CR.A/366/2012 on 12 October 2026

IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Appeal No. 366 of 2012 Reserved on: 30.9.2026 Date of Decision: 12.10.2026. Sheela Devi ...Appellant Versus Satish Kumar & ors. ...Respondents

Coram

Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Appellant : Mr. Lakshay Parihar, Advocate. For Respondents No.1 to 3 and 5 : Mr. N.S. Chandel, Senior Advocate, with Mr. Bhupinder Singh Ahuja, Advocate. For Respondent No.6 : Mr. Ajit Sharma, Deputy Advocate General. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 18.05.2012 passed by learned Sessions Judge, Hamirpur (learned Appellate Court), vide which the judgment of conviction dated 13.08.2010 and order of sentence dated 18.08.2010 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Barsar, District

Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

Hamirpur (learned Trial Court), were set aside. (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience).

2. Briefly stated, the facts leading to and relevant to the present appeal are that the police filed a charge sheet before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 147, 149, 447, 323, 511, and 506 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Section 27 of the Arms Act. It was asserted that the informant Sheela Devi, Satish Kumar, Pradeep Kumar, Rajjo Devi, and the wives of Satish Kumar and Pradeep Kumar came to the field of informant Sheela Devi (PW-1) on 29.2.2008 and burnt the Taramira planted by her. The informant was alone at that time. She narrated these facts to Up-Pradhan Bishan Chand Sharma, who advised her to take Panch Gurdas Ram and Susheel Chand with her. Gurdas Ram and Susheel Chand visited the spot, and Satish Kumar etc. also left. Satish Kumar, his wife, and Rajjo Devi entered the informant's land at about 5:00 PM and started abusing the informant. Pritam Chand also came to the spot and requested them not to abuse the informant; however, Satish Kumar continued the abuses and went towards the informant. Pritam Chand intervened, but the informant stopped him. Satish Kumar fired in the air and threatened the informant to shoot her in case she entered the land. The matter was reported to the police. The police recorded an entry No. 16 in the Daily Diary. ASI Kuldeep Kumar went to the spot and recorded the informant's statement (Ext. PW-1/A) and sent it to the police station, where FIR (Ext. PW-10/A) was registered. ASI Kuldeep investigated the matter. He prepared the site plan (Ext.PW-10/C). Satish Kumar produced the gun, the receipt of the arms license and the gun license, which were seized vide memos (Ext.PW-4/A, Ext.PW-6/A and Ext. PW-8/A). The gun was put in a sealed parcel, and the parcel was sealed with seal ‘H’. Seal impression (Ext. P-3) was taken on a separate piece of cloth. An application (Ext.PW-10/D) was filed for the demarcation of the land. Ghanshyam Dass (PW-5) conducted the demarcation and issued the report (Ext. PW-5/A), Jamabandi (Ext. PW-5/B), and Tatima (Ext. PW-5/C). The gun was sent to the FSL, and the report (Ext. P-2) was issued, stating that the gun was fire-worthy and had been fired. The empty cartridges had been fired from the gun, but it was not possible to give any opinion about the time of firing. The statements of witnesses were recorded as per their versions, and after the completion of investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court.

3. Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, they were charged with the commission of offences punishable under Sections 147, 149, 447, 323 read with Section 511, and Section 506 of the IPC, and Section 27(1) of the Arms Act. Accused Rajinder Kumar was charged with the commission of offences punishable under Sections 27(1) and 30 of the Arms Act, to which the accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.

4. The prosecution examined 11 witnesses to prove its case. The informant Sheela Devi (PW-1), her son Pritam Chand (PW-2), and Phoola Devi (PW-3) witnessed the incident. Kishan Chand (PW-4), Ram Chand (PW-6) and Hans Raj (PW-8) witnessed the recoveries. Ghanshyam Dass (PW-5) conducted the demarcation. Tilak Raj (PW-7) was working as MHC, with whom the case property was deposited. Baryam Singh (PW-9) carried the gun to FSL. ASI Kuldeep Kumar (PW-10) investigated the matter. Bakshi Ram (PW-11) signed the FIR.

5. The accused, in their statements recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), admitted that an entry was recorded in the police station. They claimed that the gun was earlier fired for testing and a false case was made against them. They did not produce any evidence in their defence.

6. Learned Trial Court held that the statements of prosecution witnesses corroborated each other. There was nothing in their cross-examination to show that they were making false statements. Their testimonies were corroborated by the report of the FSL in which the gun was found to have been fired. The accused also admitted that they had fired the gun, and the explanation provided by them that they had test-fired the gun was contrary to the suggestion given to the witnesses that the gun was fired to scare away the wild animals. Hence, the learned Trial Court convicted and sentenced the accused as under: Sections Sentence Section 147 read with Section 149 of IPC To

undergo

rigorous imprisonment for six months.

Section 447 read with Section 149 of IPC To

undergo

rigorous imprisonment for three months. Section 506 read with Section 149 of IPC To

undergo

rigorous imprisonment for two years. Section 27(1) of the Arms Act Accused Satish Kumar was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years and to pay fine of ₹2,000/- and in default of payment of fine, to undergo six months’ simple imprisonment. Section 30 of the Arms Act To

undergo

rigorous imprisonment for six months and to pay fine of ₹1,000/- and in default of payment of fine, to undergo two months’ simple imprisonment. All the substantive sentences of imprisonment were ordered to be run concurrently.

7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal, which was decided by the learned Sessions Judge, Hamirpur (learned Appellate Court). The learned Appellate Court held that the prosecution version was made doubtful by the non-recovery of the burnt ash. The statements of witnesses contradicted each other. The earliest report made to the police contained an allegation of uprooting the mustard crop, and there were no allegations of causing fire to the crop or shooting. The parties had litigation and criminal cases were pending between them. The discrepancies on record were sufficient to conclude that the incident had not taken place in the manner suggested by the prosecution. The learned Trial Court had erred in convicting and sentencing the accused. Therefore, the learned Appellate Court allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court.

8. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Appellate Court, the victim/informant has filed the present appeal, asserting that the learned Appellate Court erred in acquitting the accused. The prosecution case was proved beyond reasonable doubt. Minor contradictions were bound to come with time. The accused also admitted that a gun was fired. The strained relationship could not be a reason for acquitting the accused because enmity is a double-edged weapon. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Appellate Court be set aside.

9. I have heard Mr Lakshya Parihar, learned counsel for the appellant/informant/victim, Mr N.S. Chandel, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Mr Bhupinder Singh Ahuja, learned counsel for the respondents/accused, and Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for respondent No. 6/State.

10. Mr Lakshya Parihar, learned counsel for the appellant/informant, submitted that learned Appellate Court erred in setting aside the well-reasoned judgment passed by the learned Trial Court. Minor discrepancies are bound to come with time and could not have been used to discard the prosecution version. The testimonies of prosecution witnesses corroborated each other, and their testimonies were corroborated by the report of the FSL. The defence taken by the accused was contradictory because it was suggested to the witnesses that the accused had fired to scare off the wild animal, but it was stated in the statement recorded under Section 313 of CrPC that the gun was fired to test it. The contradictory version of the accused was rightly rejected by the learned Trial Court. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Appellate Court be set aside.

11. Mr N.S. Chandel, learned Senior Advocate for the respondents/accused, submitted that there was no burnt ash on the spot, which falsifies the prosecution version that the accused had put the crop of Taramira on fire. There were major contradictions in the statements of the prosecution witnesses, which made the prosecution case doubtful. The report of the FSL merely stated that the gun had been fired, but the time of firing the gun was not mentioned. The learned Appellate Court had taken a reasonable view by acquitting the accused, and this Court should not interfere with a reasonable view of the learned Appellate Court even if another view is possible.

12. Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent-State, supported the submissions of Mr Lakshya Parihar and submitted that the learned Appellate Court had erred in acquitting the accused. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed.

13. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

14. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment

of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sanjay Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1373, that the Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal only if it is impossible, perverse, wholly unsustainable, or manifestly illegal. It was observed: Scope of interference with an acquittal:

26. At the outset, it is necessary to remind ourselves of the settled principles governing interference with an order of acquittal. An accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty. When a court of competent jurisdiction acquits the accused, the presumption of innocence is not weakened but reinforced. Where such acquittal is affirmed by the High Court, the caution to be exercised by this Court under Article 136 is even greater.

27. In Kali Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh (1973) 2 SCC 808: 1973 SCC (Cri) 1048, this Court explained the golden thread running through criminal jurisprudence in the following words: “25. Another golden thread which runs through the web of the administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. This principle has a special relevance in cases wherein the guilt of the accused is sought to be established by circumstantial evidence. A rule has accordingly been laid down that unless the evidence adduced in the case is consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and is inconsistent with that of his innocence, the Court should refrain from recording a finding of guilt of the accused. It is also an accepted rule that in case the Court entertains reasonable doubt regarding the guilt of the accused, the accused must have the benefit of that doubt. Of course, the doubt regarding the guilt of the accused should be reasonable; it is not the doubt of a mind which is either so vacillating that it is incapable of reaching a firm conclusion or so timid that it is hesitant and afraid to take things to their natural consequences. The rule regarding the benefit of doubt also does not warrant acquittal of the accused by resort to surmises, conjectures or fanciful considerations. As mentioned by us recently in the case of State of Punjab v. Jagir Singh, a criminal trial is not like a fairy tale wherein one is free to give flight to one's imagination and fantasy. It concerns itself with the question as to whether the accused arraigned at the trial is guilty of the offence with which he is charged. Crime is an event in real life and is the product of the interplay of different human emotions. In arriving at the conclusion about the guilt of the accused charged with the commission of a crime, the Court has to judge the evidence by the yardstick of probabilities, intrinsic worth and the animus of witnesses. Every case in the final analysis would have to depend upon its own facts. Although the benefit of every reasonable doubt should be given to the accused, the Courts should not at the same time reject evidence which is ex facie trustworthy on grounds which are fanciful or in the nature of conjectures.”

28. The decision in Kali Ram (supra) further cautions that wrongful acquittal and wrongful conviction do not stand on the same footing, for conviction of an innocent person causes grave injustice and shakes public confidence in the administration of criminal justice. The rule of benefit of doubt, therefore, is not technical; it is a substantive safeguard flowing from the presumption of innocence.

29. In Ghurey Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2008) 10 SCC 450 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 60, this Court reiterated the limited scope of interference with acquittals. This Court observed: “75. The Trial Court has the advantage of watching the demeanour of the witnesses who have given evidence; therefore, the appellate court should be slow to interfere with the decisions of the Trial Court. An acquittal by the Trial Court should not be interfered with unless it is totally perverse or wholly unsustainable.”

30. The decision in Ghurey Lal (supra) also crystallised certain propositions: first, there is a double presumption of innocence in favour of an acquitted accused; secondly, if two views are possible, the view favourable to the accused must prevail; thirdly, though the appellate court has the power to reappreciate evidence, it should interfere only when the acquittal is manifestly illegal, perverse or results in miscarriage of justice; and fourthly, due weight must be given to the Trial Court's findings, particularly because the trial judge had the advantage of observing the demeanour of witnesses.

31. In Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325, this Court held that though the appellate court has full power to review and reappreciate the evidence, the presumption of innocence is strengthened by an order of acquittal. It was held that when two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal.

32. The same principle was restated in Mrinal Das v. State of Tripura (2011) 9 SCC 479, wherein this Court held that an order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. If two reasonable views are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal.

33. Therefore, the question before us is not whether another view on the evidence is possible. The question is whether the view taken by the Trial Court and affirmed by the High Court is impossible, perverse, wholly unsustainable, or manifestly illegal. Having examined the record, we are unable to hold so.

15. The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

16. It was specifically stated in the statement (Ext.PW- 1/A) that the accused came to the informant's field and put Taramira on fire. ASI Kuldeep Kumar (PW-10) visited the spot and prepared the site plan (Ext. PW-10/C). He has nowhere mentioned in it that he had found any burnt ash or any traces of fire on the spot. He was investigating the matter and could not have missed the significance of the ash of the burnt crop because the informant had made a specific allegation regarding it in her statement. He stated in his cross-examination that the accused had burnt 50 plants of lemon, which is nobody's case.

17. The report (Ext.PW-1/A) mentions that Gurdas Ram and Susheel Chand had visited the spot for verification. Both these witnesses were given up by the prosecution, and there is no corroboration to the informant's testimony that they had visited the spot and found that the accused had uprooted and burnt the Tarmira crop.

18. Therefore, the learned Appellate Court was justified in holding that the absence of the ash or the burnt crop on the spot would make the genesis of the incident doubtful.

19. The informant Sheela Devi had called the police station at 7:00 pm, and the police recorded an Entry No. 16, in which it was mentioned that the family of Dhani Ram was quarrelling with her and had uprooted Taramira; hence the investigation should be conducted. This call was silent regarding the burning of the crop or shooting in the air to scare the informant party. The learned Appellate Court had rightly held that the contents of the entry in the Daily Diary would make the prosecution case suspect.

20. It was submitted that the entry in the Daily Diary was not proved by examining any witness, and the learned Appellate Court erred in relying upon it. This submission cannot be accepted. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ramaiah v. State of Karnataka, (2014) 9 SCC 365, that the accused can rely upon a document filed by the prosecution without its formal proof. It was observed: “14…..Strangely, the High Court has discarded the mahazar drawn by PW 8 by giving a specious reason, viz., it was not an exhibited document before the court, little realising that this was the document produced by the prosecution itself and even without formal proof thereto by the prosecution, it was always open for the defence to seek reliance on such evidence to falsify the prosecution version….”

21. Therefore, the learned Appellate Court had rightly relied upon the entry in the daily diary.

22. The statement (Ext.PW-1/A) mentions that Satish Kumar abused the informant; Pritam Chand went towards him to stop him; Satish fired in the air and threatened the informant party. The informant stated on oath that Pritam came to the spot and enquired as to what had happened. She told him that the accused had uprooted the crop. The accused told Pritam Chand to bring her mother and also that he should also come near him. Satish Kumar picked up the gun and fired three shots towards the field. She narrated the incident to the police at 7:00. Pritam Chand (PW-2) stated that Satish Kumar, his wife, and Rajkumari were abusing the informant. He enquired from the informant as to why they were abusing her. Satish Kumar dared him to come near him. Pritam Chand started moving towards Satish Kumar, and Satish Kumar fired two shots in the air. He attempted to load the third cartridge and threatened to kill the informant and

Pritam Chand. Phoola Devi (PW-3) stated that the accused were uprooting the crop of Taramira. The informant objected, but the accused abused her. Pritam asked them not to abuse the informant, and Satish Kumar shot in the air.

23. The statements of these witnesses regarding the manner of the incident are not as per the prosecution case. They have given different sequences of the events, and the learned Appellate Court was justified in holding that their statements did not corroborate each other.

24. The report of the FSL mentions that the gun was fire- worthy and the empty cartridges had been fired from the gun. However, the time of firing could not be ascertained. The report does not corroborate the prosecution version that the gun had been recently fired.

25. The police recovered the gun and the cartridges from Satish Kumar. No spent cartridges were found on the spot, which would have been natural had the gun been fired and the cartridges ejected from the gun after the firing. Therefore, this evidence also does not corroborate the prosecution version.

26. It was submitted that there were discrepancies in the defence of the accused. This submission will not help the appellant/informant. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sunil Kundu v. State of Jharkhand, (2013) 4 SCC 422; (2013) 2 SCC (Cri) 427; 2013 SCC OnLine SC 316 that the prosecution must stand on its feet and cannot draw support from the weakness of the defence. It was observed at page 433: “28……It is also true that the plea of alibi taken by the accused has failed. The defence witnesses examined by them have been disbelieved. It was urged that adverse inference should be drawn from this. We reject this submission. When the prosecution is not able to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, it cannot take advantage of the fact that the accused have not been able to probabilise their defence. It is well settled that the prosecution must stand or fall on its own feet. It cannot draw support from the weakness of the case of the accused, if it has not proved its case beyond reasonable doubt.”

27. In the present case, the prosecution’s version is full of infirmities and no advantage can be derived from the contradictory pleas taken by the defence.

28. No other point was urged.

29. In view of the above, the learned Appellate Court had taken a reasonable view that could have been taken based upon the material placed before the learned Appellate Court, and no interference is required with the judgment of the learned Appellate Court. Hence, the present appeal fails, and it is dismissed. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, also stand disposed of.

30. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) the respondents/accused are directed to furnish bail bonds in the sum of ₹25,000/- each with one surety each in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court within four weeks, which shall be effective for six months with stipulation that in the event of Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment, or on grant of the leave, the respondents/accused on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

31. Records be sent back to the learned Trial Court forthwith, along with a copy of the judgment. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 12th October, 2026 (Chander)