RSA/206/2008 on 12 October 2026

IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA RSA No. 206 of 2008 Reserved on: 28.09.2026 Date of Decision: 12.10.2026 Karam Chand and another ...Appellants Versus State of H.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Coram

Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No For the Appellants : M. Sparsh Bhushan, Advocate. For Respondents No.1 & 2/State : Mr Ajit Sharma, Deputy Advocate General. For Respondent No.3 : Mr Manish Sharma, Advocate. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 19.02.2008 passed by learned District Judge Kinnaur at Rampur Bushehar (learned Appellate Court) vide which the judgment and decree dated 18.05.2007 passed by learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Kinnaur, Camp at Rampur Bushehar, H. P. (learned Trial Court) were upheld. (The parties shall hereinafter be

Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience)

2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the plaintiff filed a civil suit before the learned Trial Court seeking a declaration that the revenue entries recorded in the Misal Hakiyat and subsequent Jamabandi pertaining to the suit land mentioned in the head note and para 1 of the plaint are illegal, null and void and a mandatory injunction directing the defendant no. 1 to correct the revenue entries by showing the suit land within revenue Up Mohal Racholi. A further declaration was also sought that the northern boundary of Municipal Council Rampur Bushehar runs through Kandi Nala originating from Purohit Dogri to River Sutlej near Public Works Rest House as per the HP Government notification and for perpetual injunction restraining the defendant no. 3 from realising any tax from the plaintiff regarding the house constructed over the suit land. It was asserted that the suit land was purchased by plaintiff no. 2 and his mother Smt. Sunanda Devi (since deceased) from Narender Kumar, son of Nihal Chand, in the year 1992. Plaintiff No. 1 inherited the share of Sunanda Devi, and a mutation to this effect was attested on 03.02.2003. The plaintiffs have constructed an RCC building over the suit land. The suit land was earlier shown in revenue of Up Mohal Racholi, Tehsil Rampur,

District Shimla, before the recent settlement. However, it was recorded in Up Mohal Padam Nagar without any notification. The Municipal Council Rampur issued notices to the plaintiff No. 2 directing him to pay the house tax regarding the house constructed over the suit land. The Government of HP issued a notification No. LST 62-28/57 dated 30.09.1961 and 18.01.1962 defining the boundaries of the Municipal Committee, Rampur, as under: North: Kandi Nala, running from Purohits Dogri right down to river Sutlej near Public Works Rest House. East : A straight line from Purohits Dogri to Pipal Thanti near Oda Village and from there to Shingla Thanti on Khopri Dhar. South: From Shingla Thanti right down to the River Sutlej. West: The River Sutlej.

3. The suit land is located beyond the northern boundary at a distance of about 300 metres from the Public Works Rest House and Kandi Nala mentioned in the notification. The Public Works Rest House existed on Khasra No. 37 in the old map, and this Khasra No. was changed to Khasra Nos. 26, 37, 38, 39, 40 and 41 during the settlement. The settlement authorities have no jurisdiction to alter the limits of Municipal Council, Rampur, Bhusheher, and the inclusion of the suit land in Up Mohal Padam Nagar cannot extend the jurisdiction of Municipal Council, Rampur. The plaintiffs did not avail any facility from Defendant

No. 3, and Defendant No. 3 has no jurisdiction to impose house tax upon the plaintiffs. Hence, the suit was filed for seeking the relief mentioned above.

4. The suit is opposed by filing a written statement taking preliminary objections regarding lack of cause of action, plaintiffs being estopped to file the present suit by their act and conduct and the suit being barred by limitation. The contents of the plaint were denied on merits. It was asserted that the settlement operation was carried out in the year 1986-87. All the entries were incorporated after following the due procedure. The plaintiffs did not agitate the matter before competent revenue authorities. Similar matters were adjudicated by the learned Sub Judge Rampur in earlier suits which were dismissed. The suit has been filed without any basis. Hence, it was prayed that the suit be dismissed.

5. No replication was filed.

6. The learned Trial Court framed the following issues on 20.08.2004: -

(i) Whether the revenue entries recorded in Misal Hikyat and subsequent jamabandies showing the suit land in Up Mohal Padam Nagar instead of Up Mohal Racholi are illegal and void, as alleged? OPP

(ii) Whether the land of the plaintiffs, i.e. suit land, falls outside the municipal limits of defendant No.3, as alleged? OPP

(iii) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief of mandatory injunction, as prayed for? OPD

(iv) Whether the plaintiffs are estopped for the relief of permanent prohibitory injunction, as prayed for? OPD

(v) Whether the plaintiffs have no cause of action against the defendants? OPD

(vi) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to file the present suit by their act and conduct as alleged? OPD

(vii) Whether the suit is barred by limitation, as alleged? OPD

(viii) Whether the plaintiffs have not issued notice upon the defendant No.1 as required under Section 80 of CPC. If so, its effect? OPD-1

(ix) Whether the suit is collusive as alleged. If so, its effect? OPD

(x) Whether the suit is bad for mis-joinder of plaintiffs as alleged. If so, its effect? OPD

(xi) Relief.

7. The parties were called upon to produce the evidence and the plaintiffs examined Jiya Lal (PW1), T.J. Negi (PW2), Plaintiff No.1 Karam Chand (PW3), Kishan Dass (PW4), Nain Singh (PW5), Sainj Ram (PW6), Jia Lal (PW7), Govind Bhardwaj (PW8). The defendants examined Arjun Singh (DW1).

8. The learned Trial Court held that the boundaries of Municipal Committee Rampur, Bushehar, were not only defined with reference to the boundaries mentioned in the notification, but also by khasra numbers mentioned in the notification. The plaintiffs had not produced any evidence on record to show that their land was not included in the area mentioned in the notification. Even otherwise, the notification mentions that Kandi Nala originates at Purohit Dogri and passes down to the river Sutlej near PWD Rest House. One Nala, which the plaintiff described as Breltu Nala, originates from Purohit Dogri and runs to Sutlej, near the workshop of Ashok Sood. The plaintiff's house falls towards the northern side of this Nala. The plaintiffs were enrolled as voters in MC Ward No. 2, and their plea that their house did not fall within the boundary of M.C. Rampur was not correct. The suit was filed without any cause of action. Hence, the learned Trial Court answered issue No. 5 in the affirmative, the rest of the issues in the negative, and dismissed the suit.

9. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Court, the plaintiffs filed an appeal which was decided by the learned District Judge, Kinnaur at Rampur Bushehar (learned Appellate Court). The learned Appellate Court concurred with the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court that the plaintiffs had not produced the entire notification and, in its absence, it was difficult to conclude that the plaintiff's house fell outside the jurisdiction of M.C. Rampur. One Nala originated from Purohit Dogri and fell into River Sutlej near the workshop of Ashok Sood. The plaintiff claimed that this Nala was known as Breltu

Nala, but this was not correct because its boundaries tallied with the Kandi Nala described in the notification. The part of the land located in Chak Racholi also fell within the jurisdiction of M.C. Rampur Bushehar. The plaintiffs had never paid any house tax to Gram Panchayat and their names were included in the Electoral Voter List in Ward No. 2. All these circumstances falsified the plaintiffs' case that their house did not fall within the jurisdiction of M.C. Rampur. The learned Trial Court had rightly dismissed the suit. Hence, the learned Appellate Court dismissed the appeal.

10. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned Courts below, the plaintiffs have filed the present appeal which was admitted on 26.11.2008 on the following substantial questions of law:

(i) Whether the Courts below erred in appreciating the law applicable, pleadings of the parties, evidence adduced by them in its right perspective, thus vitiating the impugned judgments and decrees?

(ii) Whether the impugned judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below are against the law and facts and hence are liable to be quashed and set aside?

11. I have heard Mr Sparsh Bhushan, learned counsel for the appellants/plaintiffs, Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for respondents No.1 and 2/State and Mr Manish Sharma, learned counsel for respondent No.3.

12. Mr Sparsh Bhushan, learned counsel for the appellants/plaintiffs, submitted that it was duly proved on record that the plaintiff's house was located towards the northern side of Kandi Nala and the learned Courts below had conflated Breltu Nala and Kandi Nala. The State Government issued a notification during the pendency of the appeal in which the suit land was included in MC Rampur, which supports the plaintiff's version that the suit land was not earlier included within the jurisdiction of MC Rampur. Learned Courts below ignored the demarcations conducted by the field agency showing that the suit land was located beyond the jurisdiction of MC Rampur. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgments and decrees passed by learned Courts below be set aside.

13. Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent no. 1 and 2/State, submitted that both the Courts have concurrently found on facts that the Breltu Nala is in fact Kandi Nala described in the notification and the plaintiff's house falls towards the north of this Nala. These are pure findings of fact, and there is no perversity in these findings. The plaintiff had not placed the details of the notification on record to describe the Khasra numbers mentioned in the notification, and the learned Courts below had rightly held that the plaintiffs’ claim could not be

adjudicated in the absence of the notification. There is no infirmity in the judgments and decrees passed by learned Courts below. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed.

14. Mr Manish Sharma, learned counsel for respondent no. 3 submitted that the plaintiffs have not placed the complete notification before the Court and learned Courts below were within their jurisdiction to draw an adverse inference against the plaintiffs. The finding that the plaintiffs’ house falls within the jurisdiction of M.C. Rampur is a pure finding of fact, and no interference is required with the pure finding of facts while deciding the regular second appeal. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed.

15. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. CMP No. 229 of 2012:

16. The plaintiffs/applicants have filed the present application for producing the demarcation report prepared by the Tehsildar Rampur, Bushehar, District Shimla. It has been asserted that a demarcation was conducted during the pendency of the appeal, and it was found that the land of the applicant and Taku Ram is 300 meters away from Kandi Lal, mentioned as the boundary of the M.C. Rampur in the notification. The demarcation was conducted after the institution of the present appeal, and its report could not be placed on record. Therefore, the present application has been filed for taking the report on record.

17. A perusal of the documents annexed to the application shows that it is an incomplete photocopy of the demarcation report. Section 64 of the Indian Evidence Act provides that a document must be proved by primary evidence except in the cases hereinafter mentioned. Section 65(e) permits the party to give secondary evidence when the original is a public document, but it also provides that when the original is a public document, its certified copy and no other kind of secondary evidence is admissible. It was laid down by the Patna High Court in Jai Gopal Singh v. Divisional Forest Officer, 1953 SCC OnLine Pat 29: AIR 1953 Pat 310 that it is impermissible to lead any other evidence except the certified copy of the public document. It was observed at page 311: “12. What constitutes primary evidence in the case of a document is defined in S. 62. The secondary evidence is defined in S. 63, and under cl. (5) of that section, an oral account of the contents of a document given by some person who has himself seen it is also secondary evidence. But S. 64 says that “documents must be proved by primary evidence except in the cases hereinafter mentioned”. Section 65 gives the list of cases in which secondary evidence may be given of the existence, condition or contents of a document. It has got seven clauses. Clause (e) of that section speaks about a case when the original is a public document within the meaning of S. 74. In the present case, the original of the notification is in the form of an official Gazette, which, under S. 74, Evidence Act, is a public document. As to such a document, the provision laid down in S. 65 says that “a certified copy of the document, but no other kind of secondary evidence, is admissible”. In this view of the provisions of law, I think, the notification under Section 30 of the Bihar Private Protected Forests Act, 1947, being in the form of a public document, namely, the official Gazette, cannot be proved by any other kind of secondary evidence save by its certified copy.”

18. A similar view was taken by Allahabad High Court in Ganesh Prasad v. Badri Prasad Bholanath, 1980 SCC OnLine All 887: AIR 1980 All 361, wherein it was observed at page 362: 6…..The court below has further relied upon another assessment list of the subsequent quinquennial in which, according to it, the name of Umesh Chandra Gupta is mentioned. I do not find any certified copy of the aforesaid year. The learned counsel for the respondent pointed out that there were two papers, 126C and 127C, which were filed in court, and subsequently the same were proved by the clerk concerned. These papers were filed per list 125/C by the defendant's counsel, Sri Satya Narain Mishra, Advocate, on 4-3-1978 after remand. I have looked at these papers. These papers are not certified copies issued by the Municipal Board in accordance with Section 33 of the Municipalities Act. These have been issued by one Rashid Ali. They do not bear any copying stamp, folio, or seal of the Municipal Board. That also did not come under the definition of certified copies as required by Section 65 of the Evidence Act. I compared these papers with the certified copy on record, and I find that these papers were incorrect and wholly inadmissible in evidence. They were not issued by the Municipal Board as required, and further, these papers, not being the certified copies, were inadmissible as provided by Cl. (f) of Sec. 65 read with its proviso. This proviso completely barred any other kind of secondary evidence except a certified copy.”

19. Hence, the report of demarcation can be proved only by a certified copy and not a photocopy. The photocopy and not the certified copy has been placed on record, which cannot be admitted in evidence in view of the prohibition contained in Section 65 of the Indian Evidence Act.

20. The incomplete report only mentions that, as per the applicant’s statement, his land was located 300 meters away from the boundary. This report does not contain any conclusion of the demarcation or the process of demarcation adopted by the demarcating official. Therefore, it cannot be called a report of demarcation, but only a copy of the statement made by the applicant. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in J.D. Jain v. State Bank of India, (1982) 1 SCC 143, that the statement of a witness made outside the Court is hearsay and inadmissible when the object of the evidence is to establish the truth of what is contained in the statement. It was observed: - “20. The next question is, is the evidence in the domestic enquiry really hearsay, as held by the Tribunal?

21. The word 'hearsay' is used in various senses. Sometimes it means whatever a person is heard to say; sometimes it means whatever a person declares on the information given by someone else. (See Stephen on Law of Evidence).

22. The Privy Council in the case of Subramaniam v. Public Prosecutor, (1956) 1 WLR 965 observed: "Evidence of a statement made to a witness who is not himself called as a witness may or may not be hearsay. It is hearsay and inadmissible when the object of the evidence is to establish the truth of what is contained in the statement. It is not hearsay and is admissible when it is proposed to establish by the evidence, not the truth of the statement, but the fact that it was made. The fact that it was made quite apart from its truth is frequently relevant in considering the mental state and conduct thereafter of the witness or some other persons in whose presence these statements are made."

21. It was held in Kalyan Kumar Gogoi v. Ashutosh Agnihotri, (2011) 2 SCC 532: 2011 SCC OnLine SC 200 that hearsay evidence is inadmissible. It was observed at page 545:

37. Here comes the rule of appreciation of hearsay evidence. Hearsay evidence is excluded on the ground that it is always desirable, in the interest of justice, to get the person whose statement is relied upon into court for his examination in the regular way, in order that many possible sources of inaccuracy and untrustworthiness can be brought to light and exposed, if they exist, by the test of cross-examination. The phrase “hearsay evidence” is not used in the Evidence Act because it is inaccurate and vague. It is a fundamental rule of evidence under Indian law that hearsay evidence is inadmissible. A statement, oral or written, made otherwise than by a witness in giving evidence and a statement contained or recorded in any book, document or record whatsoever, proof of which is not admitted on other grounds, are deemed to be irrelevant for the purpose of proving the truth of the matter stated. An assertion other than one made by a person while giving oral evidence in the proceedings is inadmissible as evidence of any fact asserted.

That this species of evidence cannot be tested by cross- examination and that, in many cases, it supposes some better testimony which ought to be offered in a particular case, are not the sole grounds for its exclusion. Its tendency to protract legal investigations to an embarrassing and dangerous length, its intrinsic weakness, its incompetence to satisfy the mind of a judge about the existence of a fact, and the fraud which may be practised with impunity, under its cover, combine to support the rule that hearsay evidence is inadmissible.

38. The reasons why hearsay evidence is not received as relevant evidence are:

(a) The person giving such evidence does not feel any responsibility. The law requires all evidence to be given under personal responsibility, i.e. every witness must give his testimony under such circumstances as expose him to all the penalties of falsehood. If the person giving hearsay evidence is cornered, he has a line of escape by saying, “I do not know, but so and so told me”

(b) Truth is diluted and diminished with each repetition, and

(c) If permitted, it gives ample scope for playing fraud by saying “someone told me that…”. It would be attaching importance to false rumour flying from one foul lip to another. Thus, statements of witnesses based on information received from others are inadmissible.”

22. Therefore, the document cannot be taken on record, being hearsay in nature.

23. Hence, the present application cannot be allowed and is dismissed.

24. Application stands disposed of.

CMP No. 5380 of 2021:

25. The present application has been filed for placing on record a notification issued by the State of HP as additional evidence. It has been asserted that, as per the plaintiff, Khasra Nos. 738 and 742 do not fall within the limits of M.C. Rampur. The State Government issued a notification on 22.01.2015 including various Khasra numbers in the jurisdiction of M. C. Rampur. This notification mentions Khasra Nos. 738 and 742, which supports the plaintiffs’ claim that these Khasra numbers were not earlier included within the jurisdiction of the MC Rampur and have now been included. The document is relevant and came into existence during the pendency of the appeal. Therefore, it was prayed that the present application be allowed and the notification be taken on record.

26. The notification annexed to the application mentions the Khasra numbers located in Chak Khaneri. The suit land described in para 1 of the plaint and the head note was located in Up Mohal Racholi and now is included in Up Mohal Padam Nagar. The notification does not pertain to Up Mohal Racholi or Up Mohal Padam Nagar, and would not assist the Court in determining the controversy pending before the Court. Since the document is

irrelevant, the same cannot be taken. Hence, the application fails, and the same is dismissed. Substantial Questions of Law Nos. 1 and 2:

27. These substantial questions of law are intricately connected and are being taken up together for disposal.

28. The notification (Ext.PW3/H) mentions the boundaries and 63 plots of village Racholi having the area of 77.0 square yards cultivated, 113.16 uncultivated, and total 190.16 square yards. Therefore, the plaintiff's contention that the land located in Up Mohal Racholi did not form part of the jurisdiction of M.C. Rampur is not correct. Some area of Up Mohal Racholi is located within the jurisdiction of MC Rampur. This is also evident from the statement of plaintiff Karam Chand, who admitted in his cross-examination that Purohit Dogri is located in Up Mohal, Racholi. Purohit Dogri has been specifically mentioned in the notification; thus, part of Racholi is within the jurisdiction of M.C. Rampur.

29. The notification issued by the State Government mentions the northern boundary as Kandi Nala running from Purohit Dogri right down to River Sutlej near Public Work Rest House. Plaintiff Karam Chand (PW3) denied in his cross- examination that one Nala starts from Purohit Dogri and falls into the Sutlej River near the workshop of Ashok Sood. However, his witness Nain Singh (PW5) admitted in his cross-examination that one Nala starts from Purohit Dogri and falls into the Sutlej River near the house of Ashok Sood. He also admitted that the plaintiff's house is towards Rampur from this Nala. The notification specifically mentions that the Nala starts from Purohit Dogri and falls into the Sutlej River, and this Nala has been described as Kandi Nala, the northern boundary of MC Rampur. Therefore, learned Courts below had rightly held that the plaintiff’s house fell within the jurisdiction of MC Rampur. There is no perversity or misreading in such a conclusion.

30. Nain Singh (PW5) admitted that plaintiff Karam Chand was a voter in the election from Ward No. 2. Kishan Dass (PW4), Up Pradhan of Gram Panchayat Racholi, admitted in his cross- examination that the plaintiff had never paid any house tax to the Gram Panchayat during his tenure, the plaintiffs’ ration card was also prepared in the Panchayat, and the plaintiffs were also not voters in the Gram Panchayat. These statements clearly show that the plaintiffs never considered themselves to be part of the Gram Panchayat as they neither paid the house tax nor cast a vote during the elections; rather, the plaintiffs are voters in the Municipal Committee. This conduct of the plaintiffs is also inconsistent with the plea taken by them that they are the residents of Panchayat and not Municipal Committee, Rampur.

31. A heavy reliance was placed upon the report of demarcation (Ext.PW8/A). However, this demarcation report also mentions that in the absence of 183 Khasra numbers mentioned in the notification, the demarcation could not be conducted to determine whether the plaintiffs’ house falls within the jurisdiction of MC Rampur or not. Significantly, this report mentions that Kandi Nala commencing from Purohit Dogri near PWD rest house was a Gair Mumkin Rasta, which also shows that the plea taken by the plaintiffs that Kandi Nala is located adjacent to the PWD rest house is not correct

32. Therefore, learned Courts below had rightly held that the plaintiffs’ evidence was not sufficient to prove that their house fell outside the jurisdiction of MC Rampur. There is no misreading or perversity in the judgments of learned Courts below. Hence, these substantial questions of law are answered accordingly.

Final Order:

33. In view of the above, the present appeal fails, and it is dismissed.

34. The present appeal stands disposed of, and so also the pending miscellaneous applications, if any.

35. The record of the learned Courts below be returned along with a copy of this judgment. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 12th October, 2026 (Nikita)