CR.A/350/2014 on 12 October 2026

IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Appeal No. 350 of 2014 Reserved on: 24.09.2026 Date of Decision: 12.10.2026. State of H.P. ...Appellant Versus Baikunth Lal ...Respondent

Coram

Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No For the Petitioner : Mr Jitender Sharma, Additional Advocate General. For the Respondent : Mr Ashok Kumar, Advocate. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 05.05.2014, passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Sirmour, District at Nahan, H.P. (learned Appellate Court), vide which the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 28.02.2012 passed by learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sirmour, District at Nahan, (learned Trial Court), were set aside. (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience).

Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police presented a challan before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 323, 325 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). It was asserted that the informant Ved Prakash (PW3) was going to his home for lunch on 24.04.2007. Accused Bainkunth Lal and his two friends came to the spot on two motorcycles. They stopped the motorcycles near the informant at about 01:30 p.m. and started beating the informant without any reason. Bainkunth Lal slapped the informant, and the informant fell. The informant was rescued by two employees of the Court. The accused threatened the informant. The informant reported the matter to the police, and an entry (Ext.PW5/A) was recorded in the police station. An application (Ext.PW6/E) was filed for conducting the medical examination of the informant. Dr Parmesh Dogra (PW4) examined the informant and found that he had sustained multiple injuries. He referred the informant to a Dental Surgeon for expert opinion. Dr Alka Gupta (PW7) examined the informant and found that he had sustained grievous injuries which could have been caused by a fist blow. Dr Parmesh Dogra (PW4) issued the MLC (Ext.PW4/A) describing the nature of injury to be grievous. The police recorded an entry (Ext.PW5/B) in the daily diary and registered the FIR (Ext.PW6/A). HC Ranjeet Singh (PW6) investigated the matter. He visited the spot and prepared the site plan (Ext.PW6/C). He recorded the statements of the witnesses as per their version. The challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court after the completion of the investigation.

3. The learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, he was charged with the commission of offences punishable under Sections 323 and 325 of the IPC, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.

4. The prosecution examined 07 witnesses to prove its case. The informant Ved Parkash (PW3) is the victim. Ranvijay Singh (PW1) and Jagdish Kumar (PW2) are the eyewitnesses. Dr Parmesh Dogra (PW4) and Dr Alka Gupta (PW7) examined the informant. Constable Netar Singh (PW5) proved the entry in the daily diary. HC Ranjeet Singh (PW6) investigated the matter.

5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), denied the prosecution case in its entirety. He claimed that the witnesses were interested as they were the residents of the informant's village. A false case was made against him because of a dispute with the informant over the land. He did not produce any evidence in his defence.

6. The learned Trial Court held that the informant's testimony was corroborated by the testimonies of eye witnesses and the medical evidence. Minor contradictions in the statements of witnesses were not sufficient to discard the prosecution case. The litigation between the parties was no reason to doubt the prosecution version because the enmity can also furnish a motive for the commission of a crime. The matter was reported promptly to the police and the contents of the FIR corroborate the informant's version. Hence, the learned Trial Court convicted and sentenced the accused as under: - Section Sentence Section 323 of IPC To undergo simple imprisonment for two months, pay a fine of ₹500/- and, in default of payment of fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for one month. Section 325 of IPC To undergo simple imprisonment for one year, pay a fine of ₹1,000/- and, in default of payment of fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for one month. Both the substantive sentences of imprisonment were ordered to run concurrently.

7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal which was decided by the learned Sessions Judge, Sirmour, District at Nahan (learned Appellate Court). The learned Appellate Court held that the incident had occurred at 01:30 p.m., whereas the matter was reported to the police after office hours at 06:00 p.m. The informant stated that he continued to work in the office, which was highly unlikely because any injured person would not have discharged his duties. The relationship between the parties was strained, and the prosecution case was required to be seen with due care and caution. No dislocated tooth was produced before the Doctor or the Court. No blood was found on the informant's clothes, which was contrary to the informant's version that he had sustained bleeding injuries. All these circumstances made the prosecution version doubtful. The learned Trial Court had erred in convicting and sentencing the accused. Hence, the learned Appellate Court accepted the appeal and set aside the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court.

8. I have heard Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for the appellant/State and Mr Ashok Kumar, learned counsel for the respondent/accused.

9. Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for the appellant/State, submitted that the learned Appellate Court erred in reversing the well-reasoned judgment passed by the learned Trial Court. The minor contradictions were blown out of proportion to record the acquittal. The informant’s version was corroborated by the testimonies of independent witnesses and the medical evidence. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Appellate Court be set aside.

10. Mr Ashok Kumar, learned counsel for the respondent/accused, submitted that the informant had not reported the matter to the police immediately after the incident, even though the Police Station was located at a short distance from the place of the incident. It is highly unlikely that a person who was beaten and had sustained a fracture would continue to discharge his duties as if nothing had happened. The enmity between the parties was required to be considered while evaluating the evidence. The learned Trial Court had not appreciated all these aspects, and the learned Appellate Court was justified in reversing the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court. This Court should not interfere with the judgment of acquittal unless there is some perversity, and no perversity has been shown. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed.

11. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

12. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sanjay Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1373, that the Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal only if it is impossible, perverse, wholly unsustainable, or manifestly illegal. It was observed: Scope of interference with an acquittal:

26. At the outset, it is necessary to remind ourselves of the settled principles governing interference with an order of acquittal. An accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty. When a court of competent jurisdiction acquits the accused, the presumption of innocence is not weakened but reinforced. Where such acquittal is affirmed by the High Court, the caution to be exercised by this Court under Article 136 is even greater.

27. In Kali Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh (1973) 2 SCC 808: 1973 SCC (Cri) 1048, this Court explained the golden thread running through criminal jurisprudence in the following words: “25. Another golden thread which runs through the web of the administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. This principle has a special relevance in cases wherein the guilt of the accused is sought to be established by circumstantial evidence. A rule has accordingly been laid down that unless the evidence adduced in the case is consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and is inconsistent with that of his innocence, the Court should refrain from recording a finding of guilt of the accused. It is also an accepted rule that in case the Court entertains reasonable doubt regarding the guilt of the accused, the accused must have the benefit of that doubt. Of course, the doubt regarding the guilt of the accused should be reasonable; it is not the doubt of a mind which is either so vacillating that it is incapable of reaching a firm conclusion or so timid that it is hesitant and afraid to take things to their natural consequences. The rule regarding the benefit of doubt also does not warrant acquittal of the accused by resort to surmises, conjectures or fanciful considerations. As mentioned by us recently in the case of State of Punjab v. Jagir Singh, a criminal trial is not like a fairy tale wherein one is free to give flight to one's imagination and fantasy. It concerns itself with the question as to whether the accused arraigned at the trial is guilty of the offence with

which he is charged. Crime is an event in real life and is the product of the interplay of different human emotions. In arriving at the conclusion about the guilt of the accused charged with the commission of a crime, the Court has to judge the evidence by the yardstick of probabilities, intrinsic worth and the animus of witnesses. Every case in the final analysis would have to depend upon its own facts. Although the benefit of every reasonable doubt should be given to the accused, the Courts should not at the same time reject evidence which is ex facie trustworthy on grounds which are fanciful or in the nature of conjectures.”

28. The decision in Kali Ram (supra) further cautions that wrongful acquittal and wrongful conviction do not stand on the same footing, for conviction of an innocent person causes grave injustice and shakes public confidence in the administration of criminal justice. The rule of benefit of doubt, therefore, is not a technical rule; it is a substantive safeguard flowing from the presumption of innocence.

29. In Ghurey Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2008) 10 SCC 450: (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 60, this Court reiterated the limited scope of interference with acquittals. This Court observed: “75. The Trial Court has the advantage of watching the demeanour of the witnesses who have given evidence; therefore, the appellate court should be slow to interfere with the decisions of the Trial Court. An acquittal by the Trial Court should not be interfered with unless it is totally perverse or wholly unsustainable.”

30. The decision in Ghurey Lal (supra) also crystallised certain propositions: first, there is a double presumption of innocence in favour of an acquitted accused; secondly, if two views are possible, the view favourable to the accused must prevail; thirdly, though the appellate court has the power to reappreciate evidence, it should interfere only when the acquittal is manifestly illegal, perverse or results in miscarriage of justice; and fourthly, due weight must be given to the Trial Court's findings, particularly because the trial judge had the advantage of observing the demeanour of witnesses.

31. In Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325, this Court held that though the appellate court has full power to review and reappreciate the evidence, the presumption of innocence is strengthened by an order of acquittal. It was held that when two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal.

32. The same principle was restated in Mrinal Das v. State of Tripura (2011) 9 SCC 479, wherein this Court held that an order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. If two reasonable views are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal.

33. Therefore, the question before us is not whether another view on the evidence is possible. The question is whether the view taken by the Trial Court and affirmed by the High Court is impossible, perverse, wholly unsustainable, or manifestly illegal. Having examined the record, we are unable to hold so.

13. The present appeal is to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

14. The incident had occurred at 01:30 p.m. The matter was reported to the police at 06:00 p.m. as per the entry (Ext.PW5/A). The distance between the place of occurrence and the Police Station is stated to be 01 km in the FIR (Ext.PW6/A). The informant, Ved Prakash (PW3), stated in his cross- examination that he was advised by the office workers to report the matter to the police. However, he did not report the matter to the police because he was discharging his duties. He had also not made any complaint to the police via telephone. This is no explanation at all because the incident had taken place at 01:30 p.m. during lunchtime. The informant could have visited the Police Station located at a distance of 01 km from the Police Station and reported the matter to the police. However, he continued to discharge the duties and the learned Appellate Court was justified in holding that any person who had sustained a fracture would not have continued to discharge the duties as if nothing had happened. Further, there is no proper explanation for the delay. It was laid down in Mehraj Singh v. State of U.P. (1994) 5 SCC 188 that the delay in lodging FIR leads to embellishments, concoction and fabrication and the court should see the prosecution case with utmost care and caution in case of delay. It was observed: "FIR in a criminal case and particularly in a murder case is a vital and valuable piece of evidence to appreciate the evidence led at the trial. The object of insisting upon prompt lodging of the FIR is to obtain the earliest information regarding the circumstances in which the crime was committed, including the names of the actual culprits and the parts played by them, the weapons, if any, used, as also the names of the eyewitnesses, if any. Delay in lodging the FIR often results in embellishment, which is a creature of an afterthought. On account of the delay, the FIR not only gets bereft of the advantage of spontaneity, but danger also creeps in with the introduction of a coloured version or exaggerated story. With a view to determining whether the FIR was lodged at the time it is alleged to have been recorded, the courts generally look for certain external checks. One of the checks is the receipt of a copy of the FIR, called a special report in a murder case, by the local Magistrate. If this report is received by the Magistrate late, it can give rise to an inference that the FIR was not lodged at the time it is alleged to have been recorded, unless, of course, the prosecution can offer a satisfactory explanation for the delay in dispatching or receipt of the copy of the FIR by the local Magistrate. The prosecution has presented no evidence at all in this case. The second external check, equally important, is the sending of a copy of the FIR along with the dead body and its reference in the inquest report. Even though the inquest, prepared under Section 174 CrPC, is aimed at serving a statutory function, to lend credence to the prosecution's case, the details of the FIR and the gist of statements recorded during inquest proceedings get reflected in the report. The absence of those details is indicative of the fact that the prosecution's story was still in an embryonic state and had not been given any shape, and that the FIR came to be recorded later on, after due deliberations and consultations and was then ante-timed to give it the colour of a promptly lodged FIR. In our opinion, on account of the infirmities as noticed above, the FIR has lost its value and authenticity, and it appears to us that the same has been ante-dated and had not been recorded till the inquest proceedings were over at the spot by PW 8."

15. This position was reiterated in P Rajagopal vs State of

Tamil Nadu 2019 (5) SCC 40, wherein it was observed: - “12. Normally, the Court may reject the case of the prosecution in case of inordinate delay in lodging the first information report because of the possibility of a concoction of evidence by the prosecution. However, if the delay is satisfactorily explained, the Court will decide the matter on the merits without giving much importance to such delay. The Court is duty-bound to determine whether the explanation afforded is plausible enough given the facts and circumstances of the case. The delay may be condoned if the complainant appears to be reliable and without any motive for implicating the accused falsely. [See Apren Joseph v. State of Kerala, (1973) 3 SCC 114; Mukesh v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2017) 6 SCC 1].”

16. A similar view was taken in Sekaran v. State of T.N., (2024) 2 SCC 176: (2024) 1 SCC (Cri) 548: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1653, wherein it was observed on page 182: “14. We start with the FIR, to which exception has been taken by the appellant, urging that there has been no satisfactory explanation for its belated registration. It is trite that merely because there is some delay in lodging an FIR, the same by itself and without anything more ought not to weigh in the mind of the courts in all cases as fatal for the prosecution. A realistic and pragmatic approach has to be adopted, keeping in mind the peculiarities of each particular case, to assess whether the unexplained delay in lodging the FIR is an afterthought to give a coloured version of the incident, which is sufficient to corrode the credibility of the prosecution’s version.

15. In cases where delay occurs, it has to be tested on the anvil of other attending circumstances. If, on an overall consideration of all relevant circumstances, it appears to the court that the delay in lodging the FIR has been explained, mere delay cannot be sufficient to disbelieve the prosecution case; however, if the delay is not satisfactorily explained and it appears to the court that cause for the delay had been necessitated to frame anyone as an accused, there is no reason as to why the delay should not be considered as fatal, forming part of several factors to vitiate the conviction.”

17. Therefore, the learned Trial Court was justified in doubting the prosecution’s case because of the delay.

18. The entry (Ext.PW5/A) mentions that the accused gave him beatings by kicks and the fists. He changed this version in court and stated that the accused removed the helmet, held it in his hand and inflicted blows by means of the helmet. Ranvijay Singh (PW1) stated in his examination-in-chief that the accused was giving the fist blows to the informant. He stated in his cross- examination that the accused inflicted the blows by means of the helmet by holding it in both hands. Jagdish Kumar (PW2) stated that the accused slapped the informant and thereafter inflicted blows by means of a helmet. Therefore, the prosecution witnesses have changed their version regarding the weapon with which the injuries were inflicted, and this would make their testimonies highly doubtful. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Dhirendra Kumar, (1997) 1 SCC 93:

1997 SCC (Cri) 54 that when the prosecution projects a different case during the Trial, its case becomes suspect. It was observed: “11. It was very emphatically contended by Shri Gambhir that as in the first information report (FIR), there is no mention of the dying declaration, we should discard the evidence of PW 1 and PW 2 regarding the dying declaration, because of what has been pointed out by this Court in Ram Kumar Pandey v. State of M.P. [(1975) 3 SCC 815: 1975 SCC (Cri) 225: AIR 1975 SC 1026] We do not, however, agree with Shri Gambhir, for the reason that what was observed in Ram Kumar case [(1975) 3 SCC 815: 1975 SCC (Cri) 225: AIR 1975 SC 1026] after noting the broad facts, was that material omission in the FIR would cast doubt on the veracity of the prosecution case, despite the general law being that statements made in the FIR can be used to corroborate or contradict its maker. This view owes its origin to the thinking that if there be a material departure in the prosecution case as unfolded in the FIR, which would be so if material facts not mentioned in the FIR are deposed to by prosecution witnesses in the court, the same would cause a dent to the edifice on which the prosecution case is built, as the substratum of the prosecution case then gets altered. The prosecution cannot project two entirely different versions of a case. This is entirely different from thinking that some omission in the FIR would require disbelieving the witnesses who depose about the fact not mentioned in the FIR. Evidence of witnesses has to be tested for its strength or weakness. While doing so, if the fact deposed be a material part of the prosecution case, about which, however, no mention was made in the FIR, the same would be borne in mind while deciding about the credibility of the evidence given by the witness in question.”

19. Dr Parmesh Dogra (PW4) examined the informant and found multiple injuries. He stated that the injuries could have been caused in a scuffle. He has nowhere mentioned that the injuries could have been caused by a helmet, and the version propounded in the Court that the accused had inflicted injuries by a helmet was not corroborated by the medical evidence.

20. The informant stated in his cross-examination that he had sustained bleeding injuries and his clothes were blood- stained. Blood had also spilt over the place of the incident. The Medical Officer had not found any bleeding injury. No blood- stained clothes were taken in possession. Therefore, the informant's version that he had sustained bleeding injuries was not established on record.

21. The copy of the execution petition (Ext.DX) and the order passed in an application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 (Ext.DY) show that a litigation is pending between the informant and the family of the accused. Thus, the learned Appellate Court had rightly held that the parties had a strained relationship which would put the Court on guard regarding the possible false implication.

22. The incident had occurred at a public place. The prosecution examined Ranvijay Singh (PW1) and Jagdish Kumar (PW2). Both of them admitted that they knew the informant before the incident, and they had a cordial relationship with the informant. The informant stated in his cross-examination that the accused went away when the official vehicle of the learned Judge came to the spot. It is highly unlikely that the learned Judge would not have taken any action had he seen any scuffle going on at the spot. This also makes the prosecution case highly suspect.

23. Therefore, the learned Appellate Court had taken a reasonable view that could have been taken based on the material placed before it. This Court will not interfere with the reasonable view of the Court acquitting the accused while deciding an appeal against acquittal, even if another view is possible.

24. No other point was urged.

25. In view of the above, the present appeal fails, and it is dismissed. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, also stand disposed of.

26. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) the respondent/accused is directed to furnish bail bond in the sum of ₹25,000/- with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court within four weeks, which shall be effective for six months with stipulation that in the event of Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment, or on grant of the leave, the respondent/accused on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

27. Records be sent back to the learned Trial Court forthwith, along with a copy of the judgment.

(Rakesh Kainthla)

Judge 12th October, 2026 (Nikita)