CRL OP(MD)/20522/2026 of Dinesh Ram Vs The State of Tamilnadu on 12 October 2026

ORDER

1. The petitioner, who is arrayed as the sole accused in Spl.S.C.No.209 of 2025 on the file of the Special Court for Exclusive Trial of Cases under the POCSO Act, Dindigul, has come forward with the present petition seeking to quash the final report, by which he stands charged for the offences punishable under Sections 11(1) and 11(2) read with Section 12 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (hereinafter referred to as “the POCSO Act”) and Section 67 of the Information Technology Act, 2000. (A). The case of the prosecution, in brief: 2(a). The victim is the second daughter of the defacto complainant. She is aged about 12 years and is studying in VII Standard at Kodaikanal.

(b) . It is alleged in the final report that the accused, a permanent resident of Gurugram, Haryana, while knowing fully well that the victim was a minor, made a video call through the “OME TV” application to the victim and three other girls who were with her at that time. With a culpable intent, he is alleged to have told the girls “I Love You” and thereafter, using his own mobile number, uploaded the video of his conversation with the girls on Instagram, YouTube and Facebook. (B). Submissions on either side:

3. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would contend that the video application in question is meant only for adults, but it does not require its users to verify or disclose their age. Hence, according to him, the petitioner had no means of knowing the age of the victim when he came into contact with her through the application. It is his further submission that the users of the application have the option of saving the chat log, and that when the petitioner made a random call through the application, the victim girl had voluntarily stated her age to be about 18 years. Therefore, the petitioner had no knowledge whatsoever that the victim was a minor.

4. The learned counsel would further submit that the petitioner is a content creator who posts videos on YouTube, Omegle and Instagram, and that none of his content involves sexual harassment or outrages the modesty of any woman. On the date of the occurrence, the petitioner had made a routine video call to the victim and her friends without knowing their age, and invited them to take up a “challenge” for his channel, namely, to say “I Love You” if he said “I

Love You”. At the end of the conversation, he had sought their consent to post the video on social media, and the victim girl had nodded in acceptance. It is contended that the petitioner had no ill intention, much less any sexual intent, at any point of time.

5. The learned counsel would further submit that, apart from the said occasion, the petitioner had never made any video call or audio call to the victim girl and therefore, the question of repeated harassment does not arise. The First Information Report came to be registered all of a sudden. According to the learned counsel, none of the ingredients of Sections 11(1), 11(4) or 12 of the POCSO Act or Section 67 of the Information Technology Act are attracted.

6. It is the further submission of the learned counsel that merely sending messages to, or making a call to, a minor girl without any sexual intent would not attract the provisions of Sections 11(1) and 11(4) of the POCSO Act or Section 67 of the Information Technology Act. He would also point out that no document has been annexed to the final report to substantiate the case of the prosecution. ?

7. The learned counsel would further contend that, though the defacto complainant came to know of the occurrence, she lodged the formal complaint only belatedly, and that there are material contradictions in her statement recorded under Section 180 of BNSS. He would point out that the victim girl, in her statement recorded under Section 183 of BNSS, has categorically stated that she and her friends had accepted the challenge. According to him, the petitioner never posted any video on his social media platforms, and the forensic report clearly reveals that the alleged videos and images were not found in the petitioner’s mobile phone. On these grounds, he prayed for quashing of the final report.

8. Per contra, the defacto complainant, who is the mother of the victim, appeared through video conferencing and submitted that the accused was well aware of the age of the victim and that it was neither a challenge nor a casual call. Despite repeated requests made by the victim girl, the video was uploaded. Thereafter, several friends of the victim posted messages requesting the accused to delete the video, but the same was not acceded to. The police officials then contacted the petitioner and directed him to delete the video. Though he initially removed it from one of the social media platforms, it later resurfaced on other platforms. According to her, the petitioner has committed the very offences for which he is now being prosecuted, and when prima facie materials are available, the charges cannot be quashed.

9. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the respondent police would submit that the forensic laboratory report also discloses certain obscene photographs and videos in the mobile phone recovered from the petitioner, and that the titles given by the petitioner to those videos are also obscene. It is therefore evident that the petitioner had a sexual intent in recording the videos and subsequently publishing them on various social media platforms. In such circumstances, he prayed for dismissal of the petition.

10. This Court has heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, the defacto complainant in person and the learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the respondent police, and perused the materials available on record. (C). Discussion:

11. A perusal of the final report would reveal that the petitioner is alleged to have made a video call to the minor victim and called upon her to take up the challenge of repeating “I Love You” whenever he said “I Love You”. The conversation with the girls was thereafter published on Instagram, YouTube and Facebook. These facts are not in dispute.

12. The statement of the victim recorded under Section 180 of BNSS discloses that, when the petitioner sought her permission to post the video on social media, she specifically requested him not to do so, since the accounts were school-based. It is thus evident that, at least after the video call, the petitioner was aware that the victim girl was a minor. Notwithstanding the same, he proceeded to share the video on his Instagram ID.

13. Some of the classmates of the victim, who came across the said video on Instagram, posted comments requesting that it be deleted. Though the video was initially deleted, it was re-posted thereafter, and the petitioner blocked the Instagram ID from which the request for deletion had emanated.

14. The statement of the defacto complainant/mother of the victim recorded under Section 180 of BNSS reveals that she approached the respondent police and requested them to insist that the petitioner remove the videos. Even after such instructions from the police, the petitioner is alleged to have removed the videos only from Instagram, while continuing to retain them on YouTube and Facebook. The defacto complainant was thereafter constrained to approach the police once again, and only then were the videos removed from YouTube and Facebook.

15. It is further alleged that the petitioner had made the videos private, but about two weeks later, the videos were once again made public, which was noticed by the friends of the victim. It is only thereafter that a formal complaint was lodged before the respondent police on 09.12.2024, which culminated in the registration of the First Information Report.

16. The statements of the victim and her mother recorded under Section 180 of BNSS would prima facie reveal that the petitioner was aware of the age of the victim, published the videos against her wishes, and repeatedly refused to take them down despite instructions from the police officials. Ultimately, the First Information Report came to be registered against the petitioner for having repeatedly posted the videos on social media.

17. It was contended on behalf of the petitioner that he had no knowledge of the age of the victim and that he had no sexual intent whatsoever in posting the videos. In this regard, it is apposite to extract Section 30 of the POCSO Act, which reads as follows: “30. Presumption of culpable mental state : (1) In any prosecution for any offence under this Act which requires a culpable mental state on the part of the accused, the Special Court shall presume the existence of such mental state but it shall be a defence for the accused to prove the fact that he had no such mental state with respect to the act charged as an offence in that prosecution.

(2) For the purposes of this section, a fact is said to be proved only when the Special Court believes it to exist beyond reasonable doubt and not merely when its existence is established by a preponderance of probability. Explanation.—In this section, "culpable mental state" includes intention, motive, knowledge of a fact and the belief in, or reason to believe, a fact.”

18. The Hon’ble Supreme Court had an occasion to consider the scope of Section 30 of the POCSO Act in Just Rights for Children Alliance and

another Vs. S.Harish and others, reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2611, wherein it was held in paragraph 221 as follows: “221.In view of the statutory presumption of culpable mental state being attracted, any defence of the respondent no. 1 such as the absence of knowledge or intention would be a matter of trial. Absence of culpable mental state has to be established before the trial court by leading cogent evidence in that regard. Such defences should not be looked into by us at this stage. All that should be ascertained is whether a prima facie case is said to have been made out.”

19. In the light of the facts narrated above, and the other photographs and videos found in the mobile phone of the petitioner as reflected in the forensic laboratory report (though not connected with the present case), which clearly furnish the context and the intention with which the petitioner made the video call to the victim, this Court is of the considered view that the offences under Sections 11(1), 11(4) and 12 of the POCSO Act are squarely attracted, particularly since the petitioner is alleged to have repeatedly posted the videos on social media despite warnings from the police authorities, as borne out by the First Information Report and the statements of the victim and the defacto complainant. In view of the statutory presumption under Section 30 of the POCSO Act, the defence of want of knowledge or absence of intention is a matter to be established by the petitioner during trial and cannot be gone into at this stage. Viewed thus, this Court finds that there are sufficient prima facie materials against the petitioner warranting him to face the trial. (D). Conclusion:

20. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court does not find any merit in this petition. Accordingly, this Criminal Original Petition stands dismissed. Consequently, the connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.

12-10-2026 R.VIJAYAKUMAR,J.

21. After pronouncement of the order, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner requested that the personal appearance of the petitioner before the trial Court may be dispensed with.

22. Considering the fact that the petitioner is residing in Haryana, his personal appearance before the trial Court is dispensed with, unless his personal appearance is specifically directed by the trial Court.

12-10-2026 Index: Yes/No Speaking/Non-speaking order Neutral Citation: Yes/No msa

To

1. The Special Court for Exclusive Trial Cases under POCSO Act, Dindigul

2. The Deputy Superintendent of Police, Dindigul District. Dindigul.

3. The Inspector of Police All Women Police Station, Kodaikanal, Dindigul, Crime No.20/2024.

4. The Additional Public Prosecutor Madurai Bench of Madras High Court Madurai

R.VIJAYAKUMAR,J. msa CRL OP(MD) No. 20522 of 2026 and Crl.MP(MD).Nos.19514 & 19516 of 2026 12.10.2026