WP/33527/2023 of R.SURESH KUMAR Vs THE GOVERNMENT OF TAMILNADU on 14 October 2026

ORDER

The present Writ Petition has been filed challenging the impugned order dated 24.08.2023 by and in which the petitioner was imposed with a punishment of withholding of increment for two years without cumulative effect. 2 (a).The brief facts which are necessary for the disposal of the present writ petition is that, there was a complaint against the petitioner for receipt of a bribe from one Chandrasekaran and in pursuance thereof, an FIR was registered in Crime No.2 of 2004 for the offence under Section 7, 13(2) r/w 13(1) (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and the petitioner was arrested on 18.05.2004. In pursuance thereof, from 21.05.2004 the petitioner was under the prolonged suspension for more than 16 years. In the meanwhile, he got an acquittal in the criminal prosecution in Spl.CC.No.52 of 2011 by the Special Court for Vigilance and Anti-Corruption, Trichy vide order dated 28.11.2017.

(b) .Thereafter, when the petitioner gave a representation for reinstatement, in stead of reinstating the petitioner, the respondent came up with a charge memorandum dated 06.12.2019 and they proceeded with the ex parte enquiry without taking into consideration of the order passed by this Court in WP.Nos.3 & 14 of 2020 and ultimately held that the charge has been proved. Thereafter, the Disciplinary Authority imposed a punishment of dismissal from service. Aggrieved with the same, when the petitioner preferred an appeal before the 3rd respondent, vide order dated 06.05.2021, the punishment was modified to withholding of increment for three years with cumulative effect and further, he was also reinstated. Again when the petitioner preferred a Revision/Mercy Petition before the DGP of Police, the punishment was reduced to withholding of increment for two years without cumulative effect. The Government has also confirmed the punishment imposed by the DGP vide impugned order dated 24.08.2023. Aggrieved with the same, the present Writ Petition has been filed.

3. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Special Government Pleader appearing for the respondents. 4(a).The learned counsel for the petitioner would vehemently contend that after the petitioner got an acquittal from the Special Court in Spl.C.C.No.52 of 2011, he filed a writ petition before the Madurai Bench of Madras High Court in WP(MD).Nos.3 & 14 of 2020 to quash the charge memorandum and also to reinstate the petitioner into service. In the said writ petition, though the Court has given permission to the respondent to proceed with the disciplinary proceedings, has categorically held that such disciplinary proceedings should be in accordance with PSO.67. When he approached the Division Bench, the Division Bench in WA(MD).Nos.1004 & 1005 of 2020, vide order dated 08.12.2020 has confirmed the same. In spite of the order of the Division Bench, the respondent has arrived at a conclusion as if the petitioner has committed an offence of corruption in contravention to the findings rendered by the Criminal Court, that too after full-fledged trial.

(b) .It is his submission that according to PSO.67, the findings rendered by the Criminal Court shall not be altered unless there are additional documentary and oral evidence. It is his submission that even according to the respondent, the charges, witnesses, documents are one and the same both in the disciplinary proceedings as well as in the criminal prosecution. Hence, it is his contention that the findings rendered by the Disciplinary Authority that the charge has been proved is illegal as a consequence the imposition of the punishment is erroneous. Hence, prayed to interfere with the same.

5. Per contra, the said contention was objected by the learned Special Government Pleader and would contend that there is no bar in law to initiate and to conclude the parallel departmental proceedings. It is his further submission that degree of proof before the Criminal Court as well as the Disciplinary Authority are different. Therefore, the mere acquittal will in no way confer any right to the petitioner to seek a discharge. It is his submission that in the Disciplinary Proceedings, the respondent has not all cross examined the witnesses. Therefore, there are evidences available against the petitioner. Hence, the findings rendered by the Disciplinary Authority cannot be interfered with. It is also the submission that considering the totality of the circumstances, the Government has taken a lenient view and has imposed a flea-bite punishment. Therefore, the learned Special Government Pleader contended that the petitioner cannot seek a complete exoneration as there are unchallenged evidence available before the Disciplinary Authority. Hence, prayed to dismiss the present writ petition.

6. I have given my anxious consideration to either side submissions.

7. It is an admitted fact that the petitioner was prosecuted on the very same set of charges before the Special Court for Vigilance and Anti-Corruption in Spl.C.C.No.52 of 2011. Wherein vide order dated 28.11.2017, the Special Court in it’s lengthy order which is running to 135 pages and having 111 paragraphs, has held that the alleged corruption charge which stems upon the petitioner’s Kattapanchayat [kangaroo court] has not been proved. Based on the above finding, the learned Special Judge has ultimately arrived at a conclusion that, when the very fundamental and basis of the corruption charge qua the conduct of Kattapanchayat is not proved, the question of receipt of bribe would not surface. To put it differently, the Special Court has arrived at a conclusion that on account of absence of proof in respect of involvement of the petitioner in the allegation of Kattapanchayat, the consequential act of receipt of bribe does not arise. As already stated, the above findings arrived at by the Special Court after thoroughly discussing oral and documentary evidences of all the prosecution witnesses. Even the Disciplinary Authority in their departmental proceedings has relied on the same set of oral and documentary evidence.

8. When the petitioner, after obtaining acquittal in Criminal prosecution, approached this Court for quashing of charge memorandum and for reinstatement, in WP(MD).Nos.3 & 14 of 2020, while dismissing the writ petition, the learned Single Judge of this Court in paragraphs 18 to 20 has ordered as follows:- “18.However, in departmental proceedings, such a decree of proof is not required. It is a well settled principle that in criminal cases, the decree of proof is that, the prosecution shall prove the case based on clear evidences beyond reasonable doubt, whereas, in departmental proceedings, the decree of proof is only the preponderance of probability. Therefore, since decree of proof between the criminal case and departmental proceedings is different, in some cases, the department may succeed in proving the guilt against the erring official/employee by conducting a full- pledged enquiry. Therefore, it has to be decided only by the department concerned or employer concerned as to whether the erring employee has to be proceeded by way of departmental proceedings despite the fact that he having been acquitted by a criminal Court after a full-pledged trial. This has been exactly enunciated by PSO 67, where, it makes clear that, what are all the procedure to be followed after acquittal of an employee in a criminal case. However, at the same time, clause 3 of PSO 67 makes the following. “3.The Government do not wish it to be understood that the departmental authorities are not entitled, on grounds of legitimate suspicion, to order a departmental enquiry in all such cases. They do, however, wish to emphasize that in enquiries of this kind, the departmental authorities should not dissent from the conclusions arrived at by the Court of Law, unless fresh circumstances have brought to light lacunae or defects in the evidence before, or in the procedure of such court.”

19. The Government therefore makes it clear, by way of emphasizing that, in enquiries of this kind i.e. departmental enquiries after the employee is acquitted by a criminal Court, the departmental authorities should not dissent from the conclusions arrived at by the Court of Law, unless fresh circumstances have brought to light lacunae or defects in the evidence before, or in the procedure of such court. It means that, once in a criminal case, the employee is acquitted after trial, for the same set of facts, if the department proceeds for a disciplinary proceeding, where an enquiry is conducted, even though, in such an enquiry, the decree of proof is only preponderance of probabilities., neither the enquiry officer nor the disciplinary authority shall dissent from the conclusion arrived at by the criminal Court on the same set of charges. Therefore, in the considered opinion of this Court, clause 3 of PSO 67 put a cap on the departmental proceedings to both the enquiry officer as well as the disciplinary authority that, they should not deviate from any conclusion arrived at by the criminal Court. Only with this cap, the disciplinary proceedings can go on, for which,

absolutely there is no prohibition either under PSO 67 or under any other law for the time being in force.

20. Insofar as the prolonged suspension is concerned, for the reason adduced by the respondents that, since the criminal case was pending for 14 years and thereafter, now, they took two years to issue charge memo, it is for the department to conduct enquiry and complete the disciplinary proceedings within a time frame to be stipulated by this Court. In this regard as has been submitted by the learned Additional Advocate General, at this juncture, this Court feels that, the impugned suspension order may not be interfered with. At the same time, once the disciplinary proceedings is not concluded and final orders are not passed within a time frame to be stipulated by this Court in this order, certainly, the petitioner is entitled to seek review of the suspension order and in that case, the suspension shall be either revoked or to be made rescinded. In such view of the matter, as has been discussed above, this Court feels that both the impugned orders cannot be interfered with at this juncture. But, at the same time, the petitioner is entitled to get some benefits both during the departmental enquiry to be conducted against him, pursuant to the impugned charge memo and thereafter. Accordingly, to meet the ends of justice, by taking into account the facts and circumstances of these cases, this Court is inclined to dispose of these two writ petitions with the following directions: “The respondents can proceed against the petitioner, pursuant to the impugned charge memo dated 06.12.2019 and in this regard, the procedure contemplated under the relevant service regulations for conducting disciplinary proceedings have to be scrupulously followed and reasonable opportunity in all respect shall be given to the petitioner. After conducting an enquiry, if the enquiry officer's report goes against the petitioner, a further opportunity shall also be given to the petitioner to get his further defence or explanation and after giving reasonable time to give such explanation to the petitioner, final decision/order shall be passed by the respondents/disciplinary authority. The aforesaid exercise shall be undertaken by the respondents within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. If the disciplinary proceedings is not concluded within the period stipulated above, the petitioner shall be entitled to seek review of the impugned suspension order and under such circumstances, the respondents shall review the impugned suspension order and revoke the same as beyond the period stipulated by this Court to complete the disciplinary proceedings, the petitioner shall not be kept under suspension. It is made clear that, while conducting the disciplinary proceedings, both the enquiry officer as well as the disciplinary authority shall borne in mind the cap put in by clause 3 of the PSO 67 to state that neither the enquiry officer nor the disciplinary authority shall deviate or desist from any decision taken or conclusion arrived at by the criminal Court, where the petitioner has already been acquitted. This is because, the charge memo impugned now is only or almost a replica of the criminal charge from which the petitioner has already been acquitted.” [Emphasis supplied by this Court]

9. The learned Single Judge, after referring to Clause 3 of PSO.67, has held that the Disciplinary Authority though has right to proceed with the disciplinary proceedings, they should not dissent from the conclusion arrived at by the Court of law unless fresh circumstances, lacunae or defect is brought before them. This Court has carefully perused the enquiry report. While doing so, this Court could not find any instances of existence or surfacing of fresh circumstances. It is not the case of respondent that there was a lacunae or irregular procedure followed before the Court. Even according to the 3rd respondent’s order dated 29.01.2021, the charge in the instant disciplinary proceedings and the charge in the criminal prosecution have arising out of the same set of facts. Having arrived at such a conclusion and having the petitioner was acquitted in a criminal prosecution, again imposition of a punishment in disciplinary proceedings would only demonstrate the degree of innocence of the disciplinary authority and the other authorities.

10. But, the one instance, which would stare against the petitioner is that he did not cross examine the witnesses examined before the Enquiry Officer. Though such being the position, when there is a specific direction of this Court that the Disciplinary Authority can proceed with an enquiry, by keeping in mind with a cap put in Clause 3 of PSO.67, the above lapse would in no way advance the respondent case. In fact, they admit that both the Disciplinary proceeding and Criminal Prosecution are on the same set of charge.

11. As already stated, when the Special Court has reached a conclusion that there are no proof for the Kattapanchayat and as a result of which, when the petitioner was acquited, any contradictory view taken by the Disciplinary Authority that too in the absence of lacunae or defects in the procedure followed in the Court, is contrary to the direction of this Court as extracted hereinabove. Which was also later confirmed by the Division Bench.

12. Even while looking into the orders of the Disciplinary Authority, they dealt the matter very leniently. Even though they accepted the findings rendered by the Enquiry Officer that the corruption charge has been proved, they dealt very leniently, as though corruption is not a serious delinquency, which attitude though not appreciable, we must only understand that even the Appellate Authority have doubt about the finding of the Disciplinary Authority.

13. As already stated, when this Court has directed them to proceed with the disciplinary proceedings in accordance with Clause 3 of PSO.67 in the absence of any new circumstances, they ought to have accepted the order of the Criminal Court and should have discharged the petitioner from all the charges. Contrarily, holding the petitioner guilty and keeping him for more than 16 years under suspension, is nothing but an antithetical to the service jurisprudence and would reflect the respondent’s egregious conduct. The continuance of the disciplinary proceedings for almost two decades that too in the backdrop of the peculiar facts of this case would definitely impinge upon his right to life. Therefore, this Court is of the firm view that the findings rendered by the Disciplinary Authority is liable to be interfered with.

14. Accordingly, this Writ Petition stands allowed. As a consequence, the order of dismissal imposed by the Disciplinary Authority and modified by the

Appellate Authority is hereby set aside. As a concomitant, the respondents are directed to pay all attendant and consequential benefits with continuity of service including the notional promotion. While looking into the age of the petitioner, by this time, the petitioner might have retired. Therefore, all the monetary benefits as indicated above are directed to be settled to the petitioner within a period of twelve(12) weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs. Consequently, connected WMP is also closed. 14-10-2026 Index: Yes/No Speaking/Non-speaking order Neutral Citation: Yes/No KMI To

1. The Government Of Tamilnadu Rep. By Its Principal Secretary To Government, Home Department, Fort St. George, Chennai 9

2. The Director General Of Police Mylapore Chennai 04

3. The Additional Director General Of Police, Mylapore Chennai 04

4. The Commissioner Of Police Trichy City, Tiruchirapalli.

C.KUMARAPPAN J. KMI WP No. 33527 of 2023 and WMP No. 33352 of 2023 14-10-2026