to prove its case. The accused could not be convicted simply because an accident had taken place. There was a discrepancy between the photograph and the site plan, and it was difficult to rely upon either. The prosecution had failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, the learned Trial Court acquitted the accused.

7. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court, the State has filed the present appeal asserting that the statements of prosecution witnesses were discarded without assigning any cogent reason. The statements of Krishan Shayam (PW2) and Monit Verma (PW4) corroborated each other. The site plan and the photographs also corroborated their testimonies. The statements of Vinod Kumar (PW7), Jagdish Kumar (PW13) and Rakesh Negi (PW16) proved that the bus was being driven towards the wrong side of the road, which showed that the accused was negligent in driving the bus. Dr Piyush Kapila proved that the injuries sustained by the deceased could have been caused by an accidental trauma, which supported the prosecution version that the victim had sustained injuries in the accident. The site plan was duly corroborated by the photographs, and there was no discrepancy in them. Hence, it was prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside.

8. I have heard Mr Pawan Kumar Nadda, learned Additional Advocate General for the appellant/State and Ms Reeta Hingmang, learned Counsel for the respondent/accused.

9. Mr Pawan Kumar Nadda, learned Additional Advocate General for the appellant/State, submitted that the learned Trial Court erred in acquitting the accused. The photographs and the site plan show that the bus was being driven towards its right side, which was the proximate cause of the accident. The learned Trial Court had discarded the prosecution version by saying that the occupants of the Alto car were interested. However, they were natural witnesses, and there was no interstedness to secure the conviction of the accused. Learned Trial Court had not carefully weighed the evidence produced before it and had taken a view that could not have been taken by any reasonable person. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside.

10. Ms Reeta Hingmang, learned Counsel for the respondent/accused, submitted that the defence taken by the accused that the informant was driving the car at a high speed and towards the wrong side of the road was highly probable. The victim was ill on the date of the incident, and she was taken to the hospital. Hence, the plea taken by the accused that the informant was in a hurry to take her to the hospital is highly probable. The matter was reported to the police belatedly, and no reason was assigned for not reporting the matter to the police at the earliest. The learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view, and this Court should not interfere with the reasonable view of the learned Trial Court while deciding an appeal against acquittal. Hence, she prayed that the present appeal be dismissed.

11. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

12. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sanjay Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1373, that the Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal only if it is impossible, perverse, wholly unsustainable, or manifestly illegal. It was observed:

Scope of interference with an acquittal:

26. At the outset, it is necessary to remind ourselves of the settled principles governing interference with an order of acquittal. An accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty. When a court of competent jurisdiction acquits the accused, the presumption of innocence is not weakened but reinforced. Where such acquittal is affirmed by the High Court, the caution to be exercised by this Court under Article 136 is even greater.

27. In Kali Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh (1973) 2 SCC 808: 1973 SCC (Cri) 1048, this Court explained the golden thread running through criminal jurisprudence in the following words: “25. Another golden thread which runs through the web of the administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. This principle has a special relevance in cases wherein the guilt of the accused is sought to be established by circumstantial evidence. A rule has accordingly been laid down that unless the evidence adduced in the case is consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and is inconsistent with that of his innocence, the Court should refrain from recording a finding of guilt of the accused. It is also an accepted rule that in case the Court entertains reasonable doubt regarding the guilt of the accused, the accused must have the benefit of that doubt. Of course, the doubt regarding the guilt of the accused should be reasonable; it is not the doubt of a mind which is either so vacillating that it is incapable of reaching a firm conclusion or so timid that it is hesitant and afraid to take things to their natural consequences. The rule regarding the benefit of doubt also does not warrant acquittal of the accused by resort to surmises, conjectures or fanciful considerations. As mentioned by us recently in the case of State of Punjab v. Jagir Singh, a criminal trial is not like a fairy tale wherein one is free to give flight to one's imagination and fantasy. It concerns itself with the question as to whether the accused arraigned at the trial is guilty of the offence with which he is charged. Crime is an event in real life and is the product of the interplay of different human emotions. In arriving at the conclusion about the guilt of the accused charged with the commission of a crime, the Court has to judge the evidence by the yardstick of probabilities, intrinsic worth and the animus of witnesses. Every case in the final analysis would have to depend upon its own facts. Although the benefit of every reasonable doubt should be given to the accused, the Courts should not at the same time reject evidence which is ex facie trustworthy on grounds which are fanciful or in the nature of conjectures.”

28. The decision in Kali Ram (supra) further cautions that wrongful acquittal and wrongful conviction do not stand on the same footing, for conviction of an innocent person causes grave injustice and shakes public confidence in the administration of criminal justice. The rule of benefit of doubt, therefore, is not a technical rule; it is a substantive safeguard flowing from the presumption of innocence.

29. In Ghurey Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2008) 10 SCC 450: (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 60, this Court reiterated the limited scope of interference with acquittals. This Court observed: “75. The Trial Court has the advantage of watching the demeanour of the witnesses who have given evidence; therefore, the appellate court should be slow to interfere with the decisions of the Trial Court. An acquittal by the Trial Court should not be interfered with unless it is totally perverse or wholly unsustainable.”

30. The decision in Ghurey Lal (supra) also crystallised certain propositions: first, there is a double presumption of innocence in favour of an acquitted accused; secondly, if two views are possible, the view favourable to the accused must prevail; thirdly, though the appellate court has the power to reappreciate evidence, it should interfere only when the acquittal is manifestly illegal, perverse or results in miscarriage of justice; and fourthly, due weight must be given to the Trial Court's findings, particularly because the trial judge had the advantage of observing the demeanour of witnesses.

31. In Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325, this Court held that though the appellate court has full power to review and reappreciate the evidence, the presumption of innocence is strengthened by an order of acquittal. It was held that when two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal.

32. The same principle was restated in Mrinal Das v. State of Tripura (2011) 9 SCC 479, wherein this Court held that an order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. If two reasonable views are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal.

33. Therefore, the question before us is not whether another view on the evidence is possible. The question is whether the view taken by the Trial Court and affirmed by the High Court is impossible, perverse, wholly unsustainable, or manifestly illegal. Having examined the record, we are unable to hold so.

13. The present appeal is to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

14. The charge sheet filed by the police before the Court mentions that the police had received information about an accident between the bus bearing registration No. HP-19B-6032

and an Alto car bearing registration No. HP-03B-0290. SI Shakuntla (PW19) and other police officials went to the hospital and found that the injured had been taken to the hospital. SI Shakuntla (PW19) preserved the spot and went to the hospital. She called the mechanic and the photographer. When she visited Shriram Hospital, she found that the injured had been referred to IGMC. So she went to IGMC Shimla. She stopped on the way and directed the photographer to take the photographs from different angles, and she herself went to the hospital. She found in the hospital that Krishan Singh Shyam, Smt. Krishna Shyam, and Monit Verma had sustained injuries in the accident. She obtained the MLCs. She asked Krishan Singh Shyam and Monit Verma to make statements disclosing the events leading to the accident. However, they refused and said that they would make the statement after getting Krishna Shyam treated. SI Shakuntla (PW19) repeatedly requested them to make the statements. But they refused. Hence, SI Shakuntla (PW19) went to the spot and removed the vehicles from the spot. She received a telephone call on 01.12.2006 that Monit Verma wanted to make the statement before the police, and she recorded the informant's statement.

15. The facts narrated in the charge sheet filed by the police clearly show that the informant and the victim Krishan Shyam had not narrated the facts to the police despite the repeated insistence of SI Shakuntla (PW19) to this effect. The reason assigned by them that they wanted to get Krishna Shayam treated is no reason at all because she was admitted to the hospital and doctors were already taking care of her. Therefore, there is no proper explanation for the delay. It was laid down in Mehraj Singh v. State of U.P. (1994) 5 SCC 188 that the delay in lodging FIR leads to embellishments, concoction and fabrication and the court should see the prosecution case with utmost care and caution in case of delay. It was observed: "FIR in a criminal case and particularly in a murder case is a vital and valuable piece of evidence to appreciate the evidence led at the trial. The object of insisting upon prompt lodging of the FIR is to obtain the earliest information regarding the circumstances in which the crime was committed, including the names of the actual culprits and the parts played by them, the weapons, if any, used, as also the names of the eyewitnesses, if any. Delay in lodging the FIR often results in embellishment, which is a creature of an afterthought. On account of the delay, the FIR not only gets bereft of the advantage of spontaneity, but danger also creeps in with the introduction of a coloured version or exaggerated story. With a view to determining whether the FIR was lodged at the time it is alleged to have been recorded, the courts generally look for certain external checks. One of the checks is the receipt of a copy of the FIR, called a special report in a murder case, by the local Magistrate. If this report is received by the Magistrate late, it can give rise to an inference that the FIR was not lodged at the time it is alleged to have been recorded, unless, of course, the prosecution can offer a satisfactory explanation for the delay in dispatching or receipt of the copy of the FIR by the local Magistrate. The prosecution has presented no evidence at all in this case. The second external check, equally important, is the sending of a copy of the FIR along with the dead body and its reference in the inquest report. Even though the inquest, prepared under Section 174 CrPC, is aimed at serving a statutory function, to lend credence to the prosecution's case, the details of the FIR and the gist of statements recorded during inquest proceedings get reflected in the report. The absence of those details is indicative of the fact that the prosecution's story was still in an embryonic state and had not been given any shape, and that the FIR came to be recorded later on, after due deliberations and consultations and was then ante-timed to give it the colour of a promptly lodged FIR. In our opinion, on account of the infirmities as noticed above, the FIR has lost its value and authenticity, and it appears to us that the same has been ante-dated and had not been recorded till the inquest proceedings were over at the spot by PW 8."

16. This position was reiterated in P Rajagopal vs State of Tamil Nadu 2019 (5) SCC 40, wherein it was observed: - “12. Normally, the Court may reject the case of the prosecution in case of inordinate delay in lodging the first information report because of the possibility of a concoction of evidence by the prosecution. However, if the delay is satisfactorily explained, the Court will decide the matter on the merits without giving much importance to such delay. The Court is duty-bound to determine whether the explanation afforded is plausible enough given the

facts and circumstances of the case. The delay may be condoned if the complainant appears to be reliable and without any motive for implicating the accused falsely. [See Apren Joseph v. State of Kerala, (1973) 3 SCC 114; Mukesh v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2017) 6 SCC 1].”

17. A similar view was taken in Sekaran v. State of T.N., (2024) 2 SCC 176: (2024) 1 SCC (Cri) 548: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1653, wherein it was observed on page 182: “14. We start with the FIR, to which exception has been taken by the appellant, urging that there has been no satisfactory explanation for its belated registration. It is trite that merely because there is some delay in lodging an FIR, the same by itself and without anything more ought not to weigh in the mind of the courts in all cases as fatal for the prosecution. A realistic and pragmatic approach has to be adopted, keeping in mind the peculiarities of each particular case, to assess whether the unexplained delay in lodging the FIR is an afterthought to give a coloured version of the incident, which is sufficient to corrode the credibility of the prosecution’s version.

15. In cases where delay occurs, it has to be tested on the anvil of other attending circumstances. If, on an overall consideration of all relevant circumstances, it appears to the court that the delay in lodging the FIR has been explained, mere delay cannot be sufficient to disbelieve the prosecution case; however, if the delay is not satisfactorily explained and it appears to the court that cause for the delay had been necessitated to frame anyone as an accused, there is no reason as to why the delay should not be considered as fatal, forming part of several factors to vitiate the conviction.”

18. Therefore, the prosecution case is required to be seen with due care and caution because of the delay in reporting the matter to the police.

19. As per the charge sheet, the Investigating Officer, SI Shakuntla (PW19) had reached the spot on the date of the incident. She had initially preserved the spot and thereafter directed the photographer to take the photographs. She had not prepared the site plan on the date of her visit to the spot. The spot was preserved by her, and the site plan immediately prepared by her would have disclosed the position of the vehicles, but there is no explanation for not preparing the site plan depicting the spot position at the time of the accident. Therefore, no reliance can be placed on the site plan prepared one day after the accident.

20. As per the prosecution, the informant was driving the Alto car and the victim was sitting on the front seat. The MLC of informant Monit (Ext.DW1/A) shows that he had suffered a sutured wound on the left forehead and no other injury. However, Krishna Shyam had sustained multiple injuries on her person. Had the accident taken place in the manner suggested by the prosecution, the informant who was driving the car would have suffered equally serious injuries as the person sitting beside him on the front seat and not a lesser number of injuries. No explanation was provided for the lesser number of injuries sustained by the informant, and the prosecution case has to be viewed carefully.

21. The photograph (Ext.P4) shows that the Alto car was being driven straight on a curve and had not negotiated the curve. Therefore, the defence taken by the accused that the informant had not properly negotiated the curve appeared to be highly probable.

22. Krishan Shyam (PW2) stated that the accused was driving the bus at a high speed and towards the wrong side of the road. The bus hit the car, and he sustained injuries on his face, head, and ribs. The informant Monit Verma (PW4) stated that a bus bearing registration No. HP 19-B-6032 came at a high speed towards the wrong side of the road and hit the car. He sustained injuries to the head, forehead, chest, and shoulder. Krishna Shyam sustained injuries to her head, face, nose, chest and ribs. The injured were taken to the hospital in a car bearing registration No. HP-52B-0339 and they were referred to IGMC. The informant's statement that he had sustained multiple injuries on his head, forehead, chest and shoulders is not supported by the medical evidence wherein only one injury was found on the forehead. This shows that he is not making a correct statement.

23. The statements of these witnesses that the bus was being driven at a high speed are not sufficient to convict the accused. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mohanta Lal vs. State of West Bengal 1968 ACJ 124 that the use of the term ‘high speed’ by a witness amounts to nothing unless it is elicited from the witness what is understood by the term 'high speed'. It was observed: “Further, no attempt was made to find out what this witness understood by high speed. To one man, the speed of even 10 or 20 miles per hour may appear to be high, while to another, even a speed of 25 or 30 miles per hour may appear to be a reasonable speed. On the evidence in this case, therefore, it could not be held that the appellant was driving the bus at a speed which would justify holding that he was driving the bus rashly and negligently. The evidence of the two conductors indicates that he tried to stop the bus by applying the brakes; yet, Gopinath Dey was struck by the bus, though not from the front side of the bus, as he did not fall in front of the bus but fell sideways near the corner of the two roads. It is quite possible that he carelessly tried to run across the road, dashed into the bus and was thrown back by the moving bus, with the result that he received the injuries that resulted in his death.”

24. This position was reiterated in State of Karnataka vs. Satish 1998 (8) SCC 493, and it was held: “Merely because the truck was being driven at a "high speed" does not bespeak of either "negligence" or "rashness" by itself. None of the witnesses examined by the prosecution could give any indication, even approximately, as to what they meant by "high speed". "High speed" is a relative term. It was for the prosecution to bring on record material to establish as to what it meant by "high speed" in the facts and circumstances of the case. In a criminal trial, the burden of providing everything essential to the establishment of the charge against an accused always rests on the prosecution, and there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused until the contrary is proved. Criminality is not to be presumed, subject, of course, to some statutory exceptions. There is no such statutory exception pleaded in the present case. In the absence of any material on the record, no presumption of "rashness" or "negligence" could be drawn by invoking the maxim "res ipsa loquitur.”

25. This Court also held in State of H.P. Vs. Madan Lal 2003 Latest H.L.J. (2) 925 that speed alone is not a criterion for judging rashness or negligence. It was observed: - “It may be pointed out that speed alone is not a criterion to decide rashness or negligence on the part of a driver. The deciding factor, however, is the situation in which the accident occurs.”

26. This position was reiterated in State of H.P. Vs. Parmodh Singh 2008 Latest HLJ (2) 1360 wherein it was held: -

“Thus, negligent or rash driving of the vehicle has to be proved by the prosecution during the trial, which cannot be automatically presumed even on the basis of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Mere driving of a vehicle at a high speed or slow speed does not lead to an inference that negligent or rash driving had caused the accident resulting in injuries to the complainant. In fact, speed is no criterion to establish the fact of rash and negligent driving of a vehicle. It is only a rash and negligent act as its ingredients, which the prosecution has failed to prove in the instant case.”

27. Thus, the accused cannot be held liable because witnesses had stated that the accused was driving the vehicle at high speed without any further evidence that the accused was in breach of his duty to take care.

28. The statements of the witnesses that the accused was negligent are also not sufficient. A witness can only depose about the fact which had occurred in his presence, and he is not permitted to draw inferences from the facts. The inferences have to be drawn by the Jury or the Judge when he is sitting without a Jury. It was laid down by Goddard LJ in Hollington v. Hawthorn 1943 KB 507 that a witness cannot depose about negligence. It was observed at 595: “It frequently happens that a bystander has a full and complete view of an accident. It is beyond question that while he may inform the court of everything he saw, he may not express any opinion on whether either or both of the parties were negligent. The reason commonly assigned is that this is the precise question the court has to decide, but in truth, it is because his opinion is not relevant. Any fact that he can prove is relevant, but his opinion is not.”

29. Similar is the judgment in State of H.P. vs. Niti Raj 2009 Cr.L.J. 1922 (HP), where it was held: “It is not necessary for a witness to say that the driver of an offending vehicle was driving the vehicle rashly. The issue whether the vehicle was being driven in a rash and negligent manner is a conclusion to be drawn based on evidence led before the Court.”

30. Therefore, no advantage can be derived from the statements that the accident had occurred because of the negligence of the accused.

31. The statements of the witnesses that the accused was driving the bus towards the wrong side of the road are also not acceptable because the site plan was not prepared on the date of the incident and the photographs do not show the distance available towards the left side of the bus. The accident appeared to have taken place in the middle of the road, and the Alto car had not negotiated the curve but was going straight. Therefore, the photographs are not sufficient to infer that the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the accused in driving the bus.

32. Vinod Kumar (PW7) stated that he had received a call about the accident. He visited the spot and found that the HRTC bus had moved towards the wrong side of the road and hit the Alto car. The occupants of the Alto car had sustained multiple injuries, and he shifted them to the hospital. He stated in his cross-examination that the accident had not occurred in his presence and he could not say whose negligence led to the accident. Therefore, his testimony does not establish the negligence of the accused.

33. Rakesh Negi (PW16) stated that he found the accident near Mist chamber. He informed the police. Alto car was towards its side, and the negligence of the driver of the bus had led to the accident. He also admitted in his cross-examination that the accident had occurred before his arrival. Therefore, his testimony that the negligence of the driver of the bus led to the accident will not help the prosecution.

34. There is no other evidence to show the negligence of the accused. Hence, the learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view while acquitting the accused, and this Court will not interfere with the reasonable view of the Court acquitting the accused, even if another view is possible.

35. No other point was urged.

36. In view of the above, the present appeal fails and is dismissed. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.

37. In view of the provisions of Section 437 A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) the respondent is directed to furnish bail bond in the sum of ₹50,000/- with one surety of the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Registrar (Judicial) of this Court/learned Trial Court, which shall be effective for six months with a stipulation that in the event of a Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment or on grant of the leave, the respondent on receipt of notice thereof shall appear before the Hon'ble Supreme Court.

38. A copy of the judgment, along with the record of the learned Trial Court, be sent back forthwith.

(Rakesh Kainthla)

Judge 13th October, 2026 (Nikita)