Madras High Court
SA/61/2018 of SANGEETHA Vs LAKSHMI(died) on 12 October 2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Reserved On:
Pronounced On:
13.07.2026
12.10.2026
CORAM
THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE V. LAKSHMINARAYANAN
SA Nos.61 & 62 of 2018 and
CMP Nos.1322 & 1323 of 2018 & CMP No.25383 OF 2025
SA No. 61 of 2018:
1. Sangeetha
W/o Late. Karthick
2. Minor Nivedha
D/O LATE KARTHICK,
3. Minor Gobesh
S/o Late Karthick
2 and 3 rep by their NEXT FRINED MOTHER
SANGEETHA W/O. LATE KARTHICK
All Are Residing At Kappalvadi Village
Venkatasammuthiram Post
Bargur Via,
Krishnagiri Tk And Dt
..Appellant(s)
Vs
1. LAKSHMI(died)
W/o M.C.Murugan
B.R.G.Madhepalli Village And Post
Via Bargur
Krishnagiri Tk And Dt
2. Ramani
W/o.Murugan, Door No.1/37,
B.R.G.Madhepalli Village and Post, Via
Bargur-635104 Krishnagiri Taluk and District
3. Nandhakumar
S/o.M.C.Muruagan, Door NO.1/1175
B.R.G.Madhepalli Village and Post, Via
Bargur-635104 Krishnagiri Taluk and District
4. Sharmila
W/o.Krishnan, New Door NO.1/102, B.R.G.
Madhepalli Village and Post, Via
Bargur-635104 Krishnagiri Taluk and District
5. Shenbagavalli
W/o.Sekar, Door NO.3/22, B.R.G. Madhepalli Village and Post, Via Bargur-635104
Krishnagiri Taluk and District
6. Ilayaraja
S/o.M.C.Murugan, Door No.1/1175, B.R.G.
Madhepalli Village and Post, Via
Bargur-635104 Krishnagiri Taluk and District
7. Geethavarshini
D/o.Seenivasan @ Sankar, at Door NO.1/75B, B.R.G. Madhepalli Village and Post, Via Bargur-635104 Krishnagiri Taluk and District
8. Ranjithkumar
S/o.Seenivasan @ Sankar, at Door NO.1/75B, B.R.G. Madhepalli Village and Post, Via Bargur-635104 Krishnagiri Taluk and District .
[Sole respondent died, RR2 to 8 brought on record and appellants 2 and 3 already on record are LRs of the deceased sole respondent vide
court order dated 18/07/2025 made in
CMP.Nos.4647 and 14648 of 2025 in SA.No.61
of 2018]
..Respondent(s)
SA No. 62 of 2018
1. Minor Nivedha
D/o. Late Karthick
2. Minor Gobesh
S/o. Late Karthick
[Minor appellants 1& 2 Rep. by Their Mother Sangeetha]
[Resi. At Kappalvadi Village, Venkatasamuthiram Post, Bargur Via, Krishnagiri Taluk And Dist.]
..Appellant(s)
Vs
1. Lakshmi
W/o. M.C. Murugan, B.R.G. Madhepalli
Village & Post. Via Bargur, Krishnagiri Tk and District.
2. Ramani
W/o.Murugan, Door No.1/37,
B.R.G.Madhepalli Village and Post, Via
Bargur-635104 Krishnagiri Taluk and District
3. Nandhakumar
S/o.M.C.Muruagan, Door NO.1/1175
B.R.G.Madhepalli Village and Post, Via
Bargur-635104 Krishnagiri Taluk and District
4. Sharmila
W/o.Krishnan, New Door NO.1/102, B.R.G.
Madhepalli Village and Post, Via
Bargur-635104 Krishnagiri Taluk and District
5. Shenbagavalli
W/o.Sekar, Door NO.3/22, B.R.G. Madhepalli
Village and Post, Via Bargur-635104
Krishnagiri Taluk and District
6. Ilayaraja
S/o.M.C.Murugan, Door No.1/1175, B.R.G.
Madhepalli Village and Post, Via
Bargur-635104 Krishnagiri Taluk and District
7. Geethavarshini
D/o.Seenivasan @ Sankar, at Door NO.1/75B, B.R.G. Madhepalli Village and Post, Via Bargur-635104 Krishnagiri Taluk and District
8. Ranjithkumar
S/o.Seenivasan @ Sankar, at Door NO.1/75B, B.R.G. Madhepalli Village and Post, Via Bargur-635104 Krishnagiri Taluk and District .
[Sole respondent died, RR2 to 8 brought on record and a1 and 2 already on record are LRs of the deceased sole respondent vide court order dated 18/07/2025 made in CMP.Nos.14650 and 14654 of 2025 in SA.No.62 of 2018]
..Respondent(s)
SA No. 61 of 2018
To set aside the judgement and decree dated 01.12.2016 passed in A.S.No.13 of 2016 on the file of the Prl.Dist.Court Krishnagiri in conforming the judgement and decree dated 10.12.2015 passed in OS.No.95 of 2011 on the file of the Principal Sub Court, Krishnagiri.
SA No. 62 of 2018
Appeal against the judgment and decree dated 01.12.2016 passed in A.S.No.14 of 2016 on the file of the Principal District Court, Krishnagiri in conforming the judgment and decree dated 10.12.2015 passed in O.S.No.10 of 2012 on the file of the Principal Sub Court, Krishnagiri.
In both cases:
For Appellant :
Mr.P.Mani
For Respondent(s)
: Mr.T.S.Baskaran and C.Jaya Chithra for RR 3, 4 & 6
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COMMON JUDGMENT
These two second appeals assail the correctness of the common judgment and decrees of the learned Principal District Judge, Krishnagiri in AS.No.13 of 2016 and A.S.No.14 of 2016 dated 01.12.2026 in confirming the common judgment and decrees of the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, at Krishnagiri in OS.No.95 of 2011 and OS.No.10 of 2012 dated 10.12.2015.
2. For the sake of convenience, the parties shall be referred to as per their ranks in the suit O.S.No.95 of 2011. As the issues in both the appeals are inextricably interlinked, they are disposed of by this common judgment. Case according to the plaint in O.S.No.95 of 2011:
3. O.S.No.95 of 2011 is a suit for cancellation of sale deed dated 09.11.2010, executed by the plaintiff in favour of the minor defendants 2 and 3. It also sought the relief of permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the property by the plaintiff.
4. The plaintiff claimed that she is the absolute owner of the property situated in S.No.104/1 to an extent of 0.48 acres and S.No.105/2 to an extent of 3.15 acres situated at BRG Madepalli Village. She claimed that she purchased the property from one Belaga Chetty on 3.11.1983. The plaintiff had married one M.C.Murugan. From the wedlock, she begotten three sons and four daughters. They are M.Nandakumar, M.Karthick, M.Ilayaraja, Ramani, Sharmila, Sangeetha and Shanmugavalli. The aforesaid Karthick was suffering from Jaundice. He had been treated at several hospitals. Unfortunately, he passed away on 08.11.2010. His body was brought to Madepalli Village for perfomance of funeral obsequies.
5. While the body was lying at the plaintiff's house, her daughter-in-law, the first defendant and her father came with some relatives and other unruly elements and created a scene. They proclaimed that they will not allow the funeral of Karthick to go on unless the plaintiff executes a sale deed in favour of the defendants 2 and 3. The plaintiff, without reading the contents of the document, put her signature on a document presented to her. She did so as she wanted to perform the funeral obsequies in a peaceful manner. After the document was signed, the ceremony was completed.
6. On 15.06.2011, the first defendant (daughter-in-law) came with men and agents to the suit property and attempted to trespass into the same. The trespass was prevented with the help of other villagers. It was then the plaintiff came to know that the document which had been executed by her on 09.11.2010 was a sale deed. She alleged that as the sale deed had been obtained by fraud, coercion, undue influence and misrepresentation and hence, the deed ought to be cancelled. She further alleged that the defendants did not pay the requisite stamp duty on the document. Hence, the Deputy Collector of the Stamp Duty had referred the matter under Section 47A of the Indian Stamp Act. Therefore, the registration of the document was kept in abeyance.
7. She added that being the mother of the deceased Karthick, she is entitled to 1/4th share in the LIC insurance amount. However, the first defendant had appropriated it in its entirety. Therefore, on 22.06.2011, she issued a notice to the first defendant to execute the cancellation deed, cancelling the sale deed dated 09.11.2010.
8. The defendant issued a reply notice was issued on 28.06.2011 containing false and imaginary allegations. It was also pleaded by the plaintiff that the first defendant had falsely alleged that the plaintiff's husband had purchased the property. The plaintiff alleged that the creditors of her deceased son, namely, Murugan and Alagesan, never approached her on 08.11.2010 for clearing the loans. She stated that her son was known as Karthick and was never called as Vijayan. Therefore, the loan transaction said to have been entered into between the creditors and one Vijayan, has nothing to do with her son. Fearing that the defendants might trespass into the property at any moment, the plaintiff came forward with the suit for the aforesaid reliefs.
9. Summons were served on the defendants.
10. The first defendant filed a written statement. After the usual general denials, the first defendant alleged that immediately on knowing the death of Karthick, his creditors, Murugan and Alagesan called upon the first defendant to clear the loan amounts received by her deceased husband. Therefore, on 08.11.2010, a panchayat was convened at their village. During that time, it was the plaintiff who had approached the father of the first defendant, Porman Chennaian to clear the loans immediately. Accordingly, Chennaian cleared the loan. Acting on the advice of the panchayatars, the plaintiff executed a sale deed in favour of the minor defendants 2 and 3. The consideration for the sale being Chennaian clearing the loans incurred by Karthick @ Vijayan.
11. The first defendant further denied that the sale deed had been obtained by fraud, coercion, undue influence and misrepresentation. She asserted that the sale had been executed with full consent, without any compulsion from anyone, in favour of the minors. It was only after the loan amount of Rs.2,00,000/- was cleared, the sale deed was executed by the plaintiff in favour of defendants 2 and 3.
12. The first defendant denied that any incident took place on 15.06.2011. She stated that from the date of execution of the sale deed, that is on, 09.11.2010, the defendants were staying with the plaintiff. Therefore, the question of trespass does not arise. The first defendant also denied the right of the plaintiff to claim 1/4th share in the LIC amount.
13. The first defendant filed an additional written statement stating that in order to purchase the property, she had sold some of her jewels and helped her father in bearing the expenses for registration and for other expenses. With this amount, she gave a sum of Rs.2,00,000/- to the plaintiff as sale consideration. Thus, she claimed that 80 ½ cents of land was purchased by herself and her father in favour of minor defendants. On these pleadings, the defendants sought dismissal of the suit.
Case according to the plaint in O.S.No.10 of 2012:
14. The minor defendants 2 and 3, represented by their mother, first defendant in O.S.No.95 of 2011, presented OS.No.10 of 2012. This is a suit for partition and separate possession, seeking 1/4th share in the suit schedule mentioned property and for permanent injunction restraining the plaintiff in O.S.No.95 of 2011 from alienating the suit property or create any document at the office of the Sub Registrar, Bargur.
15. The claim of the defendants, in their plaint, was that the property belonged to the plaintiff. Out of the total extent of 3.52 acres in S.No.104/1 and S.No.105/2A of B.R.G. Madhepalli Village, she had disposed of 30 cents as 6 bits of 5 cents each to 6 persons. She retained 3.22 acres. The plaintiff had three sons and four daughters. One of her sons, namely, Karthick, who is the father of the minors, passed away on 08.10.2010 due to illness. After the death of Karthick, his widow and minor children were helpless and they were in the care and custody of the paternal house of the first defendant.
16. The defendants alleged that the first defendant sold her jewels and had purchased 0.80 ½ acres on 09.11.2010. The property was purchased for valid sale consideration in order to protect the interest of the minors. They alleged that though the plaintiff had affixed her signature with full consent, on account of ill advice and insistence of her other sons and daughters, she had instituted a suit in O.S.No.95 of 2011 containing false averments. As the defendants came to know that the plaintiff is attempting to alienate the property, and creating some fraudulent document in favour of her surviving daughters and sons, they came forth with the suit for partition.
17. Summons were served on the plaintiff.
18. The plaintiff admitted that she is the owner of the property. She denied that she executed the sale deed dated 09.11.2010 with full consent. She stated that her son, Karthick was suffering from cancer and jaundice and a sum of Rs.6,00,000/- had been incurred towards his treatment. Despite the same, he passed away in CMC hospital at Vellore. On his death, the body was brought to Madepalli Village. While the body was in the house of the plaintiff, the first defendant came along with her father, Chennaiyan, uncles Govindasamy, Krishnan, Saravanan, Velan, her brothers viz., Selvakumar and Bakkiyaraj, Councillor Partheeban, a former Councillor Murugan and other unruly elements and created a scene at the residence of the plaintiff. They threatened her that unless and until a sale deed is executed in favour of the minor children, they will not permit the performance of funeral rites and cremation.
19. Since the plaintiff wanted the cremation to go through, she signed the sale deed. The Sub Registrar of Bargur came over to the residence of the plaintiff and her signature was obtained. She alleged that she did not know the contents of the document and that no amounts were paid to her under the deed. She alleged that no wife will have an intention to purchase the property while the dead body of her husband is still lying at home. Hence, the sale deed dated 09.11.2010 is null and void and not supported by consideration. She asserted that she is the absolute owner of the property and that the suit deserves dismissal.
20. On these pleadings, the learned Principal Subordinate Judge framed the following issues in O.S.No.95 of 2011: “1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a decree cancelling or setting aside the impugned sale deed dated 09.11.2010 as prayed for?
2. Whether the plaintiff is in possession of the suit property and entitled for permanent injunction as prayed for?
3. To what other reliefs?”
21. The following issues were framed in O.S.No.10 of 2012:
“1.Whether the sale deed dated 09.11.2010 is not binding on the defendant as it is a fraudulently obtained one as pleaded?
2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for partition of the suit property and for possession of her 1/4th share is as prayed for?
3. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for permanent injunction as prayed?
4. To what other relief?”
22. The learned Trial Judge treated O.S.No.95 of 2011 as the lead suit. On the side of the plaintiff, she examined herself as PW1 and her son, Nandakumar was examined as PW2. She marked Ex.A1 to Ex.A9. On the side of the defendants, the first defendant, Sangeetha examined herself as DW1. The daughter of the plaintiff and the sister-in-law of the first defendant viz., one Ramani who was an attesting witness to the sale deed, was examined as DW2. The defendants marked Ex.B1 to Ex.B10.
23. The learned Trial Judge came to the following conclusions:-
(i) As the name found in the promissory note was Vijayan @ Karthick, whereas the death certificate and school certificates indicate the name of the deceased was only Karthick, he probablised the contention that the promissory notes were created by the defendants for the purpose of the case;
(ii) The sale deed, having been executed in favour of the grandchildren when the dead body was in the house, he concluded the plea of the plaintiff that the sale deed is vitiated as it lacked consent of the plaintiff must be true. As the sale deed itself was void, he decreed the suit for cancellation of sale deed as prayed for and dismissed the suit for partition.
24. Aggrieved by the same, two regular appeals were preferred in A.S.No.13 of 2016 and A.S.No.14 of 2016 on the file of the learned Principal District Judge at Krishnagiri. In and by way of a common judgment dated 01.12.2016, the learned Appellate Judge dismissed the appeals. Hence, the present second appeals.
25. These second appeals were admitted on the following substantial questions of law on 28.11.2023:- “A) Whether the plaintiff’s plea that the sale deed Ex.A3/B1 sale deed dated 09.11.2010 is vitiated on the ground of undue influence, fraud and coercion is maintainable when the plaintiff though had sufficient time did not object to the execution of the said sale deed and the circumstances indicated that the same was executed as a settlement of the debt due by the plaintiff’s son who borrowed money for his medical treatment? B) Whether the courts below erred in holding that the Ex.A3/B1 sale deed was obtained by fraud and coercion on suspicion and probability, merely because the same was obtained immediately after the death of the plaintiff’s son on the day of funeral, without actual proof for the alleged fraud and coercion by sufficient and convincing oral and documentary evidence? C) Whether the judgment and decree passed by the Courts below are perverse when they have failed to consider and appreciate the evidence on record in proper perspective and based their conclusions on mere surmises and conjectures?”
26. Pending the appeal, the sole plaintiff passed away. Her legal representatives were impleaded as the respondents 2 to 8 to the appeal.
27. I heard Mr.P.Mani in support of the appeal. Mr.T.S.Baskaran opposed the same.
28. It is the plea of Mr.P.Mani that the finding of the courts below that the sale deed dated 09.11.2010 is vitiated on the grounds of undue influence, fraud and coercion is absolutely untenable. The suit suffers from lack of pleadings. He pointed out that no steps had been taken by the plaintiff immediately after the execution of the sale deed nor when the situation had returned to normalcy, as would be expected, but the suit itself came to be filed only after disputes arose over the settlement of the insurance claim (LIC) of the deceased Karthick. He added that the courts below had presumed fraud and coercion on the basis of probability merely because it had been executed on the day of the funeral.
29. Mr.P.Mani further argued that no evidence had been tendered by the plaintiff alleging fraud and coercion as is necessary by law. He added that after the sale deed had been executed in November 2010, the parties had been residing together for six more months under the same roof. No independent witness had been examined in order to substantiate the allegations made in the plaint. He read out from the evidence of DW2 to point out that she was a witness to the sale deed and is one of the daughters of the plaintiff. He stated that the registered document carries with it a presumption. Finally, he submitted that it is not as if the plaintiff is an uneducated lady for her not to know the contents of the document.
30. Rejecting these arguments, Mr.T.S.Baskaran submitted that the discrepancy in the name of the execution of the promissory notes produced as proof of consideration, had been noticed and relied upon by the courts below. He argues this aspect throws very dark cloud around the case of the defendants that father of the first defendant had paid the amounts to the money lenders and in lieu thereof, the plaintiff had executed a sale deed in favour of her minor grandchildren. He states that once the case based on promissory notes falls to the ground, the sale deed cannot be treated as one supported by consideration. Therefore, the verdict of the Supreme Court in Kewel Krishan v. Rajesh Kumar and others, (2022) 18 SCC 489 directly applies to the facts of the case.
31. On the plea of ring of genuineness surrounding a registered document, Mr.T.S.Baskaran refers to a judgment in Asset Reconstruction Company (India) Limited v. S.P.Velayutham and Others, (2022) 8 SCC 210, to argue that it is not a proposition which is applicable at all points of time. According to him, from the very act that the sale deed had been executed even while the dead body was lying at home is sufficient for the proof of undue influence and coercion. Hence, he urges that the findings of the courts below be confirmed and the second appeals be dismissed.
32. I have carefully considered the submissions of both sides. I have gone through the records in detail. I have applied my mind to the facts of the present case.
33. It is not in dispute that Lakshmi, the plaintiff, is the owner of the property. She had three sons and four daughters. The 1st defendant is the wife of her second son, Karthick. The minor defendants 2 & 3 were born to the said Karthick and the 1 st defendant. At the time of filing of the suit, the 2nd defendant was aged about 5 years and the 3rd defendant was a baby, aged about a year. The plaintiff lost her son due to cancer on 08.11.2010. His body was brought to the native village for cremation. On 09.11.2010, her father, uncles and brothers of the 1st defendant and a few third parties came to the house of the plaintiff. It is alleged that they proclaimed that the funeral will not be allowed to proceed unless the plaintiff executes a document. It is the specific plea of the plaintiff that she had not read the document and had signed without knowing its contents. This is the gist of paragraph No.V of the plaint in O.S.No.95 of 2011. On these pleadings, the plaintiff seeks cancellation of the sale deed executed by her.
34. The main plank of the plaintiff is one of undue influence and coercion. The first question that this Court has to answer is whether this plea taken in the plaint can be held sufficient for the purpose of Order VI Rule 4 of Code of Civil Procedure. Let me deal with the issues in seriation.
35. At the outset, I should point out there is no pleading showing a relationship of “dominance” as required under Section 16 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. Section 16(1) requires two parties, one who is in a dominant position and the other, who is the subject matter of the said domination. In addition to this domination, it must be shown that the dominant party used the said position to obtain an unfair advantage over the other.
36. There is no pleading that the daughter-in-law or her father, relatives or third parties dominated the will of the mother-in-law. The father of the daughter-in-law or the “rk;ge;jp” of the plaintiff. Here too, the plaintiff has not shown that the relationship was such that he dominated her will. It is within the common knowledge that in rural areas, it is the parents of the son who dominate the parents of the daughter-in-law and not otherwise. Sine qua non to invoke the plea of coercion is the plea of dominance. As pointed out above, there is no such plea.
37. A perusal of paragraph No.V of the plaint shows that the plea is general in character. The requirements of Order VI Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure demands that full particulars of undue influence should be given in cases like the present one. A vague or general plea would never serve this purpose. The plaintiff should have specifically pleaded the precise nature of dominance and influence exercised, the manner of use of the influence and the unfair advantage obtained by the other. [See, Ladli Prasad Jaiswal Vs. Karnal Distillery Co. Ltd., and others, AIR 1963 SC 1279 and Bishundeo Narain and another Vs. Seogeni Rai and Jagernath, 1951 SCR 548].
38. As to how a Court should deal with a plea of coercion has been analysed by the Privy Council in Raghunath Prasad Sahu Vs. Sarju Prasad Sahu and others, 1923 SCC OnLine PC 62. The appeal came before the Privy Council against the judgment and decree of the Patna High Court which had modified the decree granted by the learned Subordinate Judge at Arrah. It arose under the following circumstances:- 38(i).A suit on a mortgage had been filed before the learned Subordinate Judge. The Subordinate Court decreed the suit with simple interest. It was modified by the High Court, allowing compound interest. Hence, the appeal before the Privy Council. The issue presented before the Privy Council was whether the mortgage transaction was hit by undue influence.
39. The facts leading to this appeal were as follows:- The defendant had borrowed a sum of Rs.9,999/-, at compound interest of 2% per mensem. By the terms of the mortgage, the debt had increased over eleven fold over a period of 11 years. The defendant urged that on account of the personal disputes and prior losses that he had incurred due to criminal proceedings initiated against him, he was suffering from mental distress. It was under those circumstances that he had entered into the loan transaction. Hence, he urged that the transaction was vitiated by undue influence.
40. The Privy Council laid down a step by step procedure by which the application of Section 16 would have to be gone into. It held in the first place, the Court would have to conclude that the relationship between the parties was such that one was in a position of dominating the will of the other. Once that position is substantiated, the Court would have to look at the second stage as to whether the contract had been induced by undue influence. Once so determined and if the transaction appears unconscionable, then the burden of proving that the contract was not induced by undue influence is on the person who is in the dominant position. The Board pointed out that unconscionableness of the bargain should not be the first aspect to be seen. The first angle to be considered is the relationship between the parties.
41. The relationship between the parties here is that of a young widow, who had lost her husband and her mother-in-law, who had lost her son.
42. While considering this aspect, the Court has to consider that the 1st defendant, had lost her husband, when she was hardly 25 years old with two children, who were aged 4 years and less than a year at the time of his death. In such circumstances, her father Chennaian cannot be said to be in a position of dominance over the plaintiff. He would have equally been in grief, though not to the same extent of the plaintiff, on account of the death of his son-in-law.
43. At this juncture, reference should also be made to Section 16(2)(b) of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. Under this Section, a person is deemed to be in a position to dominate the will of the other when the latter’s mental capacity is temporarily or permanently affected on account of age, illness or mental or bodily distress.
44. The fact that the death of her son would have caused mental distress to the plaintiff cannot be disputed. But, is that alone sufficient for the Court to presume undue influence? It does indicate a situation of vulnerability. It does not automatically imply coercion. There should be dominance followed by an unconscionable bargain.
45. For the mere fact that a person is old or a weak character or suffering from mental or bodily distress, there cannot be a presumption of undue influence. (See, Subhas Chandra Das Mushib Vs. Ganga Prosad Das Mushib and others, AIR 1967 SC 878). Distress alone without proof of domination cannot vitiate consent. At this stage, I will usefully refer to the judgment in Raja Ram Vs. Jai Prakash Singh and others, 2019 INSC 1015. It too was a case which related to execution of a registered document by a person aged about 80 years in favour of his daughter-in-law. The sale was challenged by his son, alleging that the sale had been procured by fraud and undue influence, taking advantage of the fact that executant was very old, infirm and dependent on the defendant. The Trial Court had dismissed the suit. The Lower Appellate Court reversed the decree and held that the defendant had not disproved undue influence. On a second appeal to the High Court, the judgment of the Lower Appellate Court was reversed and that of the Trial Court was restored.
46. Aggrieved by the same, a Special Leave Petition was preferred to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court analysed Sections 14 and 16 of the Indian Contract Act and Section 111 of the Indian Evidence Act and held that only “bald statements” about mental infirmity had been made. No medical records had been produced. The Supreme Court stressed that mere old age and familial proximity did not automatically establish domination of will. It also pointed out that the primary ingredients of the law need to be first established by proper pleadings and such pleadings must be supported by evidence. It cautioned the Civil Court on coming to the conclusion on the basis of assumptions or presumptions. Nowhere had the Trial Court or the Lower Appellate Court come to the conclusion that the dominant will that is necessary for invoking Section 16 existed in the present case. Unless and until the necessary factual foundation by way of pleadings are laid out and supported by evidence, the burden never shifts to the defendants. [See, Anil Rishi Vs. Gurbaksh Singh, (2006) 5 SCC 558]. While bereavement is universal, it does not by itself diminish the transactional ability of the plaintiff. There cannot be a presumption of domination on account of sympathetic circumstances alone.
47. Let me now turn to the aspect of evidence that has been let in by the plaintiff. The defendants have shown that the deceased had borrowed loans under Ex.B6 to Ex.B8 for treatment and business purposes. The Trial Court and the Lower Appellate Court commented adversely upon these documents, stating that the pro-notes state that loan had been given to one Karthick @ Vijayan, whereas, the son of the plaintiff was only Karthick. The Trial Court as well as the Lower Appellate Court failed to take note of the admission of PW1, the plaintiff, in her cross-examination. She had deposed as follows:- “,we;J nghd fhu;j;jpf ; vd;fpd;w tp$aDf;F epg;nghkh nfd;ru; Mfk;/ ////////////// vd; kfdpd; tp$ad; vd;W miHg;ghu;fs;” When the plaintiff herself has conceded that her deceased son was known as Vijayan as well as Karthick, the conclusion of the Courts below in ignoring this vital admission vitiates their judgments.
48. The defendants, in order to prove that the loans had been incurred towards treatment and business needs of the deceased Karthick, have produced pro notes under Ex.B6 to Ex.B8. The plaintiff had conceded that she is not aware of the loan transaction of her deceased son. In addition, in total contradiction to her pleading, she conceded in her cross-examination that she had read the sale deed prior to the execution. The admission is extracted as hereunder:-
“goj;J ghu;j;J jhd; ifbaGj;J nghl;nld; vd;why; rupjhd;”
49. She has also conceded that she is educated. There is another fact that had not been considered by the Courts below. If the case as projected by the plaintiff was true, the least that she would have done is lodging a complaint to the police. The station is hardly a couple of kilometres away from her residence. While PW1 stated that she did not lodge any police complaint, her son, whom she examined as PW2, deposed that they did not give police complaint on account of the fact that the insurance amount payable by LIC would be handed over to the plaintiff. This statement demonstrates the case of coercion is a patently false one.
50. The other aspect which this Court would have to see is whether the defendants have obtained an unfair advantage. The circumstances under which the minor defendants had been placed should be looked into by this Court for this purpose. The 3rd defendant was a baby. He was less than a year old on the date of the sale deed. His sister was 4 years old. The entire property of the plaintiff has not been written away in favour of her grandchildren. What has been executed is only 1/4th of the share. It is not as if the entire property of the plaintiff had been conveyed under the deed. Execution of a fractional share in favour of her minor grand children, who had lost their father, cannot be termed as having obtained an unfair advantage.
51. Furthermore, a registered sale deed carries with it a statutory presumption of due execution. Such a registered document cannot be cancelled or set aside casually. This is especially so, when the subsequent conduct is inconsistent with the plea of vitiating circumstances. PW1 and PW2 have conceded that the defendants were residing with them for six months after the execution of the document. There was no protest or any Lawyer’s notice issued for such a long period. Absolute silence was maintained by the plaintiff. Notices were exchanged only when the insurance amount paid by LIC was not given to her. Till that moment, the parties continued to reside together. They shared the same household and maintained normal relationship as is evident from the evidence of PW1 and PW2. Such a conduct is wholly inconsistent with a person who pleads she had been defrauded into parting with a portion of her property. Such a behaviour amounts to acquiescence. PW1 had deposed she was aware that the document she executed was read by her before execution. This shows she was alive to the fact she had sold a portion of her property. Yet, she kept quiet for six months. Issues arose due to an unconnected issue of sharing of LIC payment. Staying with the defendants for six months, after the execution of the deed without a semblance of protest goes against the plaintiff.
52. It is also a strong evidence that no coercion had in fact occurred. A person who had been coerced would have protested soon after the event or at least complained about it at the first available opportunity. In this case, disputes arose only when an unrelated issue of payment of LIC amount cropped up between the family members. The challenge to the sale deed surfaced only after the fall out of the appropriation of the insurance claim by the defendants.
53. This shows that the dispute was not on account of the alleged coercion that has been exercised by the 1st defendant, her father and uncles, but the challenge to the execution of the sale deed had been used as a retaliatory measure as the relationship savoured over an unconnected family quarrel namely, the insurance amount. Therefore, the absence of any immediate police complaint or Lawyer’s notice soon after the execution of the deed and the total silence maintained till disputes arose over the LIC payment supports the plea that is raised by Mr.P.Mani that the suit is an after thought and not a genuine grievance.
54. The fact that the plaintiff had read the document before it was executed not only gives up her case in the plaint, but also shows there is no misleading facts as to the nature of document, the extent of property conveyed or the amount of consideration. This Court is of the view that clearing the debts of the deceased son, as is evidenced by the pro notes, would amount to a valid consideration. Hence, it is not a case of lack to total consideration as held in Kewel Krishan’s case (cited supra).
55. Under Section 16(3) of the Indian Contract Act, the contract must be manifestly disadvantageous to the plaintiff. Discharging the payment towards the debts incurred by her deceased son for his treatment in exchange of a portion of the property, which continues to remain in her family (as it stands in the name of grandchildren), cannot be treated as an unconscionable bargain.
56. The Trial Court as well as the Lower Appellate Court, without rendering a finding on the dominant position or the disadvantage caused or taking note of the absence of pleading on the requirements of Section 16, have proceeded to conclude that sale is invalid purely on the basis that Ex.B6 to Ex.B8 have not been proved. They have failed to consider that the document is a registered sale deed which carries with it a presumption of due execution and cannot be casually interfered with. As the law applicable and relevant evidences have been ignored, the judgments have to be termed as perverse. Hence, this Court is constrained to interfere with the said judgments.
57. Accordingly, the substantial questions of law are answered as follows:- A) Whether the plaintiff’s plea that the sale deed Ex.A3/B1 sale deed dated 09.11.2010 is vitiated on the ground of undue influence, fraud and coercion is maintainable when the plaintiff though had sufficient time did not object to the execution of the said sale deed and the circumstances indicated that the same was executed as a settlement of the debt due by the plaintiff’s son who borrowed money for his medical treatment? As the pleadings are insufficient and since the evidence let in by the plaintiff is contrary to the scanty pleadings taken and as the bargain is not unconscionable, the validity of the sale deed dated 09.11.2010 is upheld. B) Whether the courts below erred in holding that the Ex.A3/B1 sale deed was obtained by fraud and coercion on suspicion and probability, merely because the same was obtained immediately after the death of the plaintiff’s son on the day of funeral, without actual proof for the alleged fraud and coercion by sufficient and convincing oral and documentary evidence? The Courts below have erred in concluding that the sale deed is vitiated by fraud and coercion, especially when they have ignored the vital admissions made by the plaintiff. C) Whether the judgment and decree passed by the Courts below are perverse when they have failed to consider and appreciate the evidence on record in proper perspective and based their conclusions on mere surmises and conjectures? The Courts below have not considered, applied nor the judgment laid down by the Supreme Court with respect to Order VI Rule 4 of Code of Civil Procedure or Section 16 of the Indian Contract Act and Section 111 of the Indian Evidence Act in a correct perspective. Similarly, the Courts below have totally ignored the admissions made by the plaintiff. Hence, this question of law too, is answered in favour of the appellants.
58. In the light of the above discussions, S.A.No.61 of 2018 is allowed. The judgment and decree of the learned Principal District Judge, Krishnagiri, in A.S.No.13 of 2016 dated 01.12.2016 in confirming the judgment and decree of the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Krishnagiri, in O.S.No.95 of 2011 dated 10.12.2015 is set aside. O.S.No.95 of 2011 on the file of the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Krishnagiri, will stand dismissed.
59. The plaintiffs in O.S.No.10 of 2012 on the file of the Principal Sub Court, Krishnagiri, claim a right over the property on the basis of the sale deed dated 09.11.2010 under Ex.B1 (equivalent to Ex.A3). The sale deed had been executed by the plaintiff in O.S.No.95 of 2011, which this Court has upheld as valid. When the plaintiffs are entitled to 1/4th share, the suit for partition presented by them deserves to be decreed. Accordingly, S.A.No.62 of 2018 is allowed. The judgment and decree in A.S.No.14 of 2016 dated 01.12.2016 on the file of the Principal District Court, Krishnagiri, in confirming the judgment and decree dated 10.12.2015 passed in O.S.No.10 of 2012 on the file of the Principal Sub Court, Krishnagiri, is set aside. There shall be a preliminary decree as prayed for. The Trial Court, after waiting for a period of 90 days, shall commence the final decree proceedings without waiting for a separate application from the parties. As the relationship between the deceased plaintiff and Karthick is not in dispute, she would have been entitled to 1/4th share in the LIC payments. Hence, the legal heirs of the deceased plaintiff will be entitled to claim her share of the LIC payment in the final decree proceedings.
60. In the result, both the second appeals are allowed. The judgement and decree dated 01.12.2016 passed in A.S.No.13 of 2016 and A.S.No.14 of 2016 on the file of the Principal District Court, Krishnagiri, in confirming the judgement and decree dated 10.12.2015 passed in OS.No.95 of 2011 and O.S.No.10 of 2012 on the file of the Principal Sub Court Krishnagiri are set aside. Consequently, the connected miscellaneous petitions are closed. Considering the close relationship between the parties, this Court is not inclined to impose costs. 12.10.2026 nl / krk Index : Yes / No Internet : Yes / No Speaking Order / Non speaking order Neutral Citation : Yes / No
V.LAKSHMINARAYANAN, J. nl / krk To
1. The learned Principal District Judge, Principal District Court, Krishnagiri.
2. The learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Principal Sub Court, Krishnagiri.
3. The Section Officer, VR Section, Madras High Court, Chennai. SA Nos. 61 & 62 of 2018 and CMP Nos. 1322 & 1323 of 2018, CMP No. 25383 of 2025 12.10.2026