CR.R/561/2026 on 12 October 2026

IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Revision No. 561 of 2026 Reserved on: 25.09.2026 Date of Decision: 12.10.2026. Lakhvir Singh ...Petitioner Versus State of H.P.

...Respondent

Coram

Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Petitioner : Mr Sunny Rawat, Advocate. For the Respondent : Mr Tarun Pathak, Deputy Advocate General. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present revision is directed against the judgment dated 08.07.2026 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge-I Nurpur, District Kangra (learned Appellate Court) vide which the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 08.07.2021 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class Indora, District Kangra (learned Trial Court) were upheld. (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience).

Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present revision are that the police presented a challan before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). It was asserted that informant Chaman Lal (PW1) and his family members were going to their home on 20.11.2011 in a car bearing registration No. PB-10CM-8011. A truck bearing registration No. PB-07D-1482, being driven by the accused, came in the wrong lane and hit the car at Meelwan at about 03:30 p.m. The informant and his family members sustained injuries. The accident occurred because of the high speed of the truck and the negligence of the accused in driving the truck towards the wrong side. The matter was reported to the police, and the police recorded an entry in the Police Station. SI Pritam Singh (PW16) recorded the informant's statement (Ext.PW16/B) and sent it to the Police Station where FIR (Ext.PW16/A) was registered. SI Pritam Singh (PW16) investigated the matter. He visited the spot and prepared the site plan (Ext.PW16/C). He took photographs of the spot (Ext.PW16/D1 to Ext.PW16/D9). He seized the truck bearing registration No. PB-07D-1482 and the car bearing registration No. PB-10CM-8011 along with the documents vide memo (Ext.PW5/A). An application (Ext.PW14/A) was filed for conducting the medical examination of the victims. Dr Brijesh Singh (PW14) conducted the medical examination and issued the reports (Ext.PW14/B to Ext.PW14/F). Dr Abnesh Kumar (PW11) issued the treatment summaries of the injured (Ext.PW11/A to Ext.PW11/D). The documents of the truck and car were seized vide memos (Ext.PW4/A and Ext. PW1/B). HHC Narender Sood (PW8) mechanically examined the vehicles and found that they had no defect that could have led to the accident. He issued the reports (Ext.PW8/A and Ext.PW8/B). The statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after the completion of investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court.

3. Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of accusation was put to him for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of the IPC, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.

4. The prosecution examined fifteen witnesses to prove its case. Witnesses Dr Avneesh Kumar and other witnesses examined after him have been mentioned as PW11 to PW17. But there are no PW9 and PW10 in the file of the learned Trial Court; therefore, the witnesses are being referred to in their chronological order. Chaman Lal (PW1) is the informant/victim. Shreshta Devi (PW2) and Piyush (PW3) are the victims. Gurmail Singh (PW4) is the owner of the truck. Shamsher Singh (PW5), Prem Singh (PW6) and HHC Santosh Kumar (PW10) witnessed the recoveries. Sarvan Singh (PW7) did not support the prosecution case. HHC Narender Sood (PW8) mechanically examined the vehicle. Dr Avanesh Kumar (PW9) issued the injury reports. HC Rajesh Kumar (PW11) proved the certificate issued under Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act. Dr Brijesh Singh (PW12) conducted the medical examination of the victim. HHC Sandeep Kumar (PW13) proved the entry in the daily diary. Pritam Singh (PW14) investigated the matter. ASI Chain Singh (PW15) partly investigated the matter.

5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), denied the prosecution case in its entirety. He did not produce any evidence in his defence.

6. Learned Trial Court held that the statements of the witnesses, photographs and the site plan proved that the accident had occurred on the wrong side of the road. The owner, Gurmail Singh (PW4), proved that he had employed the accused as a driver. The accused failed to drive the truck towards its left side, which was the proximate cause of the accident. The negligence of the accused had caused injuries to the occupants of the car. Therefore, the learned Trial Court convicted and sentenced the accused as under: Sections Sentence Section 279 of IPC To

undergo

rigorous imprisonment for three months, pay a fine of ₹500/- and in default of payment of fine, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for fifteen days. Section 337 of IPC To

undergo

rigorous imprisonment for three months, pay a fine of ₹500/- and in default of payment of fine, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for fifteen days. Section 338 of IPC To

undergo

rigorous imprisonment for six months, pay a fine of ₹1000/- and in default of payment of fine, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one month. All the sentences of imprisonment were ordered to run concurrently.

7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal, which was decided by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Nurpur District, Kangra (learned Appellate Court). The learned Appellate Court concurred with the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court that the truck came from the opposite side, in the wrong lane, and hit the car. The accused was driving the truck at the time of the accident. His negligence in not driving the truck in its own lane caused the accident. The occupants of the car had sustained injuries in the accident. The learned Trial Court had rightly convicted the accused of the commission of an offence punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of the IPC. The learned Trial Court had taken a lenient view while imposing sentence, and no further leniency was required in the matter. Hence, the learned Appellate Court dismissed the appeal.

8. Being aggrieved by the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below, the accused has filed the present revision, asserting that the prosecution had failed to prove the identity of the accused as the driver of the truck. The informant stated that he could not see the driver of the truck. Merely because the accused was employed as a driver cannot lead to an inference that he was driving the truck at the time of an accident. Learned Courts below had failed to provide the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act to the accused. Therefore, it was prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside.

9. I have heard Mr Sunny Rawat, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr Tarun Pathak, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent/State.

10. Mr Sunny Rawat, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and he was falsely implicated. The learned courts below failed to appreciate the material on record. The identity of the accused was not established. The informant could not identify the accused in court, and the identification of Shreshta Devi (PW2) was not proper. The use of the terms wrong lane and high speed is not sufficient to infer negligence. Therefore, he prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside.

11. Mr Tarun Pathak, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent/State, submitted that the photograph, site plan and the statements of the witnesses proved that the accused was driving the truck in a wrong lane on a four-lane highway. Learned Courts below had rightly held that the accused was negligent and this Court should not re-appreciate the evidence while deciding the revision. Therefore, he prayed that the present revision be dismissed.

12. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

13. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kuntegowda v. Thurubaiah, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1485 that a revisional court does not act as an appellate court and it can only determine the correctness, legality and propriety of the findings, sentence and order recorded by the lower court. It was observed: “7. Before parting, we would like to accentuate the revisional jurisdiction of the High Courts and the contours and inherent limits while exercising powers as a revisional authority. Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (now, Section 438 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha

Sanhita, 2023) encapsulates the power of High Courts and Sessions Courts to examine the correctness, legality or propriety of any order passed by an inferior criminal court. The said Section is extracted as hereunder: “438. Calling for records to exercise powers of revision.—(1) The High Court or any Sessions Judge may call for and examine the record of any proceeding before any inferior Criminal Court situate within its or his local jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior Court, and may, when calling, for such record, direct that the execution of any sentence or order be suspended, and if the accused is in confinement that he be released on his own bond or bail bond pending the examination of the record. Explanation. —All Magistrates, whether Executive or Judicial, and whether exercising original or appellate jurisdiction, shall be deemed to be inferior to the Sessions Judge for the purposes of this subsection and of section 439.

(2) The powers of revision conferred by sub-section

(1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding.

(3) If an application under this section has been made by any person either to the High Court or to the Sessions Judge, no further application by the same person shall be entertained by the other of them.” Discretion in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction should be exercised within the four corners of this section whenever there has been miscarriage of justice. However, while exercising power under this section, the Court does not act as an appellate Court and therefore, while considering the legality, propriety or the correctness of a finding or a conclusion, the revisional court does not and should not dwell upon the facts and the evidence of the case as an appellate Court. The court, in revision, considers the material only to satisfy itself about the correctness, legality and propriety of the findings, sentence and order recorded by the lower court, and should refrain from substituting its conclusion on an elaborate consideration of evidence, and the findings of the lower courts should not be reversed merely on the ground that an alternative view is possible on the facts of the case. In this case, such a position did not also emanate from the evidence on record.

7.1. This Court, in the State of Maharashtra v. Jagmohan Singh Kuldip Singh Anand, (2004) 7 SCC 659: 2004 SCC (Cri) 2003, observed that the High Court, in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, cannot embark upon an in-depth roving re-examination of the oral evidence and medical evidence and come to a conclusion contrary to the consistent one reached by two courts below. In the facts of the present case, in the impugned judgment, the High Court gravely erred in upsetting the concurrent findings of conviction of the trial court and the Appellate Court by substituting its own conclusions and reasoning on the merits of the case and thereby erred in setting aside the well-reasoned and correct judgment and orders of the trial and appellate courts.

7.2. Upon perusal of the impugned judgment and order dated 06.10.2023, it is apparent that the High Court went into great detail into each of the testimonies, documents and merits of the case, which could have been avoided, especially when the subject matter had come under its revisional jurisdiction. Instead, acting as an appellate Court, the High Court deemed it fit to go into the merits of the case, something which is generally impermissible unless a glaring contradiction is apparent on the face of the record. In State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 452; 1999 SCC (Cri) 275, while considering the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, this Court has laid down the following:

“5. … In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting a miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to a gross miscarriage of justice. On scrutinising the impugned judgment of the High Court from the aforesaid standpoint, we have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction of the Respondent by reappreciating the oral evidence. …”

7.3. The contours for exercise of revisional jurisdiction have been well settled by the judicial dicta of this Court wherein time and again it has been observed that the High Court shall not interfere with the orders of the lower court unless:

i. The order or finding of the lower court is perverse, grossly erroneous, glaringly unreasonable or wholly unreliable or untenable in law.

ii. The lower court has passed the impugned order after considering immaterial or irrelevant material or no material at all.

iii. There is a non-consideration of any relevant material or the judicial discretion has been exercised arbitrarily or capriciously.

7.4. This Court, in Sanjabij Tari v. Kishore S. Borcar, 2025 INSC 1158, in similar facts and circumstances wherein the High Court had reversed concurrent findings of conviction under Section 138 of NI Act, while setting aside the impugned order, observed as under: “27. It is well settled that in exercise of revisional jurisdiction, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings. This Court is of the view that it is not for the Revisional Court to reanalyse and re-interpret the evidence on record. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GMBH, (2008) 14 SCC 457, it is a well-established principle of law that the Revisional Court will not interfere, even if a wrong order is passed by a Court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error.

28. Consequently, this Court is of the view that in the absence of perversity, it was not open to the High Court in the present case, in revisional jurisdiction, to upset the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the Sessions Court.”

7.5. In the facts of the present case, we find that the High Court has failed to highlight any reason or material satisfaction to the effect that there was any such glaring contradiction or perversity apparent on the face of the record to justify the exercise of the powers under revisional jurisdiction and thereby erred in interfering with the judgment and orders of the courts below. Therefore, the present appeal has to be allowed by setting aside the impugned order of the High Court. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we are of the view that the High Court committed an error in setting aside the order of conviction in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. No sufficient ground has been mentioned by the High Court in its judgment to enable it to exercise its revisional jurisdiction for setting aside the conviction.

14. The present revision has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

15. Chaman Lal (PW1) stated that he was driving the car bearing registration No. PB-10CM-8011 on 20.11.2011. His family members were travelling with him. A truck bearing registration No. PB-07D-1482 came in a wrong lane and hit the car at a high speed. He and his family members sustained injuries. He admitted in his cross-examination that the occupants of the car were his relatives. He also admitted that he had not seen the accused on the spot. He volunteered to say that the accused had run away from the spot. He also admitted that he could not identify the accused present in the Court.

16. It was submitted that the testimony of this witness does not establish the identity of the accused. This submission cannot be accepted. Gurmail Singh (PW4) stated that he had purchased the truck bearing registration No. PB-07D-1482. His son Lakhvir was the driver of the truck, who had gone to Meerthal for loading the crusher material. He identified the accused in the Court. He admitted in his cross-examination that he was not aware of the accident.

17. The statement of this witness clearly shows that he had employed the accused as a driver. There is a presumption of continuity of the things under Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act. Therefore, the accused is to be taken as the driver even at the time of the accident in the absence of evidence to the contrary.

18. Shreshta Devi (PW2) stated that she was travelling in the car bearing registration No. PB-10CM-8011. The informant was driving the car. A truck hit the car on the wrong side. The accused was driving the truck at the time of the accident. She and her children had sustained injuries. The accident occurred because the truck was being driven towards the wrong side. She specifically denied that she had not seen the accused at the time of the accident. She denied that the accident occurred because of the high speed of the car.

19. She has categorically identified the accused as the driver of the vehicle. Her husband Chaman Lal (PW1) stated that he became unconscious after the accident. Therefore, he would have had no opportunity to see the driver, but she had not become unconscious, and her testimony that the accused was

driving the truck corroborates the statement of Gurmail Singh (PW4) and was rightly accepted by the learned Courts below.

20. It was submitted that there is a discrepancy in the prosecution case because Gurmail Singh (PW4) stated that the accused had taken the truck towards Meerthal whereas the accident had taken place at Meelwan. This submission will not help the petitioner. Gurmail Singh (PW4) stated that the truck was sent to Mirthal and there is nothing to prevent the accused from driving the truck to Meelwan. Further, the truck was being driven at Meelwan, which is duly corroborated by the recovery of the truck and the damage suffered by the truck. Thus, the mere fact that the owner had directed the driver to take the truck to some place but the driver had driven it to an other place will not show that the prosecution case is false.

21. Piyush (PW3) stated that he was going to Harchakkian on 20.11.2011 in a car being driven by his father. A truck came and hit the car. He became unconscious after the accident. He stated in his cross-examination that his mother had told him to depose in the Court that the accident had occurred with the truck and he did not know the accused present in the Court.

22. Even if the testimony of this witness is taken out, because he was told by his mother to depose in the Court, it will not take away the effect of the testimonies of the informant and Shrishta Devi (PW2)

23. The testimonies of the witnesses are duly corroborated by the site plan (Ext.PW16/C), which shows the road had four lanes. X1 and Y1 showed the lane from Pathankot to Mukerian. The accident had occurred on this lane. The Investigating Officer was not cross-examined regarding the correctness of the site plan, and the learned Courts below had rightly held that the site plan corroborated the statements of the witnesses.

24. HHC Narinder Sood (PW8) examined the vehicles and did not find any defect in them that could have led to the accident. His testimony rules out that the mechanical defect was the cause of the accident.

25. It was submitted that no independent witness was examined and this made the prosecution’s version doubtful. This submission cannot be accepted. There is no evidence that any independent person had seen the incident. Hence, the non- examination of the independent witness is not material. In any case, the non-examination of the independent witness cannot be used to discard the prosecution’s version. In Appabhai and another Vs. State of Gujarat AIR 1988 SC 696, the incident had taken place at the bus stand. It was contended that independent witnesses were not examined and the prosecution case was doubtful. It was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the prosecution case cannot be doubted due to the non-examination of the independent persons. It was observed: “11. In light of these principles, we may now consider the first contention urged by the learned counsel for the appellants. The contention relates to the failure of the prosecution to examine independent witnesses. The High Court has examined this contention but did not find any infirmity in the investigation. It is no doubt true that the prosecution has not been able to produce any independent witness to the incident that took place at the bus stand. There must have been several such witnesses. But the prosecution case cannot be thrown out or doubted on that ground alone. The experience reminds us that civilised people are generally insensitive when a crime is committed even in their presence. They withdraw both from the victim and the vigilante. They keep themselves away from the Court unless it is inevitable. They think that a crime, like a civil dispute, is between two individuals or parties and they should not involve themselves. This kind of apathy of the general public is indeed unfortunate, but it is there everywhere, whether in village life, towns or cities. One cannot ignore this handicap with which the investigating agency has to discharge its duties. The court, therefore, instead of doubting the prosecution case for want of independent witness, must consider the broad spectrum of the prosecution version and then search for the nugget of truth with due regard to probability, if any, suggested by the accused."

26. It was submitted that Shamsher Singh (PW5) has not supported the prosecution case, which made the prosecution version doubtful. The submission is not acceptable. He is a seizure witness, and his testimony does not adversely affect the prosecution case that the accused was driving the truck in a wrong lane.

27. Learned Courts below have concurrently held that the accused was driving the truck in a wrong lane, which was the proximate cause of the accident. The site plan corroborates and supports this finding as the truck was being driven on a lane leading from Pathankot to Mukerian and not towards the left side of the road.

28. The Central Government has framed the Rules of the Road Regulations, 1989, to regulate the movement of traffic. Rule 2 provides that the driver of a vehicle shall drive the vehicle as close to the left side of the road as may be expedient and shall allow all the traffic which is proceeding in the opposite direction to pass on his right side. It was laid down in Fagu Moharana vs.

State, AIR 1961 Orissa 71, that driving the vehicle on the right side of the road amounts to negligence. It was observed: “The car was on the left side of the road, leaving a space of nearly 10 feet on its right side. The bus, however, was on the right side of the road, leaving a gap of nearly 10 feet on its left side. There is thus no doubt that the car was coming on the proper side, whereas the bus was coming from the opposite direction on the wrong side. The width of the bus is only 7 feet 6 inches, and as there was a space of more than 10 feet on the left side, the bus could easily have avoided the accident if it had travelled on the left side of the road.”

29. Similarly, it was held in State of H.P. Vs. Dinesh Kumar, 2008 H.L.J. 399, where the vehicle was taken towards the right side of the road, the driver was negligent. It was observed: “The spot map Ext. P.W. 10/A would show that at point 'A on the right side of the road, there were bloodstain marks and a V-shaped slipper of the deceased Anu. Point 'E' is the place where P.W. 1 Chuni Lal was standing at the time of the accident, and point 'G' is the place where P.W. 3 Anil Kumar was standing. The jeep was going from Hamirpur to Nadaun. The point 'A' in the spot map Ext. P.W. 10/A is almost on the extreme right side of the road.”

30. This position was reiterated in State of H.P. vs. Niti Raj 2009 Cr.L.J. 1922, and it was held: “16. The evidence in the present case has to be examined in light of the aforesaid law laid down by the Apex Court. In the present case, some factors stand out clearly. The width of the pucca portion of the road was 10 ft. 6 inches. On the left side, while going from Dangri to Kangoo, there was a 7 ft. kacha portion, and on the other side, there was an 11 ft. kacha portion. The total width of the road was about 28 ft. The injured person was coming from the Dangri side and was walking on the left side of the road. This has been stated both by the injured as well as by PW-

6. This fact is also apparent from the fact that after he was hit, the injured person fell into the drain. A drain is always on the edge of the road. The learned Sessions Judge held, and it has also been argued before me, that nobody has stated that the motorcycle was on the wrong side. This fact is apparent from the statement of the witnesses, who state that they were on the extreme left side, and the motorcycle, which was coming from the opposite side, hit them. It does not need a genius to conclude that the motorcycle was on the extreme right side of the road and therefore on the wrong side.”

31. In the present case, the accused had breached the Rules of the Road Regulation, which led to the accident, and both the learned Courts below had rightly held that the accused was negligently driving the truck.

32. Dr Abnesh Kumar (PW11) and Dr Brijesh Singh (PW14) stated that the occupants of the car had sustained simple and grievous injuries. Therefore, learned Courts below had rightly held the accused guilty of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of the IPC.

33. It was submitted that the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act should have been granted to the accused. This submission cannot be accepted. It was laid down by the Hon'ble

Supreme Court in Dalbir Singh Versus State of Haryana (2000) 5 SCC 82 that a deterrent sentence is to be awarded to a person convicted of rash or negligent driving. It was observed: “11. Courts must bear in mind that when any plea is made based on S. 4 of the PO Act for application to a convicted person under S. 304-A of I.P.C., road accidents have proliferated to an alarming extent, and the toll is galloping up day by day in India and that no solution is in sight nor suggested by any quarters to bring them down. When this Court lamented two decades ago that "more people die of road accidents than by most diseases, so much so that the Indian highways are among the top killers of the country, the saturation of accidents was not even half of what it is today. So V. R. Krishna Iyer, J., has suggested in the said decision, thus : "Rashness and negligence are relative concepts, not absolute abstractions. In our current conditions, the law under S. 304-A, I.P.C. and under the rubric of negligence, must have due regard to the fatal frequency of rash driving of heavy-duty vehicles and speeding menaces."

12. In State of Karnataka v. Krishna alias Raju (1987) 1 SCC 538, this Court did not allow a sentence of fine, imposed on a driver who was convicted under S. 304-A, I.P.C., to remain in force although the High Court too had confirmed the said sentence when an accused was convicted of the offence of driving a bus callously and causing the death of a human being. In that case, this Court enhanced the sentence to rigorous imprisonment for six months besides imposing a fine.

13. Bearing in mind the galloping trend in road accidents in India and the devastating consequences for the victims and their families, Criminal Courts cannot treat the nature of the offence under S. 304-A, I.P.C. as attracting the benevolent provisions of S. 4 of the PO Act. While

considering the quantum of sentence to be imposed for the offence of causing death by rash or negligent driving of automobiles, one of the prime considerations should be deterrence. A professional driver pedals the accelerator of the automobile almost throughout his working hours. He must constantly inform himself that he cannot afford to have a single moment of laxity or inattentiveness when his leg is on the pedal of a vehicle in motion. He cannot and should not take a chance thinking that rash driving need not necessarily cause an accident, or even if any accident occurs, it need not necessarily result in the death of any human being, or even if such death ensues, he might not be convicted of the offence, and lastly, that even if he is convicted he would be dealt with leniently by the Court. He must always keep in mind the fear psyche that if he is convicted of the offence of causing the death of a human being due to his callous driving of a vehicle, he cannot escape from a jail sentence. This is the role which the Courts can play, particularly at the level of trial Courts, for lessening the high rate of motor accidents due to the callous driving of automobiles.”

34. A similar view was taken in State of Punjab v. Balwinder Singh, (2012) 2 SCC 182, wherein it was held: - “13. It is a settled law that sentencing must have a policy of correction. If anyone has to become a good driver, they must have better training in traffic laws and moral responsibility, with special reference to the potential injury to human life and limb. Considering the increased number of road accidents, this Court, on several occasions, has reminded the criminal courts dealing with the offences relating to motor accidents that they cannot treat the nature of the offence under Section 304-A IPC as attracting the benevolent provisions of Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. We fully endorse the view expressed by this Court in Dalbir Singh [(2000) 5 SCC 82: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1208].

35. Similar is the judgment in State of Punjab v. Saurabh Bakshi, (2015) 5 SCC 182: (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 751: 2015 SCC OnLine SC 278, wherein it was observed at page 196: “25. Before parting with the case, we are compelled to observe that India has a disreputable record of road accidents. There is a nonchalant attitude among the drivers. They feel that they are the “Emperors of all they survey”. Drunkenness contributes to careless driving, where other people become their prey. The poor feel that their lives are not safe, the pedestrians think of uncertainty, and the civilised persons drive in constant fear, but are still apprehensive about the obnoxious attitude of the people who project themselves as “larger than life”. In such circumstances, we are bound to observe that the lawmakers should scrutinise, relook and revisit the sentencing policy in Section 304-A IPC. We say so with immense anguish.”

36. The learned Trial Court had sentenced the accused to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 3 months each for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 and 337 of the IPC and rigorous imprisonment for 6 months for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 338 of the IPC. Considering that the accused had driven the truck in a wrong lane leading to multiple injuries to the occupants, the sentence imposed by the learned Trial Court is not excessive, requiring any interference from the Court.

37. No other point was urged.

38. In view of the above, the present revision fails, and it is dismissed.

39. The present revision stands disposed of, and so are the pending miscellaneous application(s), if any.

40. The record of the learned Courts below be returned with a copy of the judgment.

(Rakesh Kainthla)

Judge 12th October, 2026 (Chander)