CMPMO/722/2025 on 8 October 2026

2026:HHC:45454 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH SHIMLA

CMPMO No. 722/2025

Decided on: 08.10.2026

CANARA Bank

….Petitioner

Versus

Manita & anr.

…Respondents ________________________________________________________________

Coram:

The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Romesh Verma, Judge.

Whether approved for reporting?1 For the Petitioner: Mr. Sanjay Dalmia, Advocate.

For the Respondents: Mr. Naresh K. Sharma, Advocate, for respondent No.1.

Romesh Verma, Judge (oral)

The instant petition arises out of the order, dated 27.08.2025, as passed by the learned Civil Judge, Court No.IV, Shimla, whereby an application under Order 1 Rule 10 read with Section 151 of CPC for impleadment of the petitioner-CANARA Bank, through its Branch Manager, came to be dismissed.

The facts, as emerge in the present case are that the plaintiff/respondent No.1, Manita Sharma filed a suit for permanent injunction against present respondent No.2, Vivek, in 1Whether reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

the court of learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Shimla for grant of decree of permanent injunction restraining him from dispossessing the plaintiff from the suit property through himself or through his official agents, friends, etc. save and except in accordance with the provisions of law. In the plaint, it has been averred by present respondent No. 1 that she was inducted as a tenant in the ground floor of the building in the year 2015, consisting of one room, one kitchen, along with a bathroom, and toilet, which is outside the rented premises in the ground floor of the building and the monthly rent was Rs.2,500/-. The plaintiff is paying Rs.3,000/- per month as enhanced rent from time to time, excluding electricity, water, and M.C. charges. It has been contended in the plaint that the defendant, Vivek, is creating nuisance by quarreling with the plaintiff for very small issues and for the purpose of ensuring the eviction of the plaintiff by illegal means which is in possession of the plaintiff. Therefore, under such circumstances, it was prayed that the defendant Vivek be injuncted thereby restraining him from dispossessing present respondent No. 1, illegally from the suit property through himself or through his official agents, friends, save and except in accordance with due procedure of law.

During pendency of the said suit, the present petitioner-Bank filed an application under Order 1 Rule 10 of the

CPC for its impleadment in the said civil suit. In the application, it was contended that the petitioner had advanced loan of Rs. 25 lakhs on 13.12.2016 to defendant No. 1 under the name and style of M/s. S.K.V. Constructions and respondent, Vivek, being the proprietor of the firm had executed various loan documents. He had offered to mortgage his land comprised in the entire ground floor having its built-up area of 93 square meters of the building constructed over a part of the land measuring 164.51 square meters comprised in Khasra Nos. 803, 805, 806, Kita 3, Khata Khatauni No. 68/114 and 115, situated at Mohal Kanlog, Revenue Circle, Khalini, Tehsil and District Shimla through registered mortgage deed No. 935 of 2016. The charge has also been entered and attested in jamabandi vide Rapat No. 241, whereas the charge of Rs.25 lakh has been entered and attested in favour of the Bank. It has been stated in the application that since defendant No. 1, Vivek, had not repaid the loan amount of the Bank and had committed successive defaults in the repayment of the loan, therefore he was declared as NPA on 01.04.2018 as per the guidelines of the Reserve Bank of India.

It has further been stated that the present respondent No. 2, borrower, failed to discharge his loan liability and the Bank filed an application before the Debt Recovery Tribunal under section 14 of the SARFAESI Act for taking over the physical possession of the secured assets, and on application, the District Magistrate had passed the order and further directed the concerned Tehsildar to take over the physical possession. Therefore, by means of the application, it was prayed that the present petitioner may be ordered to be added as a party defendant No. 2 in the civil suit which is pending before the learned Court below.

The said application came to be resisted by the present respondent No.1 by way of filing reply.

The learned Civil Judge (Junior Division) Court No. 4, Shimla, vide its impugned order dated 27.08.2025 dismissed the application filed by the present petitioner for its impleadment in the aforesaid civil suit. Feeling dissatisfied, the present petitioner-Bank has approached this Court by assailing the impugned order.

Mr. Sanjay Dalmia, learned counsel for the petitioner, has urged that the impugned order, as passed by the learned trial Court, is erroneous and liable to be set aside. He has submitted that the learned court below has wrongly rejected the application filed by the present petitioner for its impleadment, whereas the petitioner has made out a case for its impleadment in the attending facts and circumstances of the case. He would submit that after accepting the present petition, the application which has been filed for impleadment of the petitioner-Bank in the civil suit deserves to be allowed.

On the other hand, Mr. Naresh K. Sharma, learned counsel for respondent No.1, has defended the impugned order. He has submitted that there is no illegality or perversity in the impugned order and this Court, while exercising the powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, will not interfere in the well-reasoned order as passed by the learned trial Court.

I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the material available on record.

In the present case, respondent No.1, Manita Sharma, has filed a civil suit before learned Civil Judge, Court No.IV, Shimla, for grant of injunction against respondent No.2 Vivek on the ground that she was inducted as a tenant by respondent No. 2, Vivek, in the year 2015, and he is trying to evict her without adopting due process of law. Therefore, she has sought the decree of injunction by restraining the defendant from dispossessing her illegally from the suit premises.

Respondent No.1 has filed a simpliciter suit for injunction against Vivek and admittedly the present petitioner was not arrayed as a party in those proceedings.

The provisions of Order 1 Rule 10 of the CPC read as follows:

" 10. Suit in name of wrong plaintiff.-

(1) Where a suit has been instituted in the name of the wrong person as plaintiff or where it is doubtful whether it has been instituted in the name of the right plaintiff, the Court may at any stage of the suit, if satisfied that the suit has been instituted thought a bona fide mistake, and that it is necessary for the determination of the real matter in dispute so to do, order any other person to be substituted or added as plaintiff upon such terms as the Court thinks just.

(2) Court may strike out or add parties- The Court may at any stage of the proceedings, either upon or without the application of either party, and on such terms as may appear to the Court to be just, order that the name of any party improperly joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, be struck out, and that the name, of any person who ought to have been joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, or whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit, be added.

(3) No person shall be added as a plaintiff suing without a next friend or as the next friend of a plaintiff under any disability without his consent.

(4) Where defendant added, plaint to be amended--Where a defendant is added, the plaint shall, unless the Court otherwise directs, be amended in such manner as may be necessary, and amended copes of the summons and of the plaint shall be served on the new defendant and, if the Court thinks fit, on the original defendant.

(5) Subject to the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act, 1877 (15 of 1877), section 22, the proceedings as against any person added as defendant shall be deemed to have begun only on the service of the summons."

The provisions clearly stipulate that court may, at any stage of the proceedings, either upon or without the application of either party, and on such terms as may appear to the court to be just, order that the name of any party improperly joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, be struck out, and that the name of any person who ought to have been joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, or whose presence before the court may be necessary in order to enable the court effectively and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit, be added.

In the civil suit, there is no title dispute inter se the parties, namely Manita Sharma and Vivek. The only ground and the grievance of the plaintiff before the learned trial Court is that she was inducted as a tenant by respondent No.2 Vivek, who is trying to evict her forcibly that too without adopting due process of law, and, thus she has sought a decree for permanent prohibitory injunction only against said Vivek.

It is well-settled principle of law that the plaintiff is the dominus litis, and it is the prerogative of the plaintiff to whom he/she intends to add as a party defendant and to proceed in the matter. The plaintiff/respondent No.1 cannot be forced to add a person against whom no relief has been sought by her in the civil suit.

The petitioner herein is trying to rake up the issue, which is alien to the matter in controversy between the parties pending in the civil suit. The learned counsel for the petitioner could not satisfy this Court that in a simpliciter suit for injunction, how the presence of the present petitioner is required. The petitioner failed to satisfy the Court how the impleadment is just and necessary for complete and effective adjudication of the case in hand.

The Hon’ble Apex Court in Gurmit Singh Bhatia vs. Kiran Kant Robinson and others, (2020) 13 SCC 773 has held that the Court has to satisfy two tests for determining the question as to who is a necessary party. The tests are (1) there must be a right to some relief against such party in respect of the controversies involved in the proceedings; (2) no effective decree can be passed in the absence of such party.

In the present case also, the petitioner has failed to establish any right or relief which has been sought by it. The petitioner-Bank has failed to corroborate and substantiate that no effective decree can be passed in its absence. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the aforesaid judgment has held as follows: “5.2 An identical question came to be considered before this Court in the case of Kasturi (supra) and applying the

principle that the plaintiff is the dominus litis, in the similar facts and circumstances of the case, this Court observed and held that the question of jurisdiction of the court to invoke Order 1 Rule 10 CPC to add a party who is not made a party in the suit by the plaintiff shall not arise unless a party proposed to be added has direct and legal interest in the controversy involved in the suit. It is further observed and held by this Court that two tests are to be satisfied for determining the question who is a necessary party. The tests are – (1) there must be a right to some relief against such party in respect of the controversies involved in the proceedings; (2) no effective decree can be passed in the absence of such party. It is further observed and held that in a suit for specific performance the first test can be formulated is, to determine whether a party is a necessary party there must be a right to the same relief against the party claiming to be a necessary party, relating to the same subject matter involved in the proceedings for specific performance of contract to sell. It is further observed and held by this Court that in a suit for specific performance of the contract, a proper party is a party whose presence is necessary to adjudicate the controversy involved in the suit. It is further observed and held that the parties claiming an independent title and possession adverse to the title of the vendor and not on the basis of the contract, are not proper parties and if such party is impleaded in the suit, the scope of the suit for specific performance shall be enlarged to a suit for title and possession, which is impermissible. It is further observed and held that a third party or a stranger cannot be added in a suit for specific performance, merely in order to find out who is in possession of the contracted property or to avoid multiplicity of the suits. It is further observed and held by this Court that a third party or a stranger to a contract cannot be added so as to convert a suit of one character into a suit of different character.”

Similarly, the Hon’ble Apex Court in Mumbai International Airport Pvt. Ltd. vs. Regency Convention Centre & Hotels Pvt. Ltd. & Ors., (2010) 7 SCC 416 has held that the plaintiff in a suit, being dominus litis, may choose the persons against whom he wishes to litigate and cannot be compelled to sue a person against whom he does not seek any relief. A `necessary party' is a person who ought to have been joined as a party and in whose absence no effective decree could be passed at all by the Court. If a `necessary party' is not impleaded, the suit itself is liable to be dismissed. A `proper party' is a party who, though not a necessary party, is a person whose presence would enable the court to completely, effectively and adequately adjudicate upon all matters in disputes in the suit, though he need not be a person in favour of or against whom the decree is to be made. If a person is not found to be a proper or necessary party, the court has no jurisdiction to implead him, against the wishes of the plaintiff. The fact that a person is likely to secure a right/interest in a suit property, after the suit is decided against the plaintiff, will not make such person a ‘necessary party’ or a ‘proper party’ to the suit The

Hon’ble Apex Court has reiterated the principles of Order 1 Rule 10 (2) of CPC in the following manner: “13. The general rule in regard to impleadment of parties is that the plaintiff in a suit, being dominus litis, may choose the persons against whom he wishes to litigate and cannot be compelled to sue a person against whom he does not seek any relief. Consequently, a person who is not a party has no right to be impleaded against the wishes of the plaintiff. But this general rule is subject to the provisions of Order I Rule 10(2) of Code of Civil Procedure (`Code' for short), which provides for impleadment of proper or necessary parties. The said sub-rule is extracted below: "Court may strike out or add parties. -(2) The Court may at any stage of the proceedings, either upon or without the application of either party, and on such terms as may appear to the Court to be just, order that the name of any party improperly joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, be struck out, and that the name of any person who ought to have been joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, or whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit, be added."

14. The said provision makes it clear that a court may, at any stage of the proceedings (including suits for specific performance), either upon or even without any application, and on such terms as may appear to it to be just, direct that any of the following persons may be added as a party:

(a) any person who ought to have been joined as plaintiff or defendant, but not added; or (b) any person whose presence before the court may be necessary in order to enable the court to effectively and completely adjudicate upon and settle the question involved in the suit. In short, the court is given the discretion to add as a party, any person who is found to be a necessary party or proper party.

15. A `necessary party' is a person who ought to have been joined as a party and in whose absence no effective decree could be passed at all by the Court. If a `necessary party' is not impleaded, the suit itself is liable to be dismissed. A `proper party' is a party who, though not a necessary party, is a person whose presence would enable the court to completely, effectively and adequately adjudicate upon all matters in disputes in the suit, though he need not be a person in favour of or against whom the decree is to be made. If a person is not found to be a proper or necessary party, the court has no jurisdiction to implead him, against the wishes of the plaintiff. The fact that a person is likely to secure a right/interest in a suit property, after the suit is decided against the plaintiff, will not make such person a necessary party or a proper party to the suit for specific performance.”

As observed earlier, plaintiff/respondent No.1 Manita Sharma has filed a simpliciter suit for injunction. Neither she is alleging any title or disputing any kind of rightful ownership of present respondent No.2. Her only grievance before the learned trial court is that she may be granted a decree of injunction by restraining the defendant Vivek from dispossessing her from the suit premises save and except under the due process of law. Therefore, in these circumstances, it cannot be held that the present petitioner is a necessary or a proper party. It cannot further be held that no effective decree can be passed in the absence of the present petitioner.

The petitioner has also placed on record the copy of the judgment and decree dated 07.03.2026, as passed by the learned Civil Judge, Court No. IV, Shimla, in case titled as Reena Devi vs. Vivek. The said suit was filed by Reena Devi alleging her to be the tenant of present respondent No.2 Vivek, and she had sought a decree for permanent prohibitory injunction against him. The said suit filed by Reena Devi came to be decreed by the learned trial court on 07.03.2026 and it has been fairly conceded by the learned counsel for the petitioner that till date this judgment has not been assailed before the superior court. In light of judgment, dated 07.03.2026 passed against respondent No.2, which admittedly has not been challenged as of today, no relief can be granted to the petitioner in the facts and circumstances of the case.

The power under Article 227 is limited to see that the Courts below function within the limits of their authority or jurisdiction. The High Court cannot interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the subordinate Court or Tribunal while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that, over the last 50 years, it has consistently been observed that the limited jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 cannot be exercised by interfering with findings of fact or by setting aside the judgments of the courts below on merits.

Hon’ble Apex Court in Civil Appeal No. 2226 of 2010, titled State of Haryana & others vs. Manoj Kumar, decided on 09.03.2010 has held as follow:- “23. More than half a century ago, the Constitution Bench of this court in Nagendra Nath Bora and Another v. Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals, Assam & Others AIR 1958 SC 398 settled that power under Article 227 is limited to seeing that the courts below function within the limit of its authority or jurisdiction.

24. This court placed reliance on Nagendra Nath's case in a subsequent judgment in Nibaran Chandra Bag v. Mahendra Nath Ghughu AIR 1963 SC 1895. The court observed that jurisdiction conferred under Article 227 is not by any means appellate in its nature for correcting errors in the decisions of subordinate courts or tribunals but is merely a power of superintendence to be used to keep them within the bounds of their authority.

25. This court had an occasion to examine this aspect of the matter in the case of Mohd. Yunus v. Mohd. Mustaqim & Others (1983) 4 SCC 566. The court observed as under:- "The supervisory jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 227 of the Constitution is limited "to seeing that an inferior Court or Tribunal functions within the limits of its authority," and not to correct an error apparent on the face of the record, much less an error of law. for this case there was, in our opinion, no error of law much less an error apparent on the face of the record. There was no failure on the part of the

learned Subordinate Judge to exercise jurisdiction nor did he act in disregard of principles of natural justice. Nor was the procedure adopted by him not in consonance with the procedure established by law. In exercising the supervisory power under Article 227, the High Court does not act as an Appellate Court or Tribunal. It will not review or reweigh the evidence upon which the determination of the inferior court or tribunal purports to be based or to correct errors of law in the decision."

26. This court again clearly reiterated the legal position in Laxmikant Revchand Bhojwani & Another v. Pratapsing Mohansingh Pardeshi (1995) 6 SCC 576. The court again cautioned that the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution cannot assume unlimited prerogative to correct all species of hardship or wrong decisions. It must be restricted to cases of grave dereliction of duty and flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or justice, where grave injustice would be done unless the High Court interferes.

27. A three-Judge Bench of this court in Rena Drego (Mrs.) v. Lalchand Soni & Others (1998) 3 SCC 341 again abundantly made it clear that the High Court cannot interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the subordinate court or the tribunal while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227. Its function is limited to seeing that the subordinate court or the tribunal functions within the limits of its authority. It cannot correct mere errors of fact by examining the evidence and reappreciating it.

28. In Virendra Kashinath Ravat & Another v. Vinayak N. Joshi & Others (1999) 1 SCC 47 this court held that the limited power under Article 227 cannot be invoked except for ensuring that the subordinate courts function within its limits.

29. This court over 50 years has been consistently observing that limited jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 cannot be exercised by interfering with the findings of fact and set aside the judgments of the courts below on merit.”

To the similar extent, the Hon’ble Apex Court in Civil Appeal No. 3072 of 2022, titled as Ibrat Faizan vs. Omaxe Buildhome Private Limited, decided on 13.05.2022 has held as follows: - “14. In view of the above, in the present case, the High Court has not committed any error in entertaining the writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India against the order passed by the National Commission which has been passed in an appeal under Section 58 (1)

(a) (iii) of the 2019 Act. We are in complete agreement with the view taken by the High Court. However, at the same time, it goes without saying that while exercising the powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court subjects itself to the rigour of Article 227 of the Constitution and the High Court has to exercise the jurisdiction under Article 227 within the parameters within which such jurisdiction is required to be exercised. 14.1 The scope and ambit of jurisdiction of Article 227 of the Constitution has been explained by this Court in the case of Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate (P) Ltd., (2001) 8 SCC 97, which has been consistently followed by this Court (see the recent decision of this Court in the case of Garment Craft v. Prakash Chand Goel, 2022 SCC Online SC 29). Therefore, while exercising the powers under Article 227 of the Constitution, the High Court has to act within the parameters to exercise the powers under Article 227 of the Constitution. It goes without saying that even while considering the grant of interim stay/relief in a writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court has to bear in mind the limited jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. Therefore, while granting any interim stay/relief in a writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution against an order passed by the National Commission, the same shall always be subject to the rigor of the powers to be exercised under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.”

The petitioner could not make out a case for its impleadment in the civil suit. In the considered opinion of this court, the learned trial court has exercised the jurisdiction in a legal and valid manner, thus, the impugned order is a well- reasoned order and the same deserves to be upheld as it does not suffer from any illegality, irregularity or jurisdictional error. Ordered accordingly.

Consequently, in view of aforesaid exposition of law and discussion, the present petition, being devoid of any merit, is dismissed. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.

Before parting, it is made clear that any observation made here-in-above shall not be taken as an expression of opinion on the merits of the main case, which are only for the purpose of the instant petition.

(Romesh Verma) 08th October, 2026

Judge (pankaj)